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SOME APPLICATIONS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

BY
DR. OSKAR PFISTER
Pastor in Zurich, Switzerland

AUTHORISED ENGLISH VERSION



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**DEDICATED
TO
PRESIDENT STANLEY HALL**

PREFACE

IT is the aim of this book to show what Psycho-Analysis is and how it may be applied to various spheres of human activity. Chapters I to V are taken from my work *Zum Kampf um die Psychoanalyse* (*Internationaler psychoanalytischer Verlag*, Vienna, Leipzig and Zürich, 1920); the sources of the others are indicated in footnotes.

It goes without saying that this work does not profess to be an exhaustive encyclopædia of psycho-analytical research. Its object is rather to introduce the reader to a method of investigation which has already begun its triumphant entry into many departments of mental science, and has been recognised by many English-speaking scientists as a highly valuable addition to scientific knowledge. There are indeed not a few competent investigators who anticipate a radical revolution of the whole of our cultural thought as a result of the guidance of a penetrating scrutiny of the subconscious, which has so long been lying in wait, like a menacing Sphinx, on the path of Mankind. Only those who have the courage to look facts in the face, even if they at first appear strange and entirely opposed to older schemes of thought, can understand and learn the uses of psycho-analysis. But I believe that a people who gave the world, in Bacon,

empiricism as a principle of philosophic thought, and built up the inductive method with such perspicacity, will also, with a commendable sense of reality, adopt and develop psycho-analysis.

OSKAR PFISTER.

ZURICH, *Spring*, 1922.

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OTHER WORKS BY DR. OSKAR PFISTER, Zurich

- ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HATRED AND RECONCILIATION (in German: Internat. Psa. Verlag, Leipzig and Vienna, 1910).
- THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DECIPHERING OF RELIGIOUS GLOSSOLALIA AND AUTOMATIC CRYPTOGRAPHY (in German: the same publisher).
- THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC METHOD: Moffat, Yard & Co., New York. (German edition, Klinkhardt, Leipzig, 1913.)
- PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IN THE SERVICE OF EDUCATION: London, Henry Kimpton, 1922. (In German by Klinkhardt, Leipzig, 1917. French edition by Ernest Bircher, Berne, 1921. An Italian version in preparation.)
- A NEW PATH TO THE OLD GOSPEL: ACCOUNTS OF PASTORAL ANALYSES OF NERVOUS, HYPOCHONDRIACAL AND OTHER PEOPLE IN NEED OF PASTORAL CARE (in German: Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, 1918.⁵ French: AU VIEL EVANGILE PAR UN NOUVEAU CHEMIN, Bircher, Berne, 1920).
- TRUTH AND BEAUTY IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (in German: Rascher, Zürich, 1918).
- THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXPRESSIONISM (in German: Bircher, Berne. An English version will appear in 1922, published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., London).
- THE TREATMENT OF DIFFICULT AND ABNORMAL CHILDREN (in German: Bircher, Berne, 1922).
- THE LOVE OF CHILDREN AND ITS WRONG DEVELOPMENT (in German: Bircher, Berne and Leipzig, 1922).

INTRODUCTION

It is not without some show of reason that the adherents of orthodox psychology, with few exceptions, have publicly kept silence and assumed an expectant attitude towards psycho-analysis ; for there is scarcely a scientific domain in which there has been more dilettantism, or one which has boasted of more "discoveries," all of which have long since been lost in mist. We cannot expect any science worthy of the name to occupy itself with what, after all, may prove to be merely ephemeral. On the other hand, any science that is conscious of its own value can afford to wait calmly until the time comes when it is able to demonstrate its efficiency and its right to existence.

The question now arises, however, whether orthodox psychology can any longer be contented with the part of a passive spectator, or whether it must take up a definite attitude toward psycho-analysis. A quarter of a century has elapsed since Sigmund Freud, neurologist at the University of Vienna, discovered the sources of the psycho-analytic method and made them tributary to science. Two and a half decades are but a short span of time. Those who are acquainted with the history of science are only too well aware of the fact that far-reaching innovations must always go through a long period of incubation before they are capable of affecting

the contemporary mind. But in the short lapse of time during which psycho-analysis has been before the world, and particularly of recent years, it has gained the suffrages of so many psychologists of repute, and eminent *savants* of other faculties, that the expectant stage appears to have been passed with extraordinary rapidity. It has actually happened that, in addition to young scientists (among whom there are several psychologists of high standing), even determined *opponents* from the camp of psychology have felt impelled to ascribe high merits to psycho-analysis for its additions to our knowledge of the phenomena, impulses and laws of psychic life. And they are by no means mere youthful enthusiasts in search of novelty who have broken a lance for psycho-analysis. Among the supporters of the methods of investigation initiated by Freud we find the names of older and more circumspect investigators who have acquired a well-merited reputation in the realm of orthodox psychology. I mention but a few of those workers who have given their support to psycho-analysis in recent years.

Among psychologists I may mention Stanley Hall, the well-known student of youth and religion ; Theodore Flournoy and Edouard Claparède (Geneva), and the lamented Ernst Dürr (Berne). Among pedagogues we find Paul Häberlin, Dürr's successor ; Pierre Bovet (Geneva) and Ernst Schneider ; among psychiatrists Bleuler (Zürich), von Speyr (Berne), Jones (London), Hoch, Brill and Adolf Meyer (New York), White (Washington), Jellgersma (Leyden), Bouman (Amsterdam), Delgado (Lima), and Dupré (Paris). Among neurologists we have the names of Putnam (since deceased, of Boston) ; among medical men treating internal com-

plaints that of Morichau (Poitiers). Ten years ago only one name, that of Bleuler, could have been quoted. How rapidly times have changed !

Together with the convinced supporters of psycho-analysis, we find several *savants* who more or less cautiously agree with certain of the basic ideas and main results of psycho-analysis, thus building a bridge between this science and psychology proper.

Among German psychologists Else Voigtländer was the first who ventured to enter the lists on behalf of the much maligned movement. In the collection of *Munich Philosophical Treatises* in honour of Theodor Lipps she says : " The attentive and unprejudiced perusal of Freud's writings, especially those on the interpretation of dreams, his studies in hysteria, and on the psychopathology of everyday life, provides a plenitude of stimulation and observation which lie quite beyond the sexual domain, and are of paramount importance, not only in the psychology of the abnormal, but especially in that of the normal psychic life. Freud has discovered a number of psychic experiences, the preliminaries of repression and regression, but particularly the succession and confusion of the strata of consciousness, the background and foreground of psychic life " (p. 294). Aloys Fischer confesses : " Our mental life is . . . distinguished by endeavours to secure the recognition and culture of the soul. I am by no means thinking in the first instance of scientific psychology—for this is not uniform and frequently takes no cognizance of the deeper soul-life . . . I, for my part, willingly confess that psycho-analysis has guided the mind of the investigator into wide and important domains of the soul-life, revealing facts and

relations of the highest importance to psychic development ; it is therefore unjustifiable to belittle its merit of having enriched and refined the technique of psychological investigation. Both the facts which it conveys and its methods of application will exercise an influence on actual practice. It is no longer possible to refuse to have anything to do with it, and the popular disparagement of psycho-analysis on the ground that it does not treat of serious scientific endeavour and important problems falls, from too dogmatic a bias toward individual hypotheses and methods, into the opposite error of the uncritical supporters of a new and striking method of observation." (*Deutsche Schule*, xix., p. 429.)

Of the opponents of psycho-analysis I shall mention only one particularly competent psychologist : William Stern. It is a remarkable fact that this investigator, who had entered on a passionate campaign against psycho-analysis, should feel himself impelled to confess : " Science owes to it (the basic idea of psycho-analysis) much that is valuable. Freud's doctrines of repression, of abreaction, of the displacement of the 'affects,' and his demonstration of the peculiarly active part played by subconscious currents (and these not merely removed from the conscious sphere, but in direct contrast to it) : all this may be placed to the credit of science. Much else that it contains is worthy at least of serious discussion." Such testimony from the lips of an opponent not only does honour to Stern's sense of justice, but also to psycho-analysis itself. For Freud's discoveries " placed to the credit of science " may be considered to exceed in importance anything that psychology has produced for decades ; they are of far-reaching consequence for every

psychologist who agrees with Stern's testimony, and perceives, in the opening up of new domains of psychology, an invaluable enrichment of minor experimental work. Whoever accepts these great facts of psycho-analysis must indeed be a lethargic soul if he is not seized with the desire to be one of the conquerors of this new territory which holds out such prospects of wealth. And if the methods which, according to Stern's admission, have been crowned with such success, exhibit faults or defects, should not this encourage investigators to eliminate them, in order to emerge still more victoriously as serious contributors to psychological science?

Seeing, then, that there are recognized professional psychologists in the camp of psycho-analysis, who, together with their opponents, are agreed that Freud's researches are of paramount importance to scientific psychology, it might well be expected that the representatives of the latter science would turn their attention to the investigation of psycho-analytical work, and place at its disposal the advantages which they claim for their methodical schooling and scientific experience. For it is obvious from the outset that the mere study of books or the immanent criticism of psycho-analytical literature, such as the works of Kronfeld and Mittenzwey, does not solve the problem. Both of these critics believed themselves justified in dispensing with ocular psychological demonstration. Whoever desires to grasp the principles which guide the psycho-analyst must not be satisfied with the latter's notions and hypotheses; he must enter into his experiments and look for others in conformity with these. He must enter the analyst's fields of observation and experiment, and show where false interpretations

and conclusions have been arrived at, or incorrect inferences have been drawn from experiments.

Strange to say, professional psychological circles still fight shy of taking up these experimental studies. In my first chapter, which is intended to demonstrate the right of psycho-analysis to belong to the domain of psychology, I shall endeavour to explain this surprising fact.

SOME APPLICATIONS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

I

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AS A PSYCHO- LOGICAL METHOD

I. APOLOGETICS

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS may be defined as a method with a scientific basis established by Freud, which, by gathering and interpreting associated ideas without calling in the aid of strong suggestion or of hypnotism, aims at investigating and influencing the impulses and contents lying beneath the threshold of consciousness.¹

In this definition there is no doubt much that is calculated to repel the psychologist: to this must likewise be added the fact that the whole method of investigation owes its origin to medical effort and not to the work of professional psychologists. Those who have gone through the rigorous school of academic psychology, and have assimilated the principal work of contemporary science in this domain, find themselves transported into an entirely new world when they turn the pages of psycho-analytic literature. They are, in particular, disagreeably impressed by the fact that morbid phenomena are frequently dealt with, whereas psychology has up to now (and rightly) dealt with healthy minds only. Yet we must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological study of child-life which nowadays occupies such a prominent place in orthodox psychology was first intro-

¹ Cf. *The Psycho-analytic Method*.

duced by medical men.¹ Other psychologists, too, such as Lotze, Wundt, Störing and many more, came over from the ranks of medicine, and owed not a little to their pathological observations. Why should not the psychology of normal beings eventually owe as much to morbid psychology as the physiology of health owes to pathology? Moreover, psycho-analysis has long since proceeded to the observation of normal soul-life, and from this point, through its comprehension of psychopathy, has given at least as much as it has received. The fact that certain processes are more prominently displayed, and are consequently more striking, in the sick than in the healthy, has greatly facilitated psycho-analytical observation and elucidation. It was owing to this circumstance that a perspicacious medical man became the pioneer of psycho-analysis. But if need be, psycho-analysis can be confined to the study of "normal" beings.

Of much greater importance is another obstacle which I shall now discuss more closely.

A. The empirical character of Psycho-Analysis

(a) *Experiment in orthodox psychology and in psycho-analysis*

Psychology as practised to-day is in the main experimental, though it must be remarked (as Th. Lipps² explains) "that the word experiment is conceived in a narrower sense than the ordinary. Psychology cannot, indeed, dispense with experimental methods."³ "The claim of experimental psychology to become general psychology is perfectly justified."⁴ "Experiments and measurements are the main features of modern psychology."⁵ "It is only by means of experiment that psychology can obtain accurate and reliable evidence, and experiment alone has guided this science into the right paths, even if we

¹ Tiedmann, Sigismund, Kussmaul, Preyer; cf. STERN, *Psychology of Early Childhood*, p. 4.

² TH. LIPPS, *Psychology, Wissen u. Leben*, p. 4.

³ WUNDT, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 26.

⁴ KÜLPE, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 12.

⁵ EBBINGHAUS-DÜRR, *Outlines of Psychology*, i. pp. 66-97.

are still hesitating at the entrance to these paths."¹ "It is true that experiment must be preceded by the determination of events taking place in the consciousness, but this apparently simple task is one of the most stupendous that can be imposed upon the human mind."² Hence another method must be called in to help, namely, the experimental, by which is understood chiefly that carried out by means of physical apparatus³ and controlled by the repetition and variation of the conditions under which the experiment takes place.⁴ "It must, however, be confessed that in this fashion the experimental method can merely serve for the simpler sort of psychic processes. But there is a second method, viz., the observation of generic mental processes. We must, however, not lose sight of the fact that this deals with comparatively fixed objects of popular psychology, which cannot be altered by observation, i.e. language, mythological ideas, customs, etc."⁵

It will thus be seen at the first glance that psychology is compelled to abandon a number of objects of investigation. *It is precisely the most important psychic phenomena which are eliminated from the domain of scientific psychology; not only for the present generation, but also, for the greater part, for all time.* Experiments are for the time being confined to elementary processes, and it is hardly probable that the totality of conditions can be grasped with such firmness as to bring to light the more complicated processes, such as religious experience, artistic intuition, passionate love, and the like. Popular psychology is confined to the impersonal results of psychic activity, and is absolutely helpless in the face of actual concrete creation and the genesis of the mind. *Hence psychology, which ought to investigate the totality of psychic life, has banished from the sphere of its activity many departments which are of value, and even necessary, to life. Which science is to explore these rejected countries of the soul?*

¹ WITASEK, *Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 94 et seq.

² TH. LIPPS, *The Paths of Psychology*, p. 1.

³ TH. LIPPS, "Psychology," *Wissen u. Leben*, p. 4.

⁴ ACH, *On Volition and Thought*, p. 20.

⁵ WUNDT, *Principles*, pp. 27 et seq.

It is touching to think that a man of the calibre of Th. Lipps¹ should seek to base the cultivation of the sense of justice, religious need and moral culture on psychology, which he defines as the scientific knowledge (in the highest sense) of ourselves. But orthodox psychology has no room for such endeavours, and resignedly admits that precisely those spiritual products which are of the greatest value in respect of the cultural needs of life lie outside the sphere of its investigations. And when Aloys Fischer,² following the example of the Americans, is eager to consult psychology on the choice of a profession, he forgets that *hitherto* scientific psychology has done next to nothing for the individual.

Many, indeed, have complained of the sterility of modern psychology, and many who have resorted to it in order to gain knowledge of value as an aid to the comprehension of psychic life have turned away in bitter disappointment. Yet a certain greatness may be discerned in the self-imposed limitations and concessions of contemporary psychical study. For it was not in the first instance the circumstance that it allowed itself to be taken in tow by the flourishing and all-powerful natural sciences which governed its experiments (although the founders of experimental psychology had all passed through the school of natural science, and applied its methods with very little discrimination), but rather a perfectly justifiable endeavour, viz. the demand for absolutely trustworthy results, the desire for clear and precise methods and the elimination of subjective caprice. The important problems are laid on one side in order that exact science may be benefited by modest and laborious research of minor importance in a more restricted sphere. Only an absolute lack of the scientific sense could withhold its respect from such a renunciation.

I shall discuss later on whether the self-imposed limitations and highly-developed specialism of academic psychology can really be maintained. For the moment it may suffice to point out that the distaste of orthodox

¹ "Psychology," *Wissen u. Leben*, pp. 16-21.

² *Kunstwart*, 1913, pp. 305-313.

psychology for psycho-analysis arises from the fear that the latter may drive away investigation from the precise paths which have at length been marked out for it, replacing the thought-compelling, strictly objective exploration of given material by arbitrary interpretations, thus destroying the severely scientific aspect of psychology.

At the first glance it might seem that these earnestly intended objections were perfectly justified, and it may be admitted without further parley that arbitrary and subjectively formed assertions and provisional hypotheses have indeed occasionally been put forward as scientific doctrines. But there is no science that has not swarmed with errors in its initial stages. As a matter of fairness, however, criticism should not be confined merely to the sins of youth; the question should rather be asked whether good and valuable results have been obtained, and whether error is not to be attributed to the abuse rather than to the use of the new methods.

Psycho-analysis had its rise in observation. The observer, Dr. J. Breuer, did not, however, play a merely passive part; he simply abstained from attempting to obtain any information concerning the facts of consciousness by systematically influencing the subject of his experiment and also by eliminating disturbing elements. Taking individually striking morbid symptoms as his point of departure, he was led by the patient herself to former events, which at once, to a great extent, solved the riddle of the symptoms, even though the finer connections remained imperceptible.¹ The patient, in a state of unconsciousness (absence) murmured certain words. When she had returned to consciousness she was hypnotised by the physician, who then spoke these words to her, whereupon the connecting links and the whole involved situation at once became clear. An attempt was thus made, in the manner of an examining magistrate, and without free associations, to discover the circumstances under which the symptoms first appeared.² It was only after far-reaching conclusions had been drawn concerning

¹ BREUER and FREUD, *Studies in Hysteria*, 3rd ed. 1916.

² FREUD, *Psycho-analysis*, p. 6.

the source of the symptoms, the determination of creative subconscious forces, the fate of the "affects," etc., that various difficulties led Freud to look for a new method of procedure which should replace hypnotism by the observation of symptoms and the associations connected therewith.

If we ask whether, by so doing, Freud was converted to experimental methods, the reply will depend on what we understand by experiment. If we accept Wundt's definition that "an experiment consists in an observation which is connected with the arbitrary influence of the observer on the origin and course of the phenomena under observation,"¹ then *all psycho-analysis is experimental psychology*. It is an experiment if I raise a stone to a certain height and then drop it in order to gauge the increase in the velocity of the fall. But it is no less an experiment if I keep a sharp eye on a dream-fragment, and observe the associations connected with it, so as to gather information as to how far this dream-fragment is a part of the psychic life.

Claims, however, are made on the experimenter which psycho-analysis does not fulfil. The investigator must have in hand all the conditions that may be decisive as regards the result of the experiment. For this purpose he must be able to isolate the subject, to ward off disturbing influences, and to vary the conditions. The psycho-analyst has no record of all the existing conditions and possibilities. He cannot tell what predisposition there may be to reminiscence, or what deviations may occur toward this or that part of the environment, or what by-paths may be followed. But is this not also frequently the case in recognised psychological experiments?

The physicist or chemist can repeat his experiments as often as he likes, but the experimental psychologist cannot always do so. He cannot guarantee that the verbal stimulus will always bring about the same reaction. He must have recourse to statistics so as to be able to reduce the intervention of disturbing influences to a minimum of probability. Yet the fact remains that

¹ WUNDT, *Principles*, p. 22.

“ in the domain of psychic life it is far less possible than in natural science to reproduce the necessary equilibrium of the conditions needful for exact investigation. Consequently we are compelled greatly to increase the number of individual experiments.”¹

The usual method of procedure of the psycho-analyst differs from the reaction experiments of Ach, Koffka and others by dispensing with mechanical measuring apparatus, and also by the fact that no definite instructions are given with regard to the direction of the reactions, apart from the demand for unreserved communication of the image which occurs first. This certainly allows for a great deal of free scope, and it is comprehensible that the unpractised should shake their heads and ask what use there can possibly be in such haphazard reactions. The analyst or the person under analysis would appear to be like a rifleman shooting aimlessly in all directions and consequently hitting nothing. The comparison would be a just one were it not for a factor which constitutes one of the most important and at the same time one of the most hotly contested opinions—and therefore hypotheses—of psycho-analysis. *The farther the psychic sequence is removed from the guidance of the conscious, the more dependent does it become on subconscious psychic activities.*

This is the awful heterodoxy which, I am afraid, will deter a certain number of readers from any further perusal of these pages. I shall attempt later on to demonstrate the truth of this dubious assertion; for the time being let me point to a promising fact. That which psycho-analysis discovered in its free reaction work is nothing else than that which had been discovered by stricter experiment. Narziss Ach, in his reaction experiments, which—as regards both the simplest and the most complex—were carefully developed in an exemplary manner, was forced to accept the hypothesis of determining tendencies, which he explains, with unequivocal directness, thus: “ These mental activities, working in the subconscious, and proceeding from the significance of

¹ Ach, p. 16.

the goal-idea, directed to the approaching idea of reference, and causing a spontaneous appearance of the determining idea, we call determining tendencies."¹ This promising commencement of a psychology of the subconscious, from the pen of an experimental psychologist (in the narrow sense of the word) admits precisely what psycho-analysis had always maintained. Similar conclusions were drawn by another follower of Külpe's, K. Koffka.²

Only in a somewhat catholic sense may experiment be claimed as the basis of Freud's psycho-analysis. On the other hand, psycho-analytical experiments which were more in accordance with orthodox psychology furnished valuable confirmation of these free reaction experiments. In the first place we may mention those of C. G. Jung of Zürich, who was inspired and encouraged by Kraepelin, Ziehen and Aschaffenburg; and then the discoveries of Binet, Janet, Flournoy and Freud, which made reaction experiments available to the psycho-analyst.

Jung, in his experiments, had special aims in view, and looked for general laws. He devoted a series of experiments to the determination of the time of reaction, and found that it depended on several factors belonging to the conscious: e.g., the quality of the verbal stimulus (abstract or concrete), the association (internal or external), the reaction-word, or the emotional (affective) stress of the associated links, etc. Thereby he discovered, like everybody who has paid any attention to these relations, *subconscious* images, which, by reason of their emotional values, exercised a perceptible influence on the time as well as the contents of the reaction. He investigated disturbances of reaction in a similar manner, and found their cause again to be those psychic realities which Ach and Koffka had introduced into orthodox psychology as determining tendencies.³ Can it be denied that these were experiments in the strictest sense? Further, Ludwig Binswanger investigated the galvanic phenomena which

¹ Ach, p. 228.

² *The Analysis of Images and their Laws*, pp. 319 *et seq.*

³ Cf. JUNG, *Diagnostic Association Studies*, vols. i. and ii., 4th and 9th contributions.

occurred during psychological experiments (11th contribution), and Nunberg further investigated the movements of the hands and the respiration during reaction experiments, with a view to discovering how far they were dependent on the hidden psychic forces already mentioned.

Silberer, stimulated by an observation, carried out other experiments. Pondering, in a drowsy state, over a scientific subject, he suddenly had a dream-phantasy which, so to speak, reproduced his efforts in pantomime.¹ He succeeded in collecting a number of phantasies, which symbolically anticipated an idea then being sought, or expressed an existing effort. We may remind our readers of the fact, too often lost sight of by psychologists, that even great scientific discoveries have been made in a similar way.

Kekulé von Stradowitz relates how, when on the knifeboard of an omnibus, he saw atoms in the shape of little figures whirling in a dance in couples, threes and fours. He put down these dream-pictures on paper, and his structural theory was evolved. At another time he was sitting half-asleep by the fire when he again suddenly perceived atoms whirling before his eyes, but in a very singular fashion. He says: "My mind's eye, sharpened by repeated visions of a similar kind, was now able to differentiate larger figures of various shapes: long rows, often closely connected, all moving and twisting and turning like serpents. And lo! what happened? One of the serpents caught hold of its own tail, and the figure whirled mockingly before my eyes. I woke up suddenly, and this time, too, I spent the rest of the night in working out the consequences of, this hypothesis." This was nothing less than the discovery of the "benzol ring."²

Finally, I may refer to Schrötter's "experimental dreams," which are capable of careful development.

¹ SILBERER, "Report of a Method of Producing and Observing certain Symbolical Hallucinations," *Lehrb. f. psa. u. psychopath. Forschungen*, i. 2, H., pp. 513-525.

² Cf. ROBITSEK, "Symbolical Thinking in Chemical Research," *Imago*, ii. pp. 83-90.

The experimenter ordered people in a hypnotic state, who knew nothing of the psychology of dreams, to dream of certain objects, and they at once did so. If unpleasant subjects were given these were not represented nakedly in the dream, but by a transparent symbolical camouflage. The symbols selected were such as had long since been interpreted in a similar sense by psycho-analysis. This confirmation of the psycho-analytic theory is all the more striking, as Schrötter himself had no knowledge of psycho-analysis and was by no means a follower of Freud.¹

Finally, the psychiatrist Otto Pötzl discovered an interesting experimental confirmation of Freud's doctrines. He exposed pictures tachyscopically, or employed impressions of indirect vision, obtaining written records of these immediately, and, later, on the same and on following days. The experimenter found Freud's dream theory confirmed by these.

If we compare the experiments—still in their initial stages—of psycho-analysis with those of the recognised experimental psychologists, we shall see that there is no fundamental or essential difference between the two kinds. The most disagreeable factor, from the psycho-analyst's point of view, namely, the lack of any *complete* isolation or the *absolute* visibility of the events, with all their determinants, to be observed and embraced, is one that is common both to psycho-analysis and to psychology proper. By hypnotic experiments, it is true, a fairly complete isolation may be obtained. Psycho-analysis, moreover, takes into consideration factors of high value which determine the course of the experiment, and which the pure psychology of the conscious leaves out of count : namely, those dwelling in the subconsciousness. In the frequent experiments with so-called meaningless syllables orthodox experimental psychology emphasises the obvious lack of meaning without considering that by means of association a meaning can at once be read into these syllables which would otherwise remain unknown. In psycho-galvanic experiments, in the investiga-

¹ *Vide* my demonstration in Pt. II, examples *e* and *f*.

tion of words and sentences in certain mentally affected persons ("salads" of letters and syllables) which are apparently meaningless and yet are spoken with the utmost fervour, and in other investigations, it may, I think, be proved with certainty that these apparently meaningless words, etc., may have an extremely important significance for the subconscious. In many respects the psycho-analytical experiment is superior to the usual psychological experiment in its careful consideration of contributory factors. With regard to isolation it is usually inferior. In spite of this, however, if we consider that written answers to questions put to classes in school are regarded as "experiments," as, for instance, in the interesting investigations of Hermann Roth (attested by Külpe) as to the moral judgment of children, it would be an injustice to deny psycho-analysis the character of an experimental psychological method.

Counterbalancing the above-mentioned disadvantage of the imperfect reproductive work of the psycho-analytical experiment—a disadvantage which it shares with many experiments of ordinary psychology—psycho-analysis possesses considerable *advantages* which are all the greater the more we abandon the artificial limitation of an already restricted procedure. And this is well-known to be the case in the whole practice of psycho-analysis, seeing that its experiments, in the stricter sense, are intended to serve specific theoretical purposes.

I shall here indicate three points in which the psycho-analytical experiment, which constitutes the greater part of the analytic technique, may boast of producing something that orthodox psychology is not and never will be able to produce.

1. The latter, in accordance with the methods which it has almost exclusively marked out for itself, investigates only such phenomena as may be arbitrarily produced, whereas psycho-analysis deals also with given psychic or psychically induced facts. I have already pointed out that many of the most important mental processes, and indeed vast regions of the soul-life, are withdrawn from the sphere of experimental psychology. The highest

creations of genius cannot be called up to order. Stern says rightly: "Spontaneous conduct has the advantage of revealing to us the character of the child much more clearly than do reactions, for the child behaves naturally and is not under the constraint of a momentary command; consequently it often reveals quite surprising aspects of its being which we could never have perceived by the aid of deliberately planned and experimental methods of investigation, and which, indeed, are not accessible to such."¹

The psycho-analytical experiment may devote itself to the highest mental achievements and attempt to make them psychologically comprehensible.

2. Experimental psychology in the narrower sense seeks, with the aid of mathematical methods, for generic laws, and takes no interest in the individual. It looks for natural and scientific notions, in accordance with Rickert's determinations. Psycho-analytic investigations, on the other hand, have, in addition, a comprehension of the historical; hitherto, indeed, they have looked for laws as an aid to the understanding of the genesis of individual processes, and so far they have not been transformed into pure psychology.²

3. Traditional experimental psychology places its objects in artificial isolation; the psycho-analyst investigates them with regard to the totality of their relation to life. In this respect, too, we refer to Goethe, who said: "We believe that we are most capable of acquiring

¹ STERN, *Psychology of Infancy*, p. 12.

² The change inaugurated by Freud reminds one of Goethe's introduction of the historical conception into natural science. Is there any natural scientist to-day who would deny that this caused an exceedingly fruitful revolution as to the nature of his subjects? Another saying of the great poet likewise merits the attention of the modern psychologist. He says: "At an early date I was obliged to arrogate to myself, on taking counsel with my natural tendencies and circumstances, the right to observe, investigate and grasp Nature in her simplest, most secret origins, as well as in her revealed and most striking creations, without the aid of mathematics" (Goethe, Works, Leipzig and Wien, Bibliogr. Institut, vol. xxx. p. 391). For this reason Goethe was falsely accused of being an enemy of mathematics, just as nowadays psycho-analysts are wrongly described as the enemies of systematic experiment in the domain of psychology. Goethe applied his methods to psychology itself, and it is no wonder that this far-seeing judge of the soul should have anticipated so many of Freud's most significant ideas.

a knowledge of natural objects by segregating their parts. This may indeed lead us far, but it possesses certain disadvantages. What is living is certainly divided into elements, but it cannot be put together again and restored by these elements."¹ It is significant that the psychologist who approaches nearest to historical and individual psychology should make allowances in his *Principles of Convergence* for the fact that had been emphasised from the outset by psycho-analysis. "All segregations within the personality," says Stern "are merely relative, mere abstractions (which indeed are required for certain purposes of consideration and treatment); all partial developments of individual functions are always borne by the total development of personality."² This judgment is as old as the hills, but how often has it been disregarded!

Hence psycho-analysis is an empirical psychology which aims at filling up the huge gaps left by orthodox psychology between the elementary experimental psychology and the highly spiritual psychology of nations, which, however, is diverted from the creative personality, and consequently, in this sense, is abstract.

It alone, for instance, gives rise to religious psychology, whereas Wundt gets no farther than the psychology of the myth. It alone begets a psychology of artistic and poetical creation, to say nothing of many other provinces, which are of extreme importance to life and in urgent need of scientific elucidation. It is thus *the psychology of the higher mental processes*, and, if Wundt is right, the only one that has dared to attack these enigmas.

Further, it is an empirical psychology which undertakes to fathom scientifically what is individual and particular in psychic events. Hence it is the first scientific psychology of the individual, and, according to Rickert's ideas, the *historical psychology* of the individual subject and (where sufficient experience exists) of the "herd." It must therefore likewise look for the laws, and carry on the practice of the "natural scientific" psychology.

And finally (in happy agreement with Stern's differential

¹ GOETHE, *Works*, 29, p. 43.

² STERN, p. 20.

psychology) *it is an investigation of the soul (psyche) which endeavours to do justice to the individual development within the subject in its relations to the whole psychic organism (organic psychology).*

There is in principle no opposition between the fact that the predominating experiment advances toward a phenomena which are resultants of the conditions imposed, and thus proceeds synthetically, and the fact that the psycho-analytic experiment seeks the cause of the resultant phenomena. The usual psycho-physical experiment might often be reversed, causing effects from which inferences as to causes might be drawn, just as, on the other hand, a start is made from commanded dreams and hypnagogical phantasies, or when, on apperception of an automatically written cipher, a further formation of the subconscious thought lying in it is obtained instead of a preliminary motive.¹

Hence psycho-analysis does not stand in contradiction to the psychology of the schools; it may utilise the latter's methods (e.g. the inner apperception, reminiscence, lingual segregation, etc.), with one or two modifications suited to the particular object in view, and must conscientiously test and adopt its results. But, as I shall endeavour to explain in the next section, the psychology of the schools will no longer be able to dispense with psycho-analysis without impoverishment and partial deterioration.

(b) The rôle of Interpretation in Psycho-Analysis

Among the commonest and bitterest reproaches levelled against the methods here discussed, is one to the effect that they are guilty of inadmissible and arbitrary tricks of interpretation and therefore do not merit the epithet of "scientific."

It may be unreservedly admitted that this judgment might actually be applied to certain manifestations of psycho-analytic literature. Stekel withdrew his *Interpretations*, which had shocked people's feelings. But

¹ Cf. my essay on "The Psychological Deciphering of Religious Glossolalia and Automatic Cryptography," p. 103

mistakes of this kind should not be put down to the account of the method itself and all its representatives, as—incredible as it may seem—has often been the case.

Orthodox psychology is quite as dependent on interpretations as is psycho-analysis. Stern says rightly: "Psychic life is existent only in and to the individual. . . . We must interpret the soul-life of others by what they exhibit outwardly—expressions, tones of voice, reactions and actions, etc. The greater the difference between what we observe and ourselves, the more difficult is it to interpret correctly, seeing that our interpretation must be based upon the analogies of our own experience."¹

The interpretation of our *own* soul-life often presents great difficulties, and in any case cannot be obtained in such a manner that another person may not raise objections to it. The deeper motives, indeed, often remain more effectively hidden from our own perceptions than from those of an observant spectator. That is why psychology, which is partly dependent on problems of self-knowledge, is often so extremely unsatisfactory.

And if self-judgment is for the most part unscientific, the interpretations of other persons are still more so. They pre-suppose sympathetic insight.² We all know how easy it is to be mistaken if one imputes to others the motives for an action which one would pre-suppose in oneself in respect of a similar action. A correct sympathetic insight (*Einfühlung*) would have to invest you with the special characteristics of another without falsifying them by contributions from your own divergent personality. These, too, are not attainable by strictly scientific investigation. There is, indeed, no strictly scientific knowledge of Man. The expression "sympathetic insight" (*Einfühlung*) itself is a reminder that a purely theoretical recognition, a scientifically safe grasp of other soul-life, does not exist, inasmuch as one is forced to rely upon this psychological auxiliary.

This implies, does it not? that there can be no scientific interpretation, and that psycho-analysis, which must rely on this, can never attain to the dignity of a

¹ STERN, p. 7.

² TH. LIPPE, *Paths of Psychology*, p. 16.

science. If this were true, there could be no scientific psychology, no history or philology, no researches into fairy-tales and myths, seeing that these, as we know, pre-suppose interpretations. I shall not attempt to deny that the interpretations of the higher psychic processes and the sympathetic insight into them displayed by artists and poets are frequently more correct and more sensitively inferred than those of the scholars or philosophers who obtain their conclusions by strictly logical chains of reasoning. In the psychology of child-life many a mother or governess is better able to understand the expression of the youthful mentality than the majority of experimental psychologists. But this does not imply that the material thus gained is useless as a basis for scientific work. The main thing is that the interpretations, which are indispensable, should be able to lay claim to *perfect credibility and reliability*. Science works daily on hypotheses that have not been proved (in respect of atoms, the ether, molecules, etc.). How much more may interpretations which have been found conclusive in practical life, and have distinguished themselves by a maximum of reliability, be employed as a starting-point for scientific research! Külpe and other experimental psychologists are consequently right in not perceiving any absolute obstacle to psychological knowledge in the necessity of interpretations.¹

Great precautionary measures are of course necessary. STERN gives the following excellent instructions for studying child psychology:

"1. At each interpretation differentiate strictly between the actually perceived external fact and the interpretation attached to it. 2. The interpretation must be as 'childish' as possible. 3. No general psychological assertions, interpretations or explanations should be made for which no actual observation can be given as a sufficient voucher."

I believe, however, that a careful technique would have to set up a number of prescriptions besides these self-evident ones.

¹ KÜLPE, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 5.

With regard to Stern's first principle it may be remarked that Freud acted on it from the outset. He started from facts which had preceded each analysis. Those who deny this have not read his works with proper care. A causal interpretation, a pertinent interpretation must indeed come first before a fact can be known and recognised out of a complex of successive perceptions. One judge might regard as an established fact what another takes to be a supposition only.

In any case psycho-analysis should be no less careful in its interpretations than orthodox psychology. The latter must suffer the reproach of not having investigated the facts on which psycho-analysis is based, and not having made any suggestion as to how simpler and better interpretations could be obtained.

This is especially true of the interpretation of typical symbols, in which a great deal of valuable material for careful workers has been found. That there are in fact large numbers of established symbols which have arisen independently of each other has been so certainly demonstrated by philology, the history of art, and mythological research, that only ignorance can deny the fact. And every observer of mankind must see that these symbols occur very frequently in individual life. In the history of civilisation, as in that of individuals, it has been observed that the same symbols may express very different meanings, so that it would be venturesome to make a lexicon in which every symbol would be represented by a distinct notion. Freud laid stress on the fact that typical symbols may occur in an untypical (atypical) form. Hence we can speak only of the probable value of the translation of the symbol into a notionally expressed content. I must confess, however, that my use of either my own or others' interpretations of symbols has sometimes profited me as though I had, in an algebraic equation, replaced x by an unknown quantity found by another person, and this had turned out to be correct. The main thing is always to ensure a personal verification, avoiding the error of regarding individual interpretations of typical symbols as the regular and conclusive ones.

(c) The Collection of Associations

The interpretation is looked for in observed facts, but also—and this is one of the peculiarities of the psycho-analytical method—in associations, which occur to the producer of the phenomena under analysis, if he looks at this or that part closely, but without criticism. The intention is to ascertain the conditions under which these phenomena have originated. But it may be asked whether this collection of associations is not, after all, purposeless. Who can guarantee that in this way the psychic fabric will be loosened, and the threads of which it is composed gathered together, or that the weaver who sits at the loom can be discovered? No one, indeed. But the reproach levelled against psycho-analysis is based on an error. We do not by any means believe that *every* association with the apperceived conscious facts or other phenomena with which the analyst has to deal show the paths by which the image under investigation was produced. Sometimes the analysed person jumps to some surrounding object which has no perceptible relation to the fixed object or the problem; but then this transference is a sign of existing resistances. This is distinctly seen in association experiments, for if in such cases we come across a second or a third reaction, an image is evoked later on that clearly enough betrays its origin in a painful subconscious determinant. Sometimes images arise which are but loosely connected with the fact that is being looked for.

It must not be expected that every manifestation can at once be safely determined with the aid of the collected associations, but it is generally possible to discover at least some of the leading determinants. A single association may, under certain circumstances, provide an immediate explanation of complicated situations, as I shall demonstrate later on. In other cases many by-ways must be followed in order to get at the causes of a symptom. What has to be done is to overcome the resistance offered to any attempt to bring the subconscious causes of symptoms to the level of the consciousness.

The main thing, of course, is to find the psychic motives with absolute certainty. Whether the laws of association alone will provide the explanation that the causal connection is to be discovered in the associations gathered by psycho-analysis, or whether special determining tendencies collaborate, as is already anticipated, is a problem in itself.

We owe to an experimental psychologist, to whom my attention was called by Dr. Max Nachmansohn, a considerable extension of our knowledge of the psychological presuppositions which occur in the association method, discovered by Freud in a purely empirical manner. In his important researches as to the sequence of ideas, Poppelreuter demonstrated that reproduction does not go successively from part to part on the principle of close contiguity, but from the part immediately to the whole; i.e. to that total idea which contains this newly revived part, viz. the reproduction motive.¹ "In contradistinction to the chain scheme, the course of the reproductive process must be defined as *the explanation of the parts contained in a total idea; i.e. the reproduction tends toward the totality, and from this totality the parts are explained which are implied in a more or less indistinct total idea.*"²

Psycho-analysis was long aware of this with regard to the conscious and subconscious "total idea," which it called the complex. By means of the stimulus word it attempted to "excite the complex," so that the reproduction betrayed its traces. It is gratifying to think that theoretical psychology must once again support psycho-analysis. Psycho-analysis has still to show where the total idea is not only indistinctly indicated but remains wholly in the subconscious. Poppelreuter's law holds good, that not only the transverse but also the longitudinal section explains itself; not only the *substantial*, but also the *causal* connection, and not only the *total idea*, but likewise the *intentional* unit (*vide* example *a* below).

For the moment I maintain categorically that by the

¹ *Archiv f. d. ges. Psychologie*, vol. xxv. p. 252.

² ED. CLAPAREDE pointed to a similar state of things, without going into generalities (*L'Association des idées*, Paris, 1903, p. 227).

aid of associations incontestable connections may be discovered, and in order to establish this we demand a strict application of the causal criteria. If by means of the association-method we are able to discover the sub-conscious motives, to anticipate them with certainty, the psychology of the schools is quite at liberty to point out a better way of attaining the same object. But I must confess that I have not found any such method there.

B. Some general ideas and hypotheses

(a) *The Subconscious*

Psycho-analysis endeavours to investigate and influence the instincts and contents of psychic life lying beneath the threshold of consciousness. It is thereby differentiated from that other analytical and psychological method, which studies the conscious contents and the instincts operating therein. There is a wide gulf between the two kinds of psychology.

It is of course true that orthodox psychology does not wholly deny the existence of the subconscious. But it imposes limitations which psycho-analysis cannot recognise as being justified. In certain individual matters there are differences of opinion which are of far-reaching importance. They refer to the *essence* or *being* of the subconscious, inasmuch as many perceive in it merely a physiological, a psychic correlation of the conscious processes.¹ Others consider it to be a psychic disposition of an unknown kind.² Others speak with Volkelt of "dispositional idea-activities."³ There are some who speak of subconscious sensations and ideas, but without definite contents,⁴ and, finally, there are those who assume subconscious psychic processes which are similar to conscious soul activities.⁵

Of still greater importance are the differences of opinion as to the *effects* of the subconscious. The great majority of German psychologists suppose that

¹ JODL, EBBINGHAUS.

² WUNDT, HÖFFDING, WINDELBAND.

³ TH. LIPPS.

⁴ LIEBMANN, OFFNER, KOFFKA, pp. 334 *et seq.*

⁵ KÜLPE, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 467.

the subconscious does not change and is pure disposition. Külpe and Ach assign it a value as reproduction motive and thus admit that its connection with the conscious soul-life cannot be scientifically explained and comprehended without the influence of subconscious forces.¹ Even Windelband, who concedes that our whole soul-life depends in its various conditions on the processes of the subconscious, denies the existence of subconscious relations resembling those of conscious mental life.² The very few who, with Liebmann and Offner, believe that they cannot understand psychic processes without a changing mechanism similar to that of the conscious, indicate no method which throws a scientific light on this important mechanism.³

Hence the place hitherto taken by the subconscious in psychology has been an exceedingly modest one. None the less, the greatest emphasis must be laid on the fact that even ordinary psychology, as Külpe's and Ach's investigations show, has proved it to be indispensable to its elementary research for empirical investigation.

A still more important fact is the one that the majority of psychologists, especially if German, owing to their methodical caution, have distrustfully avoided the very phenomena which most clearly demonstrated the effect of complicated changes in the realm of the subconscious. The elimination of valuable demonstrations of this kind, as well as of certain abnormal psychical facts, was punished by the already mentioned impoverishment of orthodox psychology.

An exception must be made in favour of those psychological investigators who make an exhaustive study of the origin of these very phenomena. It will suffice to refer to two recognised psychologists who pointed confidently, before the discovery of psycho-analysis, to the productive activity of subconscious psychic forces. Flournoy examined a spiritualistic medium who, in

¹ KÜLPE, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 467.

² WINDELBAND, *Präludien*, 4th ed., vol. ii. pp. 41 et seq.

³ ALOYS FISCHER's excellent work, *Untergründe und Hintergründe des Bewusstseins* (*Deutsche Schule*, xix. pp. 609-624, 673-690, 737-747, 1915) appeared only after the above was written.

a trance, spoke fluently in a self-invented foreign tongue, ostensibly that of the inhabitants of Mars. He was able to prove that the elements of this fantastic tongue were drawn from the conscious vocabulary, but that the working up of these elements into an incomprehensible xenoglossology was subconscious.

James investigated religious life and experience, which are completely excluded from Wundt's psychology, with the result that he found a great deal of it to be due to the subconscious. His remarks on this subject, toward the end of his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, are exceedingly instructive.

He characterises the discovery of the subconscious as the most important advance in psychology since the beginning of his studies.

Thanks to these amplifications the inclusion of the subconscious has very considerably enlarged the domain of psychology. But the psychologist remains dissatisfied, for the nature of the subconscious, its laws, and its influence upon the conscious, have not been any more exactly determined. To him it is an unknown quantity, and every attempt to master it scientifically has failed.

Now, in order to understand how psycho-analysis came to accept this maligned conception, and in what sense it grasps it, single definitions are insufficient. Otherwise contradictions and differences of opinion might indeed be discovered, but very little would have been gained that would make for a better comprehension of the matter. It is again absolutely necessary to go back to origins. Charcot discovered subconscious images to be the cause of certain hysterical forms of paralysis, and by hypnotic suggestion, in which he artificially induced the same symptoms, he furnished the experimental confirmation of these causal connections. Janet led those of his patients who were suffering from the same malady, backwards, in a hypnotic state, to the time of the genesis of the evil, and by making use of an increased effort of memory he had the then situation described, whereby very distinct relations with the symptoms were revealed. Thoughts were found which were active in the

symptom and likewise in the psychic phenomena. It would have now been possible to speculate as to the cause of the morbid conditions : for instance, the sight of a scurfy face might bring about the same complaint in the patient. But Janet remained an empiric, and refrained from metaphysical speculation. Breuer and the founder of psycho-analysis proceeded in the same manner. It must not be forgotten that the celebrated patient of the former investigation led her astonished physician, almost of her own initiative, to the events which were reflected in her symptoms. As the cause of her squinting and macropsy (she saw everything on an enlarged scale) she found that beside her father's sick-bed she had held her watch close to her tear-stained eyes in order to see the time. And in many cases, too, which Freud investigated, he found with little trouble former strongly emphasised images which were distinctly expressed in morbid symptoms. The presumption of a causal relation was no greater a venture than that of placing the raising of the arm and the preliminary intention of so doing in a causal relation. Freud was likewise acquainted with post-hypnotic actions, the impulses to which had disappeared from the consciousness. Hence he supposed that in those cases which did not readily betray their subconscious cause, such a cause must none the less be present, and he tried by all sorts of methods to get at it. These endeavours led to the birth of psycho-analysis.

Instead of turning his attention for the next few years or decades to the problem of the relation of physical to psychical facts, or to reflecting on the mode of existence of those motives which are not present in the conscious, Freud investigated the extent of the phenomena in which subconscious forces, equal in power to conscious ones, found expression, with the conditions and the laws which governed them, and came—to his astonishment—to the investigation of precisely that domain of the higher mental life which had been excluded and despised by orthodox psychology as contradicting its definition. If Freud may be reproached for remaining too much in the domain of empiricism and doing too little to elucidate

what he had learnt by experiment, it must not be forgotten that orthodox psychology, which has at its command an enormous number of ways and means, has nothing to say which might lead us to examine the traces of memory, the relations between body and soul, and other important factors, which it would be fatal to disregard. How can psychology reproach psycho-analysis with its inability to determine fundamental psychological principles, not specifically analytical, which it, the mother-science, does not itself understand?

Those who have themselves tested Freud's researches are thankful that he safely rounded the cape of metaphysics and with unparalleled acumen enriched the domain of experience. It may be maintained, even to-day, that psychology has never experienced a greater enrichment of its field of activities than that afforded by psycho-analysis. In addition to the introduction of the strictly historical individualistic movement, and simultaneously with the purely scientific control of this movement, based on hypothetical laws and concepts, (Rickert), Freud has for the first time made a vast quantity of psychic functions the object of scientific observation, precisely because he opened up for exact investigation that sub-consciousness which poets and keen observers had long since seen to be the principal source of psychic activity. In the second part I shall follow in his footsteps and we shall then perceive the error of those who reproach Freud's method as being incapable of proof.

On considering the subconscious more closely, Freud was obliged to extend his initial concepts, which corresponded in the main with those of Külpe and his school. The activity of the subconscious is not exhausted by producing an invariable determining tendency; it is rather the case, as the founder of psycho-analysis soon discovered, that processes take place behind the threshold of the conscious which in their results are similar to those taking place in consciousness. The inventive and creative subconscious became as certain to him as the inventions and creations of other individuals, which we can only grasp, after all, by inference and analogy.

Nobody has been able to give more satisfactory, simpler or more comprehensive explanations than those suggested by psycho-analysis. But we must refer to the notional determination which Freud gave to the subconscious. Its empirical origins must not for a moment be lost to sight. Those who expect to find speculations already formed will certainly be disappointed.

First of all it must be remarked that the notion of the subconscious is a purely negative one. As long as that which is thus designated is not actually to be found in the conscious, the term is certainly not a false one. But it may rightly be objected that the mere negative characteristic of a fact may be logically contested. It would be desirable to have the existing positive features indicated in the designation.

What are these features? The opinions of psychoanalysts on the features that constitute the *nature* of the subconscious are as various as those prevailing, in the psychology of the conscious, between the opinions as to the physical and the psychical. Many psychologists believe, as we know, in a physical causality only; the psychic is for them only a function of the cerebral cortex and has no efficiency or reality. Others concede to the psychic its own causality; they admit an influence of the mind on the body, or at least an inner psychic causality.

Those who consider the psychic as an unreal concomitant phenomenon have, in my opinion (even as psycho-analysts), no great inducement to designate the subconscious as "psychic." If purely physical energies produce conscious thinking, then it may be admitted that they produce, without any psychic concomitant, those complicated processes which we call subconscious acts, the outcome of which corresponds exactly with that of a complicated act of thought or volition. But even in this case a subconscious psychic concomitant, unnecessary for the final result, may be supposed if, for any reason, whether metaphysical or 'practical, it appears recommendable; but I repeat that, as long as this psychical subconscious does not exercise any influence, its admittance or denial is of

no great importance in judging the facts. The expressions "subconscious ideas, decisions, creations, etc." are convenient but inexact terms which designate unknown mental processes, which in their results, agree with those that lead to conscious ideas, decisions, creations, etc.

Closely related to these hypotheses are those which describe the subconscious as " x ," as differing from the conscious as the Kantian "thing in itself" differs from the "empirical thing." To this it may be objected that the effect contradicts this construction. How would it be possible for unknown processes, the conditions of whose origin are unknown to us, to produce the same final results as conscious processes under similar circumstances, if they are essentially different? Here, too, the logical conditions are wanting which have led many a thinker to distinguish between an intelligible world and one of experience.

Of greater importance is the stress laid on the psychic character of the subconscious by the apostles of psychic causality within the conscious, whether they adopt psycho-physical parallelism or the doctrine of reciprocal action. For them it will seem natural to refer to mental acts such effects of the subconscious as correspond exactly with those of the conscious soul-life, and thus assert the supremacy of the spirit in those processes which produce the greatest æsthetic, ethical and religious effects, as well as many ordinary and morbid results. A very weighty objection, however, may be opposed to such an attempt: Are not "psychic" and "subconscious" irreconcilable contradictions? Does not consciousness belong to the self-evident and necessary features of the psychic? Indeed, is not consciousness the only characteristic proper to all psychic phenomena?

In reply we may observe that we know psychic processes in the first instance only as conscious ones. We cannot think of a blue sky which nobody sees any more than we can think of a toothache which nobody feels. In the concrete psychic act subjective contents are found by the side of objective ones.

Whether it may be inferred from this that the psychic

must always be conscious depends on what we understand by it. In my book on *Psycho-analytic Method* I have dealt with eleven conceptions of "the conscious," and I do not pretend to have treated all existing definitions. It is not necessary in this place to unravel all the complicated material available. For us there is only one determination of importance, viz. *whenever ordinary speech uses the term "conscious" it refers to the empirical subject, the ego which experiences something.* The psychic processes which are accessible to us also belong to this empirical subject. And this membership with the conscious *ego* is lacking in the subconscious as investigated by psycho-analysis, just as in the other subconscious.

If, then, consciousness in the sense of reference to the empirical *ego* really constitutes that which distinguishes the psychic from all other phenomena, we must evidently recognise the subconscious as apsychic. But there are other features which can escape psychology only if the latter creates an artificial isolation and confines itself to the elementary functions. That which distinguishes the higher mental life and differentiates it from all other events is the new creative formation, the purposeful planning and calculation, with its numerous auxiliary operations. If we draw a syllogism, or propound and solve an arithmetical problem, experience and realise a desire, conceive and execute an artistic idea, forces and norms collaborate which are fundamentally different from those causes expressed in the physical event. This ingenious shaping, this establishment of inner relations, this striving and production of conditions for the execution of what has been planned are as peculiar to mental life as is consciousness itself. We can satisfactorily elucidate, and explain to a certain extent, the mechanism of an arithmetical operation by mathematical and psychological laws; but it goes against the grain to suppose that this process is the result of blind and soulless cerebral activity, and that the chain of thoughts which guides the calculator is a mere illusion, since otherwise even the absolutely unknown cortical processes are connected. Even if we accept the facts of natural causality we shall have to refer the

explanation of human thought to motives, concepts and intentions.¹

This relation, however, certainly presupposes a Conscious, and indeed, not only in the sense of a relation between all the individual factors of the psychological process in respect of a given subject, but also in the sense of the incorporation of the different parts, as of the whole systematic creative achievement into a psychic relation. Without such a connection, and without this unity, the union of the *disjecta membra* which are at the disposal of the memory could not possibly be accomplished. We may here remind our readers that Wundt defined the conscious as "the connection of the simultaneous and successive psychic processes."²

If we criticise the achievements of others we shall presuppose a systematic shaping in these processes whenever their fitness and their immanent significance reach too high a level for us to be able to impute this to mere blind chance. If we find a complicated mechanism or a beautiful poem in the virgin forest we do not for a moment suppose that these are phenomena blindly produced by Nature. Even the strictest experimental psychologist, who rigorously eliminates such phenomena from his domain, will infer mental causes by virtue of his scientific and psychical knowledge.

But if we learn by careful investigation that the originator of this mechanism or poem was guided by this, that or the other intention, we shall certainly feel no doubt whatever that its initiation, conception and accomplishment are connected by psychic links. We can draw conclusions *a posteriori* as to the industry and the methods of the engineer, the culture and character of the poet, etc. The conscious, in the sense of a connection, betrays many of its particulars to our scrutiny. We infer the existence of psychic individualities and decline to accept the view of a mindless origin of the work of art which we have found.

How, then, is it possible to heap reproaches on the

¹ Vide my book, *The Freedom of the Will*, p. 294.

² WUNDT, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 239.

psycho-analyst ? What else does he do than what every historian, technician, archæologist and judge does who traces to its sources any ingenious creation of the human mind ? Those who have read the studies of Charcot, Bernheim and Flournoy find it a matter of course that these men should investigate the mental causes of the morbid phenomena which they had under observation ; and who shall deny that they actually did find what they sought ? The subconscious, which is the object of psycho-analytical investigation, was not discovered by this science ; what is new is only its method of research and the unsuspected area of its territory, together with the recognition of numerous laws acting within it. The dream, the religious hallucination, artistic intuition, and a thousand other phenomena with which psycho-analysis deals, are assuredly in some degree ingenious formations bearing a great resemblance to the results of conscious thought. If we admit psychical causes for the latter, why not for the former ? And if nonsense frequently appears side by side with good sense, is not this the case with many of the products of conscious thinking ? Are we, if a train of thought is obscure, to refuse to regard it from the psychological point of view and deny its psychic origin ? Or are we to presume, with the supernatural psychology of the uncritical ages, that the highest achievements of art, ethics and religion, which spring up in the consciousness without any discoverable means, have come straight from Heaven ? Whosoever has been present at the giving and carrying out of a post-hypnotic command would consider that person as capricious and dull who should impute the execution of the order to any but psychological motives. Facts led with irresistible logic from the search for conscious motives to those which were never realised, which were neither in their origin nor in their meaning conscious, but, indeed, stood in direct contrast to all conscious contents. The acceptance of subconscious psychic motives has rightly been compared with the calculation of the existence of planets which were at the time invisible but which were later plainly to be seen. The movements

of the visible planets would not have been comprehensible without them. When the witty professor of theology at Geneva, who had cleverly interwoven the acceptance of the subconscious into his dogmas, was told that "the subconscious is nothing more than a faint glimmer," he answered, readily: "That is true; but then science teaches us that there are dark rays (i.e. ultra-violet)." Had he the right so to speak?

If we are convinced that a practical work of construction is taking place behind the threshold of the consciousness which cannot be caused by psychic means, but whose formations must have originated in a manner analogous to those of the conscious mental life, then we cannot deny their psychism, particularly if motives and laws are discovered to explain the origin of such formations, and even of their subconsciousness. *Those psychic motives which transcend the conscious are subconscious if by conscious we mean the reference to the event; but they are likewise conscious if by conscious we infer their relationship to a psychical connection.* As ordinary speech designates as "conscious" that which is experienced by the conscious *ego*, there can be no inducement to assert the existence of a contradiction in the notion of the subconscious psychic and psychic subconscious. If anyone were inclined not only to impute these contents and motives to a psychical connection, but also to consider them as individually referring to an *ego* beyond the domain of experience, it would be difficult to confute him.

As in the well-known phenomenon of disintegration of the personality a man is not aware in one state of what he does in the other, forgetting, in some cases, wife, child, profession and home, so does the subconscious soul-life belong to a transcendental *ego*, a double, of whom the real *ego* knows nothing. And as in the former case it may occasionally happen that in one state a slight presentiment of the other state may dawn upon the victim, so the usually subconscious will sometimes emerge as a part of the conscious *ego*, generally to disappear again.

The decisive question as to how far it is possible to apprehend the subconscious with any certitude can be settled only by individual research. I shall try to give some examples of this, and shall return later to the peculiar laws according to which the subconscious changes in contradistinction to the conscious.

(b) *The Sexual Theory*

Nothing has caused so much bitter opposition to psycho-analysis as its attitude toward sexuality. Again and again the reproach is levelled against psycho-analysts that they explain all human actions and thoughts by sexual motives, and thus degrade man to a mere sexual being. But there is no other point of the psycho-analytical system concerning which there has been so much misunderstanding.

It must be emphasised at the outset that Freud's sexual theory by no means forms the premises of the whole of psycho-analysis. It does not occur in my definition. Where Freud defines the relationship of sex to psycho-analysis he does not take the recognition of his theory of sexuality into consideration. We may even pursue an analysis for a certain distance, and make really interesting discoveries, without encountering sexual impulses, since these are strongly repressed. Yet he who would fundamentally eliminate the expression of sexual instincts might be likened to the anatomist or the physiologist who should ignore the reproductive organs and their functions. This might be pardoned in school, but serious scientific investigation has no use for prudery.

Just as the place of the sexual theory in the psycho-analytic system has been misunderstood, so has the importance of its subject within the psychic economy been wrongly apprehended. When, for instance, B. Stern says that psycho-analysis finds nothing but infantile sexuality in the depths of the child-soul, he is assuredly mistaken.¹ Only so much is true: In the regions in question Freud found an unexpected number of expressions

¹ STERN, *loc. cit.* p. 6.

which, according to his terminology, belong to the domain of sexuality. But he likewise speaks of dreams in which the hunger instinct is prominent, and confronts the *ego* instincts, the number and structure of which he does not indicate, with the sum of sexuality. We have every reason for placing a very high estimate on their many-sided character and their importance.¹

To this must be added the fact that not only does Freud employ the expression "sexuality" in the ordinary sense, as "the sum of those physical and psychical phenomena which refer to the propagation of the species or the functions of the reproductive instincts and organs," but also in a much more extended sense, which coincides, to all intents and purposes, with the word "love." It should be carefully noted that the word "sexuality" has with Freud another meaning than the popular one. Those who read their own interpretations into those of Freud or explain his doctrines of sexuality without laying stress on the extended meaning which he has given to the word, are acting unfairly or in ignorance. That love plays a powerful part in religion, art, cosmology and life is a fact that many will recognise who would like to dismiss sexuality as an unimportant factor of the soul-life.

It must be admitted, however, that Freud assigns to sexuality, in the narrower sense, a rôle which is far removed from all previous conceptions. Many who decline to have anything to do with psycho-analysis yet find that Freud has done yeoman service in laying bare with implacable candour the immense significance of the sexual life. Other investigators, on the other hand, find that he goes too far in tracing all psycho-neuroses back to repressed sexuality.

In order to obtain a satisfactory judgment we must make the following facts clear at the outset: Freud

¹ FERENCZI writes with truth: "Psycho-analysis has never ventured to decide how many psychic efforts are of sexual, and how many of egotistical or other origin. It merely maintains that sexual instincts play a much greater and more multifarious part than is commonly supposed, and that sexual factors probably play a part in almost every activity, often as examples. Between this supposition and the assertion that psycho-analysis derives nearly everything from sexuality there is so great a difference that no critic ought to have overlooked it" (*Internat. Zischrift. f. arsth. Psa.* 1916, iii. year, p. 354).

investigated the expressions of sexuality with such unusual care because they had hitherto been the most neglected. Of the other instincts he has no more to say than others have, even though he is able to tell us a good deal that is new of their rôle in general. Further, he had to deal in the first instance with psycho-neurotics who exhibited an enormously marked polarisation of their instincts owing to violent inhibitions; so that the expression of an instinct otherwise withdrawn by reason of its organic connection with other instincts is put forward with great prominence. If a boy is prevented from playing, cut off from his associates, and from the development of the higher intellectual interests, his life-impulse must inevitably turn with extreme violence to the sexual sphere. This over-emphasis is thus forced upon him; it is not the cause, but a product, of inhibition, which, indeed, in itself again becomes a cause. In many cases, however, the development inhibitions show themselves to be primarily sexual. Who would deny that indecent assaults may lead to nervous maladies? But the decision as to whether, in a specified case, the phantasy dominating the symptom was *originally* caused by the sexual instincts, or whether these were induced by *other kinds* of inhibitions, is rendered difficult by the fact that *every strong influence exercised on an instinct is made evident in the activities of the other instincts*. In the same way many organic diseases are expressed by alterations in the pulse-beat, the iris, and other phenomena in other organs. Hence there is no *serious* convulsion of the personality that does not find expression in the sexual sphere. The psychology of the instincts, which have been so cavalierly treated by orthodox psychology, has left sufficient riddles for psycho-analysis to solve, so that there can be no question of a complete sexual theory, although we have gone a good step forward in the matter. We know little of the expressions of the sexual instincts or their connection with other expressions of life. It was necessary and highly meritorious on Freud's part that he should observe sexual phenomena first of all for himself alone, even though by doing so he might suggest the appearance of artificial isolation and

exaggeration. But the acting in unison of the instincts within the psychic organism still has its rights. Freud's important discoveries in the domain of the sexual would have been impossible without his masterly delimitations.

There are some who, with Jung, regard sexuality in the narrow sense as the *causa causata* of neurosis, and perceive its real origin in the resistance to the fulfilment of the life-task. There are others who, with Adler, never admit sexuality and love as primary causes, but only as accompanying phenomena in the struggle for self-exaltation.¹ In both cases the sexual wish arising from the subconscious is to be understood metaphorically only. My own observations are at variance with these opinions. Just as in Jung's genetic psychology I see a strong hyper-sexuality (he even attempts to derive language and the production of fire from sexuality), so do I refuse to refer his asexuality to the symptom. I consider disturbances of the sexual life in the narrower sense as one of the most important and frequent causes, and more especially of psycho-neuroses. Disturbances of the love-life (refusal of tenderness, slighting, too great severity, the loss of dear ones, etc.), do often lead to illness, although grave disturbances of this kind naturally affect other instincts than the sexual ones. I cannot understand how this sexual and erotic etiology can be refuted, save as a result of sheer mental lethargy.

In any case it has been proved that psycho-analysis is not based on a special sexual theory with which it stands or falls. With this remark this introductory chapter is released from the necessity of investigating its individual factors as does Freud in his doctrine of the partial instincts, infantile sexuality, etc. One important particular, however, must be pointed out. By proving that the energies ascribed to sexuality in the narrow sense may be merged into valuable cultural functions and help to bring about a so-called sublimation, Freud's psychology defined the theoretical bases of ideal ethics. But I am here overstepping the limits of my theme.

¹ ADLER, *Heilen und Bilden*, München, 1911, p. 102; JUNG, *Jahrb. f. psch. Forsch.* vol. iv. pp. 197, 205.

My object was to demonstrate that psycho-analysis bears no stain to make it unworthy of the name of science. I should now like to demonstrate by some simple cases whether it is possible for psycho-analysis to fill up the enormous gaps existing in orthodox psychology ; in other words, whether it can impart reliable knowledge concerning the domains hitherto closed to the latter.

2. EXAMPLES OF PSYCHO-ANALYTIC WORK

Interpretations with the aid of the Association Method

It is by no means my intention to show in detail how the psycho-analyst goes to work, how he overcomes the difficulties that beset his path, or what results he feels justified in anticipating with certainty. Those who are interested in these problems are referred to the detailed account in my book. In this place I wish merely to determine, by the aid of a few examples, whether the psycho-analytic method may lay claim to be placed on the same level as the other psychological methods. For this purpose we may well inquire whether it affords us an insight into processes which have hitherto withstood the armour of psychology, and whether its degree of reliability corresponds with the claims of a serious and zealously critical science. I have chosen for this purpose some comparatively simple cases. The fact that they mostly have to do with sick people is explained by the material which I had under observation. He whose time is taken up by an almost terrifying number of suffering people is seldom able to carry out analyses of the healthy. But as far as that goes I have also described observations and experiments on normal beings. Invariably it turned out that exact analogies with pathological processes were displayed here also, so that the enriched insight into the abnormal is also of value for the understanding of the normal.

(a) Sleep-Walking

In automatism too, which does not indicate or reveal a directly accessible psychic concomitant, psychic processes

may be observed. An hysterical lady under my observation used to walk in her sleep, from the age of twelve, frequently without being aware of it the next morning. She used to take two pictures which hung over her bed, and lay them on one side, either on the floor, behind a chair or under the coverlet in her sister's room, so that they often had to be looked for.

Poets have ascribed somnambulism to spiritual processes, thus raising it to an object of psychological speculation ; as Shakespeare in *Macbeth*, Johanna Spyri in *Heidi*, etc. In the case under consideration the performance of the same action with many variants is worthy of investigation. Let us, therefore, enquire as to the nature of these pictures. The one bore the title *Parasites* and the other that of *Away!*

I made my patient look carefully at these pictures and asked her for her immediate associations without any attempt at interpretation. I give my stimulus words in parentheses and follow them by the reaction of the person under analysis.

(*Parasites*) A growing child has to give broth to a smaller one ; four other children also want some, but the girl gives everything to the pretty little one. (Association!) "I often felt myself to be a parasite. I knew that my parents would have preferred having a boy to me. My sister said it would be better if I were not there."

(*Away!*) A little bird has flown away, and some children watch it as it flies. "I once had a little bird of which I was very fond. I could not understand how the children in the picture could give anyone any pleasure ; I felt compassion for them. They had taken down the cage. I never took mine down. Once when I had placed a chair on a table to feed my bird, it slipped ; my sister shrieked, and mother came and smacked me so hard that I bled at the nose."

These were the associations. The child was often very unhappy at that time, as I was often told by my visitor ; she very rarely met with any kindness and was brought up in a strict, very narrow environment. She

was never allowed to play with other children out of doors, and was often very lonely. She removed the pictures automatically, thus expressing her great distress at being considered a parasite and likened to a captive bird. The first interpretation is at once seen by the associations, in which the sleep-walker identifies herself with the "parasites" and is differentiated from the boy. The associations of the escaped bird lead to a caged animal that is not set free; indeed, an action which might be interpreted as an attempt to take down the cage was cruelly punished. Hence the associations are all in favour of our interpretation, which was further confirmed by several symptoms occurring during the analysis.

It is no doubt astonishing that dislike of these pictures should emerge in a state of sleep. It was easy to discover the reason: The child did not venture to show that she disliked the pictures. Her sister was jealous of her on account of these presents. This was no doubt the reason why she brought them to her sister's room. She bought and gave her, remarkably enough, a picture which made a powerful impression on her—a fettered witch, a victim of superstition. The girl in the picture has some features in common with our subject. Moreover, this theory fits in with our interpretation of the sleep-walking. That which the waking consciousness is forbidden to express, yet which struggles violently for expression, is carried out during sleep by the aid of the subconscious.¹

(b) *Unconquerable aversion from a certain condiment*

A girl patient of 25 had, since her 11th year, been absolutely unable to tolerate vinegar; she could not even bear the smell of it, whereas she had formerly been very fond of salad. The aversion from vinegar remained acute up to the time of analysis. The lady felt sick at the very odour of it.

(Vinegar) "It makes me sick. Once I was forbidden to take it, when I was taking iron pills. Afterwards I didn't like it."

¹ Cf. a similar example in my book, p. 153.

(Vinegar) " I can't understand how anyone can like it. It irritates the tongue. I get fearfully excited when I think that the crucified Jesus was given vinegar to drink. Formerly I was as fond of vinegar as of cakes."

(Vinegar) " Once we made a trip to O., where we had some salad in which there was practically nothing but oil in the dressing. I could hardly get it down. This was shortly before the treatment with iron pills. From that time I could only eat salad with lemon dressing."

(The trip) " I felt terribly alone on that trip. Both of my sisters, who are considerably older than myself, had male companions ; I was alone. They were very happy, but I was lonely. I hardly knew where to go, as each of the loving couples wished to be alone. I was always expected to go on before and gather flowers. At O. I put a lot of salad on my plate, and I hardly dared leave it. Perhaps I was longing for love ; I felt very lonely. I have the same feeling when I quarrel with my husband, or when I think he loves me only for my looks." (Thus far the subject under analysis.)

We are still far removed from the explanation of her aversion, even if—supposing that we have sufficient knowledge—we may suspect a connection between the obsessional prohibition and the emotions experienced at the time of the trip.

In the next consultation the riddle was solved. The subject related what she had remembered after subsequent recollections of the trip. " One of the people present wanted to complain of the lack of vinegar, but the others prevented him for fear of offending their host. At the same time they said, jokingly : " Vinegar belongs to oil as a wife does to her husband." I said : " Then I don't want any vinegar, for I don't want a husband." Finally the others brought some vinegar, but I wouldn't take any. I often used to say to myself at that time : " I can't bear the odour of men."

Does it not appear as if the aversion from men had been transferred to the vinegar, which is connected with it by several threads of association ? Yet we dare not venture to believe in such a transference of feelings until

we have observed similar ones in a number of cases. But there are numbers of such at our disposal; indeed, all the hypotheses of psycho-analysis can be demonstrated by countless cases of this kind. I have given a large number of examples in my book (pp. 175-183), and to these I will add one more example which is characterised by its simplicity.

(c) *Inability to pluck flowers*

An artist could not bring himself to pluck flowers which he would gladly have taken home, especially trefoil and meadow-saffron. He said: "The other day I wished very much to take some flowers home, but I simply could not bring myself to pluck them. It is more difficult with meadow-saffron than with trefoil."

(Flowers) Meadow-saffron? "A girl. Not any special girl, but one of a loving disposition."

(Meadow-saffron) "Autumn¹ is the season I like best. Meadow-saffron is inconstant. I forget what we learnt about it at school."

(Trefoil) "A fairy. I have to laugh. A gipsy woman. A woman who goes with a crowd is not of noble character."

The following explanation is necessary. The subject knows—as he admits on being questioned—Heine's poem: *Du bist wie eine Blume*, and he is acquainted with Goethe's song of the boy and the rosebud. He knows, too, that in popular parlance the word "flower" is in this country used of girls in a disparaging sense. At the beginning of the treatment the subject had spoken indignantly of his brother, whose morals were lax, and who was capable of consorting with women who, if not exactly immoral, were not of a very high character. The gipsy woman in Hoffmann's *Devil's Elixirs* had made an impression on him. This woman leaves her parents and relations, and goes alone to Rome, to throw herself into the arms of the beloved painter, Francesco, and become his wife, without any regard to moral law.² He told me this a few minutes before the conversation

¹ In German, meadow-saffron = *Herbstzeitlose* = timeless harvest.

² Edition of the *Deutschen Hauses*, p. 243.

recorded above. He was tortured by the thought that no woman had ever responded to his love ; but according to his own admission, he felt happy when he saw a girl whom he loved. He often suffered from the desire of death.

For the interpretation of the obsessional phenomena we shall confine ourselves first of all to the associations. According to these the term "flower" is evidently a designation for "girl." He likes to see both, flower and girl, but he does not wish to have anything to do with either. He cannot pluck any flowers because he does not wish, like his brother, to have any intercourse with unworthy women. Thus the repression of his love is symbolically expressed in his obsessional prohibition. Wood-sorrel, for all its beauty, is something that "goes in a crowd," i.e. something vulgar and ignoble, a common girl with whom—in contradistinction to his brother—he will have nothing to do. The meadow-saffron reminds him that it is no season for love, but rather, for him, who is tired of life, the time to die. The inconstancy of the meadow-saffron, too, agrees with his experience of the girls of his acquaintance, especially the *fiancée* of one of his friends.

Hence we find Poppelreuter's law confirmed ; the total image is constellated from the apperceived stimulus-image "flower" and explained in the reproduction. In the birth of the obsession the transference of the emotion is accomplished, as well as union with a symbolical image, as in the previous example of the aversion from vinegar.

(d) *Hypnompic association*

A lady, whose married life was not altogether happy, told me that a short time previously she had been frequently awakened by violent abdominal pains. One morning these pains appeared with great intensity in her hand. On waking she had the curious idea : These pains are the same as the abdominal ones.

So far the facts. I am curious to know what an opponent of psycho-analysis would do to explain them. The lady would have been of no assistance, for she was

in the presence of a positive enigma. Moreover, her attitude to analysis was an absolutely negative one, and she assured me several times that she did not believe in it in the least. Accordingly, I simply kept to FREUD's rule.

(The pains in the hand) "They are absolutely inexplicable to me." (Once again the pains in the hand) "I don't know in the least what to think of them."

(Describe these pains) "Well, they were there."

(Did your whole hand hurt?) "No, only the inner part, the palm."

(Reflect upon it!) After long reflection, first laughingly and then with an expression of profound astonishment, the lady continued: "Now I am thinking of a scene that took place years ago. For a joke I went with my husband to a chiromantist who professed to foretell the future from the lines of the hand. She said: 'Your husband's line of the heart is not normal. As a matter of fact, in the upper of the two hand lines, the so-called line of the heart, he has a striking irregularity.' (She burst into tears) That is it; my husband cannot love me; he has no heart."

(The lady at once recognised the connection between the bodily and the mental pain, and the sense of the hypnopompic association was no longer a riddle for her. For the psychologist, indeed, there remain plenty of unsolved questions, especially if it be added that the frigidity under which the married life of the subject was suffering came to an end on the day of the individual-historical investigation above described. I shall not enter any further into this case. For the moment we have only to deal with the question whether psycho-analysis is able, with the help of the reproduction method, to lay bare psychic relations beyond the conscious. We omit here the finer determinants, which, in all cases known to me, go back as far as childhood.)

(e) *A dream on a prescribed subject*

There were present a neurologist, two clergymen and two psychologists, one of whom carried out the hypnotism

while the other, a German, was the person experimented upon. The latter, who was in excellent health, was ordered to dream about the images: *typewriter*, *soldier* and *sister*. He remained for about ten minutes in a lighted room, and awoke on being called in a fairly quiet tone, with signs of slight nervousness.

He proceeded at once to narrate: "In your room you have an Arabian wall tapestry which works hypnotically. The noise of the gas jet recalled the image of the sea. I saw myself with my friend Otto L., who fell in battle a year ago, on the deck of the *Ayesha*, the second *Emden*. We were sailing over a frightfully stormy sea. It was quite dark. The ship was sailing close to some crumbling cliffs which were on the starboard, so that parts of the taffrail were carried away. Then I suddenly heard someone call out: 'Otto (his friend's name), look out!' I saw my friend beside me, in field uniform, at my right hand, his gun reversed. He had a bronzed face. I saw the silver officer's stripes on his collar.

"Now I have a banal illusion which forcibly reminds me of some tasteless picture-postcards. But don't write this down. A soldier stands on guard; above him appears his wife, with his children, or his sweetheart or somebody, at whom he looks, and below is a commonplace verse. In the dream I had also an illusion of quite another kind. Before me on the ship I saw a plate with the inscription: Smith Premier. This, I remember, is the name of a typewriter company. I saw the plate before me right to the end of the dream. This ship sailed on further and further; it was terribly stormy.

"Suddenly a gong sounded for dinner. I realised that it was the bell of the neighbouring church tower, which was just striking nine. All the same I had the idea that it was sounding for dinner. After this, I saw my friend no more. Afterwards I went to the cabin. My father and mother were sitting at a small table. They were eating something simple, a frugal meal—supper or something. That was all."

It will at once be perceived that five external stimuli preceded this dream—the wall tapestry, the gas jet, the

soldier, the typewriter and the bell. One of the desired stimuli appears to have failed of its object, i.e. the sister. But nothing is gained thereby. Why did the dreamer make use of the gas jet, tapestry and bell, and not any other surrounding objects? What does the dream mean? I call upon the psychologists who are so keenly aware of their superiority to the psycho-analysts to give me an explanation. But they are silent.

Hence we apply the association method.

(Your friend Otto on the *Ayesha*) "A few hours ago I bought and read Mücke's book about his miraculous voyage in a tiny nutshell of a vessel."

(Otto L.) "A few hours before the dream I heard by letter that his mother believed that he was still alive, in captivity. I see him before me in his field uniform. A soldier on an advertisement packet of kola pastilles. There, where I saw it, I often had to wait for the tram, and on looking at the advertisement, I represented to myself my friend Otto in his field uniform. He was my constant companion on my mountain tours. His death affected me greatly. Now I am left to my own resources."

(Very stormy sea) "The storms that Mücke experienced; the miracle of his escape."

(Cliffs to the right) "Like those in a picture in my sitting-room."

(Crumbling walls) "Rotten: very dangerous for a small craft."

(Part of the ship torn away) "The beginning of the end."

(Someone says: "Look out!") "It must have been my sister."

(Take care!) "She must have certainly said this very often, especially when I was in dangerous places; for example, about five years ago as I was going along a precipitous path. My sister is ten years older than I. My mother used to say my sister had more trouble on my account than she herself."

(Your friend in field uniform) "Again the soldier on the poster. A healthy, robust-looking fellow, with the

stripes of a non-commissioned officer: he looks like a soldier who has evidently undergone great hardships and is taking kola tablets."

(The banal illusion) "The sentimental card on which a warrior sees his wife and child, with the inscription 'The Warrior's Longing,' or some such nonsense."

(The plate with the inscription "Smith Premier") "It was in the air. The ship sailed towards it."

(Smith Premier) "A typewriter which I don't otherwise know. The name is a commonplace one. Smith or Schmitz the First. A lot of Germans abroad have changed their names, i.e. Schmied to Smith. My mother's maiden name was Schmitz. Remington typewriter. The firm that makes them is getting a good advertisement by means of its neutrality, in refusing to supply weapons. I always see one on my way to my consulate."

(Smith Premier) "It is a white shield or plate against dark clouds. The sort of shield that soldiers' clubs carry before them. Does 'Premier' mean that the firm is the best, or only this pattern?"

(Smith Premier) "I have the impression that this is an American firm. Perhaps the manufacturer has changed his name, too."

(A gong sounds for dinner) "The sound of the church bell. Where I live an electric bell that gets on your nerves calls you to meals. A gong which stops suddenly awakens the image that the people are already at table. That is why I lately advocated procuring a gong."

(For dinner) "As a rule it sounds when I am making psychological experiments. The person on whom I am experimenting shows no signs of going; I have almost to dismiss him by force. Here meals are taken early; at home we had supper at nine."

(I don't see my friend any more) "My interest in him has disappeared. Perhaps he fell into the sea. I am no longer interested in the matter."

(Then I went to my cabin) "Lately, when I was crossing the lake and it was rather rough, I went to the cabin."

(Father and mother at a small table) "Really it is

the small table at my boarding-house. In the dream it is not even covered with a white cloth, but with a coloured one, although dinner is about to begin."

(A frugal meal) "My parents live very simply. That is the best thing for the health."

(I see my parents sitting there) "Only my parents."

After the collection of the reactions the dreamer declared himself incapable of understanding the sense of the whole dream and of the associations. Let us therefore try to put the *dissecta membra* together in the simplest manner possible.

The first part of the dream tells of a stormy and dangerous voyage with a friend who had fallen in battle. The second part refers to the number-plate of the name-plate (in the air) of a typewriter, the maker of which is suspected by the dreamer of having changed his name. The third part tells of the return to the paternal home. All this fits in with the actual circumstances of the dreamer, who had to appear before the military authorities on the following morning and was afraid that, in spite of the fact that he was suffering from a dangerous organic trouble, he would be called out for active service, a fact which would certainly lead to his early death. The struggle between patriotism and self-preservation is expressed in the dream.

The dangerous voyage recalls his friend, who died a hero's death, and Capt. Mücke, both of whom compel his admiration and whose example is an inviting one. On the other hand, he is afraid of the danger to his life (cliffs destroy the taffrail of the ship; the beginning of the end; the letter telling of his friend's safety arouses deceptive hopes). The hardships of military service likewise repel him (the brown and healthy face of the friend; that of the dreamer is pale). The overworked soldier who acquires new strength by taking kola tablets refers to the dreamer himself. The lot of the trooper is harder than that of the officer. A voice from his childhood's days (his sister's) warns him of the approaching peril. Owing to existing difficulties the dreamer returns to infancy, whereby he does not bravely withstand a

danger, but simply obeys the warning and advice to avoid a dangerous situation.

The second part is introduced as trivial and commonplace at the outset, during the analysis itself. The longing for wife, child or sweetheart is depicted as sentimentality (the picture postcard). We can understand the interruption of the dream-narrative. A motive is brought forward of which the dreamer is ashamed. This is not perceptible in the manifest content of the dream, the name-plate, but in the associations which betray the meaning of the dream-image. "Smith Premier" reminds him of people who have changed their names in other countries; the dreamer's mother also bore a name which had been changed (by marriage) and the subject (I do not know whether intentionally or not) recalls the name of the typewriter (Schmitz, like Smith from Schmied). Evidently the dreamer has a secret and subconscious wish to become a "Smith" of this kind, i.e. to settle in a neutral country. In his dream the ship of his life steers toward this goal. Adapted to this is the secondary association of "Remington," in which prudent neutrality is cleverly hinted at. The advertisement, with its praise of neutrality, meets the dreamer's eye when the reference to the army is strongest, i.e. on his way to the German Consulate. In addition, he boasts of being fortunate and ruthless in business matters, which, according to the associations, agrees with his conception of the firm. (No reproach is intended here to the celebrated firm of Remington.) The name-plate appears gleaming against a dark background. The association of the shield or plate carried by military societies now becomes clear: it represents the formal line between "patriotism" and "shield," both of which are to be seen on the insignia of such military societies in Germany. The associations with "Premier" indicate that the neutrality implied by the name "Smith" would be advantageous to him, either in the present situation (trade mark), or the best in any case (reference to the firm).

But the dreamer is unable to accept this phantasy, seeing that his love of his country is calling him back from

his expatriation. With great skill he profits by the external acoustic stimulus in order to find another solution. As I learnt a few days later, the sound awakened the vexatious thought: "Oh, this disturbance!" But, with astonishing skill, he utilises the stimulus in favour of his intentions: the sound of the bell reminds him of the call to the meal taking place at home at the hour indicated, and also of the call to the meal of which he had recently spoken. But he still retains the former picture of the sea voyage and goes to the cabin, weaving in a real incident of recent date, viz. the retreat to the cabin in rough weather. In this way he abandons, with a certain violence, his intention of remaining neutral, as in the dismissal of his experimental subjects, who have almost to be bowed out. He intends returning to his own country, but not as an imperilled warrior; rather as a son and a peaceful citizen. We are no longer astonished that he does not know anything more of his friend, and even lets him fall overboard!

There still remain the associations of some of the individual parts. Why did he dream of lunch, seeing that the stroke of nine ought to have brought up the idea of supper? Why is not the table covered with a white cloth as at home? Why is the meal of which he dreams such a primitive one? A few days later, therefore, we ask for some more associations.

(The tablecloth) "It was that of my work-table, a coloured one. I saw it hanging down crookedly, as it often does on my table."

(Lunch instead of supper, as when the stroke of the bell was heard) "A few weeks ago I was on my holidays. A gong used to call us to lunch. In the evenings we were not in our rooms and consequently paid no attention to the gong. The food was bad, and there was not even enough to eat. I cultivated a very stimulating intercourse with a friend of mine, almost the only one who was not killed or did not die of disease, as well as with his charming and intelligent young wife."

Hence the meaning of the dream is: I will not save myself from the present danger of death by steering toward a denial of my country in a neutral state, but I wish, as

a peaceful man, to return to the simple conditions of my parental home, there to indulge in scientific work and to enjoy stimulating and intellectual intercourse with friends, including a charmingly intellectual lady friend (or wife).

Let us look at the creative part of the dream. What is there in common between soldier, typewriter and sister? And yet in the dream phantasy they are connected with wonderful skill, and even present sensations are very happily employed in the construction of the whole (tapestry, gas jet, stroke of the bell). The gas jet brings him to the sea, the Arabian tapestry to the *Ayesha*, which was bound for Arabia. The sensations and recent reminiscences gravitate towards one another. Without the interesting book by Mücke the dreamer would hardly have utilised precisely those sensations for his dream-picture, in the symbolical expression of his secret wishes. It will be seen that in connection with Poppelreuter's law we must not only think of image unities, but also of intentional (determining) tendencies.

Our interpretation was confirmed by a subsequent memory. The dreamer had come to Zürich for a short time in order to learn the technique of psycho-analysis. In spite of this he sent for his papers, so as to be wholly at the service of the consulate and thus more easily free from military duty. At the same time he felt himself to be a good and enthusiastic patriot who had not evaded military service by reason of cowardice, but on account of his dangerous organic disease. This relation is likewise entirely confirmed by the dream (Mücke, his friend Otto, the soldier with the kola tablets).

In the night following this dream our subject dreamt that all his friends who had fallen in battle were standing before him. It should not be necessary to explain the meaning of this.

The order was very happily carried out: the soldier and the typewriter appear in the dream, as well as the sister (if only in a latent fashion) in a warning which was characteristic of her and fitted in excellently with the current situation.

For the theory of dreams the following hypothesis,

which has been confirmed by several others, may be postulated : While it is rare to find, in dreams, the mere reproduction of real events without some relation to present desires, it is equally rare to find the execution of orders without some interweaving of the dreamer's own interests.

From a methodical point of view our procedure completely fulfilled a demand which is often made by orthodox psychology, though wrongly, viz. the immediate writing down of the dream on awaking. Thus Ziehen¹ and Lazarus demand that paper and pencil should be placed in readiness before going to sleep, so that they are to hand on waking. The inconsequence of the idea that this is the best guarantee of a correct repetition of the dream is shown by the fact that a dream may be completely forgotten on awaking yet may be remembered fully during the day. Further, old dreams often admit of a perfectly sure interpretation, whereas recent ones cannot always be rightly explained.

(f) An experiment in hypnotic and post-hypnotic symbolical speech

During the same consultation the person experimented upon, to whom we owe the dream just analysed, was again hypnotised ; this time before the analysis of the dream. After a few minutes' sleep he was awakened according to previous agreement, by pressure on his hand, and required to cast his eyes for a moment on a piece of paper on which the following words were written : " Dr. O. (who is among us) is a blackguard who has committed a scientific forgery. You must let him know that you despise him, but in a refined manner ; not openly, for that would be impolite. You are to forget that this order has been given you." After a few minutes our conversation was resumed, gradually became more animated, and finally awakened the sleeper.

He said " I had an insane phantasy. I was at the Niagara Falls, which I first heard and then saw. I was

¹ *Outlines of Phys. Psychology*, p. 255.

at their foot where they fall into the sea. The falling waters keep on dragging at the barrel on which I am seated. It turns round and round. I cling firmly to it with my left foot. Suddenly I see on the shore a woman dressed in a singular manner; she has an old-fashioned dress on, such as women used to wear about twenty years ago, with puffed sleeves of enormous dimensions. Grotesque. I have the impression that she is laughing heartily because I am sitting on the barrel. Now I feel that the twisting of the barrel has made me wet through, and I feel the cold in my whole body. The barrel drifts on and on; my back is towards the waters. Suddenly I find myself on the edge of another waterfall which falls still farther. I do what I can to escape it. Suddenly I fall head first into the depths. But this does not do me any harm, for I travel cheerfully forwards on my barrel.

"Somebody on shore now begins to aim at me with a gun while I am sitting on the barrel; but this does not worry me. Then I drift on to a rock jutting out of the middle of the river. Dr. O. is standing on it. He is just about to undress. He is gesticulating terribly with his arms. I believe he is making a speech about the mission of Judaism or something of the sort. He is wearing eyeglasses, and throws his arms about in the air as if he had an audience of a thousand before him. But I am the only person present. I drift past the rock on my barrel. He continues to roar at me, delivering a great speech which appears to me utterly stupid. I laugh at him in cynical superiority. But this does not disturb him; he continues to wave his arms about. Suddenly this picture has disappeared. I am sitting in a cave. Three young people are sitting there. In front of them they have a big book, like a ledger. They are continually erasing items. It is quite dark, as if they were afraid of being seen. This was my dream."

(We will now collect the associations) "I have no inclination to do so." (We shall find out the reason for this later on.)

After a time he began—apparently fully awake, free from restraint—to speak to Dr. O. in an irritated manner:

"Your room is a dirty and repugnant den, like that of a false coiner, a low pot-house keeper. Perhaps I am looking at it too darkly." (To me) You need not write everything down; I am not a criminal on trial. (To Dr. O.) Listen—this business at M.—I tell you that you did not behave properly there. (Dr. O. "Indeed?") "To-day I saw a hundred-franc piece in gold." (To Dr. O.) "Have you ever seen one? There is a great deal of risk; one never knows if it is genuine or not. Did your friend T. get his money? Among the Russians one never knows what may happen. (Dr. O. was a Russian.) Doctor, you may be a swell mobster—one never knows. As a scientific man, of course, I daresay you behave correctly. You'll excuse me! When people come to you they must have the impression that it is a nice thing to see a personality if they don't know what is behind it. Your room is in a terrible mess. I could easily imagine that a couple of bombs were concealed in it. Dr. L., tell me something about the analysis of my cryptolalia. (This is done: suddenly the subject interrupts the explanation) Dr. O., did you cut me off on the 'phone to-day? You are a terribly unreliable person; that you must yourself admit. Don't be angry; things like that always vex me."

He continued in this uncouth and unmannerly way for a while and then suddenly, as though in obedience to an inward inspiration, he said to me: "Did you tell me to be rude to Dr. O.? (I was silent.) That den in the dream. . . . What were the people doing? They were scratching things out. Do you erase things, Dr. O.? I asked you lately to lend me an indiarubber, but you could not find it. The grotesque woman is the bust in your room: A Goethe stands out like an island amidst the chaos, near the cooking-range. Have you anything to do with money? I should like to find some relation between you and the hundred-franc piece. (Dr. O. "I get money from home.) Remarkable! (To me) Did you tell me, perhaps, that Dr. O. was a coiner?"

At this moment I proposed to take up the analysis, which was at once carried through. The commencement

cannot be repeated here in detail, but the most important associations may be mentioned.

(Niagara Falls) "Far more colossal than the puny waterfalls of Switzerland (Negative transference; I am to be vexed.) As a matter of fact, however, I never saw them. What a pity that a great part has been absorbed by an electric power station! There's a novel, *The Fettered River*, by Stegemann. How the hero of this work transforms the Rhine waterfall into an electric power station, expending all his energies upon it, and in spite of circumstances, when it was finished he was ruined by it; he lost his wife, his sweetheart, his whole happiness and stood there with empty hands. That is why he committed suicide. (The barrel) The dwarf Perkeo on the Heidelberg Tun. My dream-barrel, on the other hand, was ridiculously small. (Barrel) Wine. The present vintage is called the milliard wine. It is falsely said that the German billions for the war loan exist only in the imagination. (Barrel) A joke about a corpulent professor; the students wrote on the blackboard that he was a barrel. He defended himself with the words: 'A barrel is surrounded by staves, and I am surrounded by sticks.'¹ But he is a pedant with blinkers, like Dr. O."

(The woman in the old-fashioned dress) My subject tells me of an old maid with whose mother he lives. She represents for him the type of commonplace public morality (*Spiessermoral*). He dreamt that he would carry out his love affairs in spite of all nagging; his aunt was standing by and laughing mockingly.

(Edge of the second waterfall) "I try to cling to it. The fall is not so deep as in the first waterfall, and I don't hear any rushing noise. Suddenly I am below. (The second fall) A fallen girl. All girls—no, that is too much—most girls are fallen. There are those who appear outwardly decent, but are not so in reality. A Prime Minister who was supposed to be very pious used to visit the house of a lady of doubtful reputation. The first

¹ This pun cannot be rendered adequately in English. In German the word *reif* means both "ripe" and "barrel-stave"; the word *unreif* = immature.—TRANSLATOR.

person to go over Niagara in a barrel was a woman ; she came through all right."

The following associations are given in detail.

(The rifleman on shore) " I don't know who it was."

(The rifleman) " Tall ; with a certain resemblance to yourself. He had your beard. He stood there quite unmoved and superior, as if he were shooting at clay pigeons and not at me. I was inclined to protest against this shooting, but he did not hit me, so I was quite calm. (Later) He appeared to be shooting rather at the barrel than at me."

(The rock in the river) " Quite pointed, so that it was scarcely possible to stand on it. Dr. O. can hardly stand on one leg on the narrow projection. (The indentation of the rock) There are such rocks on the sea coast. In the cinema theatre I once saw a sailor running over sharp stones on the shore. His wife was going to fling herself into the sea, as he had become entangled with another woman. But he had already given the latter up and was now racing over the sharp stones to save his wife."

(Dr. O. undresses) " Like an ecstatic fakir who is quite taken up with his task of making a speech. I am sorry, Doctor ! "

(The mission of Judaism) " A few days ago he was offended at my remark that there was no religious Judaism. He flung his arms and legs about. (In fact, he does use a great deal of gesture, which, however, like his nose, is greatly caricatured in the dream.) He was angry at my passing by so smilingly on my barrel."

(The cave) " I see the people sitting there. Ah ! A passage from Karl May in the fourth volume of his romance, *In the Realm of the Silver Lion*. In this the writer, or rather, his better self, comes into a cave where *thoughts are forged*. A picture from a German comic paper, "The Allies at Work." There they sit, forging war news ; they are erasing numbers. They are in a hurry, so as not to be surprised at their work.

(Three young people in the cave) " They are from the comic paper."

(But the title says *Vierverband* [the four United

Powers)). "Italy was not yet in it. The three are sitting close together. In Düsseldorf there is a fountain. Three girls are looking intently at a frog. (The three are sitting bent over their work) As a matter of fact they are only one; the number has probably been determined by the comic paper."

(The big business book) "It is a huge ledger; the balance is forged in it."

Let us now investigate this experiment somewhat more closely. The order was not precise; it did not indicate whether the command was to be carried out in sleep or post-hypnotically. The dreamer determined to do both. That is why he did not wish to enter on the analysis immediately on waking, as desired; otherwise he would not have been able to carry out the post-hypnotic part. But it will be seen that the monologue with which the dreamer begins contains part of a dream-analysis. A cave about which he had dreamt a few minutes before is mentioned; Dr. O's room is described as the den of a coiner. The erasing recalls a remembrance of the lost indiarubber of Dr. O.

The order, understood post-hypnotically, to express his contempt in a very refined manner, was not carried out, seeing that the hypnoid man behaved very rudely. But he is otherwise in a negative attitude towards my person. When I wrote to him a few days beforehand that he was to carry out an order post-hypnotically which was to characterise him as an avaricious person, he felt the necessity of giving away his valuable ring, but dreamt in the following night that he had done somebody out of 10,000 marks, and had threatened his victim, if he resisted, to blow him up, together with his car. Thus he obeyed automatically later on.

The *contents* of the suggested symbolical speech are not at all a bad execution of the order. The accusation of coining was made very rudely, but Dr. O's scientific honesty was more or less admitted ("Of course you will behave properly": the intercalated "You'll excuse me" however, betrays irony). Suspicion is forcibly deflected to the idea of the swell mobsman, but at the same time the whole

person is so treated that the *defence* of the scientist's honesty is challenged. *Qui s'excuse, s'accuse*. This manner of acting is very cunning.

The dream shows great inventive power in carrying out its delicate mission. I beg my reader to attempt the interpretation himself, before reading further. Probably he will find the following synthesis of the stimulus-words and their associations: The dreamer is at the foot of the Niagara Falls, i.e. in the situation of the engineer who sacrifices his love to his brutal achievement. This fits in only too well with the situation of the dreamer—known to me—who is about to break off his engagement, but is still hesitating. But he does not perish; he clings to the barrel (in a manner which, indeed, is not quite free from all objection), which recalls the frivolous and bibulous Perkeo, the billions, and the identification with the immature students. Later we find that a woman is on the barrel. He clings to a frivolous enjoyment of life, the acquisition of money, and sensuality, excusing himself by the proverb: "You cannot put old heads on young shoulders." The barrel is surrounded by the immature (*Unreifen*). This, again, fits in with his present plans. He defends himself in his dream against the fall into the (immoral) depths, but is none the less precipitated downwards. In real life he had begun a liaison with a *demi-mondaine*. The fact that he clings to the cask with his *left* foot in a case where it is a question of a dubious action, whereas in the preceding dream the right-hand side had been twice emphasised (rocks; his friend in field uniform) confirms STEKEL's well-known interpretation of *to the right = right, to the left = wrong*, without, however, proving the general truth of this assertion.¹

Traditional morality is derided as being commonplace and playing an unworthy part. The moral deterioration results from the unscrupulous sensuality to which the dreamer clings (fallen women, respectable-looking woman of immoral character: the hypocritical Prime Minister is a thrust at me as an impression of negative transference, and at the same time a projection of the

¹ *Jahrb. f. psch. Forschungen*, vol. i. pp. 466 et seq.

dreamer's own emotions, as he has the greatest respect for religion). The rifleman, resembling me, represents me; I am aiming at the principles symbolically represented by the barrel. The dreamer transforms his amoral opinions into something quite harmless; the rifleman is aiming at the same time at a clay pigeon (symbol of innocence). This fits in with his assertion that he would never seriously become involved in doubtful actions, never mix in unsavoury transactions; he pretended to do so "only in fun." But it may easily be seen from the dream that the moral danger was great.

He now seems to hasten to the execution of his (probably only now remembered) task without continuing his former theme, by ascribing a certain rôle to Dr. O. But in reality, as we shall see, this is not the case. Under pressure the rocks in the sea are associated with a story which recalls to his mind the relations named at the beginning of the dream-analysis, with an intelligent and extremely moral lady (the dreamer is the engineer and then the fisherman who saves his wife while she wrongly believes that he has abandoned her). Here we already have (it seems) a connection with the suggested dream-fragment—with the one spontaneously conceived—and we see, indeed, that there is still a strong tendency to remain faithful to his *fiancée*—as is likewise shown by the phantasy of the engineer who flung away his happiness.

The caricature of Dr. O. was an unbeautiful one. He undresses, and this, as I discovered afterwards, usually denotes the intention of wholly "revealing" oneself.¹ In order not to exhaust the reader's patience I will intercalate this provisional interpretation: "It is true that Dr. O. pretends to be the pioneer of a religious Judaism, but really he is a source of cynical amusement. He juts out of the current like GOETHE out of the chaos near the cooker." This rôle does not fit him. The reason is given in the conclusion of the dream. The pious man who, moreover, is clinging with difficulty to his narrow ledge, and will no doubt soon fall into the water like the dreamer,

¹ Language likewise has its symbolism. Cf. the "devil" hallucination in my article on *The Psychological Deciphering of Religious Glossolalia and Cryptography*, Deuticke, Vienna, 1912, p. 16.

is marked as a forger—a forger of *thoughts*. Mention had already been made pre-analytically of the cave as Dr. O.'s room, a repulsive den like that of a coiner. Now the dreamer, who had a few days previously, in an analysis of cryptotalia, identified himself with Karl May's *Ustad* (better self), enters a den in which thoughts are forged. The three persons are as a matter of fact only one, namely, Dr. O. The explanation why three men have been made out of one is given by the picture in the comic paper; moreover, the Düsseldorf fountain with the three girls looking at a frog is induced. In reality there are three frogs. Does it not seem as though the dreamer is attempting to make good the former decomposition of one into three by the reverse process of turning three into one? The three idle observers of the frog no doubt refer to the men who were present without doing anything but observe the experiment and look into the eyes of the subject under analysis. The three gentlemen (Dr. O. and the two spectators) are all rascals. The dreamer himself is therefore the frog under observation. But where does the remembrance of the *four* Allied Powers come from, seeing that there are only *three* here? The answer is that the analyst half belongs to the firm (the pious and immoral Prime Minister). The ledger which is being forged can only be a scientific one, since it lies in Dr. O's den and reveals his conclusions.

Neither the person under analysis nor the analyst would have been able to find the original command in the dream and its associations. A practised analyst might, indeed, interpret it as follows: The beginning of the dream, free from any imposed command, says something like this: "For the sake of an achievement carried out in a brutal and violent fashion, I have already half sacrificed my noble and invaluable *fiancée*; I have run the risk of losing everything and of being ruined. But I escape this fate by giving myself up to a sensual life, and by the acquisition of money—a thing which may be pardoned in a young man—by not shrinking from an unsavoury love adventure, in defiance of everything that morality and my analyst have to object. Thus I let

myself drift. (Here the carrying out of the order begins.) I do this without paying any consideration to the fanatical speech of a hypocritical coiner, who is playing a far worse part than I am."

(g) Obsessional Anxiety

For many years a young girl had been suffering from the obsessional thought that her (absolutely healthy) father would soon die. During sleepless nights she would brood over this idea, which her reason refused to accept, and was afraid that she would end in an asylum. I asked the girl if this was her first obsession, and she told me that when she was about four years of age she had been haunted by another terrible phantasy. She then continually saw before her a picture which she had first seen in a book. It represented Rudolf von Wart, the murderer of his emperor and uncle (Albrecht), being broken on the wheel; his wife was leaning against the post to which the wheel was attached. At the time the child covered herself with her blanket and longed to die. Asked about her father, the girl said that he had always been calm and gentle, never violent. He was her ideal; a remarkable, highly gifted man, whom, in her opinion, nobody could approach, save a few of the old philosophers, at a great distance. If the child was separated from her parents, even for only a quarter of an hour, she wept most bitterly. Her admiration for her father became stronger and stronger. If he described a landscape the daughter was enraptured, and was always disappointed afterwards when she saw the landscape itself. No young man could be compared with her father; hence she could give her love to none, although she was greatly courted. Paying a visit a few hours' distance from her home, she suffers greatly from homesickness, although she goes to see her parents every week. She is haunted by an air of which the first words are: "It is so hard to leave one's home." The thought of her father's death is constantly recurring, and so violently that she has to fight it with all her might. She is so seized with com-

passion at the sight of suffering, that she is afraid of unfortunate or suffering persons. It is important to note that the girl often places herself on the wheel instead of Wart.

When I had the father's permission to analyse his daughter, I was not a little astonished to hear that this apparently always quiet and gentle man vehemently accused himself of having behaved very brutally to his daughter in her early years, as he had then been suffering from an acute nervous disease which was afterwards cured. There can be no doubt of the correctness of this statement.

In the case of a phantasy which has exhibited such violence for so many years, the resistances are usually so great that direct analysis is impossible. Hence, I had recourse to the so-called resistance analysis,¹ until one day the phantasy was brought forward by the subject herself, and that in the negative form, of which she had found it impossible, shortly before, to recall the image. I began with the least "affective" figure.

(Wart's wife) "She is kneeling, and wears a black shawl."

(The shawl) "When my grandfather died, my grandmother wore such a shawl. Otherwise I have never seen one like it."

(The woman's age) "She was young."

(Wart's young wife) "Nothing."

So far the associations have left us in the lurch. The fact that the woman of the phantasy recalls the grandmother's cloak is, however, of some value. Let us now see what we can do in the way of obtaining as simple an interpretation as possible.

It is striking that the life of this girl had become a formal worship of her father. He was immeasurably over-valued; her descriptions of him exceeded the most wonderful reality; no young man could bear the least comparison with him. This reminds one forcibly of those reaction formations which are intended to cover an opposite emotion, as, for instance, the exaggerated friendliness

¹ *Vide* my book, *The Psycho-analytical Method*, chap. xx.

of intriguing persons, or the forced gaiety of the melancholy.¹ It is, further, a striking fact that the dreamer knew nothing of her father's former severity, but assured me that his behaviour was the very reverse of what I knew to be the reality. Here, too, we have a reaction formation with amnesia.² The girl was absolutely sincere, and had, indeed, no reason for concealing the truth from me.

Was her excessive tenderness toward her father perhaps the camouflage of a former hatred? The answer is given by the Wart phantasy. The child puts herself in Wart's place, because she had committed a similar action in her thoughts and longed to expiate it. In her thoughts she desired to put away her over-strict father, just as Wart had put away his uncle and emperor (father-phantasy), and punished herself by her torturing phantasy. The sad, leaning woman, who wore the grandmother's shawl, was a remodelled image of Wart's wife and the child's mother.³

But who can guarantee that this interpretation is correct? The answer is self-evident to those who know in what sense dreams and day-phantasies represent the fulfilment of wishes, and what is the result of anxiety images. The proof of the correctness of our interpretation lies in the present anxiety-image that the father will soon die. This wish, which has been over-compensated by years of father-worship, must once have been conscious in the child, a fact which is by no means incompatible with the man's former violence and the great insistence on his tenderness made by the child. The evil thought, however, was thrust back with indignation, but it remained in the subconscious and inhibited the whole of the girl's vital development. On growing up to young womanhood all her capacities for love remained directed toward the father, so that a normal object of love was excluded. By her inviolable fidelity she was still expiating her former sin, as in the Wart phantasy. But at the same time the fettered eroticism revenged itself by the anxiety

¹ *Vide my book, The Psycho-analytical Method*, pp. 272-276.

² *Ibid.* pp. 184 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.* pp. 206-211.

image and the wish contained in it, that her father might die. We have, therefore, one of those very frequent cases in which the conscious psychic content stands in contradiction to the subconscious one, and the polarisation of the impulses has reached an extreme. The negative contrast of extreme compassion fits in with the extreme cruelty which desired to do away with the father. It may be added that the obsessional idea disappeared after analysis.

(h) *A case of reconciling sacred and profane love*¹

The subject whom we have to thank for the following analysis was a nineteen-year-old youth of a Protestant family, who was suffering from an acute morbid melancholy and an almost irresistible inclination to enter the Roman Catholic Church. Three months previously he had attempted to open the veins of his wrist, but did not succeed in doing more than scratch the skin. He hated mankind; his relations with his parents were inconceivably bad; he would have nothing to do with friendship. He often brooded silently. He loved one person only, but that one he loved with passionate devotion. This was a girl of about 15, without whom he declared himself incapable of supporting life. The reader will doubtless be greatly astonished when we tell him that James (this was the boy's name) had never spoken to the girl, had never even had the courage to address her. The girl was not strikingly pretty, and James knew nothing at all about her disposition, or her intellectual and artistic achievements. Yet his passion was ardent. Lately, when he saw a young fellow approach the girl in the street, he was beside himself with distress and anguish.

I should be curious to know what a psychologist or non-psychologist, knowing nothing of Freud's procedure, could make of such symptoms. A physician of the old school would have spoken of idiosyncrasy, nervousness

¹ Already given to the world in *A New Path to the Old Gospel*, Bertelmann, Gütersloh, 1918.

or similar questionable matters, behind which there is no explanation. Allow me, therefore, to tell you the results of the psycho-analytic method.

I first got the boy to speak of his earthly love. I called his attention to the material side of his passion, and told him to tell me what came into his mind, without any attempt at criticism or interpretation.

(The loved girl) "A hair ribbon, eyes, pigtails."

(The ribbon) "It flutters. That is all."

(Eyes) "Blue. They look back at someone else."

(Blue eyes) "I saw similar ones in a picture of the Madonna, but I am not quite sure. (The eyes of the Madonna) The picture of the Virgin at T. (Picture it to yourself) There were all sorts of Madonna pictures there, in all kinds of situations. Mary beside a sick-bed, in a railway accident, near a person on breaking ice."

(The Virgin beside a sick-bed) "A sick man is lying there; a woman comes in. She has a bottle of medicine. He stretches his hand out to her. (The woman with the bottle) He does not want to take what is in the bottle."

(The Virgin in the railway accident) "Nothing. (Of course) The man is lying in front of the train. He is tired of life. The people are intended to think that he has lost his way. He does not want them to divine his attempts at suicide, lest his relations should be socially ostracised. He is only wounded. Mary releases him from his sufferings by death."

(The Virgin and the person on the breaking ice) "He does not sink, but he falls ill and dies."

We may, perhaps, be allowed to make a pause here. While I was trying to find out what connection there might be between this enigmatic passion for an unknown girl, who was not even of strikingly prepossessing appearance, the subject under analysis himself led me to the Madonna phantasy. It has no doubt struck you that James read a great deal into the picture which could not be seen there. How could it be perceived from the features of the man lying under the train that he was trying to avoid suspicion of suicide so that his relations should not suffer from

the inevitable scandal? How could it be seen in the picture that the man lying in front of the train was merely wounded? How was the artist able to express that the person about to sink through the ice did not fall through, but died of a subsequent illness?

No doubt you have observed what James himself at once perceived, namely, that he had projected his own wishes into the pictures. His longing for death, his love of the Virgin, his dislike of the odium of suicide, his consideration for his relatives, in connection with his reluctance to take medicine from his mother, are very clearly expressed. For the moment we do not demand any further explanation of these phenomena, but, after this interpolated comment, we shall continue in accordance with Freud's methods by returning to the associations called forth by the apperception of the girl. After having considered the hair-ribbon and the plaits, we come to the third feature observed.

(The girl's plaits) "They are long and flowing. You can still see them when the girl runs round the corner. (Think of this!) Six years ago, when I was 13 years old, I made the acquaintance of a girl of 18, during the holidays at B., with whom I fell in love. But I was soon entirely separated from her. Much later I once saw her plaits of hair disappearing round a corner."

(The ribbon once more) "When I was 12 I was smitten with a girl who also wore such a big hair-ribbon. She had the same name as another girl, whose acquaintance I made a year later. I never spoke to either of them; in fact, with the exception of trivial things, I never spoke to any girl."

(Once again the blue eyes) "The girl last named had blue eyes."

We now see that the girl so passionately loved, although nothing is known of her, has certain external features which immediately recall similar features resembling those of the three previous objects of his affections. The flying plaits recall those of a girl of 18 who had disappeared six years previously; the hair-ribbon of his present love reminds him of that of a girl whom he lost about seven

years ago, and for whom he felt a violent passion ; while the blue eyes of his present sweetheart recall those of another girl whom he had ardently loved six years previously. Those who have already observed a number of such processes have no doubt that the feelings attaching to the girls formerly loved, but withdrawn from them after their disappearance, are now directed toward other girls possessing features resembling those of his former loves. Hence the sight alone is sufficient to call forth an ardent feeling, in spite of the fact that there is no knowledge of the girl's character or intellectual gifts. This is the reason for the deep feeling of jealousy whenever another boy looks at the object of his present *grande passion*. We must not, however, despise these traits. They play a part of paramount importance in the elucidation of the soul-life of this melancholy youth, which, as we already recognised in the consideration of the Madonna phantasy, extends to his religious life as well.

Let us now trace the causes of this state of things.

(Tell me really about your youth) "At school I failed once to obtain promotion. Whenever I said anything I was usually laughed at by my elder brothers, so that I concluded I must be a dunce. When I was five I once heard my mother say that she would rather have had a girl. She used to cry when she saw her sister's little girl. That pained me bitterly. Otherwise I was very tender to her. But this was a great blow ; I believed that girls were superior to boys and of greater value. I constantly suffered under a feeling of inferiority. The resolve to make an end of myself was always (!) there. Of late years I have had a passion for dark shades. (The dislike of light and light colours is frequent in persons who are tired of life.)

(How did you come into touch with Catholicism ?) "At the age of 10 I entered a Roman Catholic church on a school trip. Since then I have been into one now and again, especially since I was separated from that girl six years ago. The Madonna pictures were the principal attraction."

In the next consultation other reasons for his liking

for Catholicism came to light: viz. the church music, the unintelligible Latin, the priest who, with the Cross on his back, evokes an impression of saintliness, the choristers whose white surplices express innocence, and the contrast with his own impurity.

We may now try to understand the origin of his psychic distress and his preference for Catholicism. It is true, of course, that I have been lucky enough to have had cognizance of hundreds of similar cases.

The main cause of James' inner distress was the fact that at the age of 5 he found himself treated without love, and with contempt. Love and self-valuation are in this case, as in all others, indissolubly connected with each other. The child whose desire for love remains unsatisfied, and is physically rather than mentally more backward than his brothers, withdraws his love and sinks into a state of melancholy. His love for his mother is transformed into dislike of her, and yet his longing for mother-love remains. At the age of 10 he sees, in a Roman Catholic church, the Madonna, as an unforgettable image of ideal mother-love. At the age of 13 he finds a certain substitute for his mother in a girl much older than himself. Hardly has she left him than the love for Mary, the Heavenly Mother, again gets the upper hand—a fact which corresponds with numerous experiences of a similar kind. His love for the Heavenly Mother constantly increases. The view of the Madonna pictures (eight months before the analysis) gives him an opportunity of projecting himself into them. The youth who is tired of life seeks salvation through the Heavenly Mother. His mother's medicine is refused. Mary lets the patient in bed die after he has thrown himself before the train or sunk through the ice.

We might perhaps expect that this increasing love of Mary would have awakened new hopes of the future. But nothing of the kind appears. Mary helps men only to gain death. The wish for a speedy end is stronger than that of life in the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church.

But even this religious adornment of the desire for

death does not include the whole psychic image. The passionate love for a girl who is hardly known proves that the timid inclination felt for three earthly females could not be appeased in the sphere of religion. There is a transposition from the former objects of his passion to the little unknown girl, who possesses only the external features of the others. His passion for this unknown girl, owing to the loss of her predecessors, does not give him the courage to speak to her, but the slightest incident brings about the torments of immeasurable jealousy.

It was my duty as pastor to find out the real meaning of this obsessive love of the unknown and of the Virgin Mary ; to indicate its causes and to explain to the subject, under analysis, what were his true life-value and prospects. After the first consultation I succeeded in banishing his weariness of life and in creating new interests. After the third consultation his love for the unknown girl, as well as that for the Madonna, had entirely disappeared. In exchange, James' attitude toward Protestantism had become inwardly much more sympathetic. There was still a rather strange phase to be overcome ; a fairly violent misogyny set in, but this was easily mastered.

The sublimation of the instincts in countless religious experiences is quite as easy to demonstrate as in this case. The Heavenly Mother, the Virgin, offers a substitute for mother and sweetheart. She has compassion on her suffering child ; she cannot be taken away from it ; she cannot be conquered by overcoming a sense of inferiority ; with her no rivals are to be feared. The more she is loved, the more she offers ; hence an ethical enrichment and invigoration of the emotions, although real life and its moral tasks sink more and more into nothingness. But the young Protestant does not, after all, find sufficient support in the Virgin, seeing that he does not approve of several of the Roman Catholic doctrines ; nor can he summon up sufficient moral strength to go over to Rome.

The cult comes to the aid of his inhibitions. The mystical mood fits in with the idea of intellectual insufficiency ; the priest, good and holy, mentally pictured as

a man, is a welcome substitute for his father, and is consequently provided with the features of a beloved godfather; the choristers represent moral purity in contradistinction to the reproaches which he levels at himself in this respect. Darkness and dark colours please him because he is disgusted with man and with life.

I cannot give all the details here, as they would not accelerate our solution of the problem.

Here, too, it may be added that the earthly love, as well as that coloured by Catholicism, fell away after two consultations, as they stood on a feeble foundation. At first, as I have said, there was a violent contempt for the female sex, but soon saner views and pleasure in life prevailed.

3. SOME RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

It is only by means of progressive presentation, supported by numerous proofs, that we can obtain for our interpretations that measure of confidence which suffices for the advancement of serious scientific claims. By the aid of numerous observations we must demonstrate that every causal connection which we have considered is supported by a number of similar conclusions. In my book, to which I have so frequently referred, and which is intended to be an introduction to psycho-analysis, I have made an attempt to satisfy such claims. But even so I am obliged to rely on my readers' determination to attack the facts themselves.

It would profit but little to offer in this place an encyclopædia of the psycho-analytical researches and experiments which have been undertaken up to now. It will suffice to point to a number of subjects which have been investigated already. This will at least give my readers some idea of the number that must still be waiting for analytical investigation.

In all these researches two directions have been followed, according to Freud's procedure, i.e. backwards and forwards, or causal and final or teleological. The two latter notions are, as is known, differentiated by the fact that in finality the aim or object is immanent,

and thus belongs to the subject of the phenomenon to be analysed, whereas in teleology it is transcendental. The aim or object is here directed towards a volition behind it, and is to be realised in the person analysed.

It is not my business to deal here with the army of pronouncedly morbid or merely abnormal phenomena. I would merely remind you that they render excellent service as objects of practice if sufficient prudence is exercised, and are never wholly lacking even in normal beings, just as there are no human bodies which correspond in every particular to the normal standard.

(a) *The analysed phenomena*

Among those processes to which psycho-analysis has applied itself most assiduously, the foremost rank belongs to *dream-life*, in which Freud discovered the most important access to the subconscious. If a dream is properly elaborated it reveals the deepest desires, both conscious and subconscious, the most secret connections *a tergo*, the most closely concealed resistances to achievement offered by circumstances and insight. It shows where there is a longing to return to a former state, especially to childish situations, but it likewise brings to light the innermost, perhaps still diffident, plans for the future. The *causal* investigation of the dream gives us information as to the most active barriers at the moment of the dream, and gives us an opportunity of confirming and strengthening them, or of deflecting or putting them more or less on one side. And the final exploration offers an opportunity of submitting the subconscious soul-activities to the conscious, of recognising the possibility or suitability of an obscure impulse or of an entirely subconscious effort, or of denying its existence and thus promoting the mastery of the conscious mental life.

Freud has probably solved many of the riddles of dream-life—no doubt the most important of them. But several important problems of dream psychology still remain unsolved. For instance, the connection of the instinctive forces in the dream, the deeper significance

of the symbols, the collaboration of ethical tendencies in the subconscious, the suggestive influence of the waking state on the dream content, the effect of the degree of repression on the state of that which has been repressed—these and other problems are still awaiting solution. Nevertheless, we may already lay claim to enormous progress in the comprehension of the dream-world.

We now possess the key to the subliminal workshops of the *day-dream*, the waking phantasy, *hallucination*, and even *poetical* and *artistic creation*, as well as various *religious experiences* related to these. Psycho-analysis teaches us, for instance, why in so many of Wagner's dramas a woman falls to the lot of the hero, who has just arrived, and leaves the man to whom she properly belongs (Senta, Isolde, Sieglinde.)¹ It listens to the first steps of *artistic inspiration*, *religious inspiration*, and so-called *second sight*. The psycho-analyst has penetrated the mystery of hundreds of hallucinations, both religious and profane. Ecstatic "*speaking with tongues*," apparently *meaningless ciphers*, the word formed voluntarily no less than external figures of a merely haphazard nature—all these have been proved to be ingenious achievements of the subconscious psychic activities.² The parallel between the deciphering of hieroglyphs and deciphering dreams, no less than the similarity of structure of the two, imposes itself involuntarily on the mind. Thus a realm of psychic facts of immeasurable extent opens itself out before psychology.

To these belong the *phantasy* which anticipates, dream-like, and in symbolical form, a scientific event (*vide ante*), or expresses, scenically, an achievement whose accomplishment encounters violent resistance.³ Freud's principles again were excellently illustrated in his studies on Wit.⁴

The cautious observer may obtain striking proofs of

¹ Cf. O. RANK, *The Incest Motive*, pp. 639-648.

² It is a cheap kind of pleasure to make interpretations ridiculous which have followed from associations which were actually given by other interpretations inspired by pretended associations.

³ SFLBERER'S "Functional Category," *Jahrb. f. psychopath. u. psychoan. Forschungen*, vol. i.

⁴ Cf. FREUD, *Wit and its Relations to the Subconscious*.

the correctness of the psycho-analytical method by the investigation of *free associations*, whether they appear in the form of obsessions difficult to eliminate. Words or series of words (chains of ideas), sentences, tunes, images of other kinds, the sudden appearance of which cannot be explained by the mere psychology of the conscious because their motives lie beyond the sphere of the *ego*, can be traced back to these subliminal causes. The psychic state of affairs thus laid bare is usually confirmed by other phenomena which were formerly not understood.

A curious phenomenon which was not understood before Freud's time, is the "already seen" (*déjà vu*) feeling, the familiar impression that one has already experienced something which is happening apparently for the first time, although one is forced to admit, or is told by others, that this is impossible. A large number of experiments have demonstrated that this is a process of deflection or displacement.

One may feel convinced, for example, in the face of the actual facts, that one has already visited a locality which one is really seeing for the first time. The cause of this pseudo-reminiscence is that there is something about the place which recalls a painful incident of the past which was, for the time being, forgotten. Hence, instead of the circumstances which have been driven out of the conscious, but which recall the place, the latter itself is falsely conceived as being known, usually with the glamour of mystery or creepiness (transposition of feeling and representation). The "already seen" feeling may likewise be called forth by a conversation, a sentence, etc.

Synæsthesia have also been explained by psycho-analysis; for instance, the hearing of colours.¹ These phenomena are caused by repression, and the process is similar to that of the "already seen" feeling, as described above. Whether secondary images exist, whose cause is purely physiological, as Bleuler believes, is uncertain.²

¹ *Vide Imago*, i. Bk. 3.

² His psychological description is a confirmation of the fact that the secondary feelings are inspired by the subconscious. Where he lifts the veil the parent-complex is at once seen. He associates a field divided

I think it is highly improbable, but cannot enter into my reasons here.

A compendious group of phenomena which has supplied psycho-analysis with valuable material, is that of *intellectual lapses* and *ellipses*. In those cases in which an image which is certainly stored in the memory is recalled only with difficulty, or not at all, or when, instead of the image sought, another and a wrong one is called up, which may or may not be recognised as being wrong, psycho-analysis has discovered that the cause of this peculiar phenomenon is always a repression into the subconscious, or else its reaction. The countless laws which have already been observed in such cases also admit of proof, so that Freud's tested principles of explanation constantly find fresh confirmation and are advancing with more and more surety from the rank of mere hypotheses to that of a proved theory. I need hardly say that it is not every case of forgetfulness or defective memory that falls into this category; only those which are most remarkable. The false memories are always closely connected with the memory sought for, and are called *cover-memories*.

Of great interest to the psycho-analyst, is the laying bare of the subconscious roots of *philosophical thought*, whether *metaphysical*, *ethical* and *æsthetic*. Whether a thinker spins the world *a priori* out of himself or induces it empirically, whether he is inclined to immanent philosophy, pessimism or optimism, depends on subconscious inhibitions, as may distinctly be seen during analysis.¹

The psychic phenomena hitherto considered belong chiefly to the sphere of intellectual life; those which are now to be dealt with fall rather into the category into yellowish and blackish squares which symbolises Wednesday for him, with the vicinity of his paternal home (*Zeitschr. f. Psychologie*, 1912, vol. lxx. p. 5). "A" is for him dark-bluish. It is rather amusing that Bleuler, in a work which attacks the associative intermediaries of synæsthesia, gives an example which lays bare such a psychic connection and supplies the key to the enigma. "In spite of the absurdity of the thing, Adam is for me always a bluish man (p. 18)." That the father of mankind is the same colour as that expressed in the name of his own father (BLEULER) says a great deal. But this may only be one of the determinants.

¹ Cf. Ferenczi, *Jahrb. f. psa. Forschungen*, vol. i. p. 430, and *The Psycho-analytic Method*, p. 266.

of the functions of emotion and volition. In the analysis of healthy subjects the *emotional reactions* to certain *sensory stimuli* are a grateful field of observation. It is true, indeed, that only a certain proportion of them yield valuable results under the application of Freud's methods, but these are precisely those in which the rules set up by the psychology of the conscious fail of their effect. All sorts of disinclinations and insurmountable dislikes, e.g. of wholesome foods, and odours, and the harmless touch of objects which do not inspire the average person with disgust, can be explained in this way.

The same is true of *temper* and *caprice*, which are often (but, of course, not always) an enigma to orthodox psychology, since their causes lie in the subconscious. Bad temper on waking, which is not explicable by conscious processes, is often simply explained by the interpretation of the dream which has preceded it, as this arises from the same psychic difficulty as the bad temper. Peculiar attacks during the day, such as a curious exaltation or elegiac emotion, irritability or tenderness, are comprehensible if in a free association, a meaningless word or sign is formed and interpreted by the aid of the associations connected with their apprehension.

Up to now *love* and *hatred* have been most carefully investigated. Here psycho-analysis has discovered a whole world of new forms and phenomena in the face of which the suggestions of psychological treatises are poor indeed. Traditional psychology has done next to nothing in the way of investigating the enormously rich and complicated forms of the love-life, whereas Freud's method has proved brilliantly efficacious. I have no space here to give proofs, or a survey of his more important results.

The analytical investigation of *pictures* has given very important results. Not only can the subconscious springs of action be demonstrated from the analysis of the artist, but also the motives of his *æsthetic feelings*. *Natural feelings*, too, may often be derived from subconscious processes.

And finally, psycho-analytical investigation has stood the test magnificently when confronted by the facts of *volitional life*. Unimportant *wishes* and *inclinations* which could not be understood when referred to conscious motives, betrayed their determination to the analyst.

Minor lapses, such as slips of the tongue or the pen, the mislaying of objects, and the like, turn out to be the distinct work of a secret gnome, a subconscious intention. The same is true of involuntary gestures, grimaces, haphazard movements, etc. (*symptomatical actions*).

Inability to concentrate the will has also been recognised, together with a sudden loss of love, as the result of subconscious processes.

The *preference for certain occupations*, the *choice of a profession*, the inclination for this or that *sport* or *game*, the *longing to travel*, the fanatical tendency to rely on *natural curative methods*, *vegetarianism*, *homœopathy* and a thousand other volitional phenomena, which are perhaps supported by reasons and arguments, the threadbare quality of which is distinctly evident—all these are shown by analytical investigation to be the effects of subliminal psychical processes conditioned by the repression of conscious thoughts. If the structure is built on illusory subliminal suppositions, the whole structure of our determination of volition falls to the ground as soon as the real cause has been laid bare.

Frequently, indeed, the scheme of life is founded on such a subconscious fiction. How many "pushers" or tyrants are the victims of an unknown "life lie" (Bertschinger), and can only be brought to the point of self-recognition and a normal adjustment to life by means of psycho-analysis!

Broad perspectives are opened by the application of the methods of psycho-analysis to the great *problems of civilisation*. If, for instance, we have observed a number of orthodox persons who exhibit a great respect for the letter of the law, or an obsessive devotion to wrongly comprehended symbolical acts, we can also understand the period of orthodoxy, and re-examine the correctness of our individualistic historical researches by means of

comparative historical considerations. Or, if we have explored a sufficient number of persons who reveal a marked need of authority, we can understand the *monarchistic* feelings of whole nations. Hence, the investigation of *myths* and *fairy tales*, the *science of religion*, *ethnology*, *esthetics* and the *psychology of art*, *philosophy*, *ethics* and *jurisprudence*, *pedagogics* and *characterology* are elucidated anew in a fashion which has made considerable advances toward the causal need. Psycho-analysis confronts the whole art of *writing history* with a new pragmatism, which must necessarily result in a far-reaching re-modelling and improvement of the work hitherto accomplished, in the sense of laying bare its subconscious causes. This presents important points of vantage in the matter of making new scientific and cultural problems.

This enumeration is full of omissions ; it is, indeed, poverty-stricken in the face of the plenitude of facts under consideration. It is not intended to be more than a hint ; this whole work is, in fact, nothing more than an invitation to the reader to prove things for himself.

(b) *The forms of the psychic events*

In his observations of phenomena Freud naturally paid attention to their *forms*. He derived laws from a series of concurrent processes, and stated these laws, to begin with, in the form of provisional hypotheses. Later on he modified them, or raised them to the rank of a theory by means of a number of fresh experiments of a different nature. There is no space here for this enormous mental achievement ; I can give only a few details.

The *imagery*, which is of such great importance in the dream-life, e.g. those grotesque formations made of all sorts of features (centaurs, the sphinxes of mythology, etc.), confront us with a serious problem. *Anæsthesia* properly belongs to pathology, but may often be observed in healthy persons. *Hypermnnesia* and *amnesia* excite the attention of the psycho-analyst only if their contents are at all remarkable. If a name that is daily in use cannot be found, in spite of all efforts, subconscious motives

for the forgetfulness are always to be found, their relative fitness being perceived at the same time. Facts that have been completely forgotten, but are verified by information, are often recovered in dreams. Indifferent and everyday reminiscences from earliest infancy turn out to be so-called "cover memories," i.e. hints of an important event connected either by its contents or externally with that image. The *over-determination* designates the incontrovertible fact that every fragment of a dream is determined not only by *one* motive, but by several. By *overlaying* we understand the phenomenon of another meaning, behind the meaning of the dream, just as the symbol of the Cross, for instance, gives rise to a multitude of thoughts. In the dream, however, the strata can often be finely differentiated. Freud has perspicaciously brought to light the means employed by dream logic. In literature, as far as I am aware, there has not as yet been any references to *cover-thoughts*, i.e. to thoughts hinting at the expression of others lying behind those actually indicated.

There is an example in Tolstoi's *War and Peace*. The prince is told that his baby cannot go out one day on account of the cold weather. "If it were warm," said the prince drily, "the child would go out in his shirt; but, as it is cold he must have warm clothes put on; they were invented for that. The result of the cold is, therefore, that the baby must be wrapped up, but not that he must stay at home when he needs fresh air." It seems as though he intended by logic of this kind to punish others for the illogical aspirations of which he was conscious.

The *relation principle* is of great importance, as it falls into a whole number of single laws. According to this principle the psychic organism tries to bring every impression and every phantasy—every new act, indeed—into relation with experience. Psycho-analysis, however, has explained the sphere of its enforcement and activity. In my *Investigations into the Psychology of Hatred and Reconciliation*, I found that hatred re-modelled all kinds of impressions received in the schools, the theatre,

literature, etc., subconsciously, and utilised them for phantasies full of hatred.

In the case of reconciliation they did not simply lie fallow, but were re-modelled according to the new adjustment. In this way must the continuity of mental life be restored. On this necessity is based *regression*, the constant reversion to former, and especially to infantile events, which plays so important a part in dreams, in sickness, and in all phantasies, emotions, schemes, etc. Revenge, remorse, gratitude, expiation, etc., and other ethical or unethical processes, go back to this principle of relation; the therapeutic effects of psycho-analysis itself are based, in the first instance, on the fact that phantasies which have been consciously created can be more decisively and permanently re-modelled than those of the subconscious. In the analysis of artists and of religious and ethical persons, this state of affairs is particularly noticeable. It explains, for instance, why moral sermons are of so little use to the fallen, while the symbols of the Salvation Army, for instance, are extraordinarily successful.

Further, I may mention the phenomena of *rationalisation*, those efforts working throughout life to justify a subconscious wish or thought by reasonable motives belonging wholly to the conscious. Many religious convictions, a great deal of religious dogma and philosophy, the existence of love and hatred, are rationalisations. That which can be so neatly and artificially produced in the post-hypnotic experiment is produced spontaneously, step for step, in real life.

Mention has already been made of sublimation. The constant forms of emotional and volitional processes cannot, unfortunately, be touched upon here, although psycho-analysis has made a considerable breach in the general poverty of psychological knowledge in this connection. In my book many of the most important results and the method of obtaining them are given. The task of re-examination already imposed on the reader is so great, that I dare not make it any greater.

This chapter was not intended to prove that psycho-

analysis has so far always been absolutely correct in its workings, but rather that it has a right to be considered seriously, as a method auxiliary to official psychology, and to be thoroughly tested and examined. It holds good especially in those extensive and valuable domains, which orthodox psychology excluded, and had to exclude, in contradiction to its own nature, because it had accepted the dogma of the denial of the subconscious psychic forces, or had found no access to them. The trustworthiness of carefully obtained psycho-analytic results is in no way inferior to that of those of the experimental psychology of the conscious. Orthodox psychology only injures itself by passing over a method of investigation which has been recognised as of the greatest value by numerous investigators of various faculties. For those who have mastered the methods of psycho-analysis it opens out immense possibilities of discovery. But this likewise implies fresh *obligations* on the part of the investigator, which, in the long run, no psychologist will be able to evade. In spite of the useful work which it has accomplished, ordinary psychology, with its helplessness in the face of the higher psychical facts, will be found to be more and more poverty-stricken and narrow-minded. The tiny coterie of trained psychologists who have mastered the psycho-analytical method, feel themselves unequal to their titanic task. The fact that Freud and his school have made such important discoveries, attested both by friends and opponents, is a guarantee for the highly beneficial development of the new psychological method. Well for those who are still young and courageous enough to learn it and to investigate psychic facts by its help!

first consultation. (In the reproduction the features have been altered as far as was possible without spoiling the whole impression.)

The drawing (in the original $50\frac{1}{2} \times 64$ centimetres) is good ; the gloomy and threatening expression of the face which had characterised the budding artist for some time was, however, replaced by one of calm resignation.

Our attention was soon attracted to the group of heads on the right of the chain. Frank assured me that they did not represent any definite person. Urged to give me his associations, he at once described the first face in front as that of his father, that on the left as that of his mother, while the third was that of his younger sister. As he candidly admitted, he hated all three of them.

Later on he said that only the upper part of the face bore some resemblance to his father, and, if carefully considered, only the arch of the forehead and the root of the nose corresponded with those of his father.¹ The nose itself was that of his elder brother who, following in the footsteps of their strictly religious mother, was leading a quiet life devoted to the service of God. The wrinkles from the wings of the nostrils to the corners of the mouth were those of a paternal uncle who had died when Frank was five years of age. And yet he still could vividly recall how his uncle used to rage in his epileptic fits. The eyebrows, too, reminded him of his father's brother.

The curved corners of the lips were those of a brother of his, also an epileptic, who had died six years previously. The furrow under the nose¹ as well as the two sharp points of the upper lip, said Frank, derived from his hated younger sister, who also had the corners of the mouth here depicted. The small beard was traced to some disagreeable schoolmasters. The whole facial expression was supposed to represent a cynical smile, which the artist attributed to himself.

The face on the left reminded Frank of his mother, although, strangely enough, he did not at first find any of her features in this pendant. Only the hair by the parting and framing the forehead bore any resemblance

¹ Not quite distinct in the reproduction.

to his mother's. Somewhat later he found his mother's lips. Our somewhat peculiar portraitist remembered that his mother, together with some of his aunts, constantly scolded him when he began to read Nietzsche. Now it turned out that his younger sister was indicated by the same kind of lips.

The nose bore some similarity to that of a gossiping neighbour. Once she made fun of a boy who had a defect in his speech; immediately afterwards a similar defect appeared in her own child.

The whole face is deathly pale.

The head on the right is associated with the hated sister. The hair on the forehead is exactly like hers. The lowest lock is like that of a contentious and untidy maid who in spite of her regular church-going had lived an immoral life and had been obliged to marry to save her fair name. The hated younger sister bore some resemblance to this maid, being sensual, quarrelsome and a talebearer, although affecting piety.

The neck of the figure displayed an ornament which was recognised as the lace tie of a boy who had once struck Frank with an axe when he was doing some carpentry. The neck further indicated the goitres of several of his relatives.

Up to this point I had merely collated the associations of the draughtsman and kept my surmises to myself. The interpretation of this group is now easy for anybody who has empirically tested the theory of psycho-analysis: *Frank had in the most ingenious manner murdered a number of hated persons, in the first instance his father and mother and one of his sisters, by beheading, hanging and spitting (a spit runs through all the heads) and finally by crucifying them (the cross over the heads is a symbol of the piety, real or assumed, of his relatives).* Two brothers, an uncle, a bad neighbour and a companion fall victims to this massacre, or the father is perhaps meant to suffer the fate of the two epileptics.

In addition to this sadistic procedure a number of minor malicious factors are revealed.

With regard to the character of the parents I may

remark that the father was a capable and well-disposed man who was universally liked, but was somewhat too strict. The mother was an excellent and affectionate woman who could, at best, only be accused of religious partiality and officiousness.

We now turned our attention to the ornament (Fig. 1 *a*) hanging from the centre of the upper margin, and once again, however wearisome it might be for Frank, we showed him the object and recorded his associations. He said: "In front we perceive a heart, which is steely, hard and insulting." It is indented and is about to curl up in front, "so that we can see what is behind," "It must belong to my father." On the right a second heart is leaning on the other; or it might be taken for a withered and loveless bosom. Between these is a curious object which Frank could not interpret.¹ It occurred to him, however, that opposite his house there lived a wonderfully pretty girl whom he had perhaps attempted to draw here. The curve to the left he first designated as the knee, and it was only then that he discovered that he had drawn the girl inverted, i.e. standing on her head. The reader will at once perceive that both the ordinary and the gravid body are distinctly indicated. The whole picture is supposed to represent a dragon.

The explanation is consequently this: The loveless mother leans on the hard-hearted father. Both have a common secret which is about to reveal itself. The mother is pictured both as a girl and a pregnant woman. The Œdipus complex, which is seldom absent in psychoneurosis, is here distinctly recognisable: Frank is fiercely jealous of his father. The incestuous love of his mother, which is so clearly indicated, is an essential part of his neurosis. This reprehensible tendency is the dragon which is threatening him. There may even be a deeper interpretation.

Finally we discussed the portrait of the artist.

The costume is that of a monk; for a long time Frank had desired to become a Buddhist monk. He imagined that it must be "immense" to enter a monastery or

¹ Not clear in the reproduction.

merge into nothingness. The monastic garment in which the artist wrapped himself was likewise that of Parricida in Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell*. For some time Frank could not remember what this name signified, a fact which appeared to him rather curious. Suddenly he remembered that a parricide is the murderer of his father.

The hand is that of a person pleading for mercy. The original is the publican who beat his breast and said: "God be merciful to me, a sinner." (Luke xvi.)

The little finger is incorrectly drawn. It occurred to Frank that this mistake had given the hand the shape of the male genital organ about to relax after masturbation.

The piece of iron hanging from the chain penetrates the head of the painter and thus places him in the selfsame position as the other members of the family who have been murdered in four different ways. Hence for the moment we may say that the meaning of the portrait is: *I confess penitently the burden of guilt which I have laid on myself as parricide and murderer of my relatives, as well as onanist; I implore mercy and pardon, and am ready to expiate my sin by my execution or as a Buddhist monk sunk in nothingness.*

Thus the three principal parts of the picture indicate:

1. Guilt (murder of relatives, strengthened by onanism).
2. Cause of the guilt (hatred; incestuous love).
3. Expiation.

If, on the analogy of the dream, we wish to summarise the contents of this picture in one sentence, we may say: "As my hatred of my father is the cause of my impure and incestuous love of my mother, and I wish my relatives to come to a violent end, I penitently confess myself to be worthy of death, and will expiate my sin by flight into the nothingness of the cloister."

A month later we analysed the recent instigators of the portrait. Five days before, Frank had visited an art exhibition with his father and the hated sister. In front of Böcklin's and Segantini's pictures he had become angry, thinking of his bad relations with his parents.

With bitterness and injurious intent he told his father that it was a vile action to let an artist first nearly die of starvation and afterwards admire his pictures.

The evening before beginning his picture he had half intended to play truant the next morning, as he had often done. While looking at himself in the glass in the morning he was struck by the furrow going straight from the root of the nose to the forehead. In earlier days, when he was still a small boy, he remembered this furrow on his father's face when the latter was filled with care and sorrow at his son's conduct. He now asked himself what his father would say if he knew that he was going to play truant. Two hours later our artist was suddenly inspired. He hurried off at once to buy a sheet of paper, and began to work. The picture shows the father's lines of care very plainly. The rising pity is discharged by the negative father-complex, by means of a sadistic elaboration. The wrinkle on his own forehead may represent a justification of this cruel act: "You have caused me more sorrow than I ever caused you."

Hence this artistic conception reveals a recent origin just as a dream may, while the complex plainly goes back to early childhood, when the severity of an otherwise excellent father aggravated the Œdipus complex.

2. "*Requiem*"

This gloomy oil-painting (45 × 37 centimetres) was painted some seven or eight months before our consultations. The sketch was made in one hour, on the basis of an artistic inspiration; the whole uncommonly powerful composition took only eight hours. Frank remembered that while he was painting it he often wished to disappear in the river which flowed past his home town (it appears in the first picture, too), as also when he was tortured by domestic strife. Further, he was vexed that such a fuss should be made of Christianity while his prayers remained unheard. He wished to bury Christianity and himself with it. But then he heard wonderful organ music proceeding from the chapel shown in the painting.

The chapel inspired Frank with the thought that his father must somewhere be present, but where he could not say. The oval window reminded him of God's eye framed in a triangle in Albrecht Dürer's etching of *The Holy Family in Egypt*. Further, it reminded him of the one-eyed Wotan and of Polyphemus, who devoured Ulysses' companions in his cave and tried to slay the fleeing Ulysses with rocks. This eye is that of his father looking down darkly at his son.

The two cypresses recalled his two brothers, the round trees his sisters, one of whom (known to us from the preceding picture) boasted of being an exemplary daughter, always ready to help her parents, whereas in reality she tried to get as much out of them as possible. The elder sister, of nobler character, corresponding to the tree on the right, did not behave in this manner. The officiousness of the hated sister is expressed in the position of the tree on the left.

Then the chapel turned out to be that of an institution for the incurably insane. The building had formerly been a monastery. There was then living there a gifted artist; who, like Frank, had painted and poetised until he had been brought to this place. And now our subject confessed his burning desire to pay a visit to this man, and even to be interned himself as a madman for the term of his natural life. The youth used to sit for hours in front of the chapel and dream of the happiness that would be his to be free of all care in the adjacent asylum and to be able to give unbridled rein to his daring phantasies. The painted chapel of the asylum does not, however, stand on an island. The thought reminded him of the castle of Wasserstelz in Gottfried Keller's *Hadlaub*. The young minnesinger was concealed in the castle in order to escape discovery by the false Count of Rapperswyl. His beloved came to Hadlaub, confessed her love and became his wife. This story led Frank to the thought of a beautiful girl at his birthplace who lived in a "fearfully quiet house" away from the street, and whom his father liked very much. Frank hoped, like the hero of Keller's story, to supplant his father.

The interior of the chapel is brilliantly lighted up, and wonderful music resounds from it. Again Frank thinks of his pretty neighbour, who is represented behind the hearts of his father and mother. Then his thoughts fly all of a sudden to the Christmas Days which he celebrated as a child at home. All his interest in the picture is concentrated on the light that streams from the church upon the dead. Now Frank imagines that his elder brother must be somewhere in the chapel, and finally he believes that he had always imagined his mother to be there. He felt no love for her at that time.

The two crucifixes symbolise his two brothers. The posts are standing slantingly in the ground and will soon fall. The poplars (brothers) do not reach the church (mother), although they incline towards it (inartistically symmetrical). The dead person (Frank himself, of course) is lying with outstretched arms as the true Christ in front of the island—far too big in perspective.

The three stars reminded him again of his father, his mother and the hated sister. (It may be remarked that Frank's father was a churchwarden, and that the boy was familiar enough with the expression "Mother Church.")

This oil-painting consequently expresses the desire for death and its justification in the boy's attitude towards his family. Frank wished to die and in this way gain the maternal love which was (he thought) denied him in life. Another wish, deducible from the associations, was the longing to live in future in the church (= mother) or the lunatic asylum, and thus be buried alive.

With this phantasy there corresponds on the one hand active cruelty, and on the other self-exaltation. What is remarkable in the former is the desire for the death of the father, mother and younger sister (the three stars), the identification of the father with Polyphemus whose eye was gouged out by Ulysses (Frank) before he swam away, the representation of the brother who is predestined to fall, and the mockery of the officious sister. The tendency to self-exaltation is suggested by the desire to resemble the mad man of genius, to supplant his father

with the village beauty, and above all to be found and mourned by his mother, as the true Christ, by the side of the false Messiahs, his brothers.

In the portrait of the artist we find the furrow on the father's forehead; in this case we have a wish that is not expressed in the painting. While he was working at it Frank heard wonderful music. His (probably hysterical) mother formerly used at one time to hear music as an hallucination, and occasionally did so.

The religious sublimation of the death-wish, and the phantasies directed toward the members of the family should be remarked.

A few weeks after the *Requiem* Frank made a very fine drawing with the significant title: *Let the dead bury their dead*. A drowned youth is being carried along by the banks of a river bordered with poplars. A veiled female holds out her hands as if in blessing over the soulless body. The draughtsman had no difficulty in recognising himself and his mother in both figures; the latter is characterised in the title as being spiritually dead. Later on his fury degenerated into the desire for the death of the secretly loved object. In the river which flows by his native village, Frank had long wished to find death. Every swim was a death-orgy. The river itself became a mother-symbol and played the same part as the womb, the cave, the madhouse and the monastery in the other pictures.

3. "Madness"

(Pen-and-ink drawing, $36\frac{1}{2} \times 26$ centimetres; drawn five months before the analysis.)

This picture reminded Frank of the serious nature, the violence of madness, of his visit to the lunatic asylum, on which occasion he experienced the greatest pleasure in watching the patients, particularly their eyes. Opposed to his vehement desire to become mad is the clear insight into the absurdity and inferiority of this wish.

Frank was first attracted by the eyes of the figure. They betray madness, but they also remind him of his own

eyes as they appear in moments of enthusiasm. The mouth shows his own under-lip. I cannot give the reason for this substitution. The creases at the corners of the mouth are those of an uncle who used to beat him with his stick because he did not want to eat his porridge. At that time he called out to his father: "Beat me to death!"

The finger under the chin is at once seen to be the genital organ which is trying to reach the lips. Frank thinks of the act of masturbation. The serpents remind him of the same obscene pleasure, but also express something devilish. The weeping woman is first of all associated with Frank weeping for himself, then with the cemetery near his parents' house, and then with his sister and the "tremendously pretty chapel of the mad-house." i.e. his mother.

The hand is abnormally large; it grasps and controls all the threads running over the curtain (the world). It belongs to Frank. The curved lines represent dirt dropping down; power goes out of them, so that everything is illuminated. Frank sees himself and his mother in the midst of this same pleasant filth of improper sexual activity.

The vertical lines ending in curves, drawn from the bottom upwards, are supposed to rise from some murky unknown filth, attracted by the light. (I cannot interpret them with certainty. They are caused by the folds of the curtain. Perhaps they refer to sexual impulses which, set free by open sexual pleasure, ascend out of their hiding-place.)

The inscription "I know" refers to the insight into the secret of his own condition.

History of the picture. This drawing was made in the house of an elderly gentleman who overwhelmed Frank with attentions, invited him to make long journeys and promised to provide the money for his academic studies. Shortly before making the first sketch, Frank had discovered that this man was homosexual and had evil intentions towards him. For instance, when the youth was once leaving the room, he caught hold of him and hugged him. This conduct disgusted the surprised youth

and he determined to take leave of the hoary sinner. He began to draw the picture at this man's table without knowing what it would turn out to be, whereas it was the rule for his inspirations to descend upon him all at once with the greatest clearness.

Interpretation. Disgusted by the homosexual attack, Frank experienced the most intense introversion. His catatonia is wonderfully symbolised by the drawing. The patient withdraws from the world behind his curtain, revels in the wildest auto-eroticism (masturbation and masochistic pleasure in his mother's sufferings) as the All-knowing one whose powerful hand (paranoically) controls the destinies of the world. Frank confessed that he had often had such thoughts, but not during the time when he was making this drawing.

4. "*The Nymph*"

(A very glaring oil-painting; unfinished: 45 × 37 centimetres.)

Above is a woodland landscape with trees to the left; along the borders of the forest, toward the observer, a narrow path loses itself in a small stream. Below, a cliff with two caves, one lying above the other. In the upper cave is a nymph couchant, and near her a brown and a yellow butterfly. The nymph is holding her hands on high in order to catch the water dripping from the stalactites above. The long fair hair of the female figure is hanging loosely over her shoulders. This composition was commenced on a Good Friday.

The nymph has the same kind of hair as the elder and favourite sister of the artist. Frank loves only girls with the same coloured hair and the same figure. He does not object to a little flirting, but, with one exception, never asks for a kiss. As far as he can remember, the kisses of his formerly tender mother were always distasteful to him. If he has once found favour with a girl he becomes indifferent and leaves her.

At first the butterflies were regarded as fortuitous and of no significance. Then, however, he associated the

brown butterfly with himself, and the yellow one with a girl who had agreed to meet him on the evening of the consultation. He frequently used to go for walks with her, without, however, feeling very strongly attached to her person. Once only did he feel in love with her, but then he concealed his feelings. The butterflies reminded him of three girls with whom he had indulged in some slight flirtation, but from whom our innocent Don Juan had withdrawn himself.

The path near the pines really exists. He used to promenade there with his present girl friend. But the trees do not fit in with the scenery; they were taken from a wood where he had had a rendezvous with another young woman.

These were his associations. What is their interpretation? Everything points to the repressed love for the elder sister who is also consciously honoured and greatly esteemed. Frank's desire is for her; he is in reality always longing for her. All the fair-haired beauties whom he runs after, only to leave them in bitter disappointment, are intended to take the place of the dearly loved sister, but naturally they cannot do so. We shall return to this later.

What does the cave signify? A glance at the whole will tell us. The wood, the spring and the two caves are evidently representations of the female organs. Our drawing fully confirms the pictured dreams of Marcinowski, which turned out to be unconscious reproductions of the female body. The cave in which the sister lies, like the chapel where the brother was lodged, signifies the womb.

Hence Frank desired to go back to his sister in his mother's womb. We may remark that the tufaceous stones spouting water over the sister show distinct phallic forms and thus we may recognise a scene of ancient mythology; Osiris and his sister Isis live together in the womb of their mother Neith.

The yellow butterfly in the cave betrays the desire to connect his girl friend with the sister, so that the youth can realise in the former his unrealisable longing for the latter. He would bring friend and sister together so

that he can find the latter in the former. The place of the butterfly, however, at a certain distance from the sister, is not a favourable prognostic for the realisation of this desire.

Our interpretation is strongly confirmed by other observations. Those who have undertaken the analysis of these young Don Juans are aware that they are all looking for a certain female whom they hope to find in their victims, but never do find whenever serious love is in question. Freud discovered that they were always seeking the mother, but never found her. Since then I have myself found other confirmations of this. One example will suffice. An eighteen-year old youth is suffering from various hysterical forms of paralysis and violent Don Juanism. He feels himself attracted in succession by a number of girls, woos them stormily, captures their inclinations, steals a few kisses and then, to his great disappointment, entirely loses his love for them. He thinks he is a "bad egg" and feels disgusted with life. One day, while going upstairs, he was seized with asthma and violent pains in the back under the left shoulder. When he drew attention to these symptoms he remembered that his father, too, had suffered from asthma. When he was a child the boy crept nearly every night into his brother's bed, as he suffered from the hallucination that he saw terrifying shapes. He saw a man armed with a knife or revolver and panting violently, and a woman who usually carried a broom. The various cases of asthma cured by analysis have taught us that panting very frequently refers to the father *in coitu*; in this case the knife and revolver coincide with this. The negative father-complex which had led to open hatred of that amiable man was thus acquired at an early age. On the Saturday afternoon on which the above-mentioned pains occurred, a letter had arrived from the father announcing a visit. The son had become very angry on hearing this news. It was only after intensive investigation that the key to the mystery was found. A year before, the father had likewise announced his visit for a Saturday. The young man, however, wired him not to come, on

the pretext of homework, and went with a lady friend to the forest. The apperception of the painful place awakened a lively remembrance of the fact that the young fellow, while clinging caressingly to his lady-love, had been struck by a root or twig on the place where he now felt the pains, a fact which, however, did not prevent further kisses. Vexed by his father's announcement, the unfilial son wishes himself back in the tender situation of a year before, which had been procured by his refusal to see the unwelcome visitor, and identifies himself with the panting father, thus renewing his desire towards his mother. The last wish appeared still more distinctly in many of his dreams. When the son was three years old the delicate woman was attacked by lung disease and left the family for a sanatorium. She often returned home for a few months, to the great joy of the little one. The nursery governess was then dismissed. For a period of seven years, therefore, till the death of his mother, the boy transferred his affections to various females, in whom he always sought his mother. He still continued to act in this manner towards women, although he felt that it was an obsession against which he strove violently until he was freed from it by analysis.

Frank is only an apparent exception. Behind the incest-wish directed towards the sister stands the mother, almost without exception, as the early object of this desire. As a rule the sister is the first mother-substitute, and is followed by a number of others. It frequently happens that the mother-image is divided into the two types that are always before the son's eyes, the pure, ideal nature, and the sexual one. The man looking for his mother pursues the virgin or the *fille de joie*. I have myself observed several cases in which the erotic constellation of features described by Freud was strikingly present. Frank who had during at least the four first years of his life shared the bedroom of his parents, and then of his sisters, seems to have projected the mother-image upon the sisters. He finds the pure and ideal mother in the elder sister whom he loves, and the sensual female in the younger whom he hates. Both these women,

who are themselves mothers, reveal in reality a striking difference of character. But by perceiving the two mother-types in them the brother exaggerates this difference, and attaches to the younger substitute the "affects" appertaining to the mother.¹ We shall see later whether this conception is sufficient for our purposes. In order to answer the question we must first know whether the womb itself is symbolised by the cave or whether this is only a symbol for withdrawal and exclusion from the world, i.e. an introversion phantasy which makes use of the maximum regression with regard to time in order to designate the strongest regression with regard to functions. It is a fact that the mother's womb itself is longed for in innumerable cases. Nicodemus's question: "How can a man . . . enter the second time into his mother's womb, and be born?" (John iii. 4) plays² an important part. Stekel showed this wish in the dream of a neurotic, Abraham published a series in conformity with it.³ Marcinowski confirmed the observations of his predecessors by magnificent "dream drawings" which are closely related to the observations indicated here, and Paul Ernst deals with the same subject in the form of fiction⁴: Which of the various traits, in which this transformation is expressed is the narrator to select? We may perhaps tell how Hans is sitting one Wednesday afternoon in his landlady's parlour where the farmer is dozing dreamily behind the stove, and has an old cigar-box which has been given him; he carefully plasters all the joints and seams with paste so that no light can get into it, and dreams, as he often used to dream at home, as he sat under the table, how snug it would be to be quite small and to live in such a light-tight box."⁵

¹ The enormous extent to which the love of sisters and brothers obtains, even directly incestuous love, has been demonstrated by OTTO RANK with an astonishing wealth of evidence (*The Incest-motive in Legend and Poetry*, pp. 441-685).

² JUNG, "Transformations and Symbols of the Libido," *Jahrb.*, iv. pp. 268 *et seq.*

³ STEKEL, "The Symbolism of the Mother's Womb Phantasy," *Zentralb. f. Psa.*, vol. i. pp. 102 *et seq.*

⁴ ABRAHAM, "Some remarks on the Mother Cult and its Symbolism in the Individual and National Psychology," *Zentralb.*, vol. ii. pp. 549 *et seq.*

⁵ MARCINOWSKI, "Dream Drawings," *Zentralb.*, vol. ii. pp. 490-518.

At the Zurich Psycho-Analytical Assembly Dr. Frieda Kaiser spoke of a patient who did not want to get up of a morning because she compared the bed to her mother's womb. And Silberer has referred to the importance of dreams of the mother's womb.¹

I assume for the time being that the inhibition leading to introversion leads to the wish to dwell in the uterus, or in any case to attain exclusion from the world. The mother-womb phantasy operates too in the longing to end one's life as hermit or monk. The psychology of the reclusion of anchorites is a branch of the psychology of introversion.

5. "*The Bridge of Death*"

(Pencil-drawing, 38 × 28 centimetres.)

A youth is about to leap away from a female corpse on to a bridge lost in a sea of fog, in the midst of which Death is standing. Behind him the sun rises in blood-red splendour. On the right margin two pairs of hands are trying to recall or hold back the hurrying youth.

The female is associated with the mother, the hair is that of the loved sister. The figure is twisted spirally, a fact which Frank had not observed. This observation recalled to the youth the image of a sexual act. The feet are those of a woman, while the position of the upper part of the body, though not its form suggests a man. There were no other associations.

The youth represented the best friend of our analytical subject, but of course in reality signified himself. The hands are those of the father and the hated sister. I never learnt what caused the picture.

The interpretation is clear enough. The youth desires the death of his mother, and for himself a violent death, so as to cause pain to his father and his unloved sister. The sun is, no doubt, as is so often the case, the symbol of the father. An "over-interpretation" follows later.

¹ *Zentralb.*, vol. ii. p. 540.

² *The Narrow Path to Happiness*, p. 83.

³ H. SILBERER, "Spermatzoëic Dreams," *Jahrb.*, iv. (1912) pp. 141 et seq.

The drawing had been made a year before the analysis, it is hence the oldest of those treated of here ; it is put in this place because it was one of those analysed later.

II. Artistic Phantasies created under the influence of Regression

The first consultation alone exercised a calming influence on Frank, but this improvement did not last for very long. After the third consultation, when pictures 1 to 5 had been investigated, a violent revulsion occurred of the boy's whole disposition, and especially of his sympathetic relations with his parents. The following pictures will show what direction this assumed.

6. "Sunny Heights"

(Sketch for an oil-painting, made five days after the last consultation : 46 × 38 centimetres.)

A pair of lovers are standing on a sunny height overgrown with rose-bushes, above a sea of fog, on the other side of which an ascetic is sitting in front of his hut amidst rocks. The austere recluse attempts to drive the happy pair away to work, but the lover looks him in the face with calm confidence and holds his beloved firmly in his arms.

The ascetic recalls the father, in so far as he allows himself but little pleasure and holds strict views of life. Behind him is hidden the analyst, who likewise sets his face against flirtation and idleness. The hut is the penitent's dwelling. The lover, whom we have already met in *The Bridge of Death* is again our artist's best friend. The beloved is the girl friend who had been attached to the nymph in the shape of a butterfly. Her vigorous and somewhat broadly built body, and the straight nose are said to be well depicted. The very slightly curved eyebrows, however, recall those of the loved sister. In spite of the analysis of three days previously, therefore, the substitution had become fixed.

The rose-bushes are associated with love. The withered

little trunk recalls the mother, as its position with regard to the ascetic already implies. But first of all we obtained the following significant association: "All young love is like a sapling which is growing and blossoming. But here is a withered one." He meant the love for his mother. The sturdy tree in front designates the girl friend, and the two standing back, her last two predecessors. During the analysis Frank drew a rose which, however, recalled an apple. By this action he strengthened the impression that the picture was intended to represent Adam and Eve in Paradise. The father who drives them away is God, against whom the artist rebels.

Hence the sketch exhibits the unconfessed wish: *I will tear myself free from my love for my mother and, in spite of the opposition of my austere father and the analyst, rejoice in my Paradisical love for my friend, far above the mists, on the sunny heights.* This interpretation is not intended to be a definite one.

7. "WHITHER, O SOUL?"

On the day after the creation of *Sunny Heights* Frank set out on a ten days' trip to the South. One day, as he was passing the garden of a villa, the idea occurred to him, just before he came to the gates: "I would like to be buried here." Then he was struck by the olive-trees, and it seemed to him that everything was transformed into music. A moment later the wish occurred: "It must be splendid to step out of the darkness into the starlight!" Immediately the intuitive explanation of the picture here given flashed upon him "like lightning." He himself explained the picture as follows:

"The man stepping into the darkness of the garden is my soul; the crouching man behind him, my body. The former would like to step out of the darkness and approach the open sky, from which a star is brightly shining down upon him. In the garden itself I caught a glimpse of the sky through the tops of the trees. The body timorously follows the soul. Both of them, body

and soul, would like to be united, but when the soul pursues high-flying aims the body is an obstacle. The soul is looking for support in the star, the body does not see it. And now the body would like to embrace the soul and become one with it."

Behind the "soul" we perceived on the palimpsest of the original (but not in our reproduction) the shape of a youth almost wholly erased. He was standing on the ridge of a mountain which towered up against the night sky. In the background a valley could be seen. Lights were twinkling from a few houses. Mists were rising. The youth looked toward his parents' house, but could not see it on account of the fog. The artist so fertile in ideas, had destroyed this sketch because, as he said, it no longer interested him; in other words, it no longer corresponded with his altered complex. By means of this analysis Frank found the right relation to his parents' house, the fog was dispelled, and the longing for that which he had sought but never found, left him.

In place of the former pessimistic scenes we now find a new one which betrays the striving toward the light, and at the same time the hope that the timorous body, which had in its weakness so often proved to be an obstacle, might be able to follow the spirit. The picture probably portrays his longing to be free of sensuality. We may assume that his inclination for his girl friend had disappeared, at least for the time being. In reality it had disappeared entirely. A squabble with some fellow-passengers favoured the auto-eroticism.

The sense of the sketch can better be grasped if we direct our attention to its origins. It struck me that the inspiration had come with lightning rapidity, as Frank was passing the gates of the garden: I made him therefore fix his mind on this, and obtained the association: "It reminds me of the cemetery near our house." Frank often wished to be buried there. On passing the garden gate he did not recollect the similar entrance to the cemetery at home, but the desire of death was stimulated and immediately compensated by the glance at the open sky and transformed into higher hopes of life. The recent

material (the gates) acted as a stimulant on the complex, but also served as a working-out of the reaction formation (the little bit of open sky). Here, too, the rapidity with which the subconscious creates its manifestations—in this case the inspiration—is striking.

8. "Doubt"

This picture was drawn on the eve of the analysis.

After tedious wanderings a youth takes a rest before a rocky cave sinking into the earth, near which two female forms are standing. A path leads over the meadows out of the shadows into "stupendously light, cheerful and smiling heights" clad in blossoming fruit trees. In the background loom the Alps, as in the Engadine. The whole is roofed by the delicate shades of a blue sky. The youth is in doubt whether he shall enter the cave or take the path leading toward the light.

The cave recalls at once that of the earlier picture (*The Nymph*), and signifies his mother's womb. The youth is a comrade who sat for the picture. The woman with the sword is the hated sister, who was so fond of playing the part of Justice (hence the veil over her face), and had recently said to her brother that he ought to change his character. She is warlike, probably, because she intends to chase Frank into the cave. The other woman is the elder and the favourite sister. She wishes her brother to go into the cave, and follows him to it, as the younger did before her. Four days previously he had confessed that he intended to leave his parents in spring in order to go his own way. Unfortunately nothing more could be obtained from him.

The interpretation is not difficult. Frank has already slipped back a little from the *Sunny Heights* and been caught again in the mother-problem. He had planned to liberate himself from his mother by local separation—as if this would have been of any use! The whole thing depends on his liberation from the mother-image, the mother-picture dwelling in him since the time of his infantile repression. As the loved sister warns him

against the local separation there ensues a relapse into the temptation to introversion, which, however, is counter-balanced for the time being by the prospect of the radiant spring. Yet the longing for the mother predominates, as may be perceived not only from the look and the attitude of the body, but also by the leg, which is far too long.

Hence the meaning of the sketch is: *Although the attraction of the springtide of a free life is a strong one, the urge toward introversion, to a return to my mother's womb, in which I am united with my sister, is still stronger.*

A week later Frank came to the consultation in a bad humour and without any pictures. For two days he had again considered life to be a poor affair, and felt not the slightest wish to mix with his fellow men.

The reasons for his bad temper were found to be in the sudden departure of a pretty girl friend whose acquaintance he had but recently made; consequently I did not take the relapse very seriously. On the contrary, I ventured to investigate the previous pictures a second time. I have already given the very sparse results of this proceeding.

At the end of the consultation a new inspiration was described somewhat in the following words: "A starry night. A dead youth is lying on a foursquare block of marble. A dragon with the head of a lion is pressing the youth's head backwards. A girl is kissing the dead boy's hair. A shrouded figure seems to feel what has happened rather than to see it."

The dead youth is Frank, the girl the departed friend, behind whom looms the mother; the shrouded figure is the father, and the lion is Fate. The whole is the remodelled version of a picture not reproduced here, the religious spirit of which is now destroyed while its ethic kernel has been enhanced.

Frank's revelation frightened me somewhat. I had done wrong in compelling him to submit to æsthetic analysis. Although I was aware that this rather complex mentality could only be thoroughly liberated by brain work, and particularly by the investigation of recent

material, I suggested to my young friend that he should paint the portrait of a lady of my acquaintance who possessed a singularly gifted and reliable character. She was exceedingly well educated, with a charming poetic talent inclining to a highly-finished elegiac style which at times breaks forth into a strong vital impulse. As the promised wife of a capable man, superior to Frank in age, in experience of life, in love of humanity and in religious and ethical judgment, she promised to be an excellent counsellor for the youth, who would direct his eroticism toward sublimation of ethical and æsthetic value. For the moment, however, the youth refused all direct religious influence.

A week later Frank brought the

Story of the little White Cloud

to the (fifth) consultation.

“ Father and son went one fine summer morning into the meadow to mow the grass. The son was very cheerful that day. People said he was a visionary ; it was said that he had once been seen and heard looking up and laughing at a little white cloud. His sisters were older than he and not particularly fond of him. They blurted out that every spring he used to kiss the first flowers, and when the mist crept down he would leap over the pastures and laugh like one mad. (Frank often behaved thus.) That was a bad business, thought the vicar. From that moment people looked askance at the boy, and he often wept over it. (In reality Frank was incapable of weeping, a fact which he felt as a great affliction.) To-day, however, he laughed. As they were both going along the road, the boy suddenly sprang in front of his father and said : ‘ Father, it can be seen again to-day ! ’ ‘ What ? ’ ‘ The little white cloud. Don’t you know the story ? ’ The father did not. ‘ The story of the maiden who rises toward heaven from the moor on a summer morning ; on the following evening she kisses the earth as an old woman, and dies. ’ ‘ No, I certainly never heard this story, ’ said his father smiling. ‘ Then I will tell it to you ; I like talking on the way to work. ’

"A wanderer lay one beautiful summer night under a bush by the moor. The sun was still behind the mountains when he opened his eyes. Several grey cloudlets rose from the moist soil, among them one which caught his attention. It rose the most rapidly and grew whiter and whiter the further it rose from the ground. But this was not all. First he thought it had the shape of a lily swaying in the morning breeze, then he saw a maiden turning in a graceful dance. It rose higher and higher and grew whiter and whiter the nearer it came to heaven. How surprised he was in the evening to see the little cloud high up in the sky. He looked at it carefully; it was a virgin blushing for shame, for the sun was laughing in her face. In the night she gave the moon the bridal kiss and her silver hair enveloped him.¹ They behaved so lovingly to each other. The wanderer saw it as he looked late at night out of the window of the inn. The next day was hot. Many clouds wandered towards the east. The wanderer looked up and his eyes sought the little white cloud. But he found it nowhere, and was sad thereat. When midday came he lay down in the shade of an oak which was standing alone on a hill. He looked searchingly at the blue sky and was full of wonder. All the clouds had become boys and girls who laughingly stretched out their arms towards the sun. 'How can you laugh in this heat, you stupid people!' he cried, and felt—he knew not what. The little white cloud! he thought again. The others kept on stretching out their arms as though they would drag somebody back from those illumined heights. Tired, he crept away from the shade of the oak, held his hand over his eyes and looked towards the sun. It was so white, like a laughing angel at heaven's gate, and he could not gaze for long. But in his breast he felt unending happiness. But . . . did it not seem that the sun and the little white cloud lay in each other's arms?

"Who reaches these heights save thou? Who drinks of the blue of heaven and becomes white and pure?

¹ In German the moon is of the masculine and the sun of the feminine gender.—TRANSLATOR.

Who dares to kiss the sun? Who is privileged save myself, to see this? Unending happiness came over him; he laid himself again in the shade of the oak and fell asleep. He laughed in his dreams. . . . The sun grew dark. The cloud boys and girls had become youths and maids. They, too, drank of the blue of heaven, yet they did not become white, but black—and drunken. Anger seized them and they turned somersaults all over the sky: but where a youth took possession of a maid a ray of lightning darted forth and the earth resounded. The wanderer awoke and, white with terror, looked up to heaven. The white cloud came flying down to him, and he stretched out his arms. He recognised his dear old mother. At the same moment a ray of lightning struck the oak; it fell in splinters and a hundredfold echo sounded on earth. The wanderer lay dead on the ground. But the white cloud sank to earth, kissed the corpse and the flowers, watered them with her tears, and died."

"When the boy had ended his story his father looked at him questioningly and said: 'The sky was empty to me, but you have filled it with your dreams.'"

"SUNDAY MORNING, THE . . . BEFORE I DRANK A GLASS OF WATER"

(For his breakfast Frank used only to take a glass of water.)

This nebulous fairy-tale came to Frank in his sleep or when he was half asleep. A few weeks before, he had suggested to his teacher as the subject of a free composition: "Clouds." The teacher and his classmates had accepted the suggestion with pleasure.

Even if the cloud had not been interpreted as the mother by the poet himself, we guessed that our patient wished himself dead and mourned by his mother, as he had shown in so many pictures, and now he represented this desire as poetically fulfilled. The impatient youth was again chary of associations.

The introduction describes personal childish events.

Frank longed to speak out to his father, who had no idea of the spiritual distress of his son. The youth disliked the vicar of the parish on account of a denunciation: the strictly religious man had railed against the perusal of Nietzsche, and Frank had taken up the cudgels in defence of his favourite writer. The wanderer is associated with the dreamer himself who, a week previously, had been lying in the grass beside a moor with the friend of pictures 5 and 6 and the latter's fiancé.

The little cloud rising from the moor is the mother, in so far as, according to the infantile theories regarding the birth of her son, he was brought from the moor by the stork.¹ The airy image resembles a lily. A week before, the artist had admired a lily in his parents' garden and made up his mind to draw himself with this lily in his hand—a remodelling of the former self-portrait. He often used to look with pleasure at the little clouds which arose from the crests of the rushing waves of the river flowing past his home.

The little cloud appears in the shape of a dancing girl, although Frank's mother, once a very beautiful girl, who had been brought up in pietistic surroundings, never danced. Frank would have liked her to have more liberal views. The cloudlet grows whiter and whiter: it drinks in the blue of the heaven; consequently it shines brighter and brighter. His mother seeks to become purer and greater through her religion, but Frank is of opinion that Nature is quite as generous.

The disappearance of the cloudlet reminds Frank of his opinion that a refined girl of good social standing is incomprehensible to other people; the re-appearances of the flying wonder recalls the hope of the youth that some day, when a man of ripe experience, he would be able to understand the female soul.

The cloud blushes in the red of the evening sun. A rich aristocrat had desired to win and seduce his mother, but had been repulsed by the steadfast woman.

The cloudlet gives the bridal kiss to the moon caught

¹ In Switzerland little children are told that "the stork brought them."—TRANSLATOR.

in its silver hair. His father used to ride over to see his sweetheart by moonlight. When the younger brother became engaged the former warned his son against imprudent intimacies, but received the caustic reply that all did not behave alike.

From the window of his inn the wanderer sees the caressing cloudlet. From his home Frank often came across pairs of lovers, and sometimes his brother with his promised bride. Formerly he used to get vexed at these loving couples, but now he had become more tolerant.

The dreamer seeks his cloudlet the next day in vain. For years our young poet sought the love of his mother to no purpose.

The embrace of the snow-white sun and the cloudlet refers to his father's marriage. During the time this phantasy lasted Frank was incessantly longing for his parents. Suddenly it occurred to him ; " I am the sun." His joy and the falling asleep are explained by this identification with his father.

The many grey clouds which do not even become pure by absorbing the blue of heaven, but rather black, and reel drunkenly about the sky, represent all sorts of people in love who are not purified by their love, but on the contrary become bestial and dirty. The thunder and lightning are to be regarded as love fulfilled, but also as punishment.

Frank is reminded of his animal love and, in the shape of the wanderer, is suddenly awakened. The anxiety betrays the repressed *libido*.

The cloud flies towards the wanderer. It, too, would like to realise love. Frank assured me that although the draft of the whole story was quite clear to him from the very beginning, *it was only at the moment of writing this passage* that it occurred to him that the cloud must be the wanderer's mother.

The lightning rends the oak and slays the wanderer. The lightning flashes from the black cloud, i.e. from impure love. One may ask what is to be understood by the male symbol of the oak ; no associations could be gathered. Finally Frank dies as in the picture of the *Requiem*,

burdened with the love of his mother. She herself follows him to the grave.

The dream may therefore be interpreted somewhat as follows: In my early childhood, when love (the sun) had not yet awakened in me, I met many boys and girls thirsting for impure love (black cloudlets); I saw my mother, however, rising higher and higher to pure and holy love (cloudlet always becoming whiter and rising rapidly; the lily), until at the end of my childish life (first evening) she had become the ideal image of pure love (high in heaven, the sun laughing in her face).

But then, at the parting of the ways, I learnt that she had given herself in love to my father (the moon) and to my great sorrow she disappeared from my sight. On the sultry heights of life I learn how young people long joyfully for love (the arms stretched laughingly to the sun), but are at the same time ready to drag each other into the depths. I do my best to escape the influence of my unloved father (creeping wearily from the shade of the oak) and to learn to know my mother in her true being. Then I discover to my endless joy that she is yet pure in her holy and immortal love. The others who are drunk with the impure lust of love, are struck by the lightnings of judgment in the midst of their transports. But I long for my pure and revered (aged) mother; my father is destroyed, but I die in my mother's arms and she remains eternally united with me in death."

The story showed that the improvement in our subject's condition was not yet sufficient. There still remained a secret desire for death. The youth was still in danger of being lost through his introversion.

A few days after the consultation our patient had a characteristic

Dream

From a mountain height he saw several lights in the sky; a voice asserted that they were all one.

In this dream the functional category is well expressed. The attitude of the libido is well defined. The amiable poetess and other girls attract him, but his mother will not let him go. He effects a compromise by calming

himself with the assertion that in all these erotic relations one and the same person, namely his mother, is meant, which is quite true. The image of the comet is not a bad symbol of the psychology of this Don Juan. It may likewise mean that all the high lights, joys and virtues are related, identical with one light which is symbolised in the (ideal) mother.

Owing to the vacations our analyses were interrupted for a month. Meanwhile Frank went to a picturesque Alpine village eagerly studying art. One day he wrote his lady friend a humorous letter which, however, in her opinion, was somewhat grotesque. The next morning he awoke at early dawn and saw how the day slowly rose to fill its throne. He got up in a good humour and made a sketch for the picture :

Flee, night ; the world desires the day.

In an imposing mountain landscape two figures rise out of the sea of mist ; a man representing Day and a woman Night. With her right hand the woman covers her breasts and with the left she draws the mist across to her bosom.

Behind the Venus dei Medici is hidden the mother, but the hair is that of the poetess. The right hand reminds Frank of the gesture of the publican in the self-portrait. The woman is stepping backwards.

In the male figure the line from the nape of the neck to the parting of the hair, which is seen in his father, first attracted Frank's attention. The lines under the right shoulder-blade recalled the scar of a wound which his father received through falling from his horse. The furrow known to us from the self-portrait, running from the eyebrows to the forehead, also belonged to the father. The beard is that of Böcklin, the artistic father of the draughtsman. The attitude of the male figure expresses decision. It implies : " I command."

Before drawing it the thought flew through Frank's mind : " If my friend is so sensitive and prudish she will never become a great artist."

Interpretation. The mother appears as a symbol of

introverted *libido* which had withdrawn into the mists of death (*Requiem, Let the dead bury their dead*) or of madness (*Madness, The Nymph*). Frank now intends to escape from his longing for his mother and to banish his desire for madness and death. All that is misty and obscure he flings into the mother's bosom, to the profound mystery from which he now intends to separate himself. He will command as a man and bear off the victory, he will affirm the value of life as a hero of love and art, free from the bonds of his first love, his mother. The Venus-mother must flee, and she takes the animal impulses (again represented as mist) with her. In the same way he abandons in his mother his refined lady friend, who is so much to him and has contributed so much to the enrichment of his life, as Venus.

The history of the whole inspiration is interesting. On that morning Frank perceived the rock, the upper contour of which runs from the hand of his father to the elbows of Venus. It was only after I had called his attention to this rock that he said: "The line here indicated denotes a shrouded being lying there whose head reaches nearly to the father's, and the foot—plainly visible—the woman's arm." We are at once reminded of the mother lying in front of *The Bridge of Death*, the theme of which is obviously once more reproduced here. But here she is no longer shown with her figure twisted.

10. "*Night's Highest Hope.*"

The sketch was made about half an hour later than that just described. The exact title is: *Night, I know thy highest hope!*

Night sits as a mother on a rock, holding her child on high. Around her lie "spirits of the night" holding out their hands to her like praying Mahommedans. Rosy-tipped clouds announce the approaching dawn.

Urged to concentrate his attention on any one of the various figures, the young artist, surprisingly enough, fixed upon the second figure in front on the right, which reminded him of his mother.

He associated the mother with the child, and, to his own great surprise—with his poetess friend and himself. The girl was, as he said, the means of bringing him into the light. Men fling themselves in adoration before the mother and child, the Madonna, and the Messiah raising his hands in blessing. The figure in the left foreground stretching out both arms, is that of a female who would like to be as Night is and bring forth a child. This person is the hated sister. The first shape on the right shows the elder brother. He gives his sister his hand, for they are one in the adoration of Night and the child. The second figure on the left is that of the loved sister.

The picture is the successor of the preceding one in every way, and continues the thoughts there interrupted by insurmountable obstacles. We see in what manner Frank drove away his mother: he divided her into a sensual and an ideal figure. The latter he made the mother of whom he would wish to be born again; with this the error of the return to the mother's womb is overcome without his losing his mother herself. He approached her thereby in the most intimate relation conceivable; he loves her as mother, and at the same time he raises her to the rank of a Madonna. The sensual mother may now honour the Saviour in her newborn son, hence the situation is not unfavourable to her. The same may be said of the sisters. The father is not present, because he had already attained his rights in the previous picture, and was symbolically sublimated.

Frank himself comes off best of all as the Messiah who is raised high above the men lying before him in the dust, and thus celebrates the glorious triumph over his impulses, which are represented in the shrouded figures. The impulses long for deliverance; as one born again he can give it to them.

What a difference between the gloomy pictures before the analysis and the vital ones after its commencement! His state of mind has likewise been transformed. After the first consultation Frank had been mostly a happy youth. At first his cheerfulness was distinctly overdone. His constant laughter at trifles, his exaggerated humour

did not bear the genuine stamp. But gradually he became quieter, even though there were frequent relapses into the old distress. Now and again he had a slight conflict with his parents, but the violence of former occasions had disappeared and there was no more disgust with life. After six consultations Frank felt himself perfectly healthy and happy, so that to my sorrow he gave up the analyses, which, apart from a few later consultations, had been spread over a period of ten weeks. In the following years there were still some severe struggles to go through, which were treated only in a brief analysis. At the present time Frank is a happily married man and a painter of some repute.

The pastoral part of the cure was, however, not yet complete, and my thirst for knowledge had by no means been quenched. Even the pictures reproduced here have only yielded us part of their secret. But it was hardly possible for me to get any more out of Frank. Moreover, in view of the seriousness of the situation I could not, in the interests of science, take it upon myself to avoid the rules of analysis in the latest manifestations. Frank brought me two humorous drawings: a faun caressing a nude girl while two butterflies chase each other. The person represented is a cynical and sensual young fellow whose acquaintance the draughtsman had just made, and to whom the hated and sensual sister is now abandoned, while Frank himself plays delicately like a butterfly with the beloved sister. The other sketch represents centaurs who are descending joyfully from heaven. During the analysis the resistance got the upper hand. Frank intentionally abstained from giving any associations, and bored himself and me. Finally we discontinued this sort of treatment.

Our fragmentary analysis of an artist confronts us with several problems of which we shall mention only one of particular importance and of general psychological value, and one or two minor ones dealing with the psychology of art.

How is the picture of the mother to be interpreted? Is there really an incest-wish or are we dealing with other

desires which are symbolically concealed behind the relation to the mother? In other words: Is the incest-wish the real aim, or is it a camouflaged or "cover" aim?

In one place the incest-wish must be an absolute one: at the beginning of our consultations, in the decorative passages of the self-portrait. Behind the hearts of the parents the key of the dismal enigma is found in the picture of the normal and the gravid woman. This must be a representation of the mother, since a fortuitous and amorous relation with the neighbouring girl has no connection with the rest. Nor could I say how this figure should be interpreted as a libido symbol. In any case the supposition that the son was jealous of his father's possession of his mother was sufficient with regard to the interpretation of the whole. With this the desire of the son himself is admitted. If this desire is to be regarded as incestuous, as seems implied by the material shown, the question still remains whether a pure regression or a backward projection of an erotic activity which is only now present to the newly revived mother-image is in existence.

No one can deny that the mother idea is spiritualised in the later manifestations. In the story of the cloud she appears as an old woman; in the picture of departing night she is dismissed as Venus; consequently there must have been a preliminary sensual desire, if only one which was brought about by an external inhibition and not the result of any internal impulse, and not of an absolute character. I am inclined to think that there was at the outset an inadmissible tendency towards the mother-image. Later, however, the ideal traits of the mother came to the fore, and the mother herself becomes the ideal figure, the symbol. Frank's series of pictures describes the sublimation of his libido, the transition from the physical to the mystical death-wish and to his moral and religious re-birth.

The analysis makes it clear that the adaptation or execution did not occur in reality. Frank was diverted and almost absorbed by conscious and subconscious hatred, conscious and subliminal love. The inner con-

nection made the outer difficulty an insurmountable barrier. That the significance of the inner conflict greatly outstripped the other is shown by the new birth which anticipated, by several weeks, the decision to leave the Institute.

The results may, I think, be taken as satisfactory as far as the psychology of art is concerned, although the material was exceedingly sparse, seeing that neither the recent nor the regressive origins could be sufficiently laid bare.

I hope that some day investigators will have an opportunity of analysing the artistic temperament in a more scientific fashion. But I am grateful to my gifted youth for his sacrifice in leaving me his interesting sketches.

All these drawings and pictures, after close examination, as well as the fairy-tales, led me to the following judgment:

1. *Artistic or poetic inspiration is to be regarded as the manifestation of repressed desires and, as such, formed in accordance with the laws by which Freud grouped the processes participating in the origin of neurotic symptoms, dreams, hallucinations and related phenomena, save that an ingenious whole is created, the deeper psychological significance of which, however, is not perfectly clear to the artist.* Everything was present—poetic creation, substitution, dramatisation. The most extensive use was made of symbolism. But I must clearly emphasise the fact that by inspiration an artistic creative force is meant which does not carry out a preconceived plan after deliberate reflection, but becomes conscious of its work as a sudden or gradual inspiration. In artistic work reflection is joined to inspiration.

2. *The causes of the inspiration* were discoverable in four cases, of which three (*Self-portrait, Whither, O Soul? Depart, Night!*) display intuition and artistic observation, and one (*Madness*) rather an automatic development of the theme. The observation showed that the basis was an external perception, but, as far as I could see there was nothing of this kind in the automatic production, but rather a strong "affect." Yet the virulence of the complex is shown by the utilisation of the external observation. As a consequence of this "determining tendency,"

to use Ach's terminology, an everyday observation (furrow in the forehead) or an unimportant one (rock, gateway) led to the perturbing experience, the true contents of which, however, remained below the threshold of consciousness. The external cause or "recent stimulus" of the inspiration returns again in the work of art.

It would be interesting to know whether, in all cases in which an external perception works as a stimulus to the complex, the result is an intuition; but in others, which display neither a visual cause of origin nor any surrounding object as part of the work of art, an automatic creative act is accomplished without a picture in the mind's eye. Our scanty observations do not permit of our forming any generalisations.

3. *The meaning of the work of art* is a double one. The *latent significance* is to be differentiated from the *manifest content*. The former is for the artist, the latter for others. The manifest content is intended to possess general value, and is therefore given to the world; it excites similar feelings in the observer. The latent meaning, on the other hand, is the property of the artist, and is so intimate that often enough the conscious mind of its author does not recognise it. In the case under consideration we are dealing in the first instance with evil desires directed against the mother, and inspirations of hatred which would cause the death of the father. These subliminal desires dominate the whole mental life of the young artist. They are the cause of his indescribable mental distress and cruelty, which are reflected in his disgust with life, his longing for the madhouse, the tomb in the cave, death in the waves, etc. But they likewise participate in his artistic achievements and lend these an enormous pleasure-value (*Lustwert*).

The artistic phantasy—I am speaking only of the case under consideration—is thus a transformation of inadmissible instinctive impulses into admissible ones; as in the repression of incestuous desires. If the phantasy persists in the work of art without technical perfection, it is an auto-erotic complex function. By introducing the phantasy into the work of art an attempt at *transference*

is made. In its social aim the artistic work of our subject is an enterprise intended to lead out of the blind alley of introversion, and consequently deserves the highest recognition for this work of sanitation. At the same time it represents an ethical cleansing and sublimation, the biological work of which must be rated very highly, because it not only brings its author nearer to moral salvation, but also benefits the observer.

Our artist was indeed lacking to a great extent in the language that awakens an understanding echo in the depths of other souls and promises a healthy outlet for the distress which is lodged there. I find Rank's statement confirmed: "Even the great poet . . . starts from such personal interests and problems, but he finally overcomes them in the course of development, by resolving them into general human ones, a sublimation which is never successful in the case of the purely subjective poet. We note here that we must consider this subjectivity as a nervous trait, and that from the psychological point of view we have no right and no reason to undertake a valuation of poetical achievements which have their justification only in their social value."¹ The fact that Frank drew, painted and wrote verse proved his salvation as a transference attempt. But what if his creative work is not understood? What if the subjective expression makes the absence of the social touch felt? In that case there is a danger that the artist will now shut himself up all the more closely and become completely introverted. Luckily, however, there are so many promising general traits in the work of our subject that, as I have said, we need have no fear on his account.

4. *The period of incubation* of the artistic inspiration was, it seems, a short one in our examples. Between the recent cause and the vision or artistic creation there is at most an interval of two hours (perception of the furrow on the forehead, self-portrait); in one case it was simultaneous with the stimulus (gateway). It is true that the view had been prepared, for Frank had often seen himself in the glass, had perceived many a similar

¹ OTTO RANK, *The Incest Motive in Poetry and Legend*, p. 122.

gateway and had for some days been familiar with the cliff which recalled the dead mother. Hence it is possible that the incubation took just as much time, but the effect of unexpected stimuli on dreamers leads me rather to suppose that the subconscious works out its demonstrations very rapidly.

5. *The inner unity of rapidly successive inspirations* we saw in one case to be precisely analogous with those of apparently incoherent fragments of normal dreams. The pictures *Flee, Night*, and *Night's Highest Hope* are intimately connected with each other as regards their content. The yielding night corresponds to the dawning day; the real meaning of the driving away of the night is expressed in the birth scene; the motive of the mother's death hinted at in the rock of the first sketch, is re-integrated in the adoring shape of the last drawing; both together solve the whole family complex by bringing all the persons concerned into an exalted situation.

6. *The law of complex modelling and re-modelling* is finely expressed in the artistic inspiration.

In my analytical investigations into the psychology of hatred and reconciliation I made the following statements: The repressed hatred of certain individuals forms phantasies whose content is of a suitable nature, whether imagined or experienced, in accordance to the laws of dream-work, by means of which it procures imagined satisfaction. This complex-satisfaction is brought about by the fact that a wish concentrated on the injury of the hated person is either directly represented or concealed in the content of the waking dream. When the hatred is intensified the hate-complex constantly makes use of new images in order to obtain satisfaction. In the case of reconciliation, however, the former phantasies return, but they are then either unchanged or faint, i.e. accompanied by signs of conversion or of re-modelling, which, according to the laws of the formation of dreams, brings the formerly inimical character, by means of new interpretations, to the same subliminal and functional level. All that is here asserted of hatred and reconciliation applies equally to any other kind of complex. It creates its fictive

formations in the imagination of the subject—formations which, however, are usually unpalatable to those who do not know the facts—and provides them, on the solving of the complex with a negative precursor, i.e. it transforms them into similar, but harmless, phantasies after the bearer has perceived the reprehensible character of their latent signification.

The re-modelling can be easily demonstrated; I select a few examples only.

The self-portrait is revoked in the plan (not carried out) of a self-portrait in which the artist is carrying a lily as a sign of innocence. The naked mother of the same sketch is counterbalanced by repeated swathings in garments and veils which conceal even the face. The birth of the Saviour (picture 10) corresponds with the dead Messiah of the *Requiem*, the daybreak of the last sketch with the night in the former picture. *Madness* with its inscription *I know*, is echoed, perhaps, in *Night's Highest Hope*, especially as madness is designated as "benighted." Opposed to the artist surrounded by serpents we have in *Sunny Heights* a Paradisical state without serpents. *The Bridge of Death* is most carefully worked out. Here the youth rushes through the mist, whereas in picture 7, he stands high above it, and in picture 9 (in which it is caused by the mother) it is dispelled. The mother, who is lying dead, receives the following commentary in picture 10: "She was not lying dead but only prostrate in adoration." The hands stretched out after the youth in picture 5 are interpreted in 10 as outstretched in adoration.

In the oil-painting of the *Nymph* Frank is longing for his mother's womb; later he sits before the cave (Doubt), or is born (*Night's Highest Hope*). Hence the womb is the gate of re-birth, whereas at the commencement it was exclusively devoted to withdrawal from life. The underground play of the butterflies in the cave becomes elfish sport in the daylight.

The *Sunny Heights* forms a contrast with the darkness of the *Requiem*. In picture 9 the flight of night is expressly depicted, whereas the break of dawn is artistically represented in picture 10.

No doubt Frank was inspired with a number of other re-modellings, but did not commit them to paper or canvas.

In conclusion I feel impelled to meet an objection which might easily be advanced: Our biological manner of viewing things robs artistic inspiration of the nimbus of divine revelation. But does this interpolation into the natural domain of cause and purpose really mean a degradation of art? By recognising artistic work as a lifeboat in the ocean of death and suffering, and, at the same time, as an exalted guide, reconciling the solitary soul with its fellows, we perceive in it its highest dignity. For greater and nobler than the king raised to the dignity of a god, who charms merely by his gracious smile, is the plain man who is a good Samaritan to the wounded, a liberator of the captive, a healer of the sick. And it is as such a helper that psycho-analysis teaches us to honour art.

III

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PEACE AND WAR ¹

A. The Subliminal Forces of War.

WAR implies a readjustment of many recognised values. Much of the common property of knowledge and civilisation is overthrown by the sanguinary settlement of international quarrels. Civilisation, for instance, respects human life and destroys only the worst criminals; war crushes innumerable bodies beneath its red hoof, rains its bombs down upon the just and the unjust, and thrusts its bayonets indifferently into the bad and the good. Moral Man takes compassion on the pain and distress of his fellow-creatures, and a catastrophe in another country brings forth help from one's own; in warfare delight in the enemy's losses is scarcely concealed, and the news of massacres and grievous destruction is received with satisfaction, provided it is the enemy that has been injured thereby. In normal times the educated man enjoys with gratitude the culture of other countries; in time of war the voice of common culture is drowned by that of jingoism. Wagner is driven from France, Hodler from Jena; Shakespeare has to obtain a passport from the German Chancellor before a German theatrical manager is allowed to offer him a home. We are proud of our sense of justice, which acknowledges no other standard than that of what is right and proper, and leaves even the feeblest in undisturbed possession of his own. In war-time might alone is right; the tablets of Justice are splintered by shells, and the superior technique of assassination dominates the world.

Is this supposition correct, or are we dealing with a

¹ First published in *Wissen und Leben*, Nos. 4 and 5, December 1914.

phrase used merely in a figurative sense or based on haphazard analogies? As no attempt has yet been made to demonstrate psychologically that war is a regression to a former stage of development, I venture to make it here. If my endeavours are successful, we must necessarily come into contact with the subconscious psychic forces in which the immediate authors of war are to be sought.

We must first of all turn our attention towards the nature and conditions of those phenomena to which modern psychology has given the name of *regressions*. Thanks to the penetrating investigations of Freud, we know that both the healthy and the sick (usually without being aware of it) are constantly reviving events that happened in childhood.

In the investigation of dream-contents such survivals from infancy are usually met with, and the same observations have been made when tracing day-dreams to their sources, investigating nervous phenomena or deciphering the actions of the insane. In innumerable acts of the sick and the whole alike, careful investigation recognises new versions or revised reproductions of the conscious facts of early childhood. A mother who has lost her senses owing to the death of her child cradles a doll or a stick of wood, just as an ordinary child plays with her doll; a person seriously ill describes his sufferings to his long dead mother; the old man revives his childhood. Very often these childish survivals and memories are skilfully concealed, as, for instance, in religious "speaking with tongues," or in those apparently meaningless marks and signs that healthy people make unconsciously, but which sick people are often irresistibly impelled to make.¹ As a rule this influence of infantile reminiscence remains unnoticed, without, however, failing to exercise an influence on the rest of the mental life. Infantile experiences play both a favourable and an unfavourable part in temper, decisions, actions, etc.

There are no absolutely pure regressions. It is chiefly

¹ Cf. my article on *Religious Glossolalia and Automatic Cryptography*, Vienna, 1912.

with the mentally diseased that child-life is resuscitated without alteration, in as far as details from infantile life are copied or stereotyped. But even in cases like these, distinct traits from the present are interwoven. Thus the regression provides the warp unreel from the thread of the past, while the present provides the woof. Just as the Anabaptists used to wear dresses, play with wooden lambs or dance in a "ring o' roses," while conversing at the same time on theological subjects, in a manner far removed from that of childhood, so a fragment of the present—whether real or fancied—is conveyed into the regression, so that it is often difficult to distinguish between what is primitive matter dating from early years and what has been taken from a past which is possibly not so far distant. The well-known dream of the child's Paradise exhibits quite clearly the distortion of the past under the influence of the present ; for childhood is never a pure Paradise.

And just as the relapse into the primitive is never or hardly ever free from later accessories, Man with his manifold spiritual possessions, need never regress as a whole. A man may be infantile with regard to his wife, but may exhibit the greatest virility in every other respect. We have a fine example in King Ahab, in the Old Testament, who was as great a hero as he was a child, the terror of his enemies and the plaything of his wife. One need but recall the scene in which the king goes sulkily to bed, refuses his food and allows himself to be "mothered" by his wife—all because he cannot get a vineyard on which he has set his mind !

We will now investigate the question whether the features of regression are to be found in war. We have already demonstrated the fact that war does not conform with our normal moral standards and customs, which have been extolled as the highest achievements of civilisation. It is obvious that organised massacre, the indiscriminate murder of innocent persons, the destruction of valuable property, the fierce anger and lust of vengeance, the moratorium of all common culture, the replacement of right by might, all correspond with the customs of

uncivilised peoples. The psychology of men full of the lust of fighting, who are heart and soul in favour of the continuance of war, points in the same direction, viz. that if one is not allowed to murder indifferently, one does it with a pleasure that can only be described as sadistic. That the pleasure derived from another's sufferings is an endeavour to drown an inner negation has been observed just as clearly in other regressions. The greater the fury of war, the greater is the similarity of the warrior to the savage, until finally there are moments in which no difference of temperament can be observed.

This does not of course imply that every soldier has sunk into a state of barbarism ; it may be pointed out that very many, indeed, the majority, preserve a good deal of their civilisation even in the midst of the atrocities of war. Primitive peoples, too, are not wanting in kindness and mutual service. Further, it cannot be denied that in war-time the most valuable works of civilisation are felt to be a contradiction, and therefore to be maintained only in an incomplete state. All the belligerent nations complain that the others do not observe the conditions of the Red Cross and the Geneva Convention, and all are ready to believe that no blame attaches to themselves in this respect. It is, however, a fact that humanitarian culture, to which everybody is otherwise devoted, is in the nature of a foreign body in time of war. Taken all in all, the inhuman tendency, in spite of some cases of individual self-sacrifice, triumphs in war in its capacity of a sanguinary settlement of questions of right as well as in the cruel practice of war itself.

It may be objected that the soldier may at heart be a well-meaning man. True, the rifleman who shot a father to-day and burnt down his house may play peacefully to-morrow with the dead man's children. But this scarcely does more than bear witness to the fact that the man has partly escaped from his regression. Many a soldier has confessed a few days after the fight that he felt as if he had just awakened from an insane frenzy.

Even if it is maintained that war turns on a question of jurisprudence and consequently pursues moral aims, this does not alter the state of affairs. On the one hand these so-called juridical reasons and moral motives of war are open to dispute. Everyone believes that he is fighting only for his rights and his holiest possessions, and there is no reason in the majority of cases to question the sincerity of these views. But nearly all people of sufficient perspicacity who are victims of regression find plausible motives which they regard as conclusive and effective. Whenever certain religious sects begin to perform remarkable breathing-exercises, or proceed, in ecstasy, to stammer like children, they subsequently find reasonable grounds enough for these proceedings, just as the person who was ordered in a hypnotic state to slide across the room on a chair found good reasons for doing so before carrying out this performance, without having any notion of the real reason, namely, the order given by the hypnotist. Behind the conscious motives subconscious motives are always hidden. If a tune runs with disagreeable obstinacy through one's head, if a boy feels compelled to consult an oracle, if, on stepping on to the pavement he feels constrained to touch or avoid the lines joining the flagstones; behind these (mostly harmless) facts and actions are to be found sound motives of which, however, the conscious mind knows nothing, and which can only be discovered after exact and often difficult investigation. In the same way the real motives of our loves and hatreds, our thoughts and acts are always partly or wholly anchored in the subconscious soul-life, and this is certainly the case in the regressions of war. Nobody's consciousness tells him that in the warlike spirit powers which have long been fundamentally conquered force conscious reflection into their service, cast out all sense of justice, and destroy the principles of human life which have been fostered by civilisation. Closely related to regression in form and origin is *retention*, in which an inhibition has long existed but has acquired fresh importance owing to special circumstances. This is the case with war, seeing that the lust of fighting was

never properly overcome, but did not usually reach the surface. It is only on the outbreak of war that the primitive forces lying in the subconscious attain to mastery. Hence retention facilitates regression.

How are we to picture these subliminal forces of war in detail? It is only an apparent digression if we first of all consider the problem of the causes of regression. The newer psychology recognises that a relapse into the infantile and primitive occurs only when preceded by an inhibition to life. To use Freud's comparison: the inhibited life-path is like a dammed-up river the waters of which mount upwards and fill canals which have been lying empty. Those who take the trouble to consider the examples of regression here given will always come across in them inhibitions of this kind, or obstacles carried over from former times.

What is the nature of these inner chains or conflicts? There are three views as to diseases caused by psychic conflicts, which we may apply to our subject, in spite of the fact that we are dealing with normal minds. Freud believes that in the first place complications or distresses of the love-life are the cause of regression, and create the dependence on subconscious infantile images and emotions. Adler makes the feeling of inferiority created by bodily disadvantages responsible for the loss of the clear and free self-determination of the individual. This feeling of inferiority awakens the adult protest; and thus it is the need of proper valuation that throws human beings into regression and gags them with subconscious infantile instincts. And finally, Jung makes the dissension which subjects the spirit to the mastery of subconscious infantile forces arise from the contrast between tendencies of insistence and development. He who resists the accomplishment of an inner higher command falls into regression so that, given over to the subconscious, he is obliged to renew primitive and archaic thoughts and actions. Nietzsche has made a similar observation.

It is obvious that Freud had no intention of denying the fact that the impulse or the resistance to a higher moral claim drive men to regress; but he would not

admit that they cause neurotic disease. Let us first of all turn our attention to these motives. —

There can be no doubt that the love of tribe, race or nation played a large part in the late war. It would be a mistake to maintain that Panslavism, Pangermanism or other imperial desires are the only evil-doers. It is obvious that sympathy for one's own tribe and anxiety for one's own kith and kin, in the wider sense, are at work here. But love is not based only on racial relations. In the late war blood-relations were violently opposed to one another, while foreign ties held closely together. Community of speech, of the political past and the reigning house likewise form a bond. The common mother-country and mother-tongue seem to create a particularly strong feeling of community. In general it may be said that we love most those persons in whom we find our own *ego*, in the most perfect and agreeable form, and from whom we obtain the greatest life-impulse. Those who love their parents will give their affection to all those whom they identify with them. The same is true of brothers, sisters and children. There is an inclination to project the paternal house into the State to which one belongs, the head of the State becomes the father of his people, the land is the mother-country, while the citizens are brethren. The honour of the State is identified with one's own; to promote the welfare of the people is to promote one's own. The fact that the welfare (or its opposite) of the whole nation brings with it a certain profit or loss contributes to this identification. It is evident that peoples who partake of the same race, speech, manners, historical development and State organisation are most easily identified with the original beloved objects of the domestic circle and are found again in these.

Every attack on the people to which we belong, every insult to the State organisation to which we have become attached must be answered as if it were a personal attack on ourselves. Now it is worthy of notice that in individual cases inhibitions arise of which the origins apparently belong to the domain of love—jealousy, refusal of courtship, love within the forbidden degrees of rela-

tionship, incapacity of the harmonious realisation of all the traits of complete love (cf. the dilemma of a purely sensual or a purely ideal love), the inability to love humankind at all, etc. ; but in the actions of nations such complications as belong *only* to eroticism in the narrow sense are entirely wanting.

Here, more distinctly than in the case of the individual, it is evident that in the upbuilding of the emotions of love the satisfaction of egoistic needs likewise participates, even though a "herd" sympathy cannot wholly be denied. And the higher a civilisation has soared, the less is affection for it based on obscure racial instincts. For an educated man a demoralised countryman of his is inwardly further removed from him than a foreign supporter of civilisation ; for an ethically perfect person an honest stranger is inwardly closer to him than an immoral relative, precisely owing to the identity of the highest personal values. His love for his relative—if he does love him—is merely an enforced duty.

It follows, therefore, that war can never under any circumstances be a purely racial problem, even though race may be one of the causes. With the nation, as with the individual, sympathy and antipathy are produced more and more by complicated cause-complexes.

Among these is the attitude of the world around us to the *claims for consideration* of the individual and the people. Adler is right in believing that disregard of the claim for proper valuation is an important cause of the relapse into former stages of development. He exaggerates only when he calls this the unique cause of neurosis. Freud rightly claims that the curtailment of the personal valuation leads to capture by infantile subconscious powers, only if there is at the same time a loss of love affects. But if a man who has lost his reputation gains love, perhaps by reason of the complete sympathy of others, the relapse into the primitive does not ensue. And the fact must likewise be taken into consideration that even the most violent contempt will never cause a flight into the infantile, unless an inner voice justifies the feeling of inferiority, for it is only then that an inner conflict is produced.

Among the reasons intended to justify the steps which led to the war is one of particular prominence: the position of the Great Powers had to be secured. In the light of this argument the war would have to be understood as Adler understands every nervous disease. The offended feeling of inferiority awakens the aggressive impulse, the irritated man attempts to establish his claims to greatness and to secure himself against the feeling of inferiority; but in his passionate pursuit of this aim he stumbles into a difficulty for which he does not feel himself a match; his conscious mental life refuses to obey, and so he abandons himself to the primitive forces of regression.

The objection which I have to this construction is that it implies that only one important motive is efficacious. And the interests of the Great Powers must be understood in a more extended sense than that given above. Apart from this, I agree with Adler's attempt to transfer his principle (which is insufficient in the dogma of neuroses) to war; but the claim for adequate valuation must not be regarded as the only motive. The Great Powers were suspicious of each other; they feared a loss of reputation or of power, on the part of one or all, and in the endeavour to affirm or increase their rank, and the dimly felt, but not clearly conceived sense that they were no match for this task, they fell into situations which could not longer be dealt with by legal and civilised means. Consequently the regression, the breaking out of the repressed and predatory nature, was inevitable.

Individuals, however, not only strive to gain esteem in the eyes of others; they wish in any case to prosper, to acquire riches and enjoyment, to develop their talents and thus expand their personality, to live their life irrespective of the opinions of the surrounding world. The feeling of inferiority and the opinion of others is not necessary to bring about the utmost nervous tension. There are powerful inward impulses and aims hotly desired which, if not attained, lead to despair, even without a preliminary feeling of inferiority, i.e. a low valuation of oneself or the consciousness of being despised. Ardent

ambition, devouring pride (even though this find expression in the opinion that one is destined to accomplish the highest missions of civilisation), usually, though not always, point to repressed feeling of weakness. Among the motives of the war there are other tendencies, for example: to live out one's life, which obtains all the greater explosive power, by inhibition. That imperialism which strives for still greater possessions, the divine right of kings which feels itself called upon to impress the stamp of its national ideas on the world,¹ the craving for enjoyment which seeks booty in colonisation or conquest; these and similar efforts must finally come into collision with other peoples holding the same ideas. If the struggle cannot be settled by civilised means, recognised by the national soul as a whole, regression takes place, just as when the individual, abandoned by love, would throw overboard his whole life-impulse with similar intentions. I hasten to add that these egoistic desires may also occur in an altruistic form, e.g. in the love of the race which seeks to create greatness and renown for its constituent peoples. Love wishes to further the interests of others, particularly when it identifies itself with them and, at bottom, loves itself in them.

According to Jung the relapse into the underworld of the infantile and barbaric occurs when the individual is confronted with an inner cultural achievement, but is too lazy to carry it out. The dam of which Freud speaks as having thrust back the stream would thus be the new life-task, and therefore, in certain circumstances, a painful renunciation of habits hitherto cultivated. This concatenation, which is found both in the healthy and the sick, is certainly present. In daily life we hate the man who compels us to give up our free and easy ways of life; why should it be different with whole nations? In a letter to Gustav Freytag, Tolstoi wrote: "The Russians hate the Germans, for they are one hundred and fifty years ahead of us, and that has become intolerable."

In any case, however, competing civilisations cannot possibly be the chief motive, or even a concomitant cause,

¹ Cf. ROHRBACH, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*, p. 4.

for highly civilised peoples often break out into primitive war.

I am therefore of opinion that it is a mistake to attribute the outbreak of the war to one cause only. Other motives than those already mentioned will have helped to bring about the regression, just as in the life of the individual various motives drive back all clear conscious thought and volition below the threshold of the conscious. The various motives are so closely interwoven that it is impossible to isolate the will to love, racial instincts, the will to power or the craving for respect or esteem, the tendency to live one's individual life, the resistance to superhuman civilisation, and other efforts of the kind. Those who do so destroy the organism of spiritual and mental life and rely upon dull anatomy, while real life, which is the important thing, has long since fled them.

In view of the above considerations it appears childish to look for the causes of the present war in this, that or the other recent event. Neither the Serajevo student nor the Austrian ultimatum, nor the mobilisation of Russia, nor any other events are the true cause, but rather those deep-lying energies of the folk-soul which drive back the life-impulse, and subject conscious activity to the power of primitive instincts. Atavistic regression is similar to that of emotional expletives, violent temper, hot temper and other powerful discharges due to the fact that Man, in actual truth, is powerless to call into action the controlling motives of civilisation.

These considerations give us a new aspect of the problem of peace, of which I shall now treat.

B. The Psychological Hypotheses of International Peace

In the foregoing attempt to survey the psychology of war I described the deeper motives of international conflict. It seems to me that the complaints of atrocities made by the belligerents, no less than the whole idea of war (so inimical to civilisation), are to be explained as regression and retention phenomena, for the circumstances

under which we observe the appearance of these phenomena in the healthy and the sick alike, and the individual phenomena peculiar to other regressions, are to be found in this case also. The results thus obtained allow us to draw inferences as to the higher meaning of and the prevention of war. Both problems are intimately inter-related.

Let us return for a moment to the notion of regression. It was Freud once more who first recognised that the apparently purely unsuitable and morbid symptoms which must be referred to psychic sources exercise a favourable influence, like the regressions of the healthy, even if they do not achieve their secret aim. In neurosis and psychosis Freud perceived an endeavour to escape a threatening or already existing displeasure (*Unlust*) by a flight into the subconscious. The regressions of the healthy comply with the same secret endeavour. Flournoy, the well-known Genevese psychologist, found that they had a still higher suitability. He showed in the case of Benvenuto Cellini how an hallucination and an automatic movement saved the artist's life, and observations of living persons have strengthened this interpretation. Adler and Maeder, independently of each other and almost simultaneously, discovered that even in dreams not only a regression, but also the endeavour to accomplish a fresh achievement was present. If this is true, and it is the case often enough and obviously enough, then the similarity of a former event to the present situation is not the only factor to awaken the memory, for the will to live also collaborates in the selection of the early material. A relapse into a former stage of development can then occur only if there is something in it on the one hand, resembling the present situation, and on the other, something corresponding to the prevailing impulse to escape from the present dilemma. Hence memories are chosen which cry: "Just as you were able to escape at that time, so can you do it now!" It is only when the will to live is absolutely broken that disconsolate memories arise which say: "You are quite right to submerge yourself in melancholy. You were born to be unlucky!"

When a human being falls into regression there occur as a rule, new outlooks upon life; he is like Janus—looking backwards and forwards at the same time. If a rose-bush has to be rejuvenated the old wood is cut away, where-upon the sleeping buds awake, pushing forth new blossom-bearing boughs in fresh directions. So regression has frequently pointed out new paths. I may mention the Reformation, which was practically a regression to the early Christian era; or the English and French Revolutions. The more difficult the discovery of the new life-direction, the deeper does Man fall into regression. This is well displayed by the Anabaptists, who were unable to conceive of any new mastery of reality, and therefore relapsed into incredible infantilism; contrasting with the Reformers who were able to find new paths to reality for the new spirit (especially to the Bible) by the aid of regression.

The nations, too, before the outbreak of the late war, saw themselves confronted with a number of tasks whose accomplishment exceeded their ability. Where the wisdom of statesmen failed, the return took place to conditions which were, comparatively, fundamentally pre-civilised. But even this regression prepared the way for a fresh application of higher powers. Most wars have called forth unlooked-for energies.

It has frequently been observed with astonishment that even the late war awakened forces that were really desired, but could not be realised. I may remind you of the powerful feeling of solidarity which broke down the ancient barriers of social ranks and political parties; the permeation of the general mind by a great idea; the miraculous emergence of religious energies, the readiness to sacrifice self, as against the usual selfishness; the renunciation of mere superficial pleasures. These and similar features are not mere reminiscences which have been directed backwards; on the contrary, they betray new possibilities of life which were perhaps already realised at some former period and then abandoned. Such moral achievements contain the contribution to civilisation which accompanies regression. The conscience

which rejects the massacres of war is thereby appeased and thus puts itself at the service of the warlike impulse. The result is frequently a glorification of massacre as a holy task in which even the God of Peace Himself finds pleasure. But it is a matter of common knowledge that the super-achievements produced by war are usually shortlived. The conclusion of peace is followed, as a rule, by grosser egotism, social discord, increased materialism and love of pleasure ; by boasting after a successful war, and the lust of vengeance after an unsuccessful one. Consequently, even if in the regression of what is capable of vitality there lies the germ of a higher future which could not be realised without it, this is no guarantee for the victory of what is new. Just as the majority of hysterical persons derive little or no benefit from their disease, which is a product of regression, so war may leave behind it paths that are refractory to civilisation. In the case of sick people it is the duty of the physician to dissolve the unsuitable new formations immediately after their creation, and to continue doing so until the life-path has been found and entered upon, which at one and the same time complies with the highest demands of one's own nature and with the claims of reality. Should it not therefore be the duty of all experienced lovers of humanity to preserve from unsuitable new formations the life forces born of the war, and to direct them toward those aims which correspond with the true nature of Man, with the highest development of individual and communal life ?

If we do not succeed in evoking the intellectual dissolution due to regression in the consciousness of the nations, and in leading their dammed-up life tendencies into suitable paths, the relapse to uncivilised conditions will be lasting, or the threatening prophecy lately published by Otto Hintze will be fulfilled : " Now that the Hague Court of Arbitration and the World's Peace Congress are beginning their work, we are entering on the age of world-wide hostilities, of universal warfare. For—and let us not blind our eyes to the facts—we are at the beginning of a period of warfare, whether this period be short or long." ¹ A

¹ *Internat. Monatsschr. f. Wissenschaft, Kunst. u. Technik*, 1914, i.

great part of our thoughts, emotions and actions are still submerged in barbarism, like a futurist whose naïve mountain-peaks or trees remind one of those of a savage or a child, because the energy is lacking that might organise the new formations to replace those now existing. The practised eye, indeed, will commonly perceive the germ of the new age in those who are fettered by regression, but usually atavism prevails.

It is obvious that the problems of war and peace cannot be solved apart from each other. Peace societies and international conferences, State treaties and diplomatic negotiations are entirely powerless if the life-current of the peoples is not directed toward those channels of civilisation in which it can flow unchecked. It is only in connection with the whole of civilisation that the avoidance of war can properly be discussed.

And what of the renewed vitality which is intended to ward off barbarism? Our task will consist in finding out those points of regression at which fitter new formations are possible than jingoism or international hatred, imperialism or the love of Mammon. I am not merely talking theology when I remind you of the methods of Jesus. When He wished to suppress the Jewish cult of ceremonial, and the spiritual poverty caused thereby, he perceived the necessity of regression. His disciples asked Him who was the greatest in heaven. "And Jesus called a little child unto him, and set him in the midst of them, and said: Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven. And whoso shall receive one such little child in my name receiveth me" (Matthew xviii. 2-5). The regression extends to that stage of childhood which, on the one hand, has absorbed a not inconsiderable measure of civilisation and, on the other, has not yet been injured by orthodoxy and its vitiating influences. The timid child whom Jesus put forward as being on the path to heaven, is free from the confused desire of consideration displayed by the

disciples, who would like to be regarded as the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. At the final point of that regression—i.e. the child—Jesus already sees the new progression with its promise of the loftiest achievement. He identifies Himself with the child ("whoso receives him, receiveth me"); but He also projects His own soul into that of the child. He does not perceive the naughtiness, the barbarous qualities common to all children; He idealises the nature of the child, and thus accomplishes a re-transposition such as usually occurs in regression. To the historical traits (timidity, simplicity, freedom from boundless vanity) he adds others belonging to Himself. Another bold innovator of rather the same type was Rousseau, with his call for a return to Nature. He, too, speaks of childhood, which he paints with colours that by no means merely correspond with reality. His natural men of the pre-civilised ages are idealised figures which correspond more or less with Rousseau's own character and need of regression, but not with reality. A not wholly dissimilar course of action was Tolstoi's return to agricultural life

The fact is frequently overlooked that regression need not always be a relapse into cruder forms of life. Childhood may be a time of high civilisation as regards character and temperament. If, after a good beginning under the influence of capable educators, a man is dragged down by keeping bad company, this deterioration will generally give rise to a regression to an uncivilised state, in the sense that the fundamental movement, in spite of the more or less conventional shape which it may assume, offers a resistance to the spirit of civilisation. But if a man of this type comes into contact with internal or external resistance, he often experiences a new regression—due this time to good training; the moral forces of his childhood awaken and perhaps come to the surface.¹ It would be a bad thing for edu-

¹ The regression does not, then, awaken, as in the case of neurosis, impressions which have been entirely segregated from the conscious, and remain buried in the subconscious, only to be resuscitated by artificial aid. Regression to a higher stage awakens rather a clear remembrance of the moral values of the past.

cational influence if this possibility did not exist. Psychological regression may also be regarded as a cultural progression, but this does not in any way affect the relapse to a former level.

If war is recognised as a fundamental relapse into the primitive subconscious, and if the opposition to civilisation has proved itself to be untenable, the only possibility that remains is the attachment to civilised infantilism: i.e. to a life-direction which is free from imperialism, the cult of race, the love of wealth and other factors of warfare, which usually set the tone in public life, and also from barbarism of atavistic origin. If such a preliminary stage is wanting, a new formation of the life of a people is unthinkable. Comparable with a return to childhood of this kind is an honest renunciation of property whose acquisition is evocative of the atavistic springs of warfare. If the life-impulse turns with indomitable obstinacy and one-sidedness to wealth which, when acquired, curtails that of others, there arises a conflict which subjects the moral endeavour of the fully conscious mind to the crude forces of the subconsciousness.

The only possible way of escape is found when it is possible to guide the active impulses of the human psyche to paths offering complete satisfaction without entrenching on the vital capacities of others. Paths of this kind must be considered as a sublimation of all primitive instincts and lusts. But do we not possess a plenitude of such ameliorations, and do we not praise them as the highest achievements of our spiritual nature? To these belong those emotional values which, indeed, have greatly suffered under the domination of capital and the love of power. It certainly seems a monstrous thought that bureaucracy and cold-blooded diplomacy should set their course toward emotional values. But the latter exist and can never be entirely eliminated. The discord between human consideration in individual life and brutality in public life cannot be maintained indefinitely. The greater the satisfaction to be derived from family life, friendship and dignified social relations, the more safety valves do we possess against regression.

Further, the accomplishment of social and individual ethical tasks forms a channel, and a very broad channel, for the progress of the life-impulse. The prophets of Old Israel already opposed with great psychological and pedagogical wisdom, the warlike impulses of their time, on moral grounds. They shifted the stress from politics to the moral reform of social conditions, and thus drew up a programme that gave excellent results later on. Jesus acted in a similar manner.

The task, therefore, for the peoples, instead of indulging in an imperialistic policy of expansion, would be first of all to take up the development of ethical, social and individual values, whereby, of course, the improvement of the economic conditions of society would be furthered. The more a nation is inclined to avoid this cultural task, which is not imposed on it from outside, but responds to the nature and needs of mankind, the more easily will it fall into the regression of warlike tendencies, in the hope of obtaining in the quickest manner those goods which it needs for a productive life. This hope will naturally end in disappointment. Inversely, the warlike lusts of every enterprising nation that loves civilised life, and is aware of its social mission, become extinct, and the apparatus of war is retained merely as a protective instrument. Patriotism loses its jingoistic twang and reflects earnestly on the fact that a *purely* national culture is an impossibility. As little as Goethe could have existed without the Greeks and Shakespeare, Romain Roland without Beethoven and Carlyle without Goethe, so little can there be to-day or in the future a civilisation cut off from the cultural community of mankind as a whole. *The indispensable individuality of a civilisation is only sound and satisfactory if it is harmoniously linked up with the cultural organism of mankind, and is conscious of this connection.* A one-sided emphasis or over-valuation of what is national in civilisation invariably betrays a link connected with infantile fixation to the paternal house, and expresses a deficient formation of the individual life. For only that person who knows how to appropriate and elaborate all the values of life according to their

real significance, without regard to their incidental origin, is a free man.

A powerful prophylactic against all regressions, even warlike ones, to stages of development which have long been passed, is to be found in ideal activities of every kind. Social-ethical tasks presuppose a powerful affective idealism, in which love, active service, the thirst for eminent position and discovery, etc., find their anticipation. Art, too, with its infinite perspectives, poetry, and science open out broad fields to the life-impulse with its manifold desires. Perhaps the strongest security against a fall into the dark abyss of the subconscious is offered by religion, in which many of the profoundest and strongest spirits have stored up the energies which they neither applied directly to real life nor allowed to find regressive expression in phenomena injurious to the race. Art and philosophy likewise rise to the level of religion when they are borne upward by a powerful will to live. Every active religion is a reservoir of strength into which the vital impulse, driven inward by the surrounding reality, or left unsatisfied, withdraws, in order, under favourable circumstances, to become active in reality. There is indeed, as Freud proved, a neurotic piety which, in its attachment to the letter and to misunderstood ritual, its constant anxiety and remoteness from the world, betrays the tyranny of the subconscious, captivity to regression, and a resemblance to certain traits of obsessional neurosis. Besides this, there is a hysterical type which overflows with turgid expressions of emotion, but has little or nothing left for the accomplishment of the tasks of real life. This is the pietism which, secure in the possession of the bridegroom of the soul, takes flight from the world. And we frequently meet with a piety which withdraws from reality into itself and finds God in its own depths. This introverted form of piety—the pity of mysticism—like pietism itself, has no strength and no interest left for war. But it achieves little in the direction of social and other civilising tasks.

All these kinds of piety are precisely opposite to that of Jesus, who broke the bonds of the letter and of

dogma, refused to have anything to do with sentimental cults, and set up love, and explicitly the love of one's neighbour, as the most important application of Man's life-energy, thus introducing a free development leading to the highest development of the personality, and raising the moral tone of the life of societies, peoples and mankind. The life-hunger of all deep natures will always run counter to the restrictions of actual circumstances. A longing for permanent values is one of the privileges and penalties which are the heritage of the powerful intellect. The demand for the highest life-values cannot be satisfied even by a great creative civilising. If the dammed-up life-energy is not to flow back into the shallows of pessimism or injurious atavism (i.e. the lust of fighting), some wide sphere of activity is required that will hold this plenitude of life in suspension and lead it back to reality in the shape of ethical, artistic or other contributions to civilisation. All individual efforts, even those of trade and commerce, must link themselves up with this etherealised life-plan. Only a part of the biological task of religion is expressed in these statements, nor is anything said of the value or invalidity of its religious content. The question of truth does not appertain to our subject.

Only when the nations are able to perceive the real causes and subliminal forces of war, and to recognise them, with all their savage manifestations, as a regression to pre-civilised ages, and to guide the life-impulse into channels that will admit of a full development of individual and of human life, will it be possible to avoid war. For this purpose a rich inner life with high altruistic emotional values, extensive labours in the domain of science, æsthetics, ethics and religion, and above all a strength of purpose and creative activity which will not shrink from any task of civilisation, are necessary. Without intensive endeavour without a profound inward civilisation and a high level of social perfection, war cannot be prevented, despite our realisation of its evils. Peace, like all civilisation, must incessantly be fought for anew. The stronger the will to live the greater the tendency toward a catholic expenditure

of energy, the greater the danger of entering upon paths of development which result in complications and the regression to warlike lusts. All the greater, however, will be the gain derived from a completely spiritualised development of life liberated from the primitive powers of the past.

IV

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND PHILOSOPHY¹

LONG before the dark powers of war, pestilence, famine and death had begun, before our very eyes, to lay waste the field of harvest of humanity, the cry for a fuller life had already sounded through the world, preceded by the sighs and complaints, the yearning midnight song of a handful of thinkers and dreamers. Tolstoi and Dostojewski, Wilde, Maeterlinc and Romain Rolland spoke to their generation with prophetic tongues; Rudolf Eucken constructed his "personal scheme of life" in which naturalism and intellectualism had to exchange for the workman's blouse the purple which they had worn for so long, and the soul, conscious of its own peculiar nature and aware of its creative power and inner riches, mounted to the highest summits.² Henri Bergson wrote his philosophy of life in which the hitherto haughty intellect was fain to let itself be drawn up to the true pinnacles of life by the eternal feminine of intuition. It is certainly not due to mere haphazard that, simultaneously with the struggle against intellectualism, the revolt against industrialism and capitalism has arisen as a practical crusade for the conquest of life: for on this side and on that, in thought and in social life, the same cry of distress is heard; namely, that our emotions are being stifled. The life-impulse of the scholar and the economist began to seek a substitute for its lost estates in a different direction.

Psycho-analysis, too, owes its origin to this life-hunger. It is indeed true, that for its creator, Sigmund Freud, the mischievous enmity between the "male"

¹ Hitherto published in the German edition only. Written 1918-19.

² Cf. EUCKEN, *The Uniformity of the Spiritual Life in the Consciousness and the Activities of Mankind*, pp. 492 et seq.

intellect and the "female" emotion which others had believed to be established for all time, had no existence. Freud knows as well as Byron did that the tree of knowledge is not the tree of life, but he is also aware that the delicate shoots of the tree of knowledge must be grafted on to the tree of life in order to bring forth good fruit. The creator of psycho-analysis is far removed from that mere experience which, as Nietzsche contemptuously says, desires to know nothing of things but what lies before it, like a mirror with a hundred eyes. For Freud, too, psycho-analysis is at bottom a question of the enhancement and uplifting of life. If he constructed an entirely new psychology beyond the domain of the popular and wholly intellectual and emotionless science of psychic phenomena, he did so because he, too, was conscious of the same distress that in poetry, painting, philosophy, politics and the other elements of civilisation, was uttering the cry for a fuller life.

It is thus all the more striking that for a long time psycho-analytic circles were exceedingly shy of occupying themselves with fundamental life problems. Hence superficial observers came to the conclusion that psycho-analysis was a mere extension of Herbart's intellectualism,¹ based on a mechanical and passive frame of mind. But even the more active analysts failed to place their work in the great historical setting out of which it had grown, and to face such problems of cosmology as had reference to their activities. They behaved like the lucky discoverers of a new continent, who drink in the riches and beauties of the virgin soil with overflowing joy and activity, taking possession of it after much self-sacrificing effort, but not reflecting on the shape and situation of the whole. We must not, indeed, reproach them for such conduct, but we cannot approve of it in the long run. As the philosophical obligations of the analyst are gradually more urgently emphasised, I should like to contribute my modest quota to the solution of the question, and to qualify such attempts at solution as have already been advanced.

¹ J. H. SCHULTZ, *Zeitschr. f. angewandte Psychologie*, ii. 1909, p. 183.

I. Psycho-Analysis and Cosmology

"By cosmology we mean the logical extension and deepening of the mere image or representation of the external world to a uniform and definite recognition of the final cause, nature and aim of reality as a whole." In these words does Hunziger define the notion of the general view of the cosmic position. He thus expresses the fact that cosmology extends beyond the borders of experience, and on the one hand seeks information from metaphysics as to real existence, and from ethics on the other hand as to the destiny of Man, and the direction of the cosmic process.

Psycho-analysis, however, seems hardly to be the most efficient means of forging a hard and fast cosmic philosophy. In my definition (the only one known to me) I have formulated it thus: "Freud's psycho-analysis is a procedure which looks for the subconscious impulses and motives of psychic life by collecting and interpreting its associations."¹ Nothing is said here of a cosmic image; nothing of metaphysics and ethics; and the value of the subconscious impulses that have been revealed cannot be determined.

But the term "psycho-analysis" may be understood in a more comprehensive sense; viz. as the collective designation of the sum of the theoretical insight to be obtained by the aid of the method just indicated. And this is by no means insignificant. We learn of the development of instincts which were previously unknown; of introversion; of symbolical and other processes; of the ebb and flow of emotion, of the degeneration of psychic energies into morbid phenomena; of the transformation of primitive interests into valuable activities of the intellect, the emotions or the will; of the link between art, morality and religious life with the natural fundamental functions, etc. An entirely fresh psychological world is opened up; a biology of the soul which is for the most part new. In the same way psycho-analysis exerts a powerful and inevitable influence over the spiritual life,

¹ *Psycho-analysis in the Service of Education*, p. 9.

acting on the soul as the developer acts upon a photographic plate.

Seeing, then, that we have to conduct the profoundest inquiry into the nature of the psychic life, and the momentous effects arising in the course of its development, it is our task to determine how far this new material may affect our cosmic views, and how far the new direction of the soul has to conform to the standards set up by this cosmic view.

Freud himself did not attack this problem, and his classical psycho-analytical works are entirely free from philosophical considerations. This omission—whether an advantage or not—is no doubt due to his personal professional attitude and qualifications, no less than to his great modesty in the face of problems which he has not mastered as a professional expert. But there are likewise reasons of contemporary history to be taken seriously into consideration.

Like all psychiatrists, Freud was, on principle, by no means averse from consulting psychology for the purpose of enriching his knowledge of the soul; he was, however, repulsed by the incapacity of this branch of science. He was able to confirm Nietzsche's complaint in *Beyond the Good and Bad* that psychology dared not venture into the depths. Those who are desirous of knowing the experiences of the men who would have liked to make use of psychology for the purpose of comprehending the higher phenomena and relations of the soul-life should read the first chapter of Ludwig Klage's brilliant *Principles of Characterology* (Leipzig, 1910) or Bleuler's embittered and exasperated comments.¹ Freud had the same experience.

When he began his work of research metaphysical

¹ Bleuler writes *passim*: "Like many another psychiatrist I have lost a great deal of my precious time in searching the psychological textbooks for knowledge that should facilitate the comprehension of psychopathology. I have never been able to pluck even the smallest fruit of these endeavours, and could not name one of my colleagues who had derived any benefit from such studies—but many whose conceptions of reality were dulled by them. . . . I perceived, too, how many non-medical men are longing, in social intercourse, or in educational or pastoral work, to obtain a better understanding of psychology, and how grievously they are disappointed. It is our duty to help those who are looking for knowledge and actual achievement, instead of leading them

psychology was at its last gasp. In its capacity of the science of the soul it had wrestled with the philosophical notion of the psyche, but quite apart from the fact that even this central metaphysical problem had not been solved in a manner satisfactory to those in search of knowledge, the information offered in respect of the individual psychic processes was extremely dubious. While the metaphysical psychologists sailed boldly into the misty regions of transcendentalism, they played but a sorry part on the firm ground of psychic fact.

It is not astonishing that a medical man like Freud should look for a positive psychology, but even the younger army of psychologists, who had just hoisted their flag, did not satisfy him. They poured the waters of spiritual life through sieve and filter, and examined with unspeakable patience the tiny drops of liquid which they had obtained from the thus treated fluid. Only that counted which could be proved experimentally as often as one liked, and as only the most primitive processes of sensory life and intellect could be stretched upon the rack of experiment, the science of the soul was reduced to a pitiful domain that poured contempt on the name of psychology. A man like Freud, who was daily fighting against the powerful, deeply ramified psychic realities, could make but little of such results. We theologians did not fare any better. Those who were most assiduous in their studies of psychology for the purpose of serving life experienced the greatest disappointment.

Freud's profession compelled him to create a new psychology, after he had seen that neuroses are the effect of psychic causes and may be influenced in the first instance by psychic means. Being an empiricist through and through, metaphysical psychology had no disappointments for him; he simply ignored it. It was rather medicinal metaphysics that absorbed him; namely, that materialism which regarded the soul merely as a

into the wilderness of speculation, offering them a science which, indeed, has discovered thousands of isolated data, but has usually no more to offer than a few crumbs which are of no use to the student" (*Die psych. Richtung in der Psychiatrie*, *Schweizer Archiv f. d. Neurologie u. Psychiatrie*, ii. p. 192).

sort of rider of the brain, and consequently attempted to understand psychogenous inhibitions in a physiological sense. But his unconditional surrender to the experimental method saved him from the danger to which most neurologists have succumbed to this day. He grew rapidly out of the lisping accents of experimental psychology which claimed to be the only saving study of the soul.

Freud is the first great positivist in the ranks of the psychologists. By positivism we mean the opinion that given facts and their licit relations constitute the only objects of experience, and that the investigation of their innermost being and final causes and aims is thus to be renounced. Freud broke with the traditional dogma of the psychological object. Without rejecting the discoveries of the psychology of sensation he turned his attention to the vast field of research which comprised the understanding and the treatment of the soul, which psychology had neglected—and, in the first place, the life of instinct and volition, as well as *the domain of the subconscious*. For this purpose it was necessary for him to break away from the traditional *dogmas of method*. He perceived that the profound and penetrating observation of the psychical processes of the individual, which need not be artificially induced, may impart knowledge as reliable and of scientific value quite as great as the mass of observations compiled by the prevailing experimental-statistical method. In opposition to the popular scientific psychology he introduced an historical psychology which investigated the relations of individual processes, not forgetting even the most trivial-seeming lapses, associations, dreams, etc., any more than the causal and final concatenations of a whole career: e.g. that of a Leonardo da Vinci. No other psychologist displayed such reverence for facts, such sensitiveness to the study of all vital psychical problems. In this fact-loving positivism, which is wonderfully distinct from the cowardly and helpless hide-and-seek of orthodox psychology, lies an act of redemption which has opened out new worlds to many of us who were suffering under the psychological dogmas concerning the method and the object.

The new investigations were in their object and method so new that they gave the German psychologists the impression of being without historical forerunners. But in reality they were following in the footsteps of French psychologists like Charcot, Bernheim and other empirics, who had long been seeking for subconscious motives, while German psychology (in this respect almost completely shut in) was racking its brains over dull scholastics, and without the slightest regard to facts, over the notion of the subconscious. If Freud and his disciples are reproached with their want of attachment to current psychology, this attitude is closely connected with Freud's positivism. The analyst builds up his science on observations of phenomena and not on psychological text-books, and if the psychologist is incapable of understanding his inductions, this is only to be ascribed to his exclusion of actual facts, to his doctrinaire non-positivism.

It is very remarkable that Freud was able from the outset to develop his positivism merely by going beyond it. The result of his investigation of psychic phenomena was this—that their origin could only be understood by inferring the influence of subconscious psychical influences. Freud found himself compelled to trace quite definite subliminal motives, and to attribute to them quite definite effects. In this he went beyond strict positivism and phenomenism and came into collision with the academic psychology, as the latter had always maintained that *psychic* and *conscious* were identical notions, and that subliminal psychic motives were consequently to be rejected in advance. In order to remain faithful to this dogma, and to be able to deny the existence of subliminal impulses, that narrowness of horizon was necessary which we have already mentioned, and the facts investigated by Freud, to which every child might have had access, had to be depicted as incapable of observation, or even constructed for a special purpose, and actually non-existent. As we see, it was the knowledge founded on experience which, in Freud, the first universal psychological Positivist, broke the fetters of non-positivism.

It is obvious that Freud was not able to pay the same

attention to *all* the expressions of our many-coloured life, and in his selection he was guided by the needs of life and not by any dogma founded on method. He paid a quite special attention to the problems of *sexuality* because sexuality is one of the most important factors of neurosis, because no other subject had been so greatly neglected, and because in no other had such constant errors been made, to the detriment of mankind. Freud has never denied that the other instincts must be investigated just as thoroughly; but as his medical practice brought him chiefly into contact with cases of transference neurosis, i.e. with people whose love-life had been inhibited, he was forced, at the very outset, to devote himself to this expression of life. No doubt such a proceeding is apt to be one-sided, but this very one-sidedness was an historical necessity, and it actually proved to be extremely fortunate. Everything cannot be done at the same time. It speaks ill for people who have not even discovered the smallest rivulet or mountain peak to grumble at Columbus because he merely discovered America, and not the North and South Poles at the same time! The fact that the psycho-analytical method has hitherto attacked only a small part of the problems awaiting it is a proof of its fertility.

The attitude of orthodox psychology towards Freud is not to its credit, but is quite comprehensible, for if Freud were right its position would be disastrous. With its enormous accessories and auxiliaries, its costly arsenal of complicated apparatus, its army of trained men, it had only succeeded in obtaining a number of petty results in a small sector of its territory. And here comes a man, not even a professional psychologist, who dares to reveal an unheard-of number of psychological data, and even to construct psychological hypotheses and theories! In defending their position against this impertinence their weapons (unfortunately) were the primitive arms of mankind—mockery and contempt, misrepresentation of the enemy's views, the casting of suspicion on his character, the provocation of the lowest passions (such as prudery) in face of the new sexual

doctrines, etc. The facts which had been investigated by the representatives of psycho-analysis were suppressed, or, as has been already said, declared to have been invented for their special purpose. The critics and opponents of the new science were allowed space for the most absurd misrepresentations and criticisms of psycho-analysis, even if they themselves had never made the slightest trial of the method ; but if one of the analysts thus attacked and misunderstood asked for the smallest place in the same periodical for the purpose of defending himself and correcting errors, it was refused him. If anyone writes about artificial manure, for instance, we expect him to have practical experience of the subject ; in the case of the difficult problems of psycho-analysis, which is wholly based on experiment, the weapons of criticism were placed in the hands of inexperienced persons ; but even men of scientific reputation were not allowed to have their say if they were adherents of psycho-analysis ! This is a clear proof of the fact that orthodox psychologists are less concerned with the propagation of truth than with the defence of their own interests. But it is impossible that truth should be suppressed for use by the prejudiced attitude of editors.

Freud's own attitude toward ethics is that of the positivist who rejects all tracings to final causes and purposes. It is absolutely false to maintain that psycho-analysis is built up on a definite ethical basis. The only object of the founder of the new method of influencing the psyche was to give the patient a clear insight into his own mind. The analyst as such made no attempt to assume a moral attitude, and if, humanly speaking, he was not able to do otherwise, he kept his opinions to himself. The patient himself was expected to supply the needful moral approval or disapproval, and to draw the proper inferences. The analyst left the responsibility for his moral decisions to the patient himself. Whether he chose Jesus or Kung-tse, Buddha, Kant or Nietzsche, as his moral guide was no affair of Freud's.

Does not this modest attitude deserve every recognition ? The patient wants something other from his

medical man than that which he obtains from his pastor. A Jewish or Roman Catholic patient, or one without religion, would hardly thank his Protestant physician for trying to convert him! Every premature attempt to exert ethical influence would endanger the analysis. There are many patients whose own moral energy puts them on the right path once they have been shown the state of their subliminal forces. Moreover, the exertion of ethical or religious influence requires a thorough training which the medical man seldom possesses. It is a proof of no small modesty if an analysing physician is reserved in this respect. We have no right to expect that the doctor will be able to do what the clergy themselves cannot always accomplish, namely, to cause a person who has wandered from the path of virtue or religion to return to it!

Hence ethical positivism—if I may be allowed the expression—is deserving of recognition. The fact that powerful ethical influences were made possible without a single command “Thou shalt” was a discovery of far-reaching consequences. It is easy to understand why those who put their faith in moral pills and catechismal powders for the saving of the soul should break out into cries of wild indignation.

II. Psycho-Analysis and Metaphysics

HISTORICAL

The positivism for which Freud has secured a niche in the temple of Science was not based on philosophy; it was derived from the practical needs and the personal urgencies or limitations of its founder; and it was not meant to be fundamental and final.

SIGMUND FREUD

It is a mistake to believe that Freud has ever attempted to discredit metaphysics as the product of illusion:

namely, of an unwarranted projection of the specific soul-life. The authoritative expression is: "I believe, in fact, that a great part of the mythological view of the cosmos, which permeates modern religion, is *nothing else than psychology projected into the world around us*. The obscure recognition of the psychic factors and circumstances of the subconscious is reflected . . . in the construction of a *transcendental reality* which has to be transformed by science into the *psychology of the subconscious*. One might almost venture to elucidate in this manner the myths of Paradise and the Fall, God, Good and Evil, Immortality, etc., *and to change metaphysics into meta-psychology*."¹

It will thus be seen that there is here no question of pillorying philosophic metaphysics as an inadmissible self-projection. Here, rather, is an attack on mythology, in which one is, at most, astonished to find a myth of Good and Evil, i.e. an ethical distinction, co-ordinated with the religious representation of Paradise and the Fall, God and Immortality. The latter tells of what is, whereas one does not learn what is meant by the myth of the Good and Evil. Comte, as is well known, distinguished between the theological, metaphysical and positivist stages of knowledge and rejected the two former. Freud has rejected the first only, but not metaphysics in the philosophical sense.

S. FERENCZI

Neither have Freud's disciples done so on the whole. In a remarkable essay on philosophy and psycho-analysis Ferenczi protests against subjecting the latter to a definite cosmology, or giving it a place in the same.² He would have people wait awhile before attacking the young science with the weapons of metaphysics. No doubt a great part of metaphysics will finally turn out to be metapsychology; for instance materialism, as the most perfect projection conceivable of the *ego* into the surrounding world, and solipsism which is the converse;

¹ *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, 2nd ed. p. 117.

² *Imago*, i. p. 520.

but another part of metaphysics may turn out to be a presentiment of scientific knowledge (521).

It is to be noticed that Ferenczi endows psycho-analysis with the powers of a judge over the truth of metaphysical assertion, as may be clearly seen by the following remarks : " It must not be forgotten that psycho-analysis is pledged to investigate the conditions of origin of every kind of psychic achievement, not excepting those of philosophy, and to enforce the laws otherwise prevailing on the psychic plane, or, more singly, to demonstrate the enforcement of these laws. But how can psychology play the part of lawgiver to philosophy if it is expected to submit *a priori* to a definite system ? " (520)

But however meritorious Ferenczi's discovery of the psychological impulses at the bottom of materialism and solipsism may be, I must decidedly reject his philosophic nomination to the Ministry of Justice. He certainly does withdraw the statement that psycho-analysis must " enforce psychological laws," as he himself doubtless perceives that psychological laws are already in force in every psychic act, so that one cannot begin by enforcing them. The passage which Ferenczi corrected contained a confusion between psychological laws and standards of thought. By attributing to psychology the office of a " lawgiver to psychology " he confuses law and standard, and persists in his mistake. If I demonstrate the psychological validity of an assertion, the value of what has been said is not affected. False and correct assertions arise without doubt from psychological necessity ; from a psychological point of view they are both equally necessary. The fact that I know what laws collaborated in their formation does not profit me in the least in my judgment of their rightness or wrongness. Psycho-analysis has quite another task than this, and one which Ferenczi himself, as *primus omnium*, has very neatly solved with regard to two metaphysical systems. Psycho-analysis has to indicate the true motives in those cases where subconscious thought-images are concealed behind the conscious logical structures ; in other words, psycho-analysis must lay bare the real motives of a chain of thought in every case where the conscious arguments

are mere delusions (rationalisations). Ferenczi speaks of the "natural-scientific," not of the "historical" task of psycho-analysis, which is rather that which we must consider here. But even if the true motives of a philosophical assertion are made clear, the question of its value has not been decided, and it is by no means the task of psycho-analysis to do so. The fact that the materialist, as Ferenczi says, projects himself, while the solipsist absorbs into himself the processes of the surrounding world, tell us nothing of the knowable value of these two metaphysical systems. Those contents of experience which Ferenczi, in agreement with the popular consciousness, designates as the outer and the inner world, but which in reality have been in mutual opposition from the outset, according to Kant and all other theorists of experience (with the exception of the critics of empiricism) constitute a naïve supposition which must first be logically verified. Ferenczi—as is understandable in a medical man—assumes off-hand the standpoint which is designated in the *History of Philosophy* as a naïve realism. But if we take up the subject seriously we shall soon perceive that this procedure will not do, and is certainly no longer accepted by anyone who has studied the doctrine of knowledge.

The notion that psycho-analysis should be the law-giver of philosophy, as Ferenczi indicates, arises from a psychology which I consider inadmissible, and for which its author cannot give any justifiable grounds. For the time being I bow to logic and the doctrine of knowledge as the law-givers of philosophy, and cannot with the best will in the world discover that psychology has the slightest claim to the erection of a scientific standard. But that psycho-analysis, by discovering unexpected springs of action in the formation of opinion and proving that the apparently genuine basis of opinions is mere delusion, facilitates the functions of knowledge to a very great extent, reducing them even to self-evident trifles where one was previously confronted by a difficult problem, is an opinion in which I can heartily agree with Ferenczi.

Although Ferenczi would not have philosophy resign its post for ever, he yet assigns to it a part which is not entirely suited to its nature: he places it in opposition to science. "Philosophies, like religions, are works of art and fiction, which certainly may contain a number of grandiose hypotheses, the value of which must not be under-estimated. But they belong to another category than science, by which we mean the sum of those laws which, after thorough elimination, as far as this is possible, of the fantastic products of the pleasure-principle, we are compelled to accept as true. There is only one science, but there are as many philosophies and religions as there are men of varying minds and tempers. It is in the interest of both subjects, proceeding, as they do, from different principles, not to confound their theses with one another" (521).

I do not believe that Ferenczi's differentiation is correct. Both science and philosophy are, in my opinion, wrongly and insufficiently understood. Science is not a "sum of laws" (he means no doubt the knowledge of such); a science likewise includes *notions*, and the historical sciences are also occupied with individual phenomena. Nor can it be said that there is in reality only *one* science. In every branch of science there are countless dogmas contradicting one another, and when the experts are of the same opinion, it is a question whether they are dealing with real science, i.e. with conclusive knowledge. But if Ferenczi thinks that ideally there is only one science, this ideal applies equally well to the majority of philosophical systems, seeing that each of them lays claim to general recognition and absolute credibility, i.e. general acceptance. With regard to the application of these two principles of thought, the surmounting of the pleasure-principle in empirical knowledge and philosophy by the reality-principle is an ideal, the fulfilment of which leaves a great deal to be desired. Psycho-analysis has often shown that subjective elements have frequently been conveyed into apparently reliable empirical knowledge and have thus diminished the objectivity of the judgment. And even this has not happened in the same proportion

as in philosophy ; the difference is after all but a relative one. We shall return to this later when treating of metaphysics.

For Ferenczi the centre of gravity lies in the claim to extend the sphere of psycho-analysis independently of systems of philosophy, and in this he is to a certain extent right. It would be fatal if at the present time, when our empirical knowledge is so strictly limited and our method is in such urgent need of critical enlargement, although our scientific knowledge is increasing so rapidly, were we to split up its scanty forces and devote ourselves principally to philosophy, especially as there are very few trained philosophers among the psycho-analysts. But the relative and as yet not wholly comprehensible nature of our empirical analytical knowledge must be emphasised, together with the necessity of a philosophical elaboration of this material. But, as we shall show later, it will not be a question of submitting our analytical experience to the acceptance of metaphysics.

OTTO RANK AND HANNS SACHS

The encyclopædic work entitled *The Significance of Psycho-analysis in respect of the Mental Sciences* published by Otto Rank and Hanns Sachs¹ marks a satisfactory progress in the comprehension of the correct relations between psycho-analysis and philosophy. It starts from the fact that in philosophy the personality of the author emerges in a measure "such as is not really admissible in a science" (96). The authors thus hint that even the exact sciences pay their tribute to the very human but inadmissible reflection of self. They justly claim for the analyst the right to examine, psychographically, the personality of the philosopher, and to display the wish-material in his train. They thus make a difference between the metaphysical, positive, and analytical types of the philosopher. The dogmas of the latter, which start in the main from logical certainty, could hardly, according to Rank and Sachs, form an object for psycho-

¹ BERGMANN, Wiesbaden, 1913.

analytical investigation, seeing that the interference of subconscious wish-elements is to a very great extent eliminated. The personality of the philosopher, however, may be the object of psycho-analysis, as the majority of such men are practically cut off from practical life and the life of the affections.*

Still less will the psycho-analyst concern himself with positive philosophies, whereas the contents of the systems of the typical metaphysicians are determined by subconscious forces.

Thus far I am in the main in agreement with these authors, whose manual is unfortunately not sufficiently appreciated ; but I cannot agree with their notion of metaphysics. They find that this science takes its name from the fact that it does not appear to be based on objective experience (98). Both its forms of expression are the mythological formation of a system, from which some infer a Creator who has made the world out of himself, or out of nothing, and the others a supernatural world. Both systems, however, in their rejection of every proof of the reality of analytic disintegration exhibit themselves as projections of the subconscious psychic life into a supernatural world which complies with certain wishes of the individual, for psychologically considered it represents only a self-projection of the individual in the Cosmos (99). The doctrines of volition of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are cited as examples.

But the authors do not claim by these indications to have exhausted the nature of philosophy. They point out that the objective valuation of philosophical results is not in the least affected by such information as to the personal determination of philosophical views (100). Herein lies the greatest point of difference from Ferenczi, and at the same time the most important step forward.

First of all I would attribute to psycho-analysis a wider scope than that conceded by these writers. I find that the empirical theories of those thinkers who may be described as analysts displays quite as many

* If HUME is regarded as a typical representative of this mood of thought, the above remarks do not hold good, as he was Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office.

traces of repression as those of the metaphysicians, and that even positivism, in its capacity of agnosticism, and its disinclination to investigate the kernel of knowledge, is often based on a stifling of the subconscious. There are, indeed, many neurotics among natural scientists, historians and other practical positivists. Agnosticism is in many cases a negative dogmatism, a projection of the neurotic dislike of deeper self-knowledge into the outer world, a fixation to the father, etc.

And, secondly, I consider their account of the nature of metaphysics to be a wrong one. Historically the name "metaphysics" has nothing to do with one's attitude toward objective knowledge, but, rather, is derived from the wholly external fact that Andronicus of Rhodes placed Aristotle's works on the highest principles behind those dealing with nature, and entitled them τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά thus implying that the doctrine of the true Being must be based on the knowledge of nature. If Rank and Sachs merely wish to say that the further metaphysics are removed from experience the more they are subject to the interference of this subjective contents, I agree with them. But if they are of opinion that metaphysics as a whole is without an objective basis, I must oppose this view. And it is certainly wrong to raise the same objection to religion as a whole. Religion, too, starts not only from subjective, but also from objective experiences, and if it remains animistic and anthropomorphic in its primitive stages, this is likewise true of primitive natural science, and it is precisely psycho-analysis that has shown us why this must be so. But together with primitive religions there are also highly developed faiths which sometimes, as in mysticism and its *summum ens*, entirely strip off all human forms, or, as in the philosophy and systematic theology of the nineteenth century (Biedermann, Schweizer, Lipsius, Pfeiderer), is very serious in its acceptance of the need of correction by reality and a foundation of objective facts. If God is defined as the Absolute Ego, the Absolute Idea, the Central Monad, *actus purus*, and the like, this terminology has less of anthropomorphism

in it than that of the majority of the natural sciences. And it is questionable whether in such nomenclature it is possible entirely to avoid anthropomorphism.

And if religion, finally, is adjusted to the standards of life peculiar to Man, these, too, are derived from reality, i.e. from human nature. But I believe that the arrangement of subjective idealism into mythical or mythological systems cannot be historically justified, for only those images are called mythological in which the gods are like men or men are like the gods. I find that the title of "objective knowledge" as applied to subjective idealism is not to be refused without philosophical proof.

But the main point is that Rank and Sachs, too, do not raise psycho-analysis to the level of a court of judgment on this, that or the other system of philosophy. In this way, as was to be anticipated on the part of men of such multifarious knowledge and perspicacity, they have secured the self-determination of metaphysics, at least of that metaphysics which adapts itself to the facts of experience. They leave open the question as to how metaphysics is to adapt itself to the state of affairs discovered by psycho-analysis as a method.

HERBERT SILBERER

In an admirably lucid and comprehensible fashion Silberer warns us against disparaging metaphysics in the name of psycho-analysis, and he, too, defends Freud against the suspicion of having represented the whole of ontology and cosmology as a complacent self-reflection.¹ Silberer points out: "Psycho-analysis certainly does show how, in the individual being, this or that inclination to or representation of metaphysics arises . . . but this is not decisive for the essentials of metaphysical considerations, and still less for a critical-idealistic apprehension of facts. If, by means of psycho-analysis, I have elucidated the origin, let us say of a certain religious idea, I have made a psychological process comprehensible, but have done nothing for the truth of the contents or

¹ As HITSCHMANN does in *Imago*, ii. p. 167.

the value of the idea in question. To attempt to substitute metapsychology for empirical theory would be like asserting that the Danube was merely the projected symbol of my urethral eroticism, and the fishes in it nothing more than mere symbols of the penis and the spermatozoa. If we wish to speak of metaphysics or the theory of knowledge, they must be based on hypotheses (logical trains of thought) which are as independent of any individual psyche as the Danube is of the fish in it."

We shall now consider some quotations from the works of Putnam. Silberer has unfortunately made no pronouncements on the relations between psycho-analysis and philosophy.

(b) *Metaphysical advances from Psycho-analytical quarters*

JAMES PUTNAM

To James Putnam we owe the first and up to now by far the most thorough attempt to mark out the lines which the psycho-analyst should follow. At the third congress of the International Psycho-analytical Union at Weimar (Sept. 22, 1911) he dealt in a thoughtful paper with "the significance of philosophical considerations and extensions for the further development of the psycho-analytical movement."¹ A faithful supporter of Freud after careful investigation of his work, this philosophically trained neurologist attempts to penetrate to the life-process as a whole from the individual biogenetical investigation which came to a halt at certain motives (104). In doing so he attributes a peculiar place to metaphysics. If we wish to train ourselves in the knowledge of the soul, we must select the soul itself as our starting-point; hence the usual psychological training is insufficient because it takes too little account of philosophy (107). The spirit is of itself a spontaneous force, capable of making itself its own object; it must necessarily look for a unit in the surrounding world analogous to thought, and instinctively rejects the notion of a universe consisting

¹ *Imago*, I., broch. 2.

of two opposing kinds of reality. Consequently the only real thing in the world must be this self-acting spiritual energy, so that spiritual monism is justified (107). By considerations such as these we learn to understand the will better and perhaps to appreciate it more. If we could gain new starting-points for ethics, especially for the doctrine of responsibility, we should be richly rewarded (108). If we desire to be recognised for our knowledge of the soul in the widest and noblest sense of the word, we must pronounce in favour of this or that cosmic philosophy, and we should indeed perceive that the essential thing in every process of development is the spontaneous force just mentioned, which does not itself require any development (108). Bergson proved this brilliantly in animal development, but we may go beyond him by pointing out how that spontaneous energy which stands at the head of all evolution appears again as self-consciousness (109). In this way Putnam arrives at a form of metaphysics which is fundamentally in agreement with that of Hegel and Bergson. The chief point in it is that it is not the physical development, which to a certain extent occurs of itself, that leads to the psychic development, but that, on the contrary, the self-acting energy (which is to be considered as spiritual) exerts its influence from the outset. If in the world-phenomena we perceive our own spiritual endeavours, recognise our own ideal *ego*, our own ethics, our common sense, our deepest divinations and our logic, we have obtained a complete cosmic view (III) in which we not only project our emotional life, but also our thoughts into the secrets of the world.

Putnam likewise investigates the problem of why so many psycho-analysts refuse to adopt any cosmic view, and comes to the conclusion that it is precisely positivism which is based on repression. The obscure feeling in everybody that his fate is intimately connected with that of the world, is repressed on the one hand because it is mysterious and not clearly understood, "and on the other it is connected with an obscure knowledge of the fact that our mind and soul are the most important forces within us, and that the work of our intelligence and

moral development represents *in petto*, and in an imperfect form, the work of those energies by means of which the universe was created and is maintained" (112). This thought belongs to the primordial substance of the soul, and all study is only an elaboration of this substance. These divinations and impulses have been repressed because Man does not like to feel himself under the influence of powerful and not quite comprehensible forces, and because the natural science of the last century prevented religious thought, although religions, in spite of their imperfections, have always represented the poetical side of a truly scientific insight into the secret of life (113).

But what has all this to do with psycho-analysis? Putnam says that a psycho-analytical insight into psychic activity cannot be properly understood unless we take sufficient account of its real nature and its relations to other profane phenomena (117). But he unfortunately does not show how this is the case, and how positive psycho-analytical knowledge, influenced by the imperfections above-mentioned, may be increased by a preliminary philosophic doctrine of the soul.

I can still vividly remember the impression that was made by Putnam's paper. The audience, under the spell of a profound spiritual achievement, was glowing with the noblest sentiments; but the copious rush of thoughts left behind a certain bewilderment, so that only a few suggestions stood out prominently. Ferenczi, in the work already mentioned, expresses doubts which were felt by many of those present. But he understood philosophy differently from Putnam, who defined metaphysics as a science, or, as he wrongly put it, as a scientific method.

In Putnam's meritorious work there are two deficiencies to be commented upon. He has not worked out the idea of philosophical consideration, or (consequently) that of metaphysics, so clearly that its relations to the exact sciences are made evident, for the doctrine that philosophy has to deal with the nature of the spirit, treated entirely for itself (529), and that it must precede empirical psychical investigation, will satisfy nobody. Further, he did not show sufficiently in what way these philosophical

views were to act on psycho-analytical investigation. And why psychology must first wait until metaphysics has presented it with a psychical doctrine is just as little explained as the other question, as to what support metaphysics, as a preliminary to an exact psychical doctrine, possesses for the same object. Ferenczi was perfectly right in his sceptical attitude toward this obscure metaphysics which advances with victorious mien and haughtily demands that empirical science shall follow in its triumphant train. Putnam left out of consideration the unhappy experiences of psychology during the time when it was struggling in the net of metaphysics. It may be admitted that psycho-analysis can be applied as a method without any consideration for metaphysics, and that materialists, idealists and agnostics will obtain exactly the same results. But it must likewise be admitted, as Ferenczi happily does, that psycho-analytical research can obtain new points of view and fresh knowledge from philosophy (519). Putnam has not shown us how to reconcile these two ways of consideration comparatively, and how empirical science is comparatively free and (as receiver) dependent. He treats the cosmic view as the primordial substance of the soul, as an obscure feeling which is naturally a right one and needs only to be raised to a lucid comprehension. Have we not here to do with a posthumous sister of the *ideæ innatæ*? I am afraid that she will not fare any better than the poor innate ideas to which Locke gave the death-blow, on whose tomb almost every subsequent philosopher has laid his offering. With every respect for the excellent neurologist and man, Putnam, I cannot agree with his fragmentary hints, and particularly their foundations, in spite of the fact that his metaphysical conclusion so nearly approaches mine.

C. G. JUNG

Putnam, as we have seen, derives his philosophy, preliminary to all psycho-analysis, from the nature of the spirit to which psycho-analysis has to range itself, whereas Jung builds up his metaphysical concepts on psycho-

analytical and biological experience. It is true, indeed, that he does not get as far as a cosmic view. What he presents is only a theory of the "libido," and even this (as he himself expressly declares) is not a philosophically complete theory.¹ But the libido being in Jung's sense a trans-empirical, and consequently a metaphysical magnitude, I shall deal with it briefly here.

Freud conceived the libido as the psychic side of the sexual instinct. Jung extended this meaning in 1912 for reasons which cannot be given here, and at the same time considerably limited the domain of the sexual instincts. Freud attributes to sexuality an important part even in the life of the suckling, whereas Jung calls the period of life from the birth to the third, fourth or fifth year the pre-sexual period of development (189). But a libido exists even at this time, since by "libido" is to be understood "the energy which is manifested in the life-process and which is subjectively apperceived as effort and desire."² Hence the libido is not of a sexual nature; it is nothing concrete, but rather "an x ," a pure hypothesis, an image or arithmetical counter which is no more to be grasped concretely than is the energy of the physically conceived world.³

This libido, conceived as purely energetic, is already found in the protista, and, as Jung repeats, as a propagation instinct.⁴ It is the libido which, as an energy of growth, urges the individual to division and proliferation, and is therefore repeatedly called "the sexual primordial libido"; here, too, however, we are dealing with particular applications of the libido, which, in itself, is asexual.

These indications must suffice for the present, as Jung has not penetrated deeper into philosophical problems. Our criticism, too, must be confined to a few points only. I cannot approve of Jung's procedure in using the word "libido" to which Freud had given quite another meaning, in an entirely different sense, for a serious terminological

¹ "Transformations and Symbols of the Libido," *Jahrb. f. p.s.a.u. psychopath. Forschung*, vol. iv. p. 178.

² *Versuch einer Darst. d. p.s.a. Theorie*, *Jahrb.*, v. p. 342.

³ *Jahrb.*, v. p. 342.

⁴ *Ibid.* iv. pp. 177, 180; v. p. 343.

confusion was the result, as might easily have been anticipated. Even Jung's own disciples employ the word sometimes in his and sometimes in Freud's sense.¹ The elaboration of the notion itself is not original. The conception of an instinct which, itself not sexual, yet enters into sexual functions, derives from none other than Freud, who expressly declared that the "partial instincts" the totality of which constitutes the libido, were not primary, but derived from an instinct which was not itself sexual and only became so through stimuli from erogenous organs.² The positive manner of thinking, we might say the caution of the empirical method, preserves Freud from the attempt to trace the threads of this instinct, or of the erogenous organs, any further back. Freud is certainly aware that Man, in his sexual development, repeats the phylogenetic process,³ but the insufficiency of our knowledge of the history of evolution prevents him from expressing himself more clearly as regards the nature of the pre-sexual instinct and its contact with organic stimuli. It is not difficult to guess that he is inclined to derive both sources of the sexual instinct from a common origin. I still consider Jung's primordial sexual libido to be a terminological mistake.⁴ How can the instinct of propagation be called "sexual" if "sexuality" is the last phase of application of the libido, and the term "libido" is justified only in this connection? (iv. 180.) And how can one speak of a primordial sexual libido when another primordial libido is behind it?

For the metaphysical extension of the idea of the libido to the cosmos Jung confines himself to Schopenhauer's testimony; hence criticism is not necessary here.

On the other hand a great deal can be said against Jung's negative metaphysics, which consists in the denial of the existence of God. In his work *The Psychology of Subconscious Processes* he asserts that the question as to the existence of God is "one of the most stupid questions

¹ Cf. my essay "Is Incendiarism an archaistic attempt at Sublimation?" *Internat. Zeitschr. f. Ärtzl. Psychoanalyse*, iii. year, 3rd broch.

² FREUD, *Three Treatises on the Sexual Theory*, 2nd ed. p. 30.

³ FREUD, *Lectures Introductory to Psycho-analysis*, p. 409.

⁴ *Vide*, *The Psycho-analytic Method*, p. 167.

that could be asked " (91). The idea of God belongs to the " primordial images," the ancient, common property of mankind, on which the greatest and best thoughts of humanity have been based. If Jung adopts, together with this thesis, Putnam's " primordial substance of the soul," he ascribes it at once to a psychologically false and, from a philosophical point of view, a negatively dogmatic assertion." We know well enough that we cannot even conceive of a God, to say nothing of representing Him as actually existing; just as little as we can imagine a process which has not been causally determined " (91). But a glance into the history of religion shows us that men have never been able to conceive and represent God in their religious consciousness without accepting the fact of His existence. If Jung gives as the reason for the inconceivability of God the fact that the idea of God is contrary to the postulate of a causal determination, he has not made it clear to himself that the same argument would overthrow other notions and conceptions which might arise in the same way, philosophically speaking: such as the ideas of substance, atoms, matter, etc. In these, too, we start from certain phenomena whose sources are looked for, and climb up an endless ladder of causes which when surmounted are immediately transformed into effects; but for reasons which I have no time to develop here we still remain at the first cause. Naturally there are difficulties in the way of conceiving this logical last, and ontological first, phase; but are these difficulties less than the difficulties of denying these conceptions? Has anybody been able to carry through energy as a system in such a way as to leave fewer difficulties in its wake? Jung must himself admit that his appeal to Schopenhauer's metaphysics will make but little impression as long as he is unable to overcome its generally admitted weaknesses.

The falsity of Jung's psychology lies in the fact that he conceives the idea of God as " a mere psychological function of an irrational nature " (91) and leaves out of count the question as to its objective sources of knowledge. While Putnam treats his " primordial substance

of the soul " in a manner which almost reminds one of the old supernaturalism (even if it is intended to be otherwise conceived) and surrounds it with the nimbus of mysticism, Jung believes that he can manage with the psychological acceptation of an auto-symbolical process. This is just as inadmissible as if one were to say " The Egyptians conceived the sun as a boat ; thus they projected a product of their technics into the sky ; the idea of a sun-boat is contradictory, hence there is no sun." Nobody who has studied the history of religion can deny that the idea of God has undergone innumerable corrections in the direction of reality, which ran counter to the individual wish-principle. By ignoring all objective sources of the knowledge of religion, and, to use his own words, by pulling religion down from the stage of objectivity to that of subjectivity, he acted too hastily. If one considers with what a gigantic expenditure of perspicacity, comprehensive knowledge and creative systematic energy, all the great philosophers, with the exception of Schopenhauer down to Wundt, Eucken and Bergson, have investigated these objective sources of knowledge and derived the idea of God from them with logical stringency, one cannot but wonder at Jung's hastily formed conclusions.

ALPHONSE MAEDER

Maeder's metaphysics is at bottom only a philosophical elaboration of the libido doctrine. This, too, rejects logical foundations and leaves the greatest and most difficult part of the building up of thought to the philosophers, of whom Bergson is the most sympathetic to Maeder ; evidently more sympathetic than Putnam, who has more confidence in notional thinking than has Bergson or Maeder.¹

That which distinguishes Maeder from his predecessors is a more precise differentiation between vitalism and mechanism, the libido theory and the principle of energy. The interpretation of dreams and the processes of cure lead him to infer teleological life processes that cannot

¹ *Imago*, i. p. 111.

possibly be reconciled with the mechanical conception of life.¹ Physico-chemical research, which has performed such good service in respect of physiology, was no more able to grasp what is in its essence actually living and vital than it is able to define what is specifically psychic (48). "The comparison of the organism with a machine only shows us what is common to life and to the mechanism created by human genius. It does not teach us anything about the anonymous activity and the uninterrupted syntheses which represent life. The organism builds itself up by the fact of its life, in contrast to the machine which is worn out by use. Muscles are strengthened by exercise (48). Vital activity creates the organ, whereas the machine can only employ the energy which Man has stored up and given to it (48). Creative activity transcends the laws of the consumption of energy in the organism, and particularly in the psyche (50). Hence the two fundamental laws of energy and entropy are insufficient for the comprehension of what is specifically bio-psychological; the latter is controlled by a new and third fundamental law. . . . The degradation of matter and energy is opposed to the development and enhancement of the life-process (48). Entropy, which would result in the death of mankind and of organic life in general is not the mistress of the world; the law of entropy however valuable it may be in its own limited field, has no value for the biologist or psychologist; it does not concern itself with actual life (51). Maeder finds the bridge from the individual to the cosmos to be no longer natural-philosophical but metapsychological in the sense to be expressed later.

In these conceptions Maeder, like Jung, is following in Putnam's footsteps. These adherents of Bergson had likewise found the energetic method of consideration insufficient, and the biogenetic principle inapplicable to the investigation of the essential attributes of the spirit (106). Putnam also accepted the cosmic significance of the maintenance of energy and came to the conclusion

¹ *Cure and Development in Psychic Life: Psycho-analysis and its Importance in Modern Life*, Zurich, Rascher & Co., 1918, p. 47.

that new energies are created by every volitional impulse. (116 *et seq.*). Maeder's doctrines envisage the same result, except that here the enhancement and development of the life-process acts the part of guide, protector and supporter when energy is in danger of being degraded.

This metaphysical conception is, however, more definitely established by Maeder than by Putnam, particularly by the comparison between the machine and the organism. But I cannot admit that the task has been convincingly solved. The organism is said to build itself up by the fact that it is living, whereas the machine gets worn out by use. If a layman may be permitted to make an observation, I should like to say that both statements appear to me to be wrong. Overstrain, old age and death sufficiently demonstrate that the organism is not always building itself up, and many a machine becomes efficient only after long use. I do not consider that anything has been gained by this feeble argument for warming up the old idea of vitalism, which, as is well-known, confused and prejudiced physiology for so long. I can understand, indeed, that the brevity which was imposed on Maeder did not allow him to go thoroughly into the matter; but if he undertook to supply a basis, it should have been suitable and conclusive. Unfortunately this is not the case.

I consider the assertion to be erroneous that the mechanical conception of life cannot be consolidated with the teleological conception. The vital activity is said to create the organ, while the machine merely employs the energy supplied to it. Where is the contradiction between vital teleological considerations and causal energy? It is certain that "vital activity" does not create out of nothing, but takes over the energy provided by its surroundings. In the same way the machine expends its energy without destroying any of it. In both cases, if we think of both together as an isolated whole, it is doubtful whether the energies existing in the living being and its environment suffer a quantitative alteration. It is doubtful, too, whether the energies working in an organism on encountering their like, do not again exert

their influence according to chemical-physical laws. In any case physiology has never been able to demonstrate the existence of any energies withdrawn from natural causality. The hypothesis that there are energies which spring from some beyond into the natural causality, which has hitherto been considered as closed, is one which brings serious misgivings in its train. If, with Putnam, we admit that human volition releases such energies, then evidently the psyche itself will be materialised.

In reality, however, the contradiction between the mechanical and the teleological conception of the cosmos indicated by Maeder does not exist. It is true that neither the organism nor psychic life can be understood by mechanical considerations alone, and whoever has realised how the mechanical theory (which is always based on an abstraction process) came to a head will not be surprised by this fact. But this does not mean that there must necessarily be a contradiction between the mechanical and teleological conceptions. I have treated this subject fully in my book on *The Freedom of the Will*¹; and in his *System of Philosophy* Wundt treats the quarrel between the causal and the teleological conception of the world in a masterly fashion.² The question is really one of two points of view which complete one another; but this does not imply that anything has been said to invalidate Maeder's results.

III. Fundamental discussion of the relations between Psycho-Analysis and Metaphysics

I can only give some slight indications here as to the material attitude of psycho-analysis and metaphysics. I will start with the notion of experimental science and positivism.

Psycho-analysis in its quality of an experimental science attempts to recognise the subconscious motives and springs of action of the soul-life as a completion of the analysis of the conscious. Its task is to obtain absolutely reliable, because conclusive, knowledge of the psychic

¹ Pages 282-344.

² Second ed., pp. 308-340.

state of affairs. Now it may be asked whether, as Putnam claims, a metaphysical precursor is necessary.

Nobody will be ready to admit that the American savant has demonstrated the necessity of such pre-psychological metaphysics. It is by no means his intention to assert that Freud's empirically obtained theories are false. On the contrary, he is never tired of pointing out the gain to our knowledge of the human soul which has been acquired by psycho-analysis without the aid of metaphysics. His own remarks about the metaphysics which is to precede psycho-analysis in time and logic have nowhere given cause for correcting the results achieved by experimental science.

Let us obtain a clear conception of what is meant by metaphysics. Why do we not stick to positivism and content ourselves with a knowledge of phenomena and their licit associations? The popular science of half-educated people cannot understand why we should take so much trouble and not make a halt at "experience."

The reason is, that what we call experience is a motley mixture of appearance and reality, truth and error, and that all clear minds feel a strong impulse to penetrate through this admixture to real experience. For this reason they have investigated the possibility of knowledge, its limits and its auxiliaries. Mathematicians like d'Alembert, physicists like Mach, physiologists like Helmholtz, sociologists like Auguste Comte and zoologists like Haeckel, together with numerous other investigators who have done pioneer work in the knowledge of facts, were driven by their instinct for knowledge, their inner compulsion, to do justice to facts, to theories of knowledge. Those who consider this philosophical work as the idle play of dreamers and brooders living apart from reality, betray thereby an astounding lack of education.

It was the same search for knowledge that imposed the necessity of studying metaphysics. To the question why we should not stick to non-metaphysical and purely empirical knowledge there is only *one* answer: Because there never has been and never will be such purely empirical knowledge. That which we call knowledge always has

a number of contents which are not those of experience. Experience has to deal with phenomena, but these contain appearances, as the Greek word itself denotes. That simple realism which supposes that it possesses the surrounding world in its apperceptions, is scientifically untenable. Optics, as we know, withdraws colour, which is only a sensation, from visible objects, and shows it to be only a subjective occurrence. "Experience" says: "Sugar is white and sweet." The physiologist comes and says: "White is a sensation; sugar has no sensation and is not a sensation; the sensation of "sweet" occurs only in a sensory subject and does not exist beyond it any more than a toothache which nobody has. The same is true of colour, etc." And so space and time, the elements of reality up to the highest objects of metaphysics, are investigated.

At bottom metaphysics is nothing more than a scientific continuation of the procedure which is applied everywhere, and must always be applied in *naïve* experience and primitive knowledge. Every experience contains elementary, childish metaphysics. Expressions such as "cause," "force," "law," etc., are absolutely of a metaphysical nature, for, as everybody ought to know since Hume, these notions are by no means the result of real or "pure" experience. Natural science, too, goes hand in hand with trans-empirical notions, such as "atom," "matter," "substance," "electron," "energy," etc. To attempt to abolish the theory of knowledge and metaphysics would be equal to giving the death-blow to natural science or abandoning it to *naïveté*. As a contempt for philosophy is unfortunately not infrequent among medical men (with psycho-analysts it is happily rarer), it may be pointed out that a number of the most capable philosophers, such as Helmholtz, Hermann Lotze and Wilhelm Wundt were originally medical men, and, as such, induced to take up philosophy under the compulsion of logical thought. Hence, if we wish to lay claim to thorough science, we have no choice as to whether we shall take up metaphysics or not; our choice at most is the choice between childish and strictly scientific metaphysics.

Anti-metaphysical thinkers, like Ernst Mach and my

unforgettable teacher Avenarius, have to put together a very disputable doctrine of knowledge if they wish to maintain their point of view.¹ I have never yet met a psycho-analyst who had adopted this system; consequently I shall not deal with it and will merely observe that I consider Wundt's and Külpe's criticism to be conclusive.²

Metaphysics is therefore derived from empirical science owing to the need for distinguishing between appearance and reality, and for testing the empirical objects as to their origin and aim. I have investigated its logical basis thoroughly in another place.³ My definition of metaphysics is therefore the following: *Metaphysics is that science whose aim is to eliminate the unreal and contradictory elements inherent in empirical notions, and to look for the last conceivable and logical causes, together with the true being of the empirical objects.*

It will be seen that this subject has nothing to do with no such mares' nests as an absolute Beyond, but, on the contrary, with the world of *real* experience. In my opinion a science of metaphysics like that of Jung, without objective value, would be not merely an arithmetical counter, but even false coinage. In reality, metaphysics is for everyone who has broken with the dualism and the relative agnosticism of Kant, a coin of real value to knowledge.

The further thought is removed from empiricism, the more influence does the subjectivity of the thinker acquire. Hence the old opinion, especially emphasised by Fichte, that metaphysical systems reflect the character of their authors. It is this which keeps an investigator like Freud, who is hungry for facts, away from metaphysics. I can understand this very well, and honour this sense of reality. But I would like to point out that:—

1. Philosophical thought which has not been purified, even including that of the natural sciences, is even fuller of anthropomorphism than is metaphysics; one only has to think of such expressions as "cause," "force,"

¹ Cf. my book, *The Freedom of the Will*, pp. 237 *et seq.*; WUNDT, *Phil. Stud.*, vol. xiii, pp. 44-105; *Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 285-300; KÜLPE, *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland*, pp. 14-32.

² *The Freedom of the Will*, pp. 223-68.

"matter," "law." And the utter impossibility of this bad metaphysics, which the psycho-analyst smilingly sees through, is far more disturbing to every clear-headed thinker than the anthropomorphism of the great philosophers.

2. It is not true that metaphysics arose merely by a projection of the philosopher's own personality into the Absolute; it should be a matter of common knowledge how greatly Lotze, Fechner, Wundt, von Hartmann, Paulsen, Bergson, Busse, Raoul Pictet and others were influenced by their studies in natural science. It is precisely metaphysics (when rightly understood) that applies the maximum of care to the correction of reality.

3. In every science one is compelled to complete that which has been directly experienced by logical constructions, that which has been perceived concretely by abstractions, and to fill up the gaps in experience by certain suppositions. Strictly speaking there are no real experiences, unless we accept the word in a very childish connotation. Without such trans-empirical and abstract thinking it would be impossible to think comprehensively. But if we recognise this as justified, it is wrong to place obstacles in the way of the compulsion towards clarity and causal knowledge, a compulsion which has proved itself to be an indispensable means of knowledge in the history of mankind. Least of all is natural science justified in such a proceeding, seeing that it teems with good and indifferent metaphysics, and cannot exist without them, as is clearly shown by such notions as "atom," "energy," "natural causality."

4. The fact that up to now metaphysicians have admittedly projected their own individuality into the Absolute does not mean that such an individual adulteration of metaphysics must be once for all the last conclusion (Rank and Sachs). We are constantly learning that the psycho-analyst who has not himself been analysed projects his own goods and chattels into his interpretations of neurosis; the analysed psycho-analyst is in the happy position of being able to interpret objectively. Why not the metaphysician, too? If Schopenhauer had not

been the neurotic person whom Hitschmann describes,¹ had he been analysed, his metaphysics would have borne another aspect.

It is true, of course, that every interpretation, even the metaphysical interpretation of the universe, starts from sympathetic insight (*Einfühlung*) and thus carries something of the philosopher's own life into the whole: the unknown is always explained by the known, but if this is done with the greatest possible appreciation of all objective knowledge, no objection can be made to the proceeding, on which is based not only the whole of psycho-analysis, but also the possibility of every orientation in the world from start to finish. It would be absurd to maintain that this must necessarily lead to false results.

5. Metaphysics leads to new empirical knowledge; what do not natural scientists owe, for instance, to Hegel's metaphysics, with its abstract theory of development?

The determination of the relations between psycho-analysis and metaphysics is now ripe for decision. The latter cannot be the ruler who makes his decrees autonomously and puts psycho-analysis among his courtiers. Rather is psycho-analysis (naturally not as a method, but as the sum of the knowledge acquired by psycho-analysis) one of the many stages of which metaphysics must make use in order to arrive on the highest plane of knowledge. It is not advisable to rely merely on the phylogenetic development of the libido theory. From a system of metaphysics that shall be something more than the phantasy of a layman I require that it shall be founded on logic and take *the whole domain of reality into consideration*. Just as it starts from experience in every mind that is thirsting for lucidity, so must it be in agreement with all experience.

With this the justification and necessity of a *metaphysiology* is made clear. I do not understand this in the sense of an inadmissible projection of psychology into the surrounding world, but in the meaning which Freud gives to the word as a "clarification and deepening of

¹ *Imago*, II. broch. 2.

the theoretical suppositions on which a psycho-analytical system can be based." ¹ To this must be added an elaboration of the mental sciences, of which psycho-analysis forms but a part—together, of course, with a metaphysical system of the formation of notions in natural science.²

If psycho-analysis conducts itself in this free and generous way with regard to metaphysics, it will certainly be richly endowed by the latter. Even a system so far removed from reality as that of Hegel has splendidly furthered a number of natural and mental sciences; I need but remind my readers of biology, which was, so to speak, newly created by the new pragmatism and its historical considerations of evolution; further, of history, social science (Marx), political science (Stahl), theology (Strauss and Biedermann), etc. Hence the majority of psycho-analysts, e.g. Ferenczi, von Winterstein, Silberer, Putnam, etc."³ have spoken energetically in favour of metaphysics, and, as far as I can remember, it was only Hitschmann who believed that it was possible to replace philosophical systems by psychology on the hypothesis that: "He who is healthy enough to philosophise refrains from doing so." I am afraid that from the point of view of health it would be all over with poetry, music, religion and the greater part of the highest achievements of the human mind, and that the Philistine would be the only person remaining healthy on the dreary surface of the earth.

From the point of view of philosophy it is a matter for congratulation that Freud eschewed metaphysics for the time being and stuck to his work as a positivist. His cautious advance into "metapsychology," which less prudent thinkers placed to the account of empirical science, must compel the respect of all true metaphysicians for its conscientious adjustment to empirical facts.

¹ *Metaphyschologische Ergänzung der Traumlehre, Intern. Zeitschr. arztl. Psa.*, iv. p. 277.

² The promotion of "metaphysical research" to work out the actual life-connection is called for by RUDOLF EUCKEN in his work, *The Truth Content of Religion*, p. 140.

³ *Imago*, i. p. 519; ii. p. 237; iii. p. 173; *Jahrb.* iv. pp. 803 *et seq.*

IV. Psycho-Analysis and Ethics

One of the most popular, feeblest, and with ignorant, people the most powerful of arguments which the opponents of psycho-analysis employ in their defence is the assertion that Freud's procedure is immoral and based on a naturalistic and inferior system of ethics. It goes without saying that no attempt will be made here to deal with such unworthy slanderers. Rather shall we deal with the fundamental question whether the positivist point of view can be grasped by psycho-analysis in such a manner as to pay no consideration to the inmost nature of Man and his determination within the realm of reality, and further, with the problem whether analysis is justified in giving any direction to ethics, or pledged to do so.

I. HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION

SIGMUND FREUD

Freud imposed on psycho-analytical treatment the task of bringing to light the repressed images and wishes, and to ab-react by emotional pronouncements. In his last great work: *Lectures Introductory to Psycho-analysis*, he says: "The doctrine that the symptoms disappear after their subconscious relations have been made conscious, has been confirmed by all later researches, although the most remarkable and unexpected complications are met with when an attempt is made to carry them out in practice. Our therapy works by making conscious what is subconscious, and is only efficacious to the extent that it can carry out this transformation" (318). Hence we have only to deal with a historical task which is to be carried out, with the help of the psycho-analytical method, and which naturally does not require the services of ethics.

As Freud says, the medical man refrains "as far as possible" from giving his patient advice and guidance in his private affairs (506). The latter must himself decide, and during the time of the cure, should renounce all decisions of private or personal importance. The

physician must treat young people only educationally (507); adults are themselves responsible for their actions.

But the theoretical results of analysis already show that ethical interests are at stake in every case of neurosis, for this always arises out of an obstinate conflict between the libidinous instincts and the "ascetic" counter-movement (505). The symptom is nothing else than a powerful penetration of the suppressed sexual instincts. Nothing would be gained by telling the patient to "live his life" sexually, for he can only work out the impulse symptomatically. Consequently Freud rejects this method as "irregular psycho-analysis." Nor does Freud wish the analyst to exercise his influence in favour of social morality (507), especially as he has ethical objections to it. "We do not spare our patients this criticism (of the prevailing sexual morality); we accustom them to consider sexual matters with the same impartiality as other matters, and when, after the cure, they have become independent, and decide of their own accord to take up a middle position between "living their life" and unconditional asceticism, we do not feel our conscience troubled by either of these results. We say to ourselves that those who have successfully passed through the stage of education in the truth in their own persons are permanently protected against the dangers of immorality, even if their standard of morality differs in any way from that usually held by society (507). The cure certainly does not depend on "living one's sexual life," but on making the patient conscious of what has been repressed (508), so that he himself perceives this subconscious (510). By bringing to the consciousness the conflict which formerly took place in two regions of the psyche and was consequently incapable of settlement, we have now placed it on *one* ground on which both parties stand (512). Thereby we call for a favourable decision by pointing out that the former decision had led to disease, while we promise the patient that a decision will smooth the way to a complete cure; we further point out that during the disease the *ego* was feeble and infantile and therefore (perhaps rightly) banned the claims of the libido

as dangerous, whereas it is now strengthened and has a helper in the person of the physician (512). But as we are face to face with the mysterious fact that paranoics, melancholics and those suffering from *dementia præcox* cannot be cured by this procedure, it may be asked whether we have understood the possibility of success in all its conditions in hysterical and obsessional neurosis (513). The therapeutical work falls into two phases: "In the first all the libido is drawn from the symptoms into the transference and concentrated there; in the second the struggle for this new object (the analyst) is carried through and the libido liberated by him (534). Under the influence of medical suggestion the *ego* takes up a conciliatory attitude towards the libido, so that suitable activities free from repression are accessible (535). Success lies in the fact that the neurotic who has been cured becomes that which he would have become under favourable circumstances (509). From an ethical point of view it may be remarked that psycho-analytic work places itself at the service of the highest and most valuable cultural endeavours, in so far as the subconscious counter endeavours which are independent of, and not influenced by them, are robbed of their fatal power and replaced by better substitutes. The instinct which was previously repressed is thereby directed to higher applications; it is sublimated; the sexual object is exchanged for one which is socially more valuable (61) or attains, at least partly, direct and normal satisfaction (61).

The high ethical intention expressed by Freud's procedure cannot be gainsaid. He performs services for ethics with the help of the psycho-analytical procedure, just as, conversely, he assists the latter with the aid of ethics. He deserves well of ethics on the one hand, by demonstrating, by his researches into neuroses, the existence of an unsuspected and immensely important number of morbid and often tragical effects of ethical conflicts, and on the other by laying bare the nature of these conflicts. All ethics which ascribe to experience an influence on its standards (and another kind of ethics is hardly conceivable nowadays) may derive the

most important doctrines from these discoveries. Here lie buried undiscovered treasures of which we shall speak later on. On the other hand Freud borrows from ethics, so that we are thus obliged to deal with the subject which, no doubt, has been too little considered in psycho-analytical circles.

We have already spoken of Freud's reserve in guiding his patients. The respect for the free self-determination of the patient from an ethical and religious point of view is not only founded on the attitude of the medical man towards his patient, but also on a profound feeling of responsibility which is worthy of all recognition. But there are likewise special therapeutical considerations : if during the analysis the analyst were to enter upon ethical instruction and advice the resistance and consequently the repression would be strengthened, and there would be danger of failure. And the subject of analysis, to whom the analyst should offer his hand as a substitute for a father or a mentor, would not attain that independence which should be furthered for both biological and ethical reasons.

But Freud himself admits that complete abstinence from moral guidance is not practicable ; it is only " as far as possible " that he refrains from advice and guidance. My own experience led me to take up the same attitude. There are subjects who do not stand in need of advice and non-analytical help, and the analysis can be carried out without any ethical comment. In the case of young people, as Freud pointed out, this is not the case ; but adults often find themselves, after analysis, in a state of helplessness and aimlessness which leads them to folly, or anger at the analysis if they are not helped.

It seems to me, too, that the doctrine of repression and resistance indicates that without an ethical explanation it is often impossible to link up the subconscious with the conscious. For the neurotic symptom is not only created, but also held fast by the collision between a libidinous-primitive and an ethical impulse. We often find that a strengthening of the ethical watch and ward produces a heightening of the symptom. And the ethical judgment, which is confirmed by the conscious, is often based

on repression. Hence it seems to me expedient that not only the repressed libidinous impulse, but also the impulse which represses it and holds it captive should be fully elucidated. If what has been repressed is laid bare, it appears obvious that this arrogant, moral police-agent should be asked for his papers of identification, if these were not inspected at the outset. Thereupon it can and often will be found that the supposed moral intention was immoral or on a low level of morality. In cases where the command "Honour thy father and thy mother" has been understood in the Jewish and orthodox Christian sense, and proved of fatal effect, it is obviously best to confront it with the higher and freer filial piety as understood by the Gospels.

Freud does this by criticising the prevailing sexual morality before his patients. But I believe that we have here to deal with a very difficult problem which requires the most thorough study. No doubt every clear-thinking person will raise a great many objections to our ordinary sexual morality. But it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between what is objectionable and what is valuable in it. I have often seen people who believed themselves justified in rejecting it completely fall into fatal errors, whose consequences they did not perceive in advance, and of which they repented bitterly when it was too late. The analyst will say to himself that the criticism of our present morality and immorality is not only a duty, but also a grave responsibility which presupposes no little moral earnestness and profundity of insight. Only a person who is inwardly strong and has assumed a definite attitude toward these difficult and manifold problems can offer the subject under analysis the necessary support in his compromise with the great problems of life. Those highly important factors of our life's happiness and our guidance through life upon which the greatest thinkers of mankind, from the philosophers and ethical reformers of antiquity to those of the present, have expended to their utmost their intellectual powers and their loftiest efforts cannot be solved out of hand.

To this must be added the fact that the transference

whether below or on the surface of the consciousness of the person under analysis, exerts a powerful influence on the direction assumed by the forces of love and life arising from the depths of personality. You may thrust as much responsibility as you like on the subject of your analysis and treat the transference with all the care in your power, but the analyst will always retain a strong influence over the subject. That is why I agree with Freud and other psycho-analysts in claiming that the maturity of the moral *habitus* of the personality under analysis should be proportionate to the magnitude of the psycho-analytical work.

But I cannot quite share Freud's optimistic view that the education to train the patient to be truthful to himself is a permanent protection against the danger of immorality. If a brutally egoistic man gains an insight into his own peculiar character and is satisfied therewith, his truthfulness towards himself will certainly not protect him. But perhaps Freud thinks that diving deeper into the sea of the human soul will always lay bare the altruistic instincts and liberate them. In any case analysis has confirmed the fact that countless egoists and many others who were opposed to higher ethical aims, were compelled to their own great perturbation, to see the untenableness of their anti-social and anti-personal conduct, and were converted to better thoughts and deeds without any positive influence on the part of the analyst.

If the physician is right in holding out the bait of a cure, there must certainly be many cases in which the worthlessness of life oppresses the patient, when the gain of a satisfying and valuable life-content corresponding to true nature and determination may be held before the patient, but, naturally, as his own task.

I consider Freud's promulgation of the psychology of sublimation to be one of the most valuable discoveries ever made for ethics.

JAMES PUTNAM

That a thinker of the calibre of Putnam should turn his attention to the ethical side of psycho-analysis was

to be expected. His analyses showed him that the conflicts of the soul which lead to disease "have their reason for the most part firstly in present feelings and secondly in the conviction that we are in reality more than we can express."¹ As an example he cites Hamlet, who wavered perhaps not only owing to subconscious Œdipus motives, but also on account of the half-conscious feeling that the murder of his uncle would not suffice to allay his distress; that matters were rather to be considered from a general point of view (1116). Without making any distinct pronouncement Putnam demands a profound ethical and religious orientation on the part of the psycho-analyst.

I should like to add something to these, unfortunately, only too meagre hints. It is not clear what he means by "present feelings." Nor do I believe that the derivation of the pathogenous conflicts (for it is obvious that he is dealing with such) from the hiatus between Being and To-be is a happy one. This feeling of insufficiency is frequently merely secondary, and the analysis has to penetrate to the first motives of the causes of conflict. Putnam himself knows numerous people who suffer from the conflict between the ideal and life, but are entirely free from neurosis. Freud has already shown that there is a conflict with the ethical consciousness, but he has carefully abstained from regarding this fact as a sufficient proof of the formation of neuroses.

Putnam has not shown what attitude theoretical and practical ethical elucidation is to assume toward psycho-analysis.

ALPHONSE MAEDER

Maeder pronounced himself much more definitely as to the relations between psycho-analysis and ethics. But in order to be able to follow his arguments we must obtain a clear idea of his conception of analysis itself. Like Jung and his school, Maeder is distinguished by an absolute misunderstanding of Freud. Thus, he maintains that the general orientation of Freud is causal,² whereas

¹ *Imago*, i. p. 115.

² MAEDER, *Cure and Development in Psychic Life*, p. 14.

it was precisely Freud who was the first to point out emphatically the finality of the neurotic symptoms. Who can fail to realise that he spoke of the avoidance of unpleasant feelings, the profits of illness, defensive neuroses, and unsuccessful attempts to cure?

Further, Maeder assures us that Jung alone had provided the Viennese psycho-analysts with a solid basis, and had even taught them how hallucinations and apparently meaningless words were to be interpreted (15)! Dispassionate persons can only sincerely regret assertions of this kind. I was compelled some time ago to protest against these misrepresentations on the part of the school of Jung.¹

From a historical point of view Maeder is incorrect in opposing the schools of Freud and Adler as the "Viennese School" and the "Zurich School" respectively; the difference between Freud and Adler is certainly greater than that between Adler and Jung, the latter of whom, as is known, took over many of Adler's ideas. Moreover, consideration for Bleuler and his adherents, as well as for many other Zurich analysts who are often at variance with Jung, should prevent any irresponsible off-hand talk of a "Zurich School." Of recent years so many analysts have broken away from Jung that their number is no doubt equal to that of his disciples. Misleading as it is to speak of a "Viennese School," it is perverse and inadmissible to call a single tendency by the name of the "Zurich School."

For Maeder the ethical task results from his conception of psycho-analysis, which he completes by "psychogy." (It should be of course "psychagogy," but he repeatedly uses the wrong form.) But this guidance of the soul must proceed from analysis itself. In the dream, as in every neurotic symptom, the way to a cure is already indicated. Maeder says: Freud gave us the well-known definition of the dream as the symbolical fulfilment of a subconscious and repressed wish. It appears to him as a kind of discharging apparatus, a safety-valve which, by canalising certain impulses (mostly from the sphere

¹ "Is Incendiarism an archaic attempt at Sublimation," *Internat. Zeitsch. Anal. Psa.*, iii. pp. 141 et seq.

of sexuality) protects the dreamer's sleep. When applying Freud's procedure first of all to my own and then to my patients' dreams, I remarked, however, that certain dreams contained *attempts at the solution of subconscious conflicts* in a symbolical form. A number of favourable circumstances further enabled me to establish the fact that the subsequent course of events, or, more precisely, the acts following on the dream, confirm or rather, realise the attempts at solution made by the dream. My increasing experience finally told me that the dream is a kind of precursor of the impending transformations of the subconscious constellation" (39). This teleological function is in any case a function of the subconscious. The dreams point clearly to the future significance of the development and indicate, indeed, with certainty, "the way to be followed." The conscious accommodates itself, as against this, to the necessities of everyday life, and must obviously not be neglected (40). In our subconsciousness we possess a beneficent and intelligent guiding force which Maeder places off-hand on the same level as Christ (41). Here is the real physician. The analyst and conductor of souls is only the representative of this inner physician, and deserves the more credit the more devoted he is to him and to removing the obstacles from his path (43). The subconscious itself is striving towards ethical and religious ideals (Maeder speaks of a *participation cosmique*) in which the individual practically gives up his own *ego* and finds his absolute mental freedom and full creative power (52 *et seq.*)

Let us examine these ideas critically. First of all, we are astonished to see that Maeder is perfectly aware that Freud attributes teleological power to the dream, seeing that he calls it a discharging apparatus and a safety-valve for carrying off certain impulses. Then why has he disputed this and claimed the discovery of this teleology for himself? It is only another and narrower form of teleology which Maeder can lay claim to, even if it prove correct.¹

¹ In some fairy tales, F. RIKLIN has already (1908) seen "suitable teleological formations" with "psychic healing tendencies" (*Wunscherfüllung und Symbolik im Märchen*, p. 18).

And the fact that certain dreams are symbolical solutions of subconscious conflicts is by no means Maeder's own discovery, as he appears to believe. Freud had long ago expressed this opinion. According to him the whole mechanism of repression is based on a conflict, and the dream attempts to solve it.¹ Whether we speak of wish fulfilment or of the symbolical solution of a conflict, these are only different ways of saying the same thing. Every wish-fulfilment is the solution of a conflict.

Maeder continued, that in a number of favourable cases he had been able to establish the fact that dreams are confirmed by subsequent events. It is well-known that Freud had made the same observation previously ("Prophetic Dreams"). There can be no question of a new discovery on Maeder's part. Moreover, it is known that Hebbel has put the same thought into poetic shape :

"How could the dream tell you what would happen to you?
Rather it shows you what you are going to do."

But, while the poet is careful not to generalise, Maeder falls into the error of calling *all* dreams precursors of an impending transformation of the subconscious constellation and consequently (according to his text) also the conscious acts corresponding to it. It is just at the point where Maeder forgets Freud's prudent reserve, that the error begins. Experience teaches us quite otherwise.

Nobody will deny that there are stereotyped dreams which are repeated for years and decades. This alone is sufficient to contradict the doctrine that every dream expresses an impending transformation.

Further, it has been observed that a large number of dreams are by no means precursors of a corresponding event ; otherwise the numerous dreams in which a person tired of life runs into danger and perishes or kills himself would always have to be followed by suicide. In order

¹ Cf. for instance : "That which has been psychically suppressed and which in waking life has been prevented from expression by the contrary settlement of the contrasts, and is cut off from inner apperception, finds ways and means in sleep, under the dominion of the compromise formations, to penetrate to the conscious" (FREUD, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, 2nd ed. p. 378).

to retain Maeder's construction we should have to resort to terrible arts of interpretation which run counter to every method. We should have to say, for instance, that the suicides only intended the destruction of their faults, or some other nonsense of the kind. How finely does Freud stand apart from such inadmissible deductions ! He rightly reminds us of Plato's words that the virtuous man is satisfied to dream of that which the wicked man actually carries out (386).

It is further quite inadmissible to perceive in every dream attempts to arrive at solutions indicating *together with certainty the path to be followed*. Does not everybody know that neurotic persons often indicate the most unfit, shameful and mischievous wishes and schemes in their dreams ? If somebody dreams that his child is dead, this may possibly mean that his infantile nature must be rooted out. But if a man who with difficulty scrapes together the money to keep his invalid mother, and is constantly fighting against his hatred of her, sees himself in his dreams as her murderer, even the most credulous would scarcely believe that this is a masked expression for the need of exterminating the senility of his own nature, or his excess of feeling, and the like. The reproach has been levelled at psycho-analysis that it reads into every dream whatever suits it or fits in with its theories. But this reproach is only justified in the case of bad analyses. I am afraid, however, that we should have to make use of the most terrible procedure with dreams and associations if we would rescue Maeder's forced construction.

Maeder's attitude to the dream reminds one of the incompetent tutor who accepted as correct even the most absurd of his princely pupil's answers.

There would, however, still remain the fact that wish fulfilment and the solution of conflicts may be extremely unstable and contradictory. I once analysed a man who did not know whether he should continue his studies or get married. The one possibility excluded the other. According to my suggestion he dreamt either the one or the other alternatively. The dreamer soon perceived

that the dream was no oracle which, as Maeder believes, indicates the proper decision with a clairvoyant, infallible and beneficent guiding force. If we were to regard our subconscious as Christ we should run the danger of falling victims to the most terrible extravagances. The history of religious sects proves this quite plainly. The most fantastic actions have been carried out under the impression that the subconscious was infallibly the voice of God. Is this error to receive scientific sanction at the hands of Maeder?

Freud is quite right in his absolute rejection of teleology of this kind, and in pointing out that the solutions of such problems possess no greater dignity than the results of clear thinking, and that they do not express anything other than that which resided, even if obscurely, in thought. They merely repeat what was in the fore-conscious, but that which is of far greater importance to analysis, namely, the deeper layers of repression into which the light of the conscious must be made to penetrate so that there may be complete salvation and not a suggestive severance merely, the only "subconscious" in Freud's sense (in contradistinction to the fore-conscious) is not reached and reflected by such "teleological interpretations."

Maeder's judgment of the subconscious recalls the clairvoyant metaphysical subconscious of Ed. von Hartmann. This has nothing to do with empirical psychology, and it would be a pity if exact research were to be injured by fits of mysticism.¹

¹ A clever and benevolent critic, who does not himself practise psycho-analysis, puts forward the following criticism: "Much as I admire the experiments of this medical man (Maeder) and the height of his inspiration, the more do I fear that here prophecy may prove premature. I had heard psycho-analysis defined as a method of research; therapeutic, mental orthopædy. And now it is a philosophy, thirsting for unity; a system of metaphysics of which the centre is a 'cosmic ego' the divine symbol of which becomes the Intermediary given by the Gospels. Would to God it could be demonstrated! And further, there should be nothing equivocal, and that in saying: 'There is a help' we should be speaking ambiguously of the old subconscious, the miserable hypostasis of a divinity of which science knows nothing. At this rate we should be alone in the midst of the conflict. Out of too great a respect for them I am afraid of sublime words in experimental matters; but when it is a question of faith, do not say that the divine suffices when I want a God" (*La Semaine littéraire*, No. 1305, Jan. 4, 1919). With these words Professor CHARLY CLERC of Geneva has excellently eluci-

The over-valuation of the subconscious to which Maeder in his enthusiasm ascribes the attributes of a Christ corresponds with a depreciation of the conscious. It is true that this is said to be of equal value with the subconscious, but this is impossible, for how can it be on the same level as the "higher instance" (as Maeder calls it) with its clairvoyant and divine guidance? As a matter of fact the task which he ascribes to the conscious is a relatively precarious one, viz. to accommodate itself to the necessities of life (40). It is only when the claims of the outward situation (established by the conscious) and the inward situation (dictated by the subconscious) are the same that safe action is possible (40). Thus the conscious would have no command over the psychic situation; it would merely have to listen and obey.

I cannot suppress my astonishment at this strange psychology and psychagogy. The kleptomaniac is betrayed by a subconscious acting in a Christlike and fatherly manner, for, if he is compelled by it to commit theft, an act of moral heroism is behind his crime. At the same time I cannot help remembering that in the case of many a kleptomaniac whom I have treated very vulgar subconscious motives came to the surface, against which the conscious had to fight with disgust and loathing. Or we may take the case of a young man whose whole sexuality was directed with ardent desire toward small children. Before investigating the case closely I might have allowed myself to be influenced by a boundless optimism, and have thought perhaps that he had a desire towards sublime childlikeness in the sense of the Gospels. But since I have seen the crowd of errors and vices which had forced him on to the slippery path of pedophilia, I refuse to have anything to do with such phantasies. Those who do not assume a straightforward attitude toward the promptings and commands of the sub-

dated the weaknesses of MAEDER'S theses. JUNG and MAEDER have excited likewise the appetites of persons interested in the occult. EUGEN MOSER seriously demands that psycho-analysis should employ supernatural means for its tools and thus come to an explanation with occultism, and mysticism (*Psa. und Mystik*, in *Wissen u. Leben*, xii, 12, March 15, 1919, p. 357).

conscious open the door to all kinds of fantastic interpretations.¹

We are therefore unable to approve of Maeder's so-called psycho-analytical education to ethics and religion. It is not true that the subconscious is itself aware of what is morally right, and expresses its knowledge, so that all that has to be done is to translate this secret language and to carry out its instructions without comment, if our common sense admits the possibility of doing so in reality. The subconscious is quite as often the wicked demon as the friendly counsellor. Only that which is but slightly repressed, the fore-conscious, as Freud calls it, can under certain circumstances contain praiseworthy moral impulses; but that which is deeply repressed—Freud's subconscious, i.e. not the constitutional disposition—is to be counted among the spirits of hell.

Pleased as I am that Maeder should have turned his attention to the ethical task of the psycho-analyst, and glad as I am to be able to declare my agreement with some of his ethical claims, I am none the less unable to regard his whole system as weather-proof.

PAUL HÄBERLIN

In pedagogical circles the complaint is frequently heard that books on pedagogics contain nothing but well-worn and fairly self-evident truths. If we take for granted that this assertion is true, it does not in any way apply to Häberlin's work.² Or, if the pedagogic aims of the student of Kant do not offer us very much that is new, the greater part of the book, however, the doctrine of method, contains such a plenitude of fresh thought and

¹ An impressive, but hardly suitable example of such an optimistic judgment of the "teleological" functions of the subconscious is given by HANS SCHMID in the "Psychological Treatises" issued by JUNG (Deuticke, 1914, pp. 80-179). The astonished reader there learns that incendiarism under the compulsion of neurosis is an *attempt at sublimation*, although in archaic form. Cf. my reply, "Is Incendiarism an archaic form of an attempt at Sublimation"; *Intern. Zeitschr. f. ärztl. Psa.*, iii. (1915).

² *Wege und Irrwege der Erziehung, Grundsätze einer allgemeinen Erziehungslehre*, Basle, 1918.

counsel that one is tempted to speak of a downright reform of pedagogics.

An examination of this new matter soon shows us that the greater part is taken from the work of psycho-analysis, with which Häberlin is thoroughly acquainted. I name only a few of the most important subjects: The infantilism of teacher and pupil (77, 104 *et seq.*); The severance from the educator (114); The educator as an object of love (119); The sublimation of eroticism (123); The mastery instead of the stifling of eroticism (186); The higher possibilities of the modification of the love-instinct as against the ego-instinct (189); The explanation of an earlier infantile period of sexual excitation as the most important for the whole of the life (190)¹; Introversion dreaminess, powerful phantastic activity, fanatical play-impulses, inhibition of intercourse with others, capriciousness, tearfulness, sensitiveness, incomprehensible behaviour, unaccountability, the inclination to be alone, or to be rowdy, untruthfulness, honesty in an exaggerated degree, leading to self-accusation, love of torturing others, envy, and a number of other phenomena in the child's conduct as a result of the struggle against the threatening mastery of the love-instinct (190 *et seq.*); Anxiety and nervousness in boys and girls as an effect of the same struggle (191); The period of sexual latency from the seventh to the twelfth year (101); The psychology of anxiety, which may even rise to thanatophobia, the object of which symbolically indicates the actual object of forbidden eroticism (202); The complete repression of the erotic instincts into the subconscious and its dangerous consequences (208 *et seq.*); Erotic phantasies as manifestations (209); Narcissism and its relations to introversion (210); The danger of life-long infantilism (211); The sublimation of eroticism in social work (215); Sport as a transformation of youthful eroticism into work (218); The false fixations dating from childhood which become stereotyped, which falsify the expressions of

¹ To call this a first period of puberty, as HÄBERLIN does, is ill-chosen; *pubes*, as is well-known, means "of ripe age," and *puberty* the age when human beings are physically nubile. To ascribe such nubility to boys and girls from four to six years of age sounds like an ill-timed joke.

conscience in the sense of egoistic or erotic strivings (232); Revolutionaries, anarchists and atheists as negatively inhibited persons (245); Asceticism as a symptom of inhibition (256); The idea of guilt (324); False ideals of expiation and expiatory acts as a pathological obsession (257); Homosexuality (257); The large group of anxiety ideals (258); The obsessional feeling of moral inferiority (260 *et seq.*, 336, 337); Compensatory pseudo-ideals expressing the contrary of what is inwardly felt (261); Spasmodic good works; Exaggerated church-going, fantastic ideas of strength, beauty, power over love, etc., as obsessional products of fixation (262); The flight from reality into the childish dream (regression, autism) (264); Theoretical scepticism as compensatorily veiled mental disease (264); Rationalisation (264); The necessity of a special curative education for ripening the conscience (268); The inadequacy of suggestion and the necessity of analysis for correcting the contradictions of the conscience (270, 274, 275); The making effecting consciousness and dissolution of inhibitions as separate acts (271); Transference as a (usually) necessary road to cure (272); Negative transference (273); Pathological lying only to be cured by psycho-analytic treatment (317); The desire to be ill (322); Illness as self-punishment caused by infantilism (324).

A glance at this enumeration (which is by no means complete) is sufficient to show the practised hand what an enormous enrichment of his pedagogic knowledge Häberlin owes to psycho-analytical research. The importance of his work historically lies in the fact that he was the first academic pedagogue to dive into the literature of psycho-analysis. And we may be grateful to him for having done so in a popular, comprehensible and original manner, working up his matter critically and carefully, even if he has not contributed anything to the enrichment of psycho-analytical knowledge itself. His popular exposition will be of value to all those who are desirous of surveying the products of the analytical workshops without wishing to acquire these products, even if they see, as soon as they take up psycho-analysis, that Häberlin

has not understood how to make use of all the results of analytical investigation.

Psycho-analysts themselves would have occasion to be glad of this recognition on the part of Häberlin if he had not spoilt their gratification in a very annoying way. They will not be offended by his publication of his psycho-analytical finds without indicating their source; if the inexperienced reader (the book is written in a popular style) imagines that Häberlin himself is the lucky discoverer of many new facts, we have no desire to rob the Bernese professor of this halo. What is painful is the fact that Häberlin fills his basket in the vineyards of psycho-analysis and then attempts to arouse distrust of the men whose hard work in the face of unspeakable difficulties planted, hoed and pruned the vines. We are accustomed to being publicly denounced by people who do not understand us or the scientific and ethical contents of our work. But it is new to us that a man who has to thank our work for so much, not only fails to oppose the odium resting upon us (at least from an ethical point of view), but even aggravates it. And he does this by means of significant hints which make it difficult for those attacked and held up to public opprobrium to defend themselves (184, 277). In innumerable passages Häberlin plucks the fruits of psycho-analytical research without saying where he obtained them. But when he does so, he cannot help following up his praise with a warning.

The more important of these passages is as follows: "This would certainly be the place to say something of the psycho-analytical method which is nowadays playing such a prominent part and which, further, is orientated in a pedagogic-curative direction. There can be no doubt that the psycho-analytical movement is very stimulating and has made discoveries in the very domain with which we are dealing, so that we cannot but be grateful to it. On the other hand, however, both in theory and practice, it has taken a course which is regrettable from more than one point of view, a course which, it is true, was more or less indicated in its commencements" (277). "Practised

people will see from what has just been stated (including the chapter on the formation of the will) where we agree with psycho-analysis and where we differ from it. We call particular attention to the relativity of the psycho-analytical school and to its fundamental psychological error that everything is to be attributed to the instincts " (278).

Hence we see that Häberlin regrets the psychological and the ethical conception in psycho-analysis; both, however, are so intimately connected that they cannot be entirely separated from one another.

Let us first consider the reproach that psycho-analysis derives everything from the instincts. If that were so, it would be doing no more than what nearly all the psychology of the present time considers to be correct, and Häberlin's grief and reproaches would be equally applicable to the latter. Psycho-analysis may console itself with the thought that it has fallen into the same error as the bulk of modern psychology, and can only wonder why it should be singled out for reproach and regret.

It may further be noted that even if we accept the thesis of the existence of only two fundamental instincts, higher mental developments cannot be conceived as a mere process of addition. In his principles of creative synthesis Wundt has shown how a totally different manner of consideration may be scientifically tenable. It will not occur to anybody to attempt to explain the Pythagorean theorem merely from the point of view of the maintenance of the *ego* and the species. And if an outsider like Häberlin seriously believes that the higher ethics can be based only on his psychology (and that is the important thing for him), and that all other psychology, including that of Freud, is incapable of affording such a basis, he is guilty of an intolerance which should no longer be possible in the twentieth century, and which is nowhere so painful as in the domain of religion and ethics.

I confess that psychology enriched by analysis has never given me the slightest difficulty in establishing an ethical idealism; on the contrary, it has forced me to

regard the higher ethical determination of mankind as a psychological state, whereas according to Wundt's psychology I should at best have had to admit the possibility of ethical idealism.¹

Seeing, then, that Häberlin owes so much to psycho-analysis, he might have been expected to defend it against the popular reproach of moral inferiority, and to point out that an ethical system of equal value to his own exists in psycho-analytical circles. Instead of this he limits himself to the expression of his regret! It makes a painful impression on impartial people that Häberlin, on account of his attempt to depreciate the ethical dignity of psycho-analysis, was obliged to submit to an open defence of the same by a Swiss clergyman who does not himself analyse; the author who seemed to be most strongly attacked by Häberlin for his pedagogic writings, being most ably defended.²

Let us now turn our attention to Häberlin's supposedly superior psychology. To the instincts which are either ego-tendencies or identification (love) tendencies, he opposes the normative function as the second fundamental function of mankind.³ The activity of Man cannot be disintegrated into instincts, if we understand thereby only the vital activities; rather does the normative function stand opposed to the instincts, and this function does not impel to action, but merely superintends and regulates it according to definite standards. One of the fundamental functions is, consequently, a function of impulsion, the other of guidance.⁴

Judgments likewise derive from the instincts, but they are lacking in that absolute character which distinguishes the normative or conscience functions.⁵ Since the latter are opposed to the former as directing forces, they cannot be derived from them,⁶ and it follows that they are the empirical representatives of the idea which

¹ Cf. my book, *Psycho-analysis in the Service of Education*, p. 96.

² H. MÜLLER in the *Kirchenblatt f. d. reform. Schweiz.*, 1918, No. 33.

³ *On the Truth of Religion* (*Verhandl. der Schweiz. ref. Prediger-versammlung*, 1916, p. 38); *On Conscience*, BASLE, 1915, pp. 52 et seq; *Wege u. Irrwege der Erziehung*, p. 124.

⁴ *Wege*, p. 124.

⁵ *Wahrheit*, p. 38.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

constitutes the actual kernel, the absoluteness and eternity of the personality.¹ With this we have already got to metaphysics, whereas it was our intention first of all to discuss the psychological problem.²

Every psychologist will be astonished to find the primitive instinctive actions of self-preservation placed genetically on the same level as the expressions of the conscience as fundamental or primordial functions. For it is a matter of common knowledge that the former appear from the outset, before all education, while the conscience has to be formed. Häberlin will possibly reply that education thereby merely disintegrates those normative primordial functions which guide instinctive life. But is it not conceivable that "instinctive life" can likewise bring about a "normative" attitude? Cannot it be plainly demonstrated that impulses and actions may derive from instincts, which can and ought to be measured by normal standards? With a dictatorial gesture our student of Kant declares that no judgments can derive from the development of the instincts and bear the character of the Absolute. But he has hardly taken any trouble to prove this categorical assertion empirically, as might have been properly expected of him. If he had done this with the necessary care, he would certainly have come across countless cases in which an Imperative was experienced absolutely without any other than instinctive forces at work. Especially the psychology of the subconscious should have been applied. I would recall Freud's "incest barrier." It might also have been demonstrated how, sometimes, general norms can be derived from such instinctive effects as are characterised as absolute, and which psychologically do not differ in any feature from Häberlin's recognised expressions of conscience, which norms, in spite of their ethical inferiority, are fully equal to the ethical standards approved of by Häberlin.

He has not inquired how, besides the primitive instincts, the parental injunctions, which are certainly only to be adjusted to instincts, are to be accepted as having an

¹ *Wege*, p. 125.

² *Wahrheit*, pp. 20 et seq.

absolute character. And yet every experienced educator has certainly had to deal with a number of pupils who, under the influence of their parental home, rejected certain actions as being absolutely wrong, of which the consciences of others approved, such as dancing, card-playing, etc., and, on the other hand, considered actions as admissible or even good which others held to be immoral.

Some examples:—If thieving parents, as described by Dickens, bring up their children or foster-children to theft from an early age, and reward them for their criminal proficiency, we surely do not need any transcendental function in the sense of Kant and Häberlin in order to be able to understand how the orders of the educator take on the character of absoluteness. Simmel, from whom we should less have expected a psychological investigation of moral development even than from Häberlin, has proved that many contents of the innermost compulsions revert to outward compulsion; for instance, he explains the ethical disgust of the Parsee at the consumption of beef by the prohibition of the Indian authorities.¹

It can also be demonstrated experimentally that absolute inner impulses in which there is an absolute "Thou shalt" can be produced by merely empirical efforts. Post-hypnotic tasks can be imposed, and their causes eliminated from the memory, in such a way that no difference is to be noted between an action autonomously dictated by the conscience (according to Häberlin) and these post-hypnotic activities, even with the keenest observation of their conscious contents. And we likewise come across hundreds of obsessional neurotics who consider it their highest duty to commit some morally indifferent action, without meeting with any other than "instinctive" motives in their genesis.

The absoluteness of the compulsion results individually and historically, through a complicated process of the "must" and "may," from inner necessities already indicated in the instincts, and also from outer ones.

¹ *Einl. in die Morawissenschaft*, i. pp. 56 et seq.

This absoluteness can be explained to a great extent, as I have shown elsewhere,¹ by the psychology of the conscious. But I am now convinced that only the psychology of the psyche can solve the whole riddle. It is impossible to explain here briefly how this is to be accomplished. It seems to me that a careful analysis must show the attentive observer hundreds of cases in which concrete absolute imperatives necessarily derive from relative endeavours, from instinctive impulses. The general ethical command "Thou shalt" is, however, merely an ethical abstraction, just like the derivation of general normal standards, which have by no means fallen from heaven, as is supposed by the Kantian philosophy. We shall return later to this fundamentally important fact.

Häberlin confronts the wish-ideal, the "wish-to-be," with the authoritative ideal, the "must-be," which bears the character of absoluteness.² The last feature is said to express the independence of our instinctive desires. As if the transference of the foreign order into self-volition could be independent of the instinctive interests of the preservation of self and the species! Moreover, it is curious that Häberlin overlooks the link between the wish-ideal and the functions of absolute compulsion, namely, the authoritative "must," one of the most important roots of unconditional compulsion. Further, he overlooks the fact that the instincts not only impel one to desires, but often bear a positive and a negative imperative character: e.g. in the compulsion to get out of the way of a runaway horse, to save a child's life, or not to venture too near the brink of a precipice. The problem of cultivated feelings of pleasure or dislike might also be discussed here. In order to maintain his construction of a normative fundamental function psychogenetically co-ordinated to the instincts, Häberlin has given the notion of instinct far too narrow a connotation.³

¹ *The Freedom of the Will*, Berlin, 1904, pp. 171 *et seq.*

² *Gewissen*, pp. 5 *et seq.*

³ *Gewissen*, pp. 54 *et seq.*; cf. WUNDT, *Ethik*, pp. 484 *et seq.*, *Die Entstehung imperativer Motive*.

He eludes all this by basing his whole argument on a psychological fiction; namely, that the conscience is absolute as long as it speaks; it is the idea in the shape of an absolute and commanding force, and, as such, not a psychological-empirical fact, and afterwards the norm is no longer indicated as norm (24-32). "As we cannot get rid of the traces of an inner necessity—the conscience as authoritative power—those who do not agree with this authority must try and interpret it otherwise, i.e. empirically" (33).

This is an astonishing argument! Must not the psychologist investigate the conditions of origin of *all* psychic processes, whether they are regarded as empirical or absolute? And does not a psychological explanation mean bringing them into relation with other psychic facts? Non-empirical psychology is a contradiction in terms. In the Middle Ages care was taken not to interpret hallucinations empirically, seeing that the Church had proclaimed them to be the work of the Devil or inspirations from God. Does Häberlin seriously believe that we are willing to let the shade of Kant impose on us this command, rooted in by supernatural bias, as against the moral consciousness? If he himself shirks the psychological work which his ethical-supernatural speculations have considerably unsettled, the dispassionate psychologist cannot follow in his footsteps.

It is indeed strange that if we investigate the moral consciousness as psychologically as we should examine a concord, a day-dream or a symptomatic act, Häberlin asserts that we do so because the authority invested in the moral consciousness does not suit us! But he himself, who brings up the same arguments against the expressions of conscience elicited by empirical research as the old orthodoxy brought against the criticism of the Bible, cannot do this because it does not fit in with his philosophical conceptions! Which of us is then the inconsistent, inhibited spirit; the psycho-analyst who (in agreement with almost the whole of modern psychology) does not allow himself to be held back by barriers imposed from outside, or Häberlin, who opposes him in the name

of philosophy, like a priest who forbids a layman to enter a temple and suggests all sorts of dubious ethical motives?

The fact that conscience often wavers and even expresses itself contradictorily cannot be denied by our controversialist. How does he settle the question? He says: "Every true judgment or claim of the conscience is equally necessary, and is always valid. But absolute necessity excludes the possibility of contradiction. . . . In all claims (or judgments) of the conscience we have an absolutely constant and uniform system" (15 *et seq.*). "Thus the constant system of the incumbent attitude represents, in face of the real attitude, an ideal—the ideal of the whole personal attitude" (17). "Only the ideal of the conscience is a true ideal, an absolutely reliable, because absolutely necessary, aim. We call it . . . the idea of a definite personality. This idea is for every person what it is purely and simply to be" (17). "This idea is our actual being" (19). Now we feel the normal claim as an absolute imperative, and "thus we feel the idea behind it as the absolutely True. Hence it is likewise the absolutely Constant (34) which cannot waver. Those who subsequently doubt its absoluteness have put themselves outside the idea, no doubt only owing to their empirical nature." "Nobody who feels his conscience—and who does not?—can be a relativist in reality" (35).¹

If, therefore, the voice of conscience falters at different times, or at one and the same time, this, according to Häberlin, is merely apparent; the ethical individual is mistaken about the true meaning of the claims of his conscience, or he does not grasp them in their purity (35). As long as we are empirical, and consequently un-ideal beings, we cannot understand the idea in its purity (36). We mistake instinctive feelings for ethical ones (37). The ideal conscience grasps the idea adequately; the subjective conscience, which is also the "conscience in the empirical-psychological sense," may have the same contents as the ideal one, but may also be different from

¹ KANT was much more cautious than HÄBERLIN in being careful not to derive his categorical imperative empirically.

it. It is only the ideal conscience that exists everywhere and in all mankind (38).

Häberlin does not deny that there is a conscience which arises entirely from the instinctive life. That is, an absolutely characteristic normative function which is not a primordial function! This conscience is based entirely on external authority, on education, training or voluntary identification with the will of a superior personality or tradition (45), in a word on instinct (57), and it gives the impression of absoluteness the more so as the leaning on authority generally derives from pre-conscious, infantile times (45). Häberlin does not dispute this fact, but he objects that the conscience in this sense is only a false and heteronomous one, and practically does not deserve the name of conscience (46). "The question is simply this: We who feel our conscience know of necessity that we are responsible to a determination which is simply—and not by human authority—imposed on us (46). But we also know by experience that we do not always grasp this determination in its purity; nay, that we frequently go or have gone astray when we took the will of outer authorities as necessarily incumbent on us, and thus confused it with our autonomous determination. But we make a fundamental difference between the genuine and the false conscience, even if we sometimes confuse the two in our empirical attitude" (46). "In every act even of the false conscience we feel an absolute authority, and the slumbering certainty of this genuine authority precedes the confusion with the false one, and makes the latter possible" (47). Hence the absolute claim remains, even if the instinctive ingredients have been removed (48 *et seq.*). We may pass over other trains of thought in which Häberlin believes he has warded off attacks on the absoluteness of the conscience by the distinction between an ideal and an empirical conscience. They fall to pieces of themselves when the attempts to save the Kantian situation which we have already discussed break down.

The argument brought forward with innumerable repetitions by which Häberlin hopes to establish the

"normative primordial function" as opposed to the instinct life, and at the same time the "absoluteness" of its claims, may be resumed as follows: The real judgment of conscience contains its own validity; whoever feels his conscience must recognise as true the idea behind it. Now, it may be said that there is no *general* judgment of conscience: we come across only *single* expressions of conscience. The moral consciousness says nothing at first of an idea behind it. Rather is this idea an inferential product which has been manufactured with great temerity on the basis of a concomitant knowledge or supposition. I can turn and twist my experienced expressions of conscience as I like; they point to certain individual acts which may be characterised as good or bad; they say this that or the other of myself as the doer, but it is only by a logical proceeding with the help of ample materials appertaining to knowledge, a proceeding which does not itself belong to conscience, that I may *possibly* under certain circumstances arrive at the acceptance of an "idea"; *possibly*, too, of a will which sets a standard. But I lay stress on the fact that conscience itself indicates the ethical quality of the individual acts, and the feature of absoluteness refers only to this process. This alone is authoritative.

It would be turning the ethical state of affairs upside down were we to refer the absoluteness to the *causes* of the act of conscience (which are not in the conscious) instead of to the characteristic *act* in the conscience process. Only by an abstract process which, however, by no means belongs to the judgment of the conscience, do we arrive (or possibly fail to arrive) at Häberlin's metaphysically painted background, the idea, or the eternity of the personality or whatever other transcendental bosom of the conscience-judgment may be meant. But we know already that empirics, in this case of history-making psychology, have the perfect right to search for the bottom of the conscious achievement of the conscience, and we know further that metaphysics can only lay claim to validity in as far as it is not contradicted by experience. Hence we should like to warn the reader seriously against

setting up such lofty metaphysical monuments retrospectively from individual expression of the conscious which express only prospective absoluteness. The authority of the moral conscious contents does not in any way add to the authority of the metaphysics sprung from causal thinking. This confusion of an expression of conscience with a highly disputable reflection concerning the origin of this expression is a cardinal fault in Häberlin's construction.

These attempts, carried out with remarkable obstinacy, but always overlooking salient points, to establish the absoluteness of the norm functions in spite of the evident non-absoluteness of their expression, now fall to the ground. Häberlin's avoidance of the task of carefully elucidating the psychology of the absolute conscious contents, and drawing the logical inferences from this state of affairs, is bitterly revenged. The pretext that as long as the conscience speaks it is not a psychological-empirical fact has no more value than if I should say : When I have a feeling, this is not a psychological-empirical fact. Why have we then a memory ? Why cannot I reproduce the condition in which I am at the time of the expression of my conscience quite as psychologically as a condition of artistic excitation ? The attempt to silence psychologists in order to give metaphysics an opportunity of acting as it pleases has led Häberlin to make some exceedingly strange assertions.

Every true judgment of conscience, it is said, has the same value, so that contradictions among expressions of conscience are impossible. What are judgments of conscience ? Those who keep to ordinary speech and do not swear by Kant will say that they are those by which we give a moral value to our actions. Häberlin himself started from these. He derived his theory from them without marking any difference between the false and the genuine conscience. And, in truth, his deductions *a posteriori* may be drawn just as easily from the most perverse expressions of conscience as from those of a conscience approved of by every highly-educated civilised person. Is this not rather unfortunate for the followers of Kant ? *The belief in an absolute and sacred standard (norm) can*

thus be based on vile and shameful expressions of conscience! The sadistic inquisitor who tortures an innocent girl to death does not feel only *one* authoritative power of conscience, but considers this work of the hangman and torturer likewise to be a moral act which he has been commanded to perform. If the contents of what has been commanded fall to the ground, then evidently the authority of the—metaphysically, not ethically—appointed commander, i.e. the conscience that claims an absolute value and conducts itself so indifferently, breaks down. For its authority was founded on nothing else than the recognition of the absolute validity of the offered contents.

Häberlin expects us to say: "In my experienced expressions of conscience lies the claim to absolute validity and incontestability. From this I infer an absolute norm which is revealed by this expression. I perceive, however, that this supposedly absolute expression of conscience is often fundamentally wrong. Yet in spite of that I must consider the norm which I inferred from the *fundamentally wrong* (!) judgment of conscience to be a valid one!" Not only logic, but also the moral consciousness protests against Häberlin. If a teacher who claims to be infallible has committed a bad logical error—and the experienced conscience has done so thousands of times—his authority breaks down with all those who are not under the ban of a morbid respect and need of authority, and his claims are point-blank rejected. But Häberlin cannot bring himself to do this with regard to the conscience; his reverence for Kant is stronger than logic. Moral consciousness likewise contradicts Häberlin. If a judgment of conscience has proved to be false, conscience itself rejects the former judgment and its absoluteness. But it does not add: "Behind the wrong judgment of conscience and its false claims to absoluteness is a recommendable norm!" Only the followers of Kant are capable of indulging in this retrospective metaphysics.

Häberlin would at least have to give criteria according to which the conscience possessing a genuine and absolute validity could be distinguished from the false one. As the real conscience is based on a totally different

psychical "primordial function" to the supposed conscience, and as the former does not derive from instinct while the latter derives *only* from instinct, it ought to have been childishly easy to separate these diametrically different functions. The utter inconsistency of Häberlin's psychology is confirmed by the fact that he is not in a position to indicate this difference.

How is the difference between the valid and the invalid expressions of conscience to be discovered? By playing off one expression of conscience against the other? But who can then guarantee that the magisterial expression possesses a greater right to recognition than the expression judged, seeing that both advance the same claim to absolute validity? Those of us who are not Kantians, and who are not held back by the dubious mystery of the conscience which is constantly claiming absolute recognition and constantly discrediting itself, are by no means embarrassed. Häberlin believes that the faults of the conscience have been caused by the action of the instincts on the infallible voice of conscience: consequently we should have to subtract everything "instinctive" in order to obtain a blameless conscience. This, at least, is the conclusion to be drawn from Häberlin's thesis. But we know that the most splendid and valuable claims of the conscience are often "instinctive," e.g. the impulse to preserve the species and love of one's neighbour. What a stiff, frozen and tormenting ethic would remain if what is instinctive were to be withdrawn from the conscious! Even Kant points out that the reason for evil cannot, as is generally thought, be placed to the account of human sensuality and the natural inclinations arising therefrom.¹ Hence we do not advance any farther with this substraction of what is instinctive. We non-Kantians are not ashamed of setting up the psychological and ethical canons which Häberlin "regrets" from the standpoint of his ethical absolutism. We enquire into the sense of the individual moral commands, their effects, their connection with the whole of life, with their individual development in a spiritual and often even

¹ *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, Kehrbach, p. 35.

in a physical respect, the significance of the moral prescription for social life and the life of the race. And lo! we experience what the most incarnate follower of Kant must himself experience: the same conscience that appeared previously as an absolute law-giver, may be taken to task, and rejects, after it has learnt better, that which it had previously declared to be absolutely commanded; it may even give *placet* to a claim made by the instinctive life so cavalierly treated by Häberlin. Nay, by sublimating the instinctive life as a consequence of inner and outer experiences, we arrive perhaps at a less rigorous, but psychologically finer, and pedagogically more efficacious, and philosophically deeper ethic than the classical Kantian conscience.

And if Häberlin levels at us the reproach of ethical relativity we can turn the tables and ask: Is he not open to the same reproach when he deprives the empirical expression of conscience of the credit of absolute validity, reserving absolutism for an ideal, non-empirical conscience alone? He abolishes the absoluteness of the conscience which is to be found only in the conscious itself; namely, *the absolutism which is directed to a definite object*, and reserves it for a transcendental idea of personality. It is obvious that psycho-analysis as an empirical science cannot say "yea" or "nay" to such fantastical speculations concerning the Beyond.

We should like to examine more closely in this place the object of education, which Häberlin develops with great energy, finding it in the inner capacity of the pupil to fulfil his task or duty in life. But it will suffice to point out that not only the psycho-analysts, but also Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Buddha, Kung-tse, Bentham, Pestalozzi and other ethical philosophers might nod their heads compassionately over this vague and consequently useless aim. As long as we do not know *in what this life-task, determination or duty consists*, Häberlin's principles hardly tell us anything of which we could make good use. Thus his ethical-metaphysical absolutism is revenged by sticking fast in a slough of empty formalism. Kant was reproached long ago with the fact that no positive moral determinations

could be derived from his categorical imperative, and that the sharp dualism of duty and inclination (Häberlin would call the latter "instinct") fails to recognise the value of the moral feelings. Häberlin is guilty of the same error, just as he has taken the objections to Kantianism which have been raised countless times for more than a hundred years far too lightly, and taken up his abode in Kant's gigantic mansion with too little care and attention. He will have to bear the consequences himself.

A good many more objections might be raised to Häberlin's psychology: I might recall his assertion that the norm does not "impel" (as the instincts do), but can only superintend and regulate. How can it then have any influence on the course of the instinctive life if it has no impelling force? What use is a chauffeur at the guiding-wheel who cannot give off energy, e.g. who suddenly becomes paralysed? Häberlin remarks that he has to impart vital energy to the normal function, which would thereby be drawn over to the empirical, sublunary world. His philosophical supernaturalism leads him to a psychological absurdity!

II. SYSTEMATIC INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND ETHICS

A. The Significance of Psycho-Analysis in Respect of Ethics

(a) *Fundamental Hypotheses*

1. *The Nature and Task of Ethics*

From the outset psycho-analytical work went hand in hand with ethics. Freud was the first to recognise what an important part is played by the moral consciousness in the spiritual, and even in the corporal, economy of Man, seeing that he traced back the majority of nervous diseases to ethical conflicts. He demonstrated at the same time that the curative process was impossible without a new ethical attitude. If he tries to convince his patient that

the latter was wrong in rejecting the pathogenic wish and should therefore accept it, or that he should sublimate the rightly rejected wish or master it with "the help of the spiritual achievement of mankind," he demands an ethical valuation in each of these three cases.¹ And when he further demands that the decision must be arrived at under the direction of the physician (25), we realise that a ripe ethical judgment is required of the analyst, even though, as we have already heard, the latter is to remain as far as possible within the bounds of reserve and to leave his patient as much freedom of decision as possible. The ethical certitude and knowledge of the analyst is all the more important owing to the fact that his personality exerts a great suggestive influence on the decisions, and consequently on the life happiness, of his patient, owing to transference, even if every care is taken to eliminate this transference.

No analyst can remove his activities entirely from the sphere of his ethical life-plan. If, with Freud, he wishes to place them at the service of the highest and most valuable educational efforts, he must know in what these consist. And for this he needs ethics. It would be a gross error to believe that one is dealing only with the self-evident. Ethical dilettantism causes as much mischief as medical and philosophical dilettantism. Those who maintain that they have no ethics often have an inferior one, and are in any case not fit to help those in search of assistance in vital problems.

By ethics we mean the science of morality, or "what ought to be," the science of general life-aims, tasks and standards. It is not necessary to show the close connection of these notions.

As we have to content ourselves with general outlines, we cannot here explain why normative ethics cannot be constructed without the most careful regard to given psychological and sociological facts. It will suffice to point out to the failure of Kant and Häberlin on account of their insufficient consideration of the empirical. In spite of this, however, ethics is not a purely empirical science.

¹ FREUD, *On Psycho-analysis*, p. 25.

2. *The Ethogenetical Method*

The origin of moral prescriptions has been so excellently sketched by Rank and Sachs that I have nothing to add to their remarks. They showed how reprehensible, egoistical and a-social instincts were repressed, and how all kinds of moral prescriptions arose as a reaction against them and their repression."¹ Here, however, we have only to deal with the acquisition of a valid system of ethics.

The following indications will suffice as to the method which I am applying: Just as I require of metaphysics that it should start from the broadest and most carefully elaborated empirical basis, so do I make the same claim on ethics. And as in metaphysics the various empirical notions must be corrected and further built up partly by critical investigation of their inherent contradictions, and partly by comparison with other empirical contents, so must we proceed in ethics also. We investigate the validity of the aims and motives of human action, and by criticism and comparison with other life experiences arising from practical conduct, we arrive at newer and higher ethical notions, until this procedure comes to a halt with the loftiest possible ideas. From the primitive and pre-moral impulses of the imperative impulse-life already existing in instinct we arrive by complicated processes of thought at the norms of outward authority, and by continual limitations and extensions to ideas and norms which correspond with the subjective claims on life as well as to the spirit inherent in social and universal development.

Hence ethics proceeds along the path of ethical development and perfection, like every empirical science. The latter, as we know, arrange their single processes under hypothetical judgments which must be corrected or confirmed by later observations so as to accommodate themselves to all individual cases. According to the claims which I make upon it, ethics likewise takes the path which is analogous to that taken by the psycho-analytical method; it overcomes the dominion of the

¹ *The Significance of Psycho-analysis as regards the Mental Sciences*, pp. 100 *et seq.*

primitive instincts by means of sublimation, or application to sublimated objects. It tries to classify all actions designated as "good" or "bad" under general rules (norms), whereby it follows that the aims and motives are of great importance for these predicates of value. These rules are then applied to further actions, to which again a moral value must be ascribed, which will either confirm the rules or call for their correction, perhaps even bringing about an extension or development of the general imperative. Thereby the aims of the action thus approved of not only grow according to rational reflection, but also, and above all, according to the growth of the moral consciousness. These aims cannot be substantially constituted for all times from the very outset; rather do new aims arise at every stage of moral development, according to the principle of the heterogeny of aims established by Wundt.¹ With the growth of moral knowledge the individual rules are constantly being combined with more comprehensive ones. The highest aims that we can think of as being equipped with the features of perfection are called *ideals*. Their contents increase with moral perfection and go forth to meet and direct it. The highest and most comprehensive norms, which we base on the sum of life-experience up to now, and which we do not regard as requiring correction by subsequent events, but to which our whole conduct is to be subjected, bear for us an *absolute* character.

Our procedure, which corresponds, in its agreement with the philosophical formation of notions, with the postulate of scientific severity in its consideration of the creative power of the moral spirit and the uplifting of the moral consciousness in individuals and species, we call (for want of a better expression which should also indicate the activity that *seeks* for the norms) the *ethogenetical* one.

3. *Specifically Psycho-analytical points of view for the establishment of a new Ethical System*

While there can and should be no ethics built up merely on psycho-analytical experience, the latter none

¹ WUNDT, *Outlines of Psychology*, 1st ed. pp. 381 *et seq.*

the less provides us with certain fundamental points of view which claim our attention. The first consists in the *admission of the subconscious to ethics*.

Hitherto ethics was concerned with the conscious soul-life only, a fact which was revenged not only in the establishment of the moral condition of the personality, but also in the establishment of the norms of personality.

Another point of view which we owe to psycho-analysis is the *application of biological-hygienical principles in ethics*.

Freud and his followers recognised that a huge mass of phenomena which had hitherto been condemned as immoral or wrong must be regarded, from a medical point of view, as morbid, even in cases where there was no question of a "psychopathological" defect. Many a culprit who had hitherto not been treated psychopathologically turned out to be the victim of subconscious inhibitions, and even in those cases in which there was no irresistible neurotic obsession, the dominating influence of affective forces and images arising from instinct inhibitions was recognised. Not only the kleptomaniac, but also the soured man, the fault-finder, the egoist, the hard-hearted man of money, were found to be products of instinct inhibitions which excluded the possibility of other characteristics. Many actions and events which had hitherto been regarded as morally unimportant revealed themselves to the analyst as highly prejudicial to moral development, and many a judgment which formerly seemed to the ethicist the suitable one, turned out in the light of analytical experience to be false.

In this way much that was evil turned out to be diseased, or, when it was not possible to speak of disease, at least an anomaly had to be admitted which ran counter to the normal development of life.

The question now is: How far have we advanced with this method of consideration? Is ethics finally to be regarded as a higher kind of medical science, as a hygiene, a dietetics of personality and society? Or is ethics to be inferred from the postulate of the perfect expansion of life? We shall tell no secrets. It is obvious that the

standpoint of individual health in the usual naturalistic sense is insufficient. But it is certain that the standpoint of health assumed by psycho-analysis is a valuable addition to the ethical capital.

A third principle, which, indeed, was not discovered by analysis, but was thereby revealed with unprecedented definiteness, is the *postulate of the individual utilisation of the ethical commandments*.

It had never occurred to ethics hitherto to construct a normal human being to which every moral person had to conform. But Freud pointed out in a surprising and conclusive manner that the application of certain generally approved moral standards may be highly mischievous, not only for the health, but also for the moral dignity of certain persons threatened with repression. The conflict is the same as if one were to seek to impose a moral order on an unprepared people without paying attention to historical continuity. Injuries would easily arise which would outweigh the moral value of the innovation, or even transform it into its opposite. Above all individual ethical norms must stand this one: The achievement of the ideal ethical claims is dependent on the real eligibility of those for whom this command is intended.

It is clear that, without prejudice to the above, there are ethical claims which are valid for everybody, just as the requirements of hygiene are valid, provided that they have been correctly established. Special subjective and social factors, however, see to it that forms of life of an infinite variety emerge under the guidance of ethics.

Already in his acquisition of the life-aims, goods, tasks and standards to be recognised, the ethicist, as analysis has demonstrated, is dependent not only on facts, but likewise on his own subliminal dominants. The objective judgment may therefore be influenced and subjected to chance events, as has happened even to the clearest and most profound minds. Plato reflects in his ethical dualism his own inhibitions just as clearly as does Kant in his ethics of transcendental liberty, so inimical to instinct and inclination, or Schopenhauer in his pessimistic view

of life, and Nietzsche in his doctrine of the superman, by which his feeling of disease and impotence was over-compensated. Everybody establishes the system of ethics which corresponds with his own life-needs, and the tighter the leading-strings of the underground forces working up from the subconscious, the less chance is there of being able to accommodate oneself dispassionately to human nature and the total reality.

Nor dare we overlook the fact that the greatest ethical reformers, prophets and heroes were certainly neurotics, and that ethics has been best furthered by them. If we submit ethicists of this kind to an analysis in Freud's sense, the ethical system is seen to be a rationalisation, and consequently a product of repression, and the structure falls to pieces when attacked by dispassionate criticism or an ethical point of view which has not been falsified by inhibitions of life. How often does it happen that the scales fall from the eyes of pessimists, for instance, whose fury with life has brought them to the brink of the incapacity to exist; when they recognise other of their faults and are happy to be freed from them, whereas all theoretical arguments had previously been without any effect! This does not, however, exclude the fact that certain ethical depositions which were created in a state of fixation, brought back to their right measure and placed in a suitable light, may be recognised as valid and of high significance. They are not extinguished in the light of psycho-analysis, but, like all genuine works, begin here to shine brightly for the first time. Thus the ethicist who is inhibited by the subconscious provides the free ethicist with valuable contents. This is due to the fact that ethics, as an empirical science, stands in need of purely objective and sober criticism, and is based on it—and in so far it must be free from the influence of repressions. On the other hand it presupposes the most powerful development of moral force, the broadest horizon of the experience of life, and still more the deepest penetration of the moral forces, their comprehension in one's own psyche and in the surrounding world. But all this is not gained by mere calm reflection and observa-

tion ; powerful ethical experiences must have occurred. The ideal ethicist will be he who possesses all these ethical requisites in perfection, and is able to think them out and express them most adequately.

The ethicist, however, must presuppose the scientific doctrine for which we have to thank psycho-analytical research : *Ethical thought must not be so fixed by subliminal inhibitions that it cannot accommodate itself to the subjective and objective conditions and affects of human conduct.*

(b) *The Principles of Ethics*

It is not possible in this place to apply the ethogenetical procedure in such a way that the individual ethical values and standards emerge as necessary results of human development. We should have to show how the primitive instincts already point backwards and forwards beyond themselves. Backwards, in so far as they owe their force and determination to a larger whole, to the individual and finally to the cosmos ; and forwards, by overlapping their aim-contents for the time being. Instinct can only be understood as the life phenomenon of an individual who does not wish merely to preserve himself and his species ; for life is a boundless ocean whose waves spread farther and farther, and which is constantly extending its reach, unless, indeed, disturbing influences should modify life. The notion that the preservation of self and the species alone constitute the primordial instincts is a short-sighted one, a worthy counterpart to the politically conservative notions of the comfortable *bourgeois*. Every instinct starts from a deficiency which is felt and which the individual tries to make good. But, when looking for this solution, the instinct sets other functions in action, so that the life-circle is widened, the individual instinct serves to extend the individual life-domain. With regard to his object the individual aims, in a functional sense, instinctively and from inward compulsion, at an extension of his primitive existence. Both extensions are interlocked. When a human being comes to conclusions with his environment and with other human

beings for the purpose of satisfying his instincts and furthering his life, he is obliged to extend his capacities as well. He must accommodate his wishes to reality. If, at the outset, he obeyed his instincts and lusts only, he will have been induced by various painful conflicts with the surrounding world to pay thoughtful consideration to them and to look for standards which will permit him to find a *modus vivendi* which shall correspond both with his own needs of expansion and with those of his fellow creatures under the sun, as well as to the laws of the reality after which he is striving.

As soon as Man sees the necessity of accommodating his own feelings by means of valid standards to the life-claims of others he leaves the pre-moral stage and enters on the domain of morality.

His task with regard to the surrounding world now consists in correctly accommodating himself to reality in his actions and sufferings. But the way in which this is to be done can only be discovered by an exact knowledge of human nature and communal life. It is soon perceived that a consistent execution of one's own wishes without consideration for the life interests of others is extremely injurious to one's own prosperity, and the necessity of conforming to laws and standards is recognised. Many egoistic desires are renounced because one's fellow creatures might likewise assume the same attitude, which would lead to mischief, whereas the organic incorporation of the individual in the life of a community is of benefit to him also.

A knowledge of his further relations shows that national morality arises from that of the family, and finally from a human morality, and each of these tries to create for itself the most favourable forms of life-development. The transition from the one stage to the other takes place at times in company with all kinds of crises, the stamp and effects of which psycho-analysis as a pioneer has already begun to investigate in several directions.¹

¹ NIETZSCHE already understood the state of affairs in general and describes it in his ingenious passage: "That hidden and masterly Something for which we have no name, until it finally displays itself as our task—this tyrant in us takes a terrible revenge for every attempt we

Philosophical elaboration leads us to the knowledge that we are participating in a total life which fills up the whole of reality. The individual is borne up by it and has only a relative place for himself in this absolute process, but the powers entrusted to him are to be devoted to this total life. Psycho-analytical research has shown that the man who is shut off from total life plays the same part as a cell which does not attach itself to the organ that contains it, but lives and thrives without consideration for that organ. Such a cell must be considered as a morbid growth, which might easily destroy its host and itself. Analysis has revealed many an egoist and loveless autist to be a man rendered ill by repression, who should be regarded biologically and ethically as diseased. But even in the case of many a self-denying ascetic it has unmasked morbid traits which were due to repressed instincts.

Hence analysis supports *the principle of objective incorporation with social and general life*. We may put it in this form: *Give each of your life-functions, and your life as a whole the proper place within the objective total life.*

But we cannot do much with this general formula, which is by no means to be taken as the sole property of psycho-analysis. What is this total life, and what are its objects? Wherein lies its true value? How are we to conduct ourselves in it? These questions can only be answered with the help of a keen observation of psychic life. Only when the nature of the spirit is exactly known can we indicate how an objective incorporation with universal life corresponding to a standard is to be understood.

We must now, in a hasty sketch of the ethogenetic process, enter upon the question of the needs and develop-

make to escape or elude him; for every precocious acquiescence, every equivalence with those to whom we do not belong, and every activity, however deserving of respect it may be, that deflects us from our chief aim, nay, for every virtue which should try to protect us against the harshness of our own responsibility. Illness is always the answer when we doubt of our right to our task, when we begin where possible to make it easier. This is at once curious and terrible! It is our alleviations that we must expiate most severely! And when we wish to return to health, we have no choice left; we have to load ourselves more heavily than we were laden before!"

ment tendencies of the human soul, without which the objective ethical attitude of the individual within the universal life cannot be grasped. We shall not be astonished to find that we cannot discover the nature and significance of the whole of life without investigating psychic occurrences, if we reflect that the consideration of Nature offers us only the external appearance of things obtained by sensory apperception, whereas in that which we have ourselves experienced we grasp reality close at hand and from within.

We begin with the primitive expressions of life, which we shall designate as elementary ego-instincts, and we may call to mind that in every psychic experience of phenomena, sensation and effort are included. When we speak of instincts we mean the totality of similar efforts, and, indeed, first of all those of a primitive nature, but on a higher level, such as are denoted by the instincts of play, power and acquisition.

In the newborn child the instincts of respiration, motion and sucking are expressed, together with other ancestral experiences in which the instinctive impulses are displayed. With the satisfaction of the instincts apperception is developed, and in its turn creates fresh possibilities of development which on their part extend apperception and experience.

The weakness and narrow limitations of the newly-born human being make evident the intention of the preservation of life. At the beginning there can be no question of aim and intention in the child. The pursuit of the aim is entirely teleological, not final, for the power which directs the aim is transcendental and not immanent in the individual, seeing that it lies only in natural volition.

When the pursuit of the aim has been developed—and psychology gives us the particulars of this process—not only the needs of life, but also the innate disposition of the individual compel him to enlarge the circle of objects as well as of the psychic functions, in the manner already indicated. With regard to ethical development we are mainly interested in observing how the life-instinct applies

itself to the various objects and functions and gives them an affective (emotional) stress. This displacement of the emotional energies has hitherto hardly been investigated, although it is of the greatest importance in the development of all life. Psycho-analysis alone has made the recognition of the problem clearer.

For our purposes I should like to point out a differentiation among the various commutations which strongly influences the moral consciousness. At the commencement the effort is directed to the preservation of life in such a way that the object takes up a fresh position with regard to the *ego*, and is made serviceable to its aims, or the *ego* puts itself into another connection with it, with the same intention of effective power, or for averting unpleasant sensations (*Unlust*). The affective stress in the effort and the satisfaction belongs neither to the object-image as such nor to the acquisitive function as such, but to the whole process and its result.

But under the influence of certain experiences a displacement of feeling can and will take place. Under conditions of which we shall discuss a part later, Man comes into contact with external objects; their image is not accompanied by any ultimate feeling of pleasure, and the instinct withdraws itself from them. At first, however, he looks for other objects in the outer world which might satisfy his needs; if he does not find them anywhere the result is an introversion, so that he creeps back into himself. The *ego* is thereby over-emphasised. And whereas he was previously not aware that it was a question of benefiting the *ego*, this feeling is now placed in the foreground or the more egoistic functions are more strongly emphasised. The normal feelings of power and knowledge which were mere accessory phenomena in the attempt to assume a satisfactory attitude towards the outer world, are now so strongly overloaded that they become an end in themselves; or certain functions emerge more energetically, e.g. the function of thinking, after failures and inhibitions in emotional life. Thus, owing to the non-satisfaction by the outer world of the claims of instinct, an introversion is created which leads to a strong emphasis of

the *ego*-feelings, and the endeavour to enhance the value of the *ego* or of the individual autistic functions.

The actual determination of the *ego* and its functions may thereby be dispensed with. If, for instance, the acquisition of certain external material is found necessary for the maintenance and furtherance of life, this acquisition, e.g. of money or political power as a consequence of the above-mentioned evil experiences in the outer world, will become an end in itself, or a means of enhancing the value of the *ego*. It is clear that in this way no proper incorporation of the individual life with the total life can take place, as the acquisition of property pays no consideration to the needs of others. Or the suppression of emotional values is revenged by a sterile formalism of thought and a feeling of inner emptiness.

The power-instinct is not, as Adler believes, a primary one, but a product of displacement in the sense indicated, just as the aggressive instinct is by no means elementary, but arises from the defensive measures of the competitor on behalf of property or any similar need. According to the experience of psycho-analysis, egoism is not always to be regarded as secondary, in so far as we conceive it as a carrying-out of *ego*-endeavours at the cost of the just claims of others. It is primary in so far as, at the outset, only the person's own wishes are consulted, while the interests of his neighbours are not yet known, or being known are not considered with due emotional emphasis. Egoism becomes secondary when the normal regard of the rights of one's fellow creatures, as of the whole of life (although it is a part of individual disposition) is not felt, owing to inhibitions to development.

The limitation of purely egoistic wishes is not, however, (as might appear by the foregoing provisional description) effected merely by the conflict with other and authoritative habits in infancy. Rather do the facts of animal mother-love like the whole ascent of the principle of mutual assistance (Krapotkin) prove that it belongs to the original equipment of mankind and is merely stimulated by external motives.

We now come to the second class of instincts, namely

the "you" instincts, by which I do not mean only those instincts which have been designated (probably too narrowly) from the teleological point of view as the instincts necessary to the preservation of the species. From the point of view of finality we are first of all dealing with certain of our fellow creatures toward whom the instinct is directed with the intention either of giving or of receiving. Various occurrences may release these instincts: the acceptance of food, putting dry clothes on infants, carrying infants, etc. Freud pointed out that the *sexual* instinct, especially, after leaving the *ego* was of paramount importance in the development of the "you" instincts. The sensory furtherance of life obtained from others is followed by the spiritual, which again has endless channels at its command: i.e. assuaging fear, gratitude, instruction, etc.

With regard to persons as to things, feelings undergo various displacements with which the most complicated processes of representation correspond. We must again point out the great importance of the differentiation and polarisation of the feelings concerned with our earliest relations to others. Whereas at the commencement the value is ascribed entirely to the "you" and its relations to "I," it can be withdrawn either from the object or the subject, as well as placed to the other link of the relation. If a child, for instance, is rebuffed in its demand on tenderness, care, understanding etc.; if it finds itself treated harshly, severely and unjustly, it often withdraws into itself, unless its whole love is (as sometimes happens) transferred to animals, plants and other natural objects. As a rule a *feeling of worthlessness* is engendered which has to be over-compensated by megalomaniacal phantasies with a simultaneous hatred of humankind. (If this leads to comparison with others it becomes a feeling of *inferiority*.) Or, if the sensual pleasures, pride in work accomplished or in intense intellectual development, the desire of power, and especially the longing for a free life-activity, and other enrichments of the *ego* or functional outlets are barred, there arises an over-emphasis of the "you" which, under certain circumstances, may lead

to complete self-sacrifice and self-destruction. People of this sort, whose love for others has reached its maximum, joyfully sacrifice their lives for them.

In conformity with traditional, social and individual ethics, psycho-analysis shows that neither the one-sided development of the *ego* instincts nor the sole domination of the "you" instincts is consistent with human nature. Without the love of others the individual falls into a state of grievous inner desolation, and when the "I" and "you" have been removed from the sphere of a man's desires, we shall never fail to find morbid biological symptoms. Our insight in this respect has been considerably increased by analysis. It is true, of course, that there are persons whose feelings toward others are naturally feeble.

We have already seen that conflicts with the outer world (to which we may now add the inner world) act as an inducement to create rules of conduct. In reality, however, the individual himself creates only a few of his own rules; they are rather inspired by an assimilation to the teacher, resulting from affection, or by authority whereby the person taught benefits by a great deal of traditional *savoir vivre*.

In authoritative morality we already find that duplication of the imperative with which we always meet in the expression of the conscience. The primitive instinct impels the subject in a certain direction; the authoritative will impels him in another, by the admitted claims of its superiority. Even inferior imperative impulses, which nobody would try to trace to an influence from the Beyond, very easily take on a character of absolute validity if they are released from without with such efficacy in the case of persons in the stage of development, that such of his instincts as run counter to them are permanently rejected, until they emerge no longer, or only in the shape of a consciousness of inferiority. This supposed inferiority need not be real. If, during this time, a finely-strung person is influenced by violence, if his first independent activities are characterised as wicked and nonsensical, his mentality often grows accustomed to recognise the absolute character of the alien command and the invalidity

of his self-valuation and self-volition, particularly if painful experience has brought about the repression of the authoritative or his own impulses. In a later phase of development there often follows a reversion to the negative and the rejection of all ethical authority: in certain circumstances the empirical conscience may entirely lose its claims to absoluteness.

The power of a morality based on authority is not, however, dependent merely on the compulsion exercised in childhood and the repression caused thereby (as far as this contributes to the claim for the absoluteness of individual expression), but also on childish love, and on the circumstance that morality corresponds in many respects with human nature and is superior to childish inexperience. It assists in the taming of the primitive lusts, and sets free the higher functions. It likewise corresponds to a certain extent with the need of assimilation which springs from the "you" instincts.

But the individual cannot always maintain his approval of the acquired principles of action; it is frequently sufficient for him to leave his parental house to deprive the acquired standards of their previous absoluteness and to shake their security. Or they may turn out to be mischievous, or may come into conflict with each other; or they are referred to authorities of greater apparent value. Or a man may achieve a deeper insight into social and human relations, and a more profound solution of the life-tasks of the individual and communal life. These new standards, which are almost always set up after violent struggles with traditional morality, are opposed to the primitive feelings and presuppose a taming of the *bête humaine*. In this connection they have no less claim to consideration than the acquired moral commandments; nay, the feeling of reverence proper to the others is now transferred to them. And the harder the fight against an insufficient morality is felt to be, the more powerful does the redeeming power of the new norms appear to be; and the more definite their revelation of the deeper meaning of life, the sooner is the new ethical claim clothed with the dignity of absoluteness.

Yet it would be wrong to regard the development of ethical insight only as an extension and a deepening of authoritative morality. Rather does the higher development of the "must" result in a subsequent or previous sublimation of the "may"; a sublimation of the instincts up to the highest regions of the love of others, or even to religious love. If ethical growth were merely under the ban of "Thou shalt," we should indeed be captured by that rigorous, harsh and unspeakably fatiguing ethics with which Kant has rightly been reproached since the beginning. But we are faced by the highly satisfactory fact, which Kant, owing to his unhappy repression of his inclinations, could not understand: that precisely the highest morality, even if it is based on a fight against the lower passions, comprises the highest inclinations. Thus psycho-analysis helps us towards the attainment of the highest notions of love, inclination and duty, in which each mutually promotes the others, whereas Häberlin has no room for the inclinations in his love.¹

I do not know where he finds them, with his dualistic psychology. Yet this is extremely regrettable, for desire without compulsion leads to anarchical confusion, and compulsion without desire to the deepest inward desolation and ossification. What psycho-analyst has not had to deal with patients who were the embodiment of the sense of duty—and at the same time the incarnation of misery?

It is not by segregating the instincts or by the ascetic banishment of inclinations and the joy of life that Man attains to his highest vital development, but by other ethical methods of progress which we shall presently show. We may point out already that in Christianity the harsh "Thou shalt" is confronted by a liberating "Thou shalt love," whereby, naturally, the nomistic character is commutated by the exaction of love. Kant's principle is a good enough sheet-anchor for those who are incapable of love, but it does not, or at least does not sufficiently protect the subject from an inner feeling of misery. The

¹ *The Truth of Religion* (Treatises of the Swiss Prot. Meeting of Preachers, 1916, p. 79).

ideal of a universal, organically canalised love, however, holds up without Mosaic severity the ideal which psycho-analysis, too, has always recognised as being founded in the nature of Man. This love may rightly be designated as a "must" in so far as it has to confront the originally narrow love and to be overcome by conquest, also and in so far as it has to be exercised in succour and often even in sacrifice. But it likewise proceeds from the human temperament and is based psychologically and biologically *on the primitive instincts, which it always comprises in itself*, and without which it could not exist, although it is by no means identical with them.

Hence we agree with Eucken when he lays stress on the one hand on the fact that the ascent to the higher spiritual self can only be achieved by a breach with the "natural ego."¹ Psycho-analysis shows how the gravest nervous diseases are to be understood as an unhappy outcome of this conflict. But Eucken is equally correct when, on the other hand, he lays the greatest stress on the fact that the highest duty comprises not only the relations and limitations, but also the liberation and expansion of life (96). While Kant with his opposition of the primary instinctive impulses, and his isolation of the inclinations, makes for repression and develops himself in the domain of psychology, practically in monkish dualism, psycho-analytical practice shows that the *sublimation and subjection of the primary instincts to the ethical idea* is in conformity with the being and the needs of human nature. *Desire and compulsion are one in this sublimation. Love becomes duty; duty urges to love.* This peculiar relation results from the fact that love in the highest sense is part of the essential nature of mankind, but that, on the other hand, this profound natural trait can only be realised by conflict. It would be an absolute misconstruction of human nature to designate only the primary instincts as "natural." Rather is it evident that the psychological and biological situation is such that sublimating forces, which are virtually the possession of mankind from the outset, must attain to reality, and

¹ *The Truth Contents of Religion*, p. 129.

if this does not take place, or does so only insufficiently, there can be no question of normal development.

Pure "naturalness" in the traditional sense, is unnatural for adults in civilised countries, whereas culture and sublimation correspond with human nature. What ethics has to do is to determine this higher expansion of human nature and its relations to primary and universal nature. Any system of ethics that is not founded on human nature would be a lamentable chimera. Those who oppose the moral claim to the "natural" effort understand "nature" in a narrower sense, somewhat in that of the naturalistic, non-idealistic conception of life, and make out of the alteration which the primary life experiences in sublimation on the principle of creative synthesis, a *μετάθσις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, which fits in with subjective experience but is not in conformity with psychological development. A squabble about mere words might easily arise out of the difference. For us the object of ethical study is not the contrast with Nature, but the development of human nature, and especially the human spirit.

After these general discussions we now turn our attention again to the problem of normative and true human nature and its incorporation with the whole of life conformably with the conditions of living. The highest aims to be selected by the individual and mankind depend naturally on existent powers, dispositions and needs.

We return to the difference between the "I" and the "You" instincts. By its endeavours to "carry on" the *ego* enriches and extends its intelligence, its feelings and its knowledge. All this does not take place, however, in isolation from its fellow creatures, but in constant reciprocal action with them, on whom it is, indeed, in many respects dependent. We cannot create an ethics of the individual without taking into consideration our normative relations to our fellow creatures. For Man is a gregarious being, and, however independent he may be of others, his determination, and his highest life-aims are related to theirs.

Psycho-analysis strengthens the opposition to that

egoism, which exploits its neighbour only as a means to its own ends. And if sociology shows that the principle of general selfishness means that everybody is fighting against everybody so that the arrow which has been released must rebound upon the archer, analysis further shows that without love Man's life is poverty-stricken, disordered and contrary to his own nature. Normal sexual development already drives one human being to another, preferably to another of the other sex. Freud showed how deeply these primary instincts influence and accompany further development, up to the highest conceivable functions of civilisation.

Among the primitive impulses there are some that have to be withdrawn for the purpose of a salutary communal life, particularly the sadistic impulses. On the other hand, the standpoint holds good of the furtherance of the interests of one's neighbour, which not only conforms with general utility, but also with a primary disposition of human nature. Love in the sense of voluntary devotion to others with the intention of furthering their interests, is an indispensable necessity for the individual as for the communal life. Love transforms the severe "must" of the Kantian doctrine into a joyful "will," without, however, any detriment to the purity of its intentions.

■ The keener our view of the connections of human existence, the more evident does it become that love can only be perfected in the universal love of one's fellow-creatures, which, as is well-known, likewise comprises those who are remote from us. That which was experienced by the Founder of Christianity, thanks to His profound submersion in the nature of the individual, and especially of the poor and humble, their distresses, powers and capabilities, and also thanks to His own power of loving, as the strongest subjective and objective force, has proved itself true in the light of history and analytical anthropology: There is a vital law of love to which the individual dare not refuse recognition either in the development of his own life, or in the acquisition of the highest communal forms.

This principle of love, which is everywhere demon-

strable, from the primary and primitive expressions of life up to the greatest achievements of culture and acts of ethical heroism, if repression has not withdrawn all grace, freshness and joyfulness from ethical conduct, must consequently control the incorporation of the individual into communal life. Psycho-analysis, which has shown even a brutally denied sexuality in the highest and purest love of others, often as an undertone, but always as impelling power, by no means falls a victim to naturalism, because it understands the facts of sublimation according to which the original purely animal sexual impulses may be applied to asexual ethical activities, and even to these of the highest order, so that there is always an association with functions which have no direct relations with sexuality.

If it were our task to set up an ethical structure, we should now have to show how truthfulness, justice, fidelity, generosity, compassion and other social virtues are derived from the love of one's neighbour. Psycho-analytical experience would here be of great assistance by showing how life, in conformity with the standards corresponding to these virtues (in so far as it remains free from too violent and extensive repressions) is also to be approved of biologically if the dammed-up vital impulse can turn to these standards in the sense of the advancement of life, provided that they are grasped generally and not too sharply adjusted to the individual case.

Instead of pursuing this matter further, let us—seeing that we are limited to mere indications—turn to another task. *The notion of life* gradually acquires another significance if we apply the ethogenetic procedure. At the commencement we employed it in the sense of natural scientific biology, which comprises vegetable, animal and human life, and it was then a question of the preservation of the physical organism and its most important functions. With increasing development psychic life comes more and more into the foreground, and the organic existence falls back to its basic and preliminary conditions. Here we have again before us one of those transferences of feelings which we have recognised as so important a

feature of ethical development. It is now our task to examine more closely this gradual emphasis of what is spiritual. But we may point out beforehand that all individuals do not participate in this sublimation in a manner conforming with the ethical standards which we have recognised as the right ones. As a matter of fact this is the case with all standards.

The INTELLECT contributes to the expansion of life. We need not show here how, by instinct and experience, the chaos of sensations is sorted out into apperceptions ; how images, expectations, wishes, imaginary wish-fulfillments (Freud's infantile hallucinations, which are also of great importance as regards ethogenesis), judgments, etc., are formed, and how notions and ideas are created. But we may point out how thought continually gains more weight in the economy of life, and constantly withdraws itself from the aim of preserving physical existence. The desire to know the truth, even if it brings no profit in its train, becomes stronger. Thought as such will become pleasurable ; it will be felt to be a necessity. We observe that this thinking for thinking's sake, this emphasising of the functional in thought without regard to the object or the gains of thinking, frequently occurs where there is no love of mankind or of one's own life. The pleasure is withdrawn from the object of thought or from its contributions to life and is derived from the function of thinking itself. Men fly to thought because they seek an escape from reality. But thought may apply itself to unreal, imaginary objects, like scholastics. Analysis has shown that the consequence of such conduct is a stunting of the personality, just as this has been caused by grave inhibitions to development. This discovery will frighten ethical judgment away from intellectualism and its curtailment of the life of emotion and human needs. It may be admitted that the world has a great deal to be thankful for to its intellectuals, but their manner of thinking cannot be accepted as a normal development of life because an enormous waste of necessary vital energy outweighs this hypertrophy of the intellect, and because even the most imposing structure of thought founded on

the repression of the emotions must turn out lopsided and, supposing it to be of ethical import, must pay for its admitted advantages with grave disadvantages.

If the centre of gravity of our life-interests is to be removed from the animal to the spiritual functions, we must demand, from the analytical point of view, that thought shall be paired with the emotional functions and conform with the demands of both the intellect and the instincts. Emotion and thought expand together. The love of husband and wife, of parents and children is extended until it becomes a love of mankind, wherein, however, the intimate relations with a narrow circle form the necessary basis and presupposition of a love for those far removed from sight. Without a great love for individuals, the love of mankind would easily become a colourless and feeble thing. And, finally, the collaboration of universal thought creates a personal relation to the whole world and the will which penetrates it. If we recognise a sense, a determination of human life, this necessarily presupposes a spiritual power which created this kind of mind. Otherwise we should have to fetter or deny our need of causality which we are entitled everywhere to apply, and this would not be logically justified. In this extension of our horizon there is again a displacement of feeling which is logically justified. Whereas primitive Man feels himself responsible only to himself and his family, in a higher stage of development the people and (later) mankind (and in religious men the ethical universal Will) take the first place. Thus, under certain circumstances an ethically highly developed man may voluntarily sacrifice himself for his nation or for mankind. The collective life becomes more important than the individual life. The highest effort that can be made in this direction is to use one's powers for this totality of life in such a way that it is brought closer to its highest determination. If we call the highest aims ideals, the ethogenetic acquisition of a standard finally involves an explanation to the individual of his duty of loving, his voluntary and absolute devotion to these ideals. It is obvious that these ideals cannot consist of anything

further than the best possible promotion of the physical well-being of our fellow creatures, and, still more, their spiritual and emotional development, with the corresponding forms of communal life. Whatever can be conceived as ideal (including art, science and technics) finally stops at this one ideal. The last step which it is possible to take is to conceive mankind as part of an absolute life, and indeed of an absolute spiritual life which, it is true, perfects its noblest intentions by educating Man for the acquisition of the highest earthly possessions. Religion has dared to take this step and to arrange life in accordance with it.

Thus we attain to a higher notion of life than the naturalistic one, seeing that the spiritual and moral possessions, the world of ideals, or, rather of the ideal becomes the aim and object of human effort. And it is not only those actions that bear toward this goal that have a moral valuation; the centre of gravity lies rather in the sentiments of the worker and not in the work itself. Those who are always ready to live for this ideal and to sacrifice everything for it, are participating in the highest form of life. To live for the ideal which one has set up means to live for and in the highest form of love, and likewise (without falling into the rigorousness of Kant) to devote oneself to the highest duty, for there can be no duty that does not issue from the natural and spiritual determinants of love.

The sense and the shape of the various individual domains of life result from this. PROPERTY is to be considered and treated as the basis of all development of life. Endless social and political misery has been caused by the fact that owing to the displacement of feeling already mentioned property has been torn from its organic and menial condition in respect of the total life, and has been set up as the highest earthly aim. Psycho-analysis provides indispensable guiding-lines for a new consideration of the history of political economy: it shows how the love of gold and landed property, and the lust of war are connected with repressions. It demonstrates further how proposals for social improvements, which are often

made from the standpoint of a sublime idealism, must perforce hang fire as long as the psychological presumptions for these sublimation processes have not been created. An investigation of the whole economic and political history of mankind from the standpoint of repression and sublimation is one of the most urgent needs of our time. It would demonstrate the fact that only by opening out a freer emotional life and a highly spiritual activity could both inner and outer conflicts be avoided.

COMMUNAL LIFE must likewise be considered from the standpoint of the highest vital development—the family, the state, society, mankind. Care should be taken everywhere to place the smaller organism (person, family, state, people) in the larger one, a part of which it is, in such wise that neither hypertrophy nor atrophy shall ensue. We can prove by psycho-analytical observation how the supposed enrichment by family or national egoism, like everything that runs counter to Nature, is in reality a robbery of life. The contradiction between the actual organic relations of mankind and the particularism of our manner of thinking is the product of a bad psychology which makes its plans on the existing sympathies and antipathies (which are mostly caused by repression), instead of purifying these fundamental feelings by analysis.

SCIENCE, too, must bow before the higher claims of life. In this way it protects itself from that empty formalism which nowadays condemns many an exact science, particularly psychology, to sterility. The terrible waste of intelligence which rightly angered Tolstoi, Poincaré and others (a mocking reference to the task of counting tree-lice will be remembered) can only be overcome by a more conscious conformity with life as a whole. If science ceases constantly to drink of the spring of life (and it has only too often ceased to do so) it falls back into obsessive-neurotic brooding and rationalism. It would be very desirable that the history of science should be written from this point of view.

The same thing is true of ART. It must not be merely a vessel into which we pour our superfluity of emotion and desire; not merely a copy, a reduplication of reality;

not merely an autistic playing at God by creating a world according to our personal tastes, as is the case with many expressionists. Rather should it be a means of surmounting, in a fashion true to reality, the imperfections of what is already in existence. Art stands the higher and is noted more profoundly in that it realises the distress and the forces of the world and the valid aims of liberation from this distress, and expresses this symbolically in its creations.¹ "Art for art's sake" is a contradiction in terms; it is only as a consoler, a harbinger of peace, a guide to higher vital development that art is justified of its existence. True art, however, is one of the most valuable means of sublimating life as a whole, and the more distinctly we recognise the fact that the outward display of our culture, with the help of materialism, capitalism, political imperialism and scientific intellectualism, should be abandoned in favour of a better existence, more conformable to the true nature of our spirit, the more will art be appreciated.

It is only in connection with absolute life that RELIGION, too, can be rightly understood and properly expressed. If there are to-day not only a number of non-sublimated sybarites, but also many profound minds whose judgment of religion, especially of present-day religion, is critical and hostile, this attitude is in truth not without foundation. How often has religion deprived life of energy by its repressive ethics, and driven the intellect, by its orthodoxy, and the emotions and the will by its ritual into the paths of harmful and obsessive neuroticism! The life offered as a substitute has been so narrow, stuffy and inimical to reality that healthy souls could not feel at home in it.

But it would be unjust and short-sighted to lose sight of the effects of religion under these prejudices. If a naïve religious feeling as Freud rightly warns the reader, can really impair the instinct for knowledge by an appeal to God Who has created everything, its influence, on the other hand, has been immeasurable in respect of encouraging meditation on life and the world, as has been shown a

¹ Cf. my essay, *Truth and Beauty in Psycho-analysis*.

hundred times by the history of ethics and philosophy. And if a perverted belief in ecclesiastical authority has frequently enervated independent thought, religious experience has, on the other hand, given many a bold spirit the courage and strength to create powerful innovations, and has called into being splendidly independent and creative personalities, as the lives of the ethical and religious founders of the cults of all times have sufficiently proved.

The nature of religion may be indicated very briefly. Art solves the difficulties of life by symbolical representation ; whether that which is represented be true or only imagined is unimportant for art itself, nor is it concerned with the question as to whether what has been created in the work of art is or is not possible in reality. Art demands nothing ; it sets itself above reality, both causally and finally.

The case is different with religion. I would define it as the relation of mankind to centres of spiritual power which are supernatural, but felt to be real. It, too, starts from inhibitions in restraint of life, and attempts to overcome them. But it does not do so by denying forces which really exist, being actuated by the tendencies acting behind the empirical surface, i.e. spiritual realities. Religion, like philosophy, attempts to find a true Being behind the external aspect of reality ; and it believes in controlling powers which were first conceived anthropomorphically. But we must be on our guard against despising this primitive mythology or treating it as pure illusion. Psycho-analysis has found real and deeply-sunken roots in many a myth. To it we likewise owe our insight into the fact that important knowledge of the highest scientific truth may emerge in a symbolical form from the subconscious. This may be a source of annoyance to psychological rationalists ; not so, however, to the free explorer of the soul. On the other hand, the large number of great philosophers who adopted religion into their systems show that even the sharpest criticism has in no way destroyed the essential kernel of religion. No cautious psycho-analyst will believe that he has established the falsity of the religious symbol of a fatherly God by laying

bare the father-complex inherent in this image. That commanding, i.e. spiritual powers are expressed in cosmic development, and that the empirical spiritual life does not appear as the haphazard product of a material (un-spiritual) course of things; that the ethical temper and determination of mankind revert to a purposeful world-Will; these are presumptions which necessarily follow on the search for a cause, if chance is not to be elevated to the dignity of a god, who violently cuts off all thinking, and they are suppositions which are justified in the face of all contradiction. And everybody who knows anything of the history of pietism is aware how powerfully the thoughts which, in religion, are certainly often directed to the wish-principle, are overcome by the commands of exact thinking; how strongly many religious people have been compelled by facts and logic to abandon their favourite conceptions (often at a great cost) and to exchange them for enlightened religious ideas.

If, in this constant reference to actual facts, religion is seen to be a relative of science, it is, prospectively regarded, a sister to ethics. Art demands nothing from its recipient, religion a great deal; in its highest phases, everything; the devotion of the whole of mankind to their ideals. Authoritative and heteronomous religions derive ethics from religion and take over the moral command from revelations which are believed to be of supernatural origin, whereas religious thought, since Kant, has taken the opposite path, by recognising the moral command derived from the nature of Man and from reality as the expression of an absolute Will. Hence God is the spiritual motor-centre of religion, from which issues the physical and moral cosmic system.

Religion has this in common with art; that it prefers to make use of symbols, even though it need not do so to the same extent as the philosophers and learned men in general. Art contains much that is valuable in its work which cannot be put into words. That which the superficial observer takes to be mere chimera has perhaps exceedingly valuable reality contents. The symbol—and every artistic image is at the same time a symbol—

possesses the advantage of comparatively easy comprehension, and inexhaustibility, and also the highest emotional values; but it is deprived of the clarity and definiteness of the substantially poorer notion. Are we to take it amiss of religion that it should clothe its highest knowledge and its truest presentiments (like art) in symbols—nay, according to Putnam—for the large part it plays in artistic creation? If we speak with respect of the artist's inspiration, are we to depreciate the great histories of Moses, Amos, Josiah, Jeremiah, Jesus and Paul? It would be a complete misunderstanding of human genius to refuse the religious man what is conceded without further ado to art.

We must however strictly require of the religious man who expresses generally valid truths about Being and To-be, that he should look dispassionately and without paying heed to any external authority for that incorporation with the whole of life which corresponds with his highest faculties. Art finds this active and passive incorporation in a representative manner; science in thought, ethics in action and tolerance. In every perfectly spiritualised religion we shall find the synthesis of all these functions, and indeed in most valuable forms and harmonious combinations. Those who possess this kind of piety have at their command a centre of life which (with full development of creative liberty) fills reality with ideal values and enriches it as the artist does, or even more, by blending the shapeless dabs of colour on his palette into a work of art.

Consequently religion must never be confused with individual religious forms, ceremonies, dogmas, churches, etc. It is a remarkable fact that in Protestant countries many religious leaders take exception to or regard coldly, churches and their exterior forms of activity. Religion is an absolutely personal and inner grasp of that ideal, and at the same time real, power-centre to which the name of God has been given.

The Development of the Moral Personality

The ethogenetic procedure led us by way of a physiological and sociological biology to an idealistic conduct of life,

Psycho-analysis has given us many a valuable hint for its development, but nobody will maintain that it could have indicated the aims of ethical endeavour unaided, since it is a descriptive and elucidative, but not a standard-setting science. If the analytical point of view, founded on the most impressive material, drawn from a profound knowledge of the soul, is important for ethical considerations, the standards referring to the psychology of the ethical personality are of even greater significance.

The highest moral principle is, as we have seen, the following: *Always behave so that you further the whole of life according to your highest determination and your talents!* From this standard result the ethical claims on the individual which may be resumed in the sentence: *Try to bring your powers into such a relation to each other as to serve the highest standard in the most suitable manner.*

How is this to be done? Psycho-analysis has made the problem a burning one. It has taught us to perceive that it is not enough to subject the lower instincts existing in the conscious to the impulses of moral decision; we must likewise admit the still greater necessity of subjecting the subconscious psychic forces to moral aims and purposes.

How can this best be done? *Is it a canon of ethically free personality that it should be free from repressions?* The question is a difficult one. One objection is, that all true art springs from the subconscious, and consequently presupposes repression, and further, that all great ethical reforms were due to personalities who likewise gave of their treasures from the depths of the subconscious. But—can we dispense with artists and prophets?

If we are willing to admit that life is more than art and prophecy, then we must also concede that both would be superfluous in a perfect life, for both arise from deficiency and are symbolical anticipations of the longed-for higher state. An ideal life would therefore overtake them and put itself in their place. The absence of all repression and the absolute consciousness of the psyche would be consistent with an ideal life.

But we must reckon with things as they are, and they soon convince us that there are great obstacles to the

realisation of this thought. Freud calls our attention to the fact that to effect an absolute analysis of the subconscious and to raise it into consciousness is impossible. And even if this could be done to-day, to-morrow these results might be invalidated by new repressions. Highly-strung and reflective people will always suffer more under the conflict between the ideal and actual life than the great masses ; they go deeper into the heart of things and look for much more difficult ways of dispelling distress than does the average man. For this reason it cannot but happen that the most stupendous knowledge will be symbolically anticipated by the help of the subconscious, and if truth is veiled, it is none the less truth. Hence there will never be a time without art and prophecy.

This, however, is not decisive for the setting up of a standard. No ethical ideal can be realised. The highest ideal would certainly be freedom from repression, a state in which the subliminal layers of the soul would be irradiated by the light of the conscious. Truth would have dropped her veil, moral perfection would no longer exist in the magic mirror of the symbol. The divine truth of the seer would be raised to the true divinity of absolute vision.

Let us not overlook the fact that this ideal is a millennial hope! If we enquire into the aims which the individual is to pursue, we cannot unconditionally impute the greatest measure of consciousness to them. There are poets whose manifestations are of greater efficacy and penetration than if they were free of repressions. The genuine values which they grasp by means of their artistic intuition never suffer by being brought to consciousness. But because the artist, like the preacher, has to reckon with the subconscious of other men, which does not pursue pure thought, but follows the lure of the subliminal voice, too great a psychical irradiation might easily denote the loss of the prophetic mission. The man would gain what the artist would lose. Hence no general indications can be given as to where the borders of the making conscious lie. If the artist breaks down under his fixations, analysis is evidently called for. But how far we are to proceed

after the capacity of existence has been found, must be decided from case to case.

It is of the learned that we have the best right to require the closest approach to a state of absolute psychical irradiation, as it is a supreme protection from that dry intellectualism which is caused by the representation of emotional life. The man who is free submits his work to the ideal life as a whole and is thus protected from empty formalism and sterile remoteness from life.

Hence we come to the following requirement: *The psychic zones (the conscious, the fore-conscious and the subconscious) must stand in such a relation to one another that they best serve ideal life as a whole.* I call this THE PRINCIPLE OF THE HARMONY OF THE PSYCHIC ZONES AND STRATA.

If we enquire how this principle is to be carried out, other standards are easily found. For a proper relation of the zones the primary instincts must be subjected to the sublimated endeavours. We have seen that without this arrangement not only communal, but also the higher individual life would be injured, and in certain cases destroyed, whereas an organic incorporation with life as a whole best provides for the development of the subjected functions and life-centres. But there is yet another reason for equipping the sublimated aims with the strongest emotional affects, namely, because they can be maintained only by constant expenditure of force. Sublimation is like warmth, in that it bears within it the tendency to cool. Consequently, in ethics as in education, the incessant fight for the ideal must be emphasised. I call this THE PRINCIPLE OF THE DOMINATION OF WHAT HAS BEEN SUBLIMATED, and extend its validity to the widest domains of the soul.

Those who have taken up psycho-analysis take up with great earnestness one requisition which has never before been made, viz. that of PSYCHOLOGICAL GENUINENESS. Many ethicists point out that Man must be true to himself and be able to trust himself. Where do conscience, reason and love lead to, if their promptings are not to-morrow what they are to-day? The disunited person

in the leading-strings of the subconscious is never secure against such leading by the nose. Very often he does not know his true motives and allows himself to play the fool on the stage of the conscious. But he may soon no longer stand by the decisions made under the influence of the subconscious, and if he allows himself to be swayed by previous decisions, he will become untrue to himself. It is for this reason that the psycho-analytical deepening of individual ethics insists on the promotion of genuineness in the sense of psychological closeness and security against the fluctuations of the conscious brought about by the subconscious.

And finally we demand, in the name of analytical experience, the *freedom of the personality*, by requiring that the plans formed by the conscious, and their execution, shall be accomplished without disturbance by the commands of their subliminal counter-will.

It is of course not our task to construct a whole system of ethics, but I believe that I have shown that ethics can gain from psycho-analysis not only important general points of view, but also important facts for the setting-up of ethical standards.

B. The Significance of Ethics in Respect of Psycho-Analysis

The significance of ethics to psycho-analysis has in my opinion been excellently outlined by Freud. Numerous observations have convinced me that the most beneficent acquisitions of psycho-analysis are wasted and the well-being of the analysed person endangered by any deviation from his canons. I must emphasise this all the more for the reason that these mistaken paths have been praised with the moral pathos of prophecy.

A warning should be given against making moral claims at too early a stage. Since certain medical men have made the so-called present conflict alone responsible for neurosis and have tried to overcome it by outside suggestion or by the suggestion of a mysterious auto-suggestion, or the interpretation of dreams, or associations,

and what not, this warning has become necessary. Very often the "laziness" is superficially made responsible, whereas there is evidently fixation due to repression. In such cases there is a relapse into pre-analytical pressure. If those authors whose shortsightedness has so regrettably diminished the good results of Freud's work, were carefully to take up the study of the laws of historical continuity and the mechanism of repression, both they and their patients would be spared many a disappointment. The fact remains that the making conscious of repressions on the basis of a historically critical reduction is the most important and the most difficult part of the cure of neurosis.

The second important mistake which threatens the ethicist who applies psycho-analysis is the officious and indiscriminating moral sermon which proposes certain definite solutions of the conflict. By this the resistance is strengthened, a penetrating analysis is prevented, discouraging deceptions and relapses are caused, the assimilation of a dignified self-determination is hindered, and the analysed person falls into still deeper distress. If the task consists in freeing the most valuable forces, Freud's extremely careful interpretation of the symbols, his investigation of the subconscious motives, the representation of their fate at and before the time of repression, and the unmasking of the intended benefits of the neurosis must be taken very seriously indeed. Those whose prudery in sexual things leads them to neglect these are guilty of a particularly mischievous omission.

Freud has, in striking phrases, rebuked the attempts of those who would like the patient who is being freed from his inhibitions at once to follow the highest moral aims. He says clearly and wisely: "But the physician must control himself and take for his guide not so much his own wishes as the character of the person under analysis. All neurotics have not the talent for sublimation; many of them, it may be presumed, would not have fallen ill at all if they had possessed the art of sublimating their instincts. If they are urged beyond measure to sublimation and if the nearest and most convenient satisfaction of their instincts is cut off, they feel that their

life is made more difficult than without such treatment. As a medical man one must always be very tolerant to the weaknesses of one's patients, and one should be modestly content with having won back even for an inferior person some of his capacity for work and enjoyment. Educational ambition is quite as unsuitable as therapeutical ambition. And further, the fact must be taken into consideration that many people have fallen ill precisely because they have tried to sublimate their instincts to a degree incompatible with their organism, and that in the case of those who are capable of sublimation this process is accomplished of itself as soon as their inhibitions have been overcome by analysis. I am therefore of opinion that the regular application of analytical treatment to sublimation is always praiseworthy but not always recommendable.¹

I have been taught by experience to agree with this. The parable of the tares in the wheat (Matt. xiii. 24 *et seq.*) is in its mildness worthy of consideration by the psycho-analyst. We must first let the tares grow among the wheat. Attempts to pluck them out would only destroy the wheat itself and plunge the patient into deeper misery.

Consequently it is one of the most serious of mistakes to try and find a way out of the neurotic conflict by evading a careful analysis on account of moral considerations. On the other hand, ethics applied in another direction is beneficial to the person analysed; it shows that the psycho-analytical work is itself a moral achievement, and in this way furthers eagerness and courage to carry it out. I have often seen how powerfully the will for analytical work was strengthened when the client recognised that it was a question of a fight against illusions, lies, immoral lusts, unworthy fetters, the preoccupation with truth and love in the noblest sense, i.e. the acquisition of high moral values. The bait of a high and noble life-content forms an exceedingly strong motive power which renders the most valuable services not only in the often

¹ *Ratschläge für den Arzt bei der psychoanalytischen Behandlung.* Kleine Schriften, Scr. iv. p. 409.

difficult beginnings of the analytical work, but also in the continuance of the same with its need of great perseverance. Even fanatically immoral persons who commit all sorts of offences against the prevailing moral code in their hatred of all that is accepted, often have strong desires toward a higher form of life.

Ethics has further to take up an attitude toward dangerous actions which are planned during the analysis and are to be considered as neurotic symptoms. The person under analysis must be protected against decisions which he might be inclined to make before he is cured and which consequently might be very prejudicial to his later life. The analyst cannot permit his patient during this time of restricted liberty of action to be given over to his morbid desires and perhaps allowed to destroy his future. Psycho-analysis plays a part in the release of energies from the subconscious, which, for instance, might turn toward an imprudent marriage, or a disastrous business undertaking; hence it must prevent mischief where it can. I pledge all my clients not to undertake, during the period of analysis, any action of importance, until its genuineness, its non-neurotic character, has been analytically made clear. In his drama *The Guide* Paul Ilg shows the fate of analysed persons when the analyst allows them, in a state of the gravest neurotic confusion of mind, to form difficult decisions in vital questions. In this work a man whose neurotic confusion spoils his relations to his parents and his *fiancée*, and who without consulting a medical man performs the most responsible actions, finally blows out his brains. If he had had a physician as confidant who without officiousness but with the soul microscope of analysis, had made things clear to the patient and prevented these hasty steps, his life might have been spared.

In the discussion of urgent decisions of importance for life which crop up at the time of the analytic treatment, a stand may be made on mere utility, in which case the judgment is formed on a lower ethical plane. Or one may take one's stand on a deeper ethics which comprises a richer life-content. In all cases of a wrong ethical

judgment caused by fixation the analyst aims at analytical reduction. There are cases in which positive ethical arguments must be brought forward, even if no advice is given. And we know from Freud that we should be as sparing as possible of advice.

Ethical considerations are particularly powerful when the patient is invited to assume an attitude towards wishes and plans of the present which have been made conscious, no less than to those of the past and the future. The neurosis which has arisen through an ethical conflict must be removed by a better moral decision. We have already heard how Freud in many cases demands a compromise with the prevailing sexual morality.

We have nothing but praise for the reserved attitude of the medical man who is unwilling to interfere with the innermost questions of belief and conscience. But if we consider ethics only as hygiene on the highest scale, the medical man must likewise read from the tables of a free and sublime ethics.

Finally, ethics is necessary if, according to Freud's requirements, we wish to lead our analysed subjects to the highest and most valuable cultural efforts. The standards of ethics will show wherein these consist. We have no right to impute to any physician indifference as to whether his patient leaves his hands as an ethically valuable person or as a crass egoist. His personality, even if the transference is a justifiable one, will have a powerful influence on the ethical directions of his patient, even if this influence was unintentional. Hence the medical man will himself take very seriously the questions as to the meaning and aim of existence with which the most powerful minds of all times have wrestled, and on the replies on which so much of our happiness or unhappiness, our efficiency or inefficiency depend. An analyst without morals would be a contradiction, for it is only a man of inner ripeness who can analyse properly. But beyond this it would likewise be desirable to form our decisions as to the highest cultural values hinted at by the founder of psycho-analysis from the heights of a lofty ethical standard. In this way we should render our

patients the best possible service without neglecting the claims of our analytical task. It is obvious, for instance, that the treatment of youthful persons cannot dispense with such ethical training. And it is just as evident that the pastor must always carry out analysis within the limits of his profession ; only he must know that he is in this case no longer a pure analyst, and he will refrain from all high-flown demands, however freely he lets his moral ideals radiate.

Conclusion

Our demonstration that psycho-analysis must get into touch with philosophy both as giver and receiver must not lead to false conclusions. We have said that it was a historical necessity and a good thing that Freud's investigations were positivist. There are plenty of examples to warn us of the injuries that may be suffered by theoretical and practical psycho-analysis if a sharply-defined empiricism is dulled by mystical and metaphysical speculation. There is not the slightest objection to the continuation of positivist investigation, to which we owe so many brilliant results. On the contrary, I consider this work to be necessary, and those who feel a call for it should feel it as a burning need. Ferenczi's wish that we should wait awhile before attacking the young science with the weapons of metaphysics is fully justified.

But it lies in the nature of the human mind to deepen empirics by means of theory. Analysis, too, cannot oppose this need, and consequently has an interest in seeing that it is satisfied in a manner that shall not injure but rather promote it. I have already tried to indicate how a metaphysical system should be built up which would not disturb, but rather promote exact psycho-analytical research. I do not know of any way in which a science which could suitably remove the unreal elements and contradictions of the notions of experience and lay bare its last conceivable causes as well as its true nature, could disturb empirical knowledge. But just as empirical science was greatly promoted by the systems of Hegel, Herbart, Lotze, and others, so psycho-analysis may be

greatly furthered by a deepening of this kind. Ferenczi has already rightly recognised this. We find the most promising beginnings in Freud's metapsychological works.

In order not to tire my readers by repetition, I shall not here survey the manner in which psycho-analysis has to protect itself from attacks on the part of ethics, and in what way it is able to serve and be served by ethics. The proper fulfilment of our standards will certainly promote both of these mental activities.

In the introduction we started from the urgent cry for life which permeates our civilisation. In conclusion I may be allowed to take up this thought once more and continue it on the basis of our investigations. The outer display of our civilization in the shape of materialism and intellectualism brought about a relapse ; people turned seriously to the inner life in the most varied domains of thought.

The same thing happened in the Hellenic world when the abstract idealism of the Pythagoreans and Eleatics, as well as realism, had worked itself out and left a feeling of inner emptiness. Many turned towards sophism, which made Man the measure of all things (Protagoras), with respect both to knowledge and action. The result was sterile scepticism and brutal egoism. The new points of view, acute as they were, were not able to find the truth behind the appearance. Mere negations did not lead to freedom, for liberty without the redemption of the personality and without any aims is nonsense. And so the whole movement fell to pieces.

Then came Socrates, who reverted to the demon fettered by the subconscious ; who tried by clear thinking, and above all by deeper self-knowledge, to extend the power of Man over inner counter-currents, who introduced an obstetrics which was capable by careful induction of obtaining from his disciples the best that was in them, and set up a higher and freer ethos as the aim and object of existence.

But do we not encounter the same traits in Freud ? He has again assured the *subconscious* of due recognition, has undertaken to overcome the inner counter-will by

clear self-knowledge, *has expanded by induction the peculiar psychic forces of the pupil*, and with all this has created a high and free *sublimation*. In spite of the difference of the methods of work the similarity is striking.

May we not hope that Freud's psycho-analysis, although, like the philosophy of Socrates, it has not created any new system, will give an impulse to fruitful spiritual movements and revolutions? It will suffice if all those called to this work do it with all their might. But the sword and shield of the psycho-analytical warrior are courage and humility.

V

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND CHILD-LIFE

I. MODEL PUPILS—AND OTHERS.¹

THE poet Hebbel has told us: "Children are riddles sent by God, and harder to solve than any; but Love succeeds if it has first mastered itself." Which of us has not felt a feeling of warmth about his heart on reading these words? They are a witness to the boundless wealth which is confided to us in the persons of our pupils, but also to our distress and poverty, because we are so often unable rightly to administer the loan entrusted to us. And from the land of our poverty the poet builds a golden bridge of promise into a country where God's riddles can be solved by feeble Man, where we no longer feel ourselves possessors of a treasure which we cannot realise; where Love, completely master of itself, throws its light into the dark abysses, the ocean depths of the childish soul; and where we, with full recognition of youth, are able to help it to fulfil its destiny, to guide it toward sincere volition, steadfast love in the spirit of the Gospels, clear knowledge and judgment. But dare we calmly put our trust in the poet's promise? I must confess that I can do so no longer. To me, indeed, his verses seem ever more significant, of greater import, and weighty. Children are indeed riddles sent by God. My fellow-teachers and I have often felt this when standing before our pupils and endeavouring to give them of our best, when we saw the light of joy and love shining in the windows of their souls, when the ranks of pupils were for us transformed into furrows, and our words into

¹ This chapter was delivered as a lecture at the Institut J. J. Rousseau, Geneva.

golden seed-corn, and when we saw them tenderly and mysteriously budding. We rejoiced at these incarnate secrets of God, and because they reminded us of a higher world, we were spared the so general idolatry of the child.

But the enigmas slumbering in the child-soul did more than fill us with wonder, gratitude and joy. Often they confronted us in demoniacal rather than in divine shape, and grief, anxiety, fear and pain seized upon us at this aspect of childhood. We saw in our pupils' aberrations and deep distress of soul that we could neither explain nor overcome. And the more lovingly we absorbed ourselves in our children, the more openly they revealed their inmost thoughts to us, the more helpless were we in the face of the abundance of enigmatical facts, some of which were glorious and some terrible. We were incapable of solving these difficult problems. May we hope with the poet that Love will succeed, if it can master itself? Assuredly, Love gives us patience for the careful exploration of the recesses of the child-soul. And our self-mastery prevents our interpreting the words and actions of children with a mien of injured vanity, of unjustifiable distrust, of love of dominion and conflict.

Yet I must regard it as a fatal error to expect to find the key to the deep-lying chambers of the youthful mind in Love alone, in Love which has mastered itself. When complicated facts have to be recognised, clear eyes and a clear insight into the laws of the special events are necessary. Sympathetic insight alone does not give us sufficient knowledge of what is happening in other souls, particularly when processes are at work that are foreign to our own psyche, or which we do not ourselves understand. Rousseau says rightly: "*Commencez donc par mieux étudier vos élèves, car très assurément vous ne les connaissez point !*" (Begin by studying your pupils better, for assuredly you don't know a thing about them !)

In your circle it is hardly necessary to point out that the knowledge of soul-life can only be obtained with the aid of a carefully thought-out method and positive

experience. And even if I am ready to admit that a knowledge of the soul-life, at least in the case of the higher mental processes, always includes a procedure which cannot strictly be called scientific, yet it can and must, like other sciences in the same situation, e.g. history or philosophy, acquire scientific rank by the careful observation and comparison of individual phenomena, the inference of hypotheses and theories, the acquisition of definite notions and thoroughly tested laws.

If Love cannot in many cases help us to solve the enigma of the child-soul, it will nevertheless compel us to seek those scientific means which will enable us to carry out this important work. But where shall we find such means? In academic psychology? There are many of us who have studied it closely. I myself had fifteen years of it. But my experience was that of countless others; the result was a boundless disappointment at the present low status of that science, which eliminates at the outset provinces of the greatest importance for the educator—amongst others the whole field of mental creative work, because this is not suited to the methods which it borrowed from the natural sciences. Not, however, that we should neglect the little that psychology has been able to bring to light (notwithstanding the enormous means at its disposal). But it gives us far too little of that knowledge of the soul which is indispensable to the educator.

We might expect the psychology of child life to come to our aid, but unfortunately the psychology of childhood is suffering from the childishness of psychology. Even in view of the excellent preliminary work accomplished by Professor Edouard Claparède and others, whose merits I should be the last to belittle, the science treating of the childish soul is itself still in long-clothes and bears the marks of infantile immaturity, particularly with regard to the life of feeling and volition and the subconscious masters of the soul.

Psycho-analysis, this new and deeply penetrating method of explaining and influencing the lowest strata of mental life, here attempts to lend a helping hand.

The psycho-analyst who takes up questions of an educational nature finds himself in the delightful but dangerous position of treading on virgin soil during nearly the whole of his wanderings. He does not presume to fathom the whole of the child-soul. Following the needs of life and his own practical scientific needs, he would merely like to be of service in those cases in which the psychology of the conscious has left him in the lurch.

It would be equivalent to carrying coals to Newcastle if, in the city which, after Freud, has done most for the investigation of the subconscious, I were to particularise the aims and objects of psycho-analysis. It endeavours to lay bare the roots of the soul-plant, either for scientific purposes, or to get rid of enemies or decay. Psycho-analysis reveals the subconscious, and in the first instance all the subliminal motives which were once conscious, but have been banished, owing to their painful associations, to the depths of the soul, whence they frequently exercise a powerful influence on the conscious. Together with these formerly conscious, but now repressed motives, analysis attempts to find the inhibitions caused by this disturbance of the conscious mental development, together with the subliminal after-results of these inhibitions. To use a simple figure : While the psychology of the conscious is sitting in the theatre and admiring Hamlet ; while, from its seat, it perceives the mysterious ghost and takes good care not to get in closer touch with it, the psycho-analyst springs on to the stage, penetrates behind the scenes and below the trap-doors in order to find out the nature of that subterranean visitor, to discover the actor who plays the part, the mirrors that project his image on the stage, etc. Do you now understand why orthodox psychology, which does not desire at any price to leave the places for which it has paid such a high price, will usually have nothing to do with psycho-analysis ? We are dealing with two totally different kinds of scientific observation which stand as the poles asunder.

But we know, since Freud's marvellous discovery of the deep-lying powers of the soul, that these are of enormous importance in the development and shaping of

the human mind. Under the surface of the stream of consciousness dwell the dangerous sirens who drag down and destroy the youthful seaman. How many unhappy people have been drawn down by the subconscious forces of their nature to vice and pitiless disease, and even to complete moral and physical ruin? Below the surface of the soul the sirens are lurking, and bewitch the unresisting youth until he is compelled to give ear to them alone, and has neither interest nor strength left for the realities of life. Think of those dreamy souls who are no longer capable of concentrating themselves on their work because, by some mysterious power, they are constantly entangled in the meshes of their dreams. Below the surface of the stream of the conscious lies the sunken bell reminding them of former guilt, and making life bitter for them. But under that surface there reigns also the lovely princess who loads with her enchanted gifts her favourites on the shore. We know that at least the raw materials of the noblest gifts of poetry, painting and piety are prepared in the subconscious. Thus the realm of the subconscious is at the same time Heaven and Hell, and if the psycho-analyst descends into this Avernus, it is for the purpose of fettering the demons and setting the angels free. How this can be done I propose to demonstrate by means of simple examples which elucidate the problem of the so-called bad and supposed model school-children.

What are "dunces" and "model pupils"? I would ask you, for the time being, to confine the terms to the pupils' school work. But we shall not occupy ourselves with those who are incapable of doing much owing to their natural want of talent, for the psycho-analyst knows no more about these than does the psychology of the conscious. Nor shall we touch on those brilliantly gifted children who obtain excellent results without any strain, and enjoy their lives at the same time. Rather would I speak of *divided natures* only, whose defects or advantages form the obverse of internal distress. The inefficiency or the over-valuation of the pupils with whom I am now dealing is not, therefore, the expression

of the whole being, the real individuality, but a deceptive appearance. The apparent mental deficiency does not exist in reality, and the marvellously brilliant achievements are but the mask behind which gloom and despair are concealed. It is a matter of indifference, however, whether the pupil himself has the feeling of inner dismemberment or whether he believes that his apathy, his hatred of school life, the teacher or the individual subjects, or again his eagerness to learn, are the effluence of his whole nature.

We shall presently see that all pupils who achieve considerably more or considerably less than might be expected of their natural talents are the victims of inhibitions to their development which are related to the repression of painful events.

I begin with cases in which the pupil's *power of thinking* is inhibited. We have often to deal with such pupils, who are evidently talented enough and yet achieve nothing. We call them lazy and absent-minded, and believe that they could do better if they only wished to do so. This idea we usually associate with the idea that the pupil has deliberately chosen to be lazy when he might just as easily have been industrious. The examples which I am about to give you are taken from children whose will was really paralysed, but who found it impossible to become more energetic. All the pedagogic measures applied to these cases were merely deleterious.

I will first take the case of a boy who achieved very little during the whole of his time at the elementary school but was one of the best of his class at the Grammar School (*Mittelschule*). I shall describe the case as it developed before my eyes, for it is only in connection with the whole of the child's life that the individual symptoms can be understood.

A boy of 15½ confessed to me that before going to sleep he had the uneasy feeling that clouds were covering him and that he was falling into an abyss. Gradually he related a number of other anxiety-feelings. If he went over a bridge he had such a feeling. He was also anxious in the presence of girls. He was further greatly

troubled about his health; he believed that he had cancer of the stomach or that he was going blind. During the analysis other anxiety symptoms appeared, only to disappear again after they had been traced to their sources and explained. He was afraid of every vacant space in his body; even life itself gave him this anxiety feeling. Then again, he was afraid of burglars, poisonous snakes in his mouth, etc.

It might appear that symptoms such as these were a case for the psychiatrist, and that it was my duty to call one in to give me authority to deal with the boy. But other symptoms came to light which were of a more educational nature. The boy felt himself utterly solitary and desolate, and loved nobody except a comrade who ill-treated him and overwhelmed him with unmerited insults. His dislike of mankind extended even to his parents, who loved their child and had brought him up carefully and lovingly without, however, understanding his peculiar character. He hated those of his teachers who were kind to him, but if they were unfriendly he liked them. To lie to his teacher was a pleasure which he often permitted himself. His longing for ill-treatment was to a certain extent conscious. At the same time he suffered under a feeling of inferiority, but assumed a haughty and cynical bearing in the presence of others. It was not mere idle talk with him when he said that it would not matter if he were to die next week. His melancholy had reached a fairly high degree. His desire was towards nirvana and extinction. He denied the existence of God, although the order and mind in the world of reality made a great impression on him, and he could have given no reason for denying the existence of God. He called the world a merry-go-round which was constantly on the whirl; the human soul was Satan's handkerchief, which had been clean till the Devil put his nose in it, etc.

It was my task to interpret the real meaning of these symptoms, which was hidden from the conscious, to discover their sources and to demonstrate their nullity to my pupil and thus overcome the subconscious inhibition of the inner desires. I can only give you the results.

The boy, who had a hereditary taint, had been greatly spoiled before going to school on account of his delicacy. When he went to school and fell into the hands of a strict teacher, he became frightened and consequently gave wrong answers. The bungling teacher made him the laughing-stock of the class, and when the little fellow burst into tears the others were encouraged to laugh at the "blubberer." His classmates were only too ready to comply with this villainous order, and even continued their mockery in the street. The little chap's work—and later on, at a higher school, he was perhaps the best pupil of his class—deteriorated more and more under the influence of his anxiety, and corporal punishment of his supposed laziness had merely a disastrous effect.

At the beginning the boy complained to his parents of what had happened at school. But his father, who had hitherto protected his child, decided that it was now high time for the boy to get away from his mother's apron-strings, and that it would do him good to have his cry-baby tendencies knocked out of him. The terrified boy withdrew himself, and after the first few days never again told his people of what was going on at school. He was absolutely defenceless against his comrades, and even when they ill-treated him, made no attempt at defence. The parents believed their son's silence to be a good omen. The only thing that struck them was the fact that long before school-time the boy kept on anxiously asking if it were not yet time to go.

But in his secret soul there was an obsessive idea which gave the seven-year-old boy a great deal of trouble during a period of two years. He constantly saw himself torturing or burning to death a girl in his class. She was the prettiest of the class, but at the same time the one whose mockeries had mortified him the most. Whenever he tried to get rid of this phantasy it returned with renewed force. The fact that he told his mother of it (as she admitted to me) was of no avail. After he had finally succeeded in freeing himself from this villainous idea, another obsessive and expiatory idea appeared,

namely, that of suicide. He regarded himself as thoroughly wicked, and this thought never left him until analysis. An injurious effect had been produced upon him by certain events in connection with his sister which I cannot mention here.

What was it that drove the child into this morbid state? Nobody, I presume, will deny that obsessive ideas are morbid. The spoilt and nervous child had been terrified, and his self-esteem broken by the cruelty of his teacher, and his father's refusal of the protection which he had asked for served to increase his distress. It would be incorrect to state that his physical weakness and the resultant feeling of inferiority were alone the cause. And it would be equally biased to make the supposed refusal of his parents or the experience with his sister alone responsible. We have before us one of the many cases in which various factors collaborated in perturbing the whole personality. And it is only when the whole personality has been convulsed that subconscious motives and relations originate which cause disease or morbid states.

Very often the injurious influence is exerted in one region of the soul only, but as the various highly valuable psychic processes hang together, the disturbance spreads to other regions. Inhibitions of the love-life or love-wish may disturb and even destroy the self-esteem, just as, conversely, happy love will enhance it. As a poet has said: "Your love gives me value in my own eyes." And, of course, the tendency to nervousness must likewise be taken into consideration.

The inhibition of the capacity of loving persisted up to the time of analysis. Here we have the explanation of that anxiety which the richest treasury of the profoundest knowledge of mankind elucidates as inhibited love: "There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear; because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not made perfect in love" (1 John iv. 18).

How this poor boy's love was connected, in a hopeless and unlovely manner, with his good mother and his sister cannot be told here. In any case he was impelled to

withdraw and bury in his subconscious his love for all men, because they were so unkind to him or, as he imagined, did not understand him. Hence his avoidance of his fellow-creatures, his feeling of solitariness and his sheepishness. The bitter tortures of the early years of school life became a necessity, just as refuge in prison may become a necessity. The active cruelty which took delight in the phantasy of the murdered girl led to a passive cruelty which brought about the delight in being ill-treated which is known to every educator. Hence the boy hated those who treated him kindly, and loved those who ill-treated him. The pride and irony openly displayed were intended to conceal his real feeling of inferiority. The confused picture of the world was only a projection of the psychic confusion into objectivity. He projected his own discord into the world.

The analysis was rich in surprises. The symptoms disappeared after a few consultations. At first the impulse raked out of its hiding-place beneath the threshold looked for new places of concealment, and fresh temporary symptoms appeared which at the same time remodelled the previous ones. For instance, whereas our pupil had formerly been afraid of being struck blind, he now suddenly had the idea that his eyes had become preternaturally big, and while he had previously withdrawn entirely into himself, he now had the sudden feeling that his limbs had grown enormously and would fill the whole earth. But these and other new formations disappeared as soon as their significance and motives had been pointed out to him. Our pupil was soon able to state that his inner relations with his schoolfellows and his parents were considerably improved, that he longed for a sympathetic boy or girl friend, and that he had overcome his doubts of the existence of God. His melancholy disappeared. The analysis, unfortunately, could not be brought to a conclusion, but the results obtained were eminently satisfactory.

It will now be understood, on looking back over the whole of the circumstances, why this pupil learnt and could learn but little. A person tortured by such inner

sufferings and constantly compelled to elaborate them transfers an enormous amount of his psychic force to his symptoms, and cannot possibly make a normal use of his mental gifts. It follows, too, that the supposed laziness of a pupil cannot be understood unless the whole psychic condition is realised. "Absent-mindedness" should often be understood as a disruption into two psychic spheres in which the normal connective links are lacking, i.e. a cleavage into conscious and subconscious.

I am indebted for the second example of a strong inhibition of the capacity for thought to a gifted foreigner of 28 who was sent to school rather late, and achieved next to nothing during his first two school years (at the age of 8 to 9) in spite of punishment, and later, under another teacher, made excellent progress, so that he was able to skip a class. The first teacher seems to have been an extremely brutal personage, who kept school on medieval principles; e.g. he made the pupils hold stones in their uplifted hands, and thrashed them when fatigue compelled them to drop their burdens. Or he made the boys hang on to a bar till their strength failed. Once, when my patient had to say his lesson, he began to tremble with fear of this birching pedagogue. In this case, too, the well-meaning but weak parents would not help their son because they did not believe the tales of the master's severity. The first result was a violent melancholy. Nervous twitchings, which previously had possibly been present to a trifling extent, now gained the upper hand. During the whole of his school life he was obsessed by two words, which were constantly before him, and greatly impaired his powers of thought. They were "Duke Alba." Up to the age of 22 he could not get rid of these annoying words.

No doubt you are curious to know what became of this child, since you are not merely interested in the subconscious adversaries which place obstacles in your path as teachers, but also in those which exercise an unfavourable influence on the subsequent development of your educational work. You educate, indeed, for the future. Under observation our subject revealed a violent

anxiety-hysteria. The outward disturbance was chiefly manifested by nervous twitchings of the head, arms and trunk. The man of 28 who stood before me was unable to lift a glass of water to his lips ; he literally had to lower his lips to the glass, otherwise he would upset everything. Formerly he had been unable to go out alone. At the time of the analysis he was able to do so with difficulty, but he invariably looked for someone to accompany him ostensibly out of a desire for companionship, but in reality to afford him protection. In public places he felt that he was under observation, and his *tics nerveux* gained the upper hand. Whenever he thought of anybody—e.g. his mother—the pictured face faded away after a few seconds and the features were transformed into terrifying shapes, so that the victim of hysterical anxiety (for he was nothing else) was actually haunted by a ghost. He tried to drive it away, but it always remained for some time until the face first thought of and desired reappeared. The young man used often to kiss the girl whom he loved, but when he did so the *tics* used to break out again violently, the feeling of reality was lost for an instant, the terrible shadowy shape was there, and his love had entirely cooled. Then he would cling appealingly to his beloved, the shape would disappear, and this curious lover had the remarkable feeling that he had been revenged. In his manners the hysterical young man was gentle and submissive—in fact, quite incapable of self-defence. It is all the more striking that he was capable of writing highly aggressive newspaper articles, dangerous to himself, on matters which did not touch his person.

It would take up too much space to describe the analysis, but I will give the result : Our patient came of a family with a strong hereditary taint. Two of his sisters had the same nervous twitchings, and his younger sister suffered from them even more severely than her brother. His parents were very kind-hearted but weak people who never had recourse to punishment. Two elder brothers had turned out badly. One of them once threatened his father with a revolver in order to obtain

money for drink, and often caused "scenes," especially at night, so that the police had to be called in. Our patient suffered greatly from such events long before he went to school. Between the ages of 3 and 4 the house where he was living was burnt down, and he had a narrow escape. He saw a woman perish in the flames. Some time before or after this he had been endangered by a fall from the terrace.

When, therefore, at the age of 9 he was put in charge of an over-strict teacher, he was incapable of mastering difficulties by good work and conformity with the master's requirements; the former terrifying experiences were revived and made their contribution of anxiety to the present occasions for fear. Hence they were regarded as worse than they actually were, and calm reflection became an impossibility. In spite of his natural gifts his work could not turn out otherwise than badly; all the timid lad's good intentions broke down. In the main, the twitchings expressed an anxious withdrawal, and also a violent attempt to pull himself together when in these states of humiliation and depression.

I can give you a brief insight into a fragment of the analysis. Its technique consisted in closely observing the ideas to be analysed, and insisting on the communication of all the associations. When the idea of "Duke Alba" was firmly fixed it revealed the following associations: "These words were constantly in my mind, even if I were thinking of something else: a persecutor: my strict teacher." The teacher was even then, after two decades, the ghost that haunted him, so that he was always feeling compelled to look furtively towards the door. But he was not aware of this until the time of the analysis. Fear of this man had formerly prevented him from going into the street, and even later he had done so unwillingly. But he likewise projected this teacher into his two prodigal brothers, especially the one with the revolver.

I reproduce literally the analysis of the transformation of certain persons, e.g. his mother. We learnt that the recollected face disappeared and was transformed into

a mysterious and even terrible shadowy image. I made my subject fix his attention sharply on this and tell me his associations without criticism or comment.

(The shadowy figure.) "It assumes various shapes, but the synthesis of them all is a large head; thin, with big, round eyes; terrible; a smirking face full of devilish irony like Mephistopheles. When it appears it evidently intends to say: 'Ah, here I am!' This is the principal form which it assumes." (Look at it intently.) "When my master struck me he always had this expression on his face." (Another form of the shadowy shape.) "In general there are two principal shapes; the second has the form of a sinful man who confesses his great guilt and says: 'Excuse me for coming here, but I have come merely to apologise. I am watching over you: be calm. You have done me no harm. I am grateful. . . .' When this shape appears I have no courage to struggle. I let him go. The shape appears to derive a certain amount of satisfaction from this, and disappears with an angelic, fatherly face." (The first head.) "I immediately think of the teacher who ill-treated me. The leanness, the round eyes, the devilish irony agree with those of the shadowy shape." (The second shadowy head.) "My very wicked brother. It is he in every feature. I desired his death." ("I am watching over you.") "A dead man becomes a spirit and can, it is said, watch over the living. In my dreams he gives me hope and consolation."

As you will have perceived, the hated teacher always plays the part of a terrifying ghost in this tormenting phantasy, and, in fact, in the shape of a devil, whereas the brother likewise appears as a ghost, but in another and far nobler form. He appears as a repentant sinner who begs for forgiveness and testifies that no harm shall come to the patient, i.e. that there is no reason for revenge; and even takes the shape of a guardian spirit watching over the family. Our hallucinant felt anxious on account of his wish for his brother's death, and feared the dead man's vengeance. The hallucination told him that he had obtained pardon and that the man whose death he desired had become an angel, although he did

not deserve it, and had to beg forgiveness of his sins. No doubt you will guess that observations of this kind are of great importance in the psychology of the belief in demons.

The teacher as ghost finds no rest, and even in the love-affairs of his former pupil he haunts him as a spoiler. While the youth of 21 was kissing his sweetheart he was seized by his *tic* because his conscience was then not clear, and accused him of frivolity. Thus it attempted symbolically, by an automatic gesture, to pull him together again. By his loss of the sense of reality he tried to get out of the whole business. In vain! At once the terrible shadow stood before him, as a punitive and admonitory conscience, warning him against greater offences. For a moment his love died completely, just as his sense of reality had faded away. But then he clung to his beloved, i.e. the portion of reality that was so dear to him and was now in danger of being torn from his side; and reality triumphed over hallucination. Consequently he felt that he had had his revenge on his teacher, as the ghost of the latter was forced to disappear.

It was the task of the analysis to show the patient the historical origin of his symptoms; hence the careful discussion of the events of his childhood. Then I had to show him what he expressed and intended thereby; I had to lay bare his hatred of his teacher, the cruel and unclean lust which made the hated man haunt him like a ghost. But I likewise had to demonstrate that with his anxiety, by playing the part of a terrified child, he was trying to economise the energetic investiture of his strength and thus to profit by his illness (*Krankheitsgewinn*). I had to bring to light the immoral manoeuvres against his teacher and himself. Then the moral judgment of the patient stepped in and refused to pursue such conduct any further. Afterwards the misguided impulse attempted to pursue all kinds of by-paths, the unsuitability of which was likewise unmasked by the analysis. And finally the impulse, diverted from its normal development by painful events in infancy, found

the paths of bodily and moral health, and the patient was cured.

I could describe a number of other cases of anxiety neuroses which were traced for the most part to over-strict teachers. Last year two girls of 18, pupils of the same teacher, whom they had left three years previously, came to me at the same time but independently of each other. Both were afflicted with violent anxiety-hysteria. In both cases the teacher, who is a very conscientious man, but unaware of the dangers of his great severity, had played a very regrettable part.

If, then, you have to do with pupils whose powers of thinking are obviously inhibited, you must not try to obtain attention by severity, for in many cases this would mean useless torture which would merely aggravate the injury. What has to be done is rather to find out the reasons for this state of things.

I may here mention other backgrounds of inhibitions to thought. In many cases there is no anxiety, but rather an *obsessional absence of mind* which remains attached to quite different contents. Very frequently these are day phantasies, dreams which are spun out in a waking state for months and even years, and in which the dreamer plays a part of some sort, usually more or less heroic. The analysis of these *day-dreams*, in which the most intense desires are symbolically expressed, is of the highest importance. All distress and longing finds a mental outlet in these dreams and phantasies.

Many others, again, like our second subject, roll with great distress and toil the Sisyphus stone of an obsessive word. A pupil under my observation, who had often been reproached with his absent-mindedness, suffered from *obsessional brooding* on mistakes in spelling and other trifling matters. Thus he was tortured by uncertainty as to whether "telephone" was spelt with an *f* or a *ph*,¹ or he knew that there were three trees in a certain meadow, but told himself that there were four,

¹ In German, *Telephon*. The pupil did not know whether to write *v* (pronounced as *f*) or *ph*. TRANSLATOR.

and brooded over this obsession, naturally, without ever discovering the hidden motives of this strange compulsion. Even at the age of 9 this boy suffered from a very annoying obsession which spoiled his holidays and finally made it impossible for him to go for a walk. If he passed a stone on the left-hand, he told himself, for some unknown reason, that he ought to have passed it on the right. He had no peace until he had returned and corrected this supposed error. He also suffered a great deal from ugly ideas, and this fact led to the causes of the morbid disturbance.

Another pupil, who was unable to concentrate his attention, was compelled to rivet his eyes for hours at a time on the outlines of the figures on the wall-paper. A girl felt compelled to look at all the flowers on the wall-paper and to kiss all the pictures in a book; she fell into a state of anxiety that she had perhaps forgotten one of them—a flower or a picture—and had to begin over again. I daresay you will guess the meaning of this conduct when I tell you that she felt herself to be a forlorn little blossom, and longed for tenderness.

Thinking is often paralysed as regards one subject only, because there is an irresistible aversion from it. Or a gifted pupil can do nothing properly *under a certain teacher*, without any conscious reason, while with others he works very well. Analysis shows that in those cases in which the conscious can give no reason, or only an obviously unfounded one, the subject or teacher in question, owing to some adversary hidden in the subconscious, has usually been the recipient of an antipathy which is, as a matter of fact, not directed towards the said teacher or subject, but has been transferred as by underground gnomes from former events to the present task or teacher. The feelings act somewhat like a dog which has been teased by naughty children and then bites the hand of a boy who loves animals and only wants to stroke it. Where there are violent repressions the antipathy may become so violent that even the strictest sense of duty and a maximum of effort cannot bring about the necessary amount of attention. We find the

same phenomena in countless numbers of women, who are never ready in time, or neglect important work, and in learned men who cannot complete a work which they have begun with the strongest effort of will, etc.

And not only the dynamics of the thinking process, but also its *direction* may suffer greatly under the tyranny of subconscious tormenting spirits. It is impossible for me to describe here the thousand and one crotchets and whims with which the analyst has to deal. Nor can I demonstrate now how quite reasonable opinions are built up, not on the reasons brought forward, but on subconscious arguments.

I will just mention a few particularly frequent tricks of the subconscious. There are pupils who, in their thinking, *do not reach the object itself*, but think in a purely *formal manner*. They cannot immerse themselves lovingly in a subject, but they can arrange any objects in order, or they soon lose themselves in abstractions foreign to reality, idle juggling with ideas, primitive scholastics, etc., as I shall show in my next chapter. All of you are acquainted with a certain dryness of style which eliminates all feeling. Psycho-analysis has demonstrated in countless cases that a forcible inhibition of the emotional life is to be found behind this.

Among those pupils who are *poor in emotion* you will often find such as are unhappy because they cannot love either their parents, nor a sweetheart, in the usual sense of the word, nor a people, nor humanity, nor God. Inversely, among those fettered by the subconscious we come across others whose power of thought is opposed to a sharply logical direction consistent with the object. and is immediately lost in unbridled phantasies of which the teacher or other reader can make as little as the author of the flimsy web himself. Often the author of such incomprehensible compositions experiences an intense feeling of pleasure without being able to explain what he wished to express (*vide* the chapter on the sources of artistic inspiration).

Under the influence of analysis it frequently occurs

that a person who has hitherto been poor in emotion and fancy suddenly displays luxuriant wealth of feeling and poetic power.¹ Those who have carried out many analyses are sometimes in a position to interpret such ideas as are absolutely incomprehensible to the unpractised—at least with great probability. But prudence is called for.

Many pupils are compelled by their subconscious to contradict all their teacher's views. If they are called upon to give their reasons, the inexperienced teacher is often surprised to find how threadbare are pupils' arguments. Analysis proves at once that the reasons are to be sought elsewhere; namely, in the revolt against the father, whom the pupil now projects into the schoolmaster, and the alleged reasons, known to the boy alone, are just as foolish as those of a person who is told in a hypnotic state to carry out some task after waking, but without recollecting that this task has been imposed on him during the hypnotic state. The man feels the irresistible impulse to carry out the task—perhaps even a stupid one—and takes an absurd amount of trouble to discover plausible grounds for this impulse. Thus many pupils constantly oppose the teacher, turning his words to ridicule, deriding him before their classmates, adopt an opposite point of view from a pure spirit of opposition, without being aware of their own inner want of liberty. Many a simple-minded teacher has taken unspeakable pains to get at such anarchists, but his common-sense thoughts were of no avail because the motives of his opponents were on another plane, viz. the subconscious.

Others, again, feel themselves irresistibly attracted towards pessimism or the doctrines of Nietzsche, and, from the standpoint of their deepest experience, consider everybody a blockhead who does not feel as they do. Or they cherish a hatred of God, of abstruse religious views, etc. The analyst has hundreds of opportunities of discovering the real motives of such thoughts in certain events and peculiar reactions; hence he abstains from

¹ Vide my work, *Truth and Beauty in Psycho-analysis*, p. 105.

approaching such pupils with logical utterances in respect of life, the world, and God.

There are other pupils, again, who are *incapable of thinking for themselves*. They trot in spiritless dependency behind the master, and form their judgments, not on their own experiences, but on authority. This unworthy dependence revenges itself above all by the fact that the creative powers of the mind lie fallow, and that a fresh authority, with perhaps opposite views to those of the first, may easily upset the whole edifice of thought which has been hitherto built up. Behind these inhibitions to thought, too, lies an improper and subconscious dependence on the father.

I could bring forward a number of typical cases, but space forbids. What I should greatly like to do would be to point out to you the opponents to our own thoughts, and to show you with what refinement the subconscious of the pupil scents the teacher's inhibitions and makes capital out of them. But this task, by the solution of which psycho-analysis may render inestimable services to pedagogy, exceeds the limits of a lecture.

I shall therefore give you some examples of so-called *model pupils*.

As a general rule we are pleased to have model pupils who are distinguished by their exemplary industry. And we are right in being thus pleased if we are dealing with pupils who are inwardly free. But how often do we find on closer investigation that many of them are unhappy beings who, in the distress and anxiety of their hearts, *flee to learning in order to numb their feelings!*

Many of them make a sad raid on their strength, and overwork themselves. And then it is said that school has injured them, whereas it was merely an insufficient haven in the storm of their innermost feelings. Many of these obsessional model pupils suffer from a feeling of inferiority due to slighting behaviour on the part of their relatives, guilty feelings of various origin, or some painful wrong inflicted upon them. It is very one-sided of Adler to make corporal disability responsible for these feelings of inferiority. *The non-*

satisfaction of the desire of love, of the impulse to self-determination and freedom, etc., is, according to my own observations, much more often the cause of this feeling of inferiority, which seeks compensation in brilliant school performances or other substitutes.

It happens very frequently that the life-impulse which has been inhibited in its development applies itself with exaggerated zeal to scholastic subjects. Among *fanatical* (I do not say, capable) *mathematicians* and *logicians*, the psycho-analyst finds countless persons who are seeking a substitute for their loss of emotion in exaggerated formal thinking. A passionate love of *astronomy* on the part of a lady whom I knew, who had formerly loved poetry and then abandoned it, was explained by unhappy love.¹ Schoolchildren complete their flight from emotion by their passionate and one-sided intellectualism. The most zealous boyish *naturalist* that I ever came across was an obsessional neurotic, who felt himself separated from the majority of mankind and sought compensation in Nature for his unnatural symptoms, which were especially occupied with the solving of the secrets of sexual life by the help of natural science. This it was that led him to the choice of his favourite subject. I have often seen people plunge into the past who did not know what to do with the present; for instance, a young girl whose only male friend had died. Boys who are absorbed in *history* by this choice betray their subconscious to the analyst. The worshipping admirers of conquerors betray the consciousness of their weakness, just as Nietzsche, condemned to mental and bodily decay, betrayed the fact in his adoration of the warlike and healthy instincts.

As you perceive, the forces acting in the subconscious are playing a dubious game. The help which they give the teacher has often to be paid for by the pupil with his life's happiness, and in very difficult cases with his utter ruin. In slight cases an outlet into the normal can be found by a happy direction of the path of life; the fixation forms a spur to greater effort without any serious visible consequences. But, as a general rule,

¹ Vide my book on *The Psycho-analytic Method*, p. 173.

evil consequences continue until the close of life. It is impossible to say how much intelligence is lost to-day owing to inhibitions, not only in ordinary mortals, but also in highly-gifted beings. On the other hand, however, it may be admitted that many of the greatest achievements of human thought have been accomplished under the influence of such inhibitions to development lying below the threshold of consciousness. But it is precisely these great spirits who often have to give the world of their best at the cost of great personal suffering. The Cross of Golgotha casts its shadow over the domain of science, too, and the Crucified One stretches out His hand to the disciples dwelling there who took up their cross in the service of truth.

I should be willing, indeed, to show you how the emotional life of our pupils, their loves and hates, their pleasure-sensations, pain, and all their other feelings, must perforce walk at the bridle of the subconscious directing forces, so that the efforts of the conscious are almost, if not quite, powerless against them. But I have no space to treat of such phenomena here.

Since the life of reason and volition, as is well known, can only be segregated notionally, but not actually, I have already anticipated a great many things. The incapacity to concentrate one's thoughts on an object is at the same time a *paralysis of the will*. We come across this numbness, however, outside of thought. There are people of paralysed will who are held back by invisible hands whenever they wish to undertake anything. Perhaps they imagine that they are physically or mentally weak, or pursued by ill-luck, etc. But reasons of this kind fall wide of the mark, for they do not touch the subconscious. It is here that we find the memory of all kinds of painful occasions in which the will was crushingly defeated; here, too, is the dishonest thought: "By the help of illness you can escape many a claim laid upon you, and you can gain a number of advantages, such as tender consideration, compassion, etc." Psycho-analysis has opened the eyes of countless persons who had entrenched themselves behind the disease of *abulia*

(loss of volition) to the immoral background of their conduct, and has indicated their moral task of accomplishing, without exception, ethical achievements, and of knowing no other aims than truth, love and duty. Yielding to the subconscious must be replaced by a conscious attitude, and psycho-analysis endeavours to bring this to a successful issue even in the case of a paralysed will.

I call your attention to the fact that even a stimulus of the will to exaggerated achievement may be communicated by repression. That which is missing in the one place has to be replaced by fanatical efforts in another. Hence distress, disappointment, blind zeal and disease.

Those who are acquainted with the origins and motives of these inhibitions can but look with deep pity on the useless tortures which are intended to aid the captive will, with the help of inner or outer compulsion; but without taking into consideration the unknown dictator. It is as though one were to try to whip a tied horse out of his stable instead of slipping his halter. In serious cases asceticism is almost worse than outward pressure. Every failure after violent effort increases the feeling of powerlessness. Some patients have been driven to despair by so-called "gymnastics of the will." Even the setting of a daily task, as is often done in the case of neurotics, I consider to be dangerous.¹

One of my subjects, who had filled his diary with burning resolutions, vows and prayers, confessed to me that for fifteen years he had sworn every day to think for others and was always drawn back into himself. The other panacea, a restful holiday or removal from school, is equally mischievous. How much unhappiness has been caused by such measures! It may be admitted that occasionally, especially in pleasant new surroundings, the displacement may prove beneficial, and it may further be admitted that the parental home is almost always the worst place for nervous children. But the repose of the holidays does not solve the inner conflict,

¹ *Vide* my essay, *F. W. Foerster—ein Psychoanalytiker?* Schriften d. Pestalozzi-Fellenberg-Hauses, Bern.

and consequently hundreds of children return fatigued from their vacations, or fall back immediately afterwards into their previous unhappy state.

Instead of presenting you with a number of peculiar volitional types, I should like to make you acquainted with a man whose life was one constant revolt against authority. His opinions were in the sharpest conceivable contrast with the existing order of things—Church, State, society and the current morals of society; he was attracted only by what was anarchical and savage in art and poetry. Sooner or later he quarrelled with everybody and everything. He considered everyone to be his enemy, and could not believe that there were people who looked at the surrounding world from a different angle. At the same time he felt unhappy and suffered from a number of hysterical symptoms, such as stiff neck and staring eyes. The analysis gives us the explanation. Nearly all his dreams told of persecutions of which he had been a victim. His earliest memories went back to a bear of which he said he used to dream in his first or second year. During the analysis he admitted that the bear bore a striking resemblance to his father; its beard was exactly the same as the latter's. His father had possessed a bronze bear with which he used to terrify the little boy whenever he disturbed his afternoon nap. The stiff neck and staring eyes dated back to scenes in which his father had looked at him fixedly and the child had to hold his head up immovably before the tall man and look at him. How senseless it would have been for us to philosophise about order and morality to this man, who denied all laws of morality and recognised only intense living as the standard of action.¹

Behind disobedience there are often motives which are unknown to the majority of educators. I made the acquaintance of some pupils who suffered from a violent passive love of torture and *provoked punishment* because they felt an exquisite pleasure in being thrashed! In

¹ Particulars of this case will be found in my book, *The Psychological and Biological Foundations of Expressionist Pictures*, E. Bircher, Bern, 1920.

one case a model pupil behaved contrary to discipline in order to prove to himself that he was not merely a weak-willed baby, but that he too dared to assert himself. The fact that he did not succeed and was not punished furthered the stifling of his self-esteem. His disobedience was to a certain extent a moral act ; the return to slavish obedience a serious defeat which was bitterly revenged later. Thus to beat those who torment animals is often a thoroughly wrong action, seeing that in this way the never-failing desire of the evil-doer for suffering pain is satisfied.

As a matter of fact, the psycho-analyst sees in corporal punishment a very dubious means of maintaining discipline, especially caning on the back. I have come across a number of unhappy persons whose perverse obsessions could be traced back to this procedure.

Beautiful as it is when a child, perhaps under the wholesome influence of pious parents, freely seeks the love of God and adores its Saviour, there is a religious devotion which the practised eye can but consider with sorrow and grave misgivings. I came across cases in which children attended the divinity classes with an eager desire for learning, and were the pride of their teacher ; but in the background there lurked a morbid burden of sin and a striving for sanctity which sank into the darkness of night in spite of a desperate struggle for uprightness and a piteously touching confidence in God, Jesus and eternal grace. Our Protestant faith has certainly become an asylum for thousands of threatened souls, has alleviated countless miseries and prevented still greater ones, but Jesus' own words (Matt. xii. 43-45) warn us against the error of believing that the Gospels can banish all evil spirits. There are cases in which nothing can be done without the help of some other healing influence. The glory and power of God's word suffers no loss by this admission.

Perhaps you would like to have proofs of my assertion that even an ardent religious zeal may be morbid. I will give you a single example. A boy used to attend Sunday-school with intense longing, and spent the solemn

hours of the week there like a dreamer absorbed in an intense happiness. The child had a secret ; his prayers were always wonderfully heard. He was terribly afraid, it seems, to leave the house, as he had to pass the cellar door, and his mother (whom he feared) had told him that the "bogey-man" lived there. One day, when he had been compelled by threats to leave the house alone, he prayed fervently for help. And what happened? All at once he found himself outside the door, and was firmly convinced that an angel had carried him over the threshold. This was repeated for years, and became later—even three decades later—the strongest proof for him of God's existence. He built up his faith logically on this fact. Those who have studied the so-called negative hallucinations and know how easily convictions based on such occurrences may be upset, will admit that this sort of piety was based on very feeble foundations. Our over-zealous Sunday scholar, as you will guess, fell into neurotic snares which greatly disturbed his own and his parents' happiness, and which he might have been spared if a prudent, analytically trained pedagogue had sealed the sources of his distress.

I could cite the cases of several other schoolchildren whose characters were repressed by tyrants under the threshold of the conscious. Among them are morbid liars, thieves, loafers, enemies of mankind, bumptious fools, grumblers, "pushers," etc., etc. Who would care to count them all? But it was my intention to deal with dunces only, and there are not many spoilt characters among them. My intention, however, was merely to offer proofs, not to treat this immense subject exhaustively.

Yet many apparently satisfactory achievements of the life of emotion and volition are like the hectic cheeks of consumptives. A capable educator must not let himself be deceived thereby. The child of whom I have just spoken is an example : his religious zeal once made his teacher happy, but there were, indeed, no reasons for any particular satisfaction.

I must, however, hasten to a conclusion. You know how helpless is ordinary pedagogics when faced by these

unhappy beings, and you are aware of the reason : they direct their attention only to the conscious and leave the real forces, the subconscious impulses, out of count, because they would forcibly drive forward the ship of the soul, but omit to lift the anchor at the bottom of the roadstead. Psycho-analysis, on the other hand, plunges into the depths of the subconscious, guides the psychic energies whither they are most needed, liberates the fettered impulses in the only possible way, i.e. that of critical-historical research, brings to light the hidden unclean or foolish motives concealing themselves from the light of conscience, and thus carries the decisive contest which was being waged between the conscious and the subconscious into the realm of the former. In this way common sense, conscience, and love are first placed in a position to utilise their whole force, whereas they were as defenceless against the powers of the subconscious as his enemies were against Alberich in his Fortunatus's cap. Thanks to the elucidatory work of psycho-analysis, it is able, like Wotan, to conquer the Nibelungs when bereft of the invisible cap, and render them harmless, and to make a worthy use of the pearls gathered from the deep, the noble energies discovered in the subconscious. Its aim is to effect the subjection of the impulses to the godlike, of the flesh to the spirit, the sole dominion of love in the sense of the Gospels, the release from the demoniacal. The only means is truth alone. The closeness of the basic notions of psychoanalysis to the principles of the Gospels I was able to demonstrate in another place.¹ Analysis cannot create this new and noble life-content, and we need not take it from its original documents. There is another path to truth and true life. But what is the use of this way to those who are separated from it by thorny hedges and walls ? It is the task of psycho-analysis to remove these obstacles, and this task is a difficult one ; so difficult, indeed, that it requires extensive study and a thorough analytical self-purging in order to be able to apply it without undue daring. The man who has not himself been analysed

¹ *Ein neuer Zugang zum alten Evangelium*, Bertelmann, Gütersloh, 1918.

will botch his work and is a danger. Pedagogues and psychologists would do better to carry out the preliminaries than to ignore the facts, or dish up the old and crass ignorances, the nonsensical statements that can so easily be refuted, viz. that the effects of psycho-analysis are due merely to suggestion. Those who place analysis in their general plan of education will be certain of attaining to the greatest joys known to the educator.

It was not the purpose of these remarks to give a systematic survey of the natural technique and power of the new methods; I merely wished to show you by a few examples how the disintegration of the personality can influence school work. Psycho-analysis lays bare the injured places and puts an end to suffering in cases where there is no organic disease. For thousands of such sufferers it is an invaluable benefactor, indeed the only one that can afford real assistance. If I have induced any of you to think of acquiring a thorough knowledge of this great and important subject, or even to look for the necessary equipment for descending like Orpheus into the Avernus of subterranean spirits and conducting the noble Eurydice of the human soul out of the shades into the light, then the object of my lecture will have been attained.

2. CHILDREN'S GAMES AS EARLY SYMPTOMS OF MORBID DEVELOPMENT.¹

My object in this chapter is merely to make a modest contribution to psycho-analytical research. I should like to show by a few simple examples how trifling occurrences of which the teacher as a rule hardly takes cognizance, have often an exceedingly important background, the meaning of which is no clearer to the pupil than to the master; and I should further like to point out how these incomprehensible backgrounds may dominate the patient's future life. And again, I shall show what exceedingly important indications for a judgment of the before-

¹ *A Contribution to the Psychology of Science.* Lecture delivered on October 14, 1916, at the Educational Holiday Course of the Swiss Pedagogic Society at Sundlaenen. Printed in *Schulreform*, 10th year.

mentioned cultural life may be supplied by an individual analysis.

I shall confine myself for the moment to some remarks on an autobiography which a business man of 25 gave me, of his own accord, before the commencement of psycho-analytical treatment. He had been a so-called model pupil, a talented and industrious boy, of whom his teachers were proud, and who had satisfied the highest claims upon him by his almost passionate sense of duty and eagerness to learn and his quiet and painfully correct behaviour. Nobody dreamt that the quiet and usually cheerful boy was hurrying at full speed toward a serious neurosis. And yet every condition was present that was calculated to embitter the life of this sympathetic youth for many years, even though, during his school life, there was no disease in the ordinary sense.

Before beginning the analytical consultations, the young man described his condition in the following verses :

My soul is embittered,
My mind closed in on every side,
My breast painfully closed,
I have had too little joy !

I could never sing joyfully,
Never float amidst idle pleasure,
Sorrow began in my young days
To gnaw at my soul.

My days passed in greyness,
Without song, and yet without complaint ;
The sun would not shine for me,
And yet I could not weep.

Thus I live dumb on earth ;
Evening is gradually coming on ;
Mists are creeping here and there
Through my heart, soul and limbs.¹

It is not our task to discuss the large number of individual morbid phenomena indicated by this *Complaint*

¹ Any attempt to put these lines into English poetical form would have necessarily eliminated the original words and phrases ; hence the translator has contented himself with a literal version.—TRANSLATOR.

of a Dumb Man, as the poem was called. We shall mention only the most important traits: incapacity of loving other human beings in combination with the greatest hunger for love, and violent complaints of the coldness of his well-meaning mother and excellent brother. In the domain of intellect the incapability of concentrating thought is particularly prominent; instead of grasping the contents of what he reads, the youth loses himself obsessively in external forms of speech, a fact which makes his professional work more difficult, and torments him. He has two states at his command; one an active one, in which he is able to think, but with a strong pressure on his brain, and the other passive, in which he feels happier, but is unable to concentrate his thoughts. We can only briefly mention his various hysterical symptoms, such as a distinctly "affective" toothache, a feeling of swelling in the lips, cheeks and tongue, all sorts of convulsive movements, etc., which were present. His diary tells of constant torture and despair.

Julius (this was his name) had been a very delicate child who was only kept alive by the very greatest care. His mother, who came of a family with an hereditary taint, was distinguished by her excessive emotions and over-care of her children. For instance, once when she was going on a holiday visit to some of her relatives, she cried so much from home-sickness the evening before that her younger son was compelled energetically to claim his right to go to sleep, while the soft-hearted elder, Julius (at that time five years old) burst out into tears.

At the same time she was a good-hearted, occasionally rough, mother, who was joyfully ready to sacrifice herself for her children, but unable to protect them from the danger of over-education inherent in her emotional type. The children had more love for their father, who was an intellectual but quiet and modest man, who had given up a good post because it had brought him into conflict with his social conscience.

The first memories contained in the biography are these: "Up to the time of going to school I was very sensitive to colds, coughs and other slight evils of winter-

time. Physically I was somewhat weak, and probably for that reason shy, nervous and obedient; the latter quality, of course, could have no connection with my weak bodily constitution. It took me longer to get rid of the "comforter" than my brother. I can remember a tragi-comical event in this connection. One day I had found the courageous decision to give up this childish thing, and it was thrown into the w.c. (I do not know whether I did this myself). When the courageous day had given place to evening, my heroism yielded to a melancholy feeling, and my tears for the martyrdom of the innocent "comforter" in its dark prison caused so many tears on my part that a new "comforter" was bought in order to get me to sleep. But I did not care about it, seeing that I was not in need of a "comforter," but was sorry for the poor prisoner, just as, later, I was greatly attached to my playthings and when they were lost I was more affected by their sad fate than by my personal loss."

We may thus see that in his early stages Julius, who was later incapable of feeling, was exceedingly emotional, expressing his emotions chiefly in compassion. This presupposes, however, the faculty of entering into the sufferings of others, which, again, presupposes experiences of one's own suffering. It is not mere hazard that the child should bewail the "comforter" on account of the place where it had been thrown, for he suffered from "anxiety-dreams," in which he saw himself shut in a baker's oven by a witch. There were anxiety-feelings later, too, especially when alone in the dark, and even ghostly apparitions. But we will not dwell on these now, but will rather content ourselves with the much more probable supposition that the child identified itself with the "comforter" or other playthings which had been thrown away.

"I once felt a kind of *Weltschmerz*," says our document further, "when my mother roughly bade me go into the house because some children playing with me had broken some trifling thing, of which offence, however, I was convinced that I was innocent. I went and sat

in a corner, was inconsolable, and would gladly have pretended to be ill in order to punish my mother." This occurrence is of extreme importance, because it introduces and establishes the periphery in the emotional life of the child. From the time of the trifling occurrence just described, which no doubt was followed by a number of others, Julius became secretly full of anger with his mother, in spite of the fact that his obedience made her very happy. It was previously a lucky thing for the boy threatened with feelings of inferiority that his relations with other children of his age had been favourable ones; now his mother's severity destroyed this favourable canalisation of his childish inclinations. From that time the vital impulse was increasingly turned inwards.

The autobiography then tells of anxiety-dreams and night terrors, which induced his father to take the little boy into his own bed in order to quiet him. We shall not enquire here how much these dreams had to do with the repression of feelings connected with turning away from his mother and comrades, or how far other motives collaborated. But we must not suppress the fact that the memoirs of the young man, who knew very little about psycho-analysis, add a number of sexual experiences to the account of the anxiety phenomena. "I came to the conclusion that I stood in a particular relation to some pictures—bathing boys on one picture, and the other a congratulation card with the picture of a naked coachman. Another time, when I found in a book the picture of the nude, or nearly nude, torso of an Oriental saleswoman, I fancied myself this person by stripping my shirt from the upper part of my body and pretending to sell things, using the quilt as a counter. My parents and my brother looked on. I had a peculiar feeling when I passed my arms over my chest. And I often tried to get my big toe into my mouth, and found out that this could not be done with another part of my body, after my brother and myself had heard a story about one of our playmates. (A little boy next door had been guilty of urethral eroticism with his sister.) . . . We had

told the story in all innocence to our mother who was naturally greatly shocked. But it remained in my memory for a long time. This was probably in my first year of school."

During analysis we discovered that an evil-minded servant-girl had excited Julius sexually at the end of his first and the beginning of his second year, and encouraged him to exhibitionism. She had been sent away for this. The subject of analysis had entirely forgotten the circumstance, which had been told him only two years previously by his mother.

These childish scenes might be allowed to fall into oblivion were it not that they evidently had a great influence on his later life. We may avoid the encounter with childish sexuality as much as we like, but it occasionally comes forward with implacable boldness and must be considered in all its bearings and, unfortunately, often in its whole tragedy. Julius had tried to forget these unimportant events during almost the whole of his life, and had never told anybody about them. Without knowing anything of psycho-analysis, however, he felt that his development, which was constantly taking on a more threatening aspect, would be incomprehensible without them, and his assumptions in this respect were quite right, as we shall see.

"I was very glad to go to school, but was on the verge of tears almost the whole forenoon at being among so many strange people; but later I was able to compete successfully with my comrades, though not without a certain bashfulness and shy admiration of the robust boys of the class of pupils, two years older than ourselves, who were taught with us. At home I spoke a great deal about the master and about a very delicate boy who cried every morning and had finally to be taken away, and of a girl who gave clever answers."

The delicate crying boy made such a deep impression on Julius because he was obliged to feel consideration for him, either positively or negatively, by identification or by differentiation. He had himself been weak and tearful. The mention of the girl is perhaps an attempt to transfer

his feelings to a playmate of the opposite sex, seeing that the intercourse with boys had been stopped by his mother. How little the faint wish was to be fulfilled was soon to be discovered.

"I used to amuse myself a lot with my playthings, and spent hours with them; consequently, it was not difficult to keep me at home. As a matter of fact, my father often used to send me out to play in the open air. But I do not think I had much feeling for Nature. There was one place, however, where I loved her; that was in the little bit of our garden which had been given to me, and in which oaks and pines had been tended with particular care. According to the books which I had been reading I turned them into cocoa or date palms. In my little garden I saw all sorts of wonderful countries: North American prairies through which Red Indians roamed, and Australia, which had always been the object of my longings, owing to its great remoteness. The most mysterious regions of our earth were, and practically still are, those remote regions of the ocean between South America and Australia. And of course I did not fail one day to turn my garden into Crusoe's island.

"Another tremendous pleasure of mine was derived from looking at atlases or maps. Although, as was shown later, I could only get good marks in drawing by dint of industry, but never was one of those with a talent for draughtsmanship, I could always draw good maps from memory at any time. I used continually to be drawing them, chiefly maps of the world, on which every country contained its special secret. I looked with a peculiar thrill at the dreary deserts and steppes of my self-created world, and always visited the solitary and stormy capes. With really mystical thoughts I followed a cardboard boat along the weird wastes of the Pacific, the name of which sounded to me like a magic word. 'Now it is furthest out,' I used to think, and almost trembled at the thought; then it had to steer towards the longed-for land of Australia. For ships I could use only little bits of cardboard, which were symbolically taken to represent boats. Real paper boats

would have been too big in proportion to the size of my seas and countries, and that would have disturbed me tremendously. Once, when I had steered a ship of this kind out into the ocean, I played melancholy tunes on my mouth-organ and heard them swelling over the endless waves, becoming fainter and fainter until they could be heard no more. But there was nobody there to hear them. Then came the wreck of the ship at a place where the ocean was deepest and from which no news could reach any coast. I must later on have feasted on this treasure of secret memories—much longer than I was aware of. In all my historical studies in later youth, and when reading biographies, even if I found hardly anything to interest me in the hero or the tragedy of the historical action, I grasped the geographical relations with lightning-like rapidity, and they remained longest in my memory, greatly to my regret, for they were not the most essential.

"I had also a peculiar passion for listing things. Thus I made a list of the most important towns of all countries, and the foreign names sounded wonderfully mysterious to my ear; I made lists of railway stations, buildings, vehicles, etc. The liking for collecting stamps sprang from this same inclination. A similar thing was, I daresay, the hunger for foreign words; in my first school years I seriously wanted to learn Italian by myself.

"An unusually instructive sort of material for our games was waste chips and blocks of wood from a factory, and their various peculiar shapes were capable of being applied in a number of ways. I used to build Chinese walls, dams and viaducts, and fancied myself in these just as I had done with the maps, so that I could not be torn away from them for whole afternoons."

An important event for Julius was the sunning of the beds.¹ "I felt a peculiar pleasure in staying under the feather-beds spread over trestles and ladders, hidden by the overhanging sheets. The charm consisted in the fact that I imagined myself to be an Arab in his tent

¹ In Switzerland the mattresses of the beds are "sunned" once every year; they are taken out of doors, where they are beaten and then left to the action of the solar rays until the evening.—TRANSLATOR.

in the desert, and I stretched out one foot (at the time of the 'sunning' I was usually barefooted) into the sunshine in order to make sure that the desert sun was burning."

Can we see in these occupations, considered from outside, anything morbid? Many a childish dreamer does the like. And yet it is worth while to examine the most important features of these games and to trace their motives.

1. *The increased activity of the imagination* arises from the separation from mother and comrades already mentioned. The vital impulse removed from reality creates its own world of wishes.

2. This world, for our little dreamer, lies *far away in solitary places*. The wilderness of the North American forests, remote Australia with its supposed melancholy plains, Crusoe's island, the mysterious world of the maps, which foreshadow the thrill of the steppes and deserts and solitary capes, the weird and yet sweetly magic world of the Pacific, the Chinese wall and other geographical things form a uniform whole which distinctly betrays the longing for remote countries and solitude. While other boys usually dream of adventures when their thoughts turn to the "wild and woolly west," Julius is looking for solitude.

3. The child's phantasies as Indian or Arab arose from another source which came to light only too distinctly later, because the instincts arising from it carried enormous emotional complexes in their train and were exceedingly prejudicial to healthy development. The desire to *unclothe* himself is already seen, although in a form which appears to be perfectly innocent. Nobody, we imagine, will find it shocking that the Arab should go barefoot, or that the Indian should have bare arms and a partly bare breast.

4. *The pleasure in systematising* cannot be regarded as abnormal; at the most it is too "affective." Practised analysts certainly see an effect of repression in this abstract occupation which partly (but not in every case) gives an emotional value to the intellectual process as

such, and withdraws the pleasure from the object. This may become dangerous under certain circumstances, and it actually drove Julius into great distress, as we shall presently see. But we must not overlook the fitness of this turning to a logical operation. The incapacity of indulging the vital instinct in reality led, as we saw, to bold phantasies which were removed from the discipline of severely logical thought and were intended merely to satisfy the longings of the heart. The systematising, purely intellectual occupation forms a wholesome reaction to this, a logical impulse, which would necessarily degenerate into excess of emotion. But it is certain that this occupation of systematising, which many learned men do not often go beyond, is one-sided, and it cannot do justice to the subject, seeing that many of the most important relations are not taken into account. Wide perspectives are opened out here for the *psychology of science*, which has, unfortunately, been so greatly neglected in spite of its great importance. For the moment we must hang a curtain over it. We merely establish the fact that with Julius, as with every neurotic—and with many normal persons too—a polarisation had taken place. In our case we are confronted with a *fanciful* occupation with real things, which holds aloof from logical penetrations and is directed toward the satisfaction of subjective feelings; and at the same time we have before us a logical work which entirely ignores these personal claims, and attacks reality with great energy, not for the sake of reality itself, however, but rather in order to give the mind something to do. The phantasy and the abstraction (cataloguing) are one in the flight from reality. The feeling has at one time remained true to reality, even though this be an imagined reality in which the *ego* plays the principal part. At another time it is entirely withdrawn from reality and finds its place in the subjective function of arranging things.

5. A play-phantasy which might easily have become dangerous and which most clearly betrays the unfessed inner distress, is the solemnly meant shipwreck. The ship sailing to the longed-for country of Australia

is naturally the dreamer himself. The catastrophe, accompanied by melancholy strains, which also supplied a memory for a later time, represents the desire of death. This was expressed later by a dream which Julius had of a murder, the victim of which he at once associated with himself. The little boat had to be exceedingly tiny in order to embody his feeling of inferiority. This is the explanation of the apparently exaggerated expression that a ship which was too big would have spoilt the thing "tremendously." As a matter of fact, this expression is not too strong, for it touches on the most important emotional values of which the boy was capable. Success, especially that of the greatest benefactor to our subject, the school, prevented the victory of the tendency to self-destruction. Are we too bold in attributing the exaggerated sorrow for the lost "comforter" to the same root as that of the wrecked cardboard boat, so that the idea of death had been obscurely present even before his schooldays?

Our child of many sorrows was lucky enough to fall into the hands of excellent teachers. He devoted himself passionately to his school tasks and achieved excellent results. Nobody had an inkling of what was going on in this quiet and industrious little fellow's head. The first occasion that might have given food for thought to a teacher trained in psycho-analysis was this: "It was an exciting event when I had for the first time to go to the swimming-baths while at school. I felt an uncontrollable timidity at the idea of undressing among strange people. I did not want to go, but my teacher sent me with other boys who had not at first wished to bathe. Under the pretext that I had come too late, I returned to my classroom, where, of course, I was laughed at by my teacher, who was teaching the girls alone. I went the second time without this feeling of bashfulness, and used to go to the common baths regularly, even when I was in the sixth form, when it was no longer obligatory." When he was about ten years old and had been frightened by the sight of his dead grandmother, anxiety fits set in. "One evening I was afraid when

going to bed that I should see a black man rise behind the bed, or between the doorposts, unless I turned my eyes away in time. I hurried out of my clothes so as to be able to hide myself in bed as quickly as possible." The reaction of the repressed instinct of uncovering himself is distinctly seen here in exaggerated bashfulness and anxiety.

I shall refrain from attempting to explain these phenomena more clearly until we have further material in hand. In order to be able to survey the most important facts concerning the early phases of life, I may mention a strikingly powerful *instinct of torture* which was expressed both actively and passively—naturally only in the tame fashion of which this timid and anxious boy was capable. Whether the heroic running over stubble fields with bare feet is to be counted under this head I cannot say, although the preference for this painful surface is suspicious. The following confession is, however, clear enough: "I was particularly fond of our evening games under the big pear-trees. Now and again I thought of the bare feet of a girl. Once a little girl came into the next house, whom I found rather nice-looking, and I felt that something fine had happened to me. I went up to her while she was sitting on a stool in the shade of a tree, knitting, and talked to her about school: I felt a freakish desire to ask her how many slaps she had already had. I ought not to have put this question, for it was certainly indiscreet, and everybody would have taken it for an expression of self-conceit. But he would have thought wrongly in this case, for I was so far removed therefrom that I was sorry that I myself had never had any slaps, so as to be able to confess in a way to sin. The more satisfactory, therefore, was the answer from the girl that she had once had six slaps at a time. 'What a terrible sinner!' would no doubt have been my words if I had had to express my feelings; the sinner, however, was not indifferent to me, for I never again thought of the child's peccadillo. Once before a little female wrong-doing had gone to my heart, for when a girl of whom I thought more than of others

(as I now suppose) stood, with half the class, outside the door after the bell had rung, and all passed the master in Indian file in order to receive a slap from him, it seemed to me an important matter that this girl should be among them, just as if a person of high rank had suddenly been found in a compromising situation. I looked carefully when the ruler fell on the outstretched little palm, and was not sorry to see the culprit cry.

"Another time, when the same girl arrived late with a note from her mother to the teacher, and in spite of this, and contrary to my expectations, was punished, I did not feel anything more of that satisfied melancholy with which I usually enveloped the 'noble fallen.' I was full of malignant joy.

"One of the most peculiar caprices that ever befell me is probably connected with the above occurrences. In the summer of my fourth school-year we heard at home that my brother had been caned. This news moved me as much as if I had heard he had become engaged. (I use this expression now on looking for a fit term to express my feelings; at that time it was only a peculiar feeling.) It seemed to me that he had gone through something great and become another being. I had constantly to imagine to myself: 'My brother has been caned; that is something unheard-of.' And at the same time I was envious of him. I expected my parents to lecture him for it. But they did not, and a sort of secret anger took possession of me. I said to myself: 'My brother gets caned, and nobody says anything! Why should I be good? I too will get myself caned!' This thought showed me to myself in a new light; I felt again that something important had happened; almost a turning-point in my life and character, nothing less than if I had fallen in love. (I use this term again from a later point of view.) This temper lasted for some time, so that at school I did not sit as still as usual, but kept looking out of the window and laughing to myself. The others began to look out of the window too, until the teacher noticed us. He asked what was the matter, whereupon I pointed to a girl who had formerly been in

the class and who was mowing in the neighbouring meadow. I was not really interested in her, but was manœuvring to bring about a sort of fall into sin. Almost to my disappointment, it did not get further than the teacher's reference to my inattention. The high esteem in which I held my teacher carried off the victory over my inner dispute as to whether I should retain my former relations to him or place myself among the sinners. I had imagined that my punishment would be a caning. Children's thoughts are no doubt stranger than many pedagogues imagine."

The pleasure felt at the punishment of the two girls whom he liked is particularly striking. In one case the lust of prying (when filing before the teacher) plays a distinct part. The "satisfied melancholy" gives way to malignant joy when the girl tries to escape punishment by appealing to her mother. His brother goes up in his estimation and is envied because he has been caned, and the failure of his own attempt to suffer corporal punishment leaves unpleasant feelings behind? How are we to explain this strange impulse, incomprehensible to the boy himself?

There are no doubt two tendencies at work together. First of all the instinct of torture. This designation is not well-chosen, for our subject had neither planned nor committed any cruelty. But we may presume that the pleasure felt in witnessing another's pain brings with it a secret desire to cause it.

But it would be superficial to be satisfied with this explanation. In the cases mentioned it was not a question of the infliction of pain, but a question of punishment. The punished children had rebelled against the authority of the teacher. The importance of this motive is seen by the malignant pleasure felt in connection with the girl who tried to escape punishment with her mother's help. Evidently the admiration felt is for the rebellion. We can easily understand this. Julius felt himself oppressed by his mother. We may recall the dream of the boy who is placed in the oven by a witch. The analysis showed that the witch represented his mother,

and the boy Julius. In this allusion are contained cruel death-wishes directed against his mother, for the girl's witch is burnt. Biologically considered, it would have been desirable that the boy should rebel against the oppression of his individuality by authority. No one who knows mankind can feel any pleasure on perceiving the child's submission. We have here a case in which temporary naughtiness would have been preferable to obedience, for the latter, as we see, is sometimes paid for by violent emotional sufferings. The fact that Julius, for the most honest motives, gave up his courageous plan of attacking the authority of the beloved teacher, had to be paid for dearly. The throttling of his inexpressible claims on life and liberty was continued. As a matter of fact it would not have been of much use to fight against the well-meaning teacher; the actual emancipation had to be effected with regard to his parents. And there was likewise a danger that Julius might have become wrong-headed, while he might have fallen into still deeper distress.

Pedagogues will already have received a hint with regard to punishment. I have shown in another place that punishment is often consciously or unconsciously desired, so that the punisher falls into the trap set for him by the punished and, it may be, often obtains the opposite of the intended pedagogic effect. A punishment, too, would probably have strengthened Julius in his naughtiness.

Some important psychological questions now arise. One of them is: What is the origin of cruelty? Is it to be derived from an elementary instinct which has been exaggerated by the barring of other and more valuable instinctive paths? Or is it sufficiently explained by the pertinacious opposition of the violence offered to the personality? The latter is certainly not the case; the love of prying upon punishment is not so easily evoked. When it is reported that his brother's punishment had moved the hearer as greatly as if he had fallen in love, this does not tell us what the child felt. It is no doubt of importance that the young man

should make this comparison, but this does not solve the psychological problem of the child. It is possible that the young man has only now placed the then most important imperative, namely, the rebellion against tyranny, the carrying through of one's own will in the face of the outer barriers of authoritative prohibitions, on the same plane as the present most important inner command, i.e. the erotic one. In any case, however, it would be somewhat audacious to attempt to deduce the psychology of the instinct of torture from our rather opaque material.

The suppression of the instincts of freedom confirmed his reclusion from the world about him, and his self-absorption. His brilliant school results helped Julius over many an inner difficulty. But even his attitude toward his teacher, favourable as it was outwardly, suffered under subliminal inhibitions, as the following incident shows: "My farewell from that teacher was made unpleasant by an enigmatical omission on my part. A collection for a present was made as usual. I was asked to contribute something, and naturally consented, but omitted to say anything at home and forgot all about the matter until it was too late and the present had already been bought. Of course my parents would have wished me to give something. Naturally, I could have added to the present in some way, but I was not capable of thinking rapidly as to what to do in such a case and to carry out my intention. I have often thought since what the teacher, who was greatly touched by the presentation, must have felt when he read the names of the donors. It was with curious feelings that I shook hands with him on saying good-bye. The matter was all the more painful to me because this particular teacher was rather intimate with my people, and had also invited his best three pupils (among them myself) because we could not sing, to his house, and regaled us with a concert and cream caramels, and finally because the mother of Bertha (*vide* below) had purchased the present, and must have thought it shabby that there was no donation from me—one of the best-off boys of the class."

There can be no doubt that the excellent teacher was pained by this event, which was no fault of his. But if he had a sound knowledge of human nature, he must have inferred that his pupil also was suffering to a not inconsiderable extent. The fact that for Julius he represented the embodiment of hated authority, *inimical* to liberty, lay in the nature of things and not in the person of the teacher.

Up to the time of puberty the boy with whose case we are dealing might have been regarded as healthy in the ordinary acceptation of the word, for the temporary anxiety phenomena played a very unimportant part. But the rock on which inwardly inhibited children are most easily wrecked is sexuality, or the love-life. This was likewise the case with Julius. At the age of 10 he fell in love with Bertha, who was the prettiest girl in the class, and appears to have been an excellent little person. But the unhappy lover arranged matters in such a way that this emotion only caused him pain. "That girl, whose sorrows I had so taken to heart and whose punishment had filled me with a malignant joy, had now become somewhat dear to me ; at least, I had been half aware of it for some little time. Once, when I had to make a list of chatterers, one of my comrades pointed out that Bertha's name ought to be on the list, as she had been chattering too. I had not noticed it, but did not hesitate to put her name on the list ; perhaps rather with the intention of concealing my feelings for her than in order not to appear unjust. The fatal paper was given up, the wrong-doers were scolded, and the poor little innocent girl left the room in tears, for, as it turned out, she had made a permissible remark, having been sent out on an errand and therefore compelled to ask when she came back where we were in the lesson. The matter lay heavily on my conscience." The girl was not angry with him, but rather allowed him distinctly to see her liking ; this was reciprocated, but in a curious form. " My happiness reached its zenith one day in February. School was over at 10 a.m., and I accompanied Bertha and her girl friend of the same age as myself. Both of

them had arranged to lay a little trap for me. A post for hanging up clothes was a suitable target ; if I did not hit it I was to play with them with the skipping-rope. I agreed, missed my aim, but refused to do what I had promised, perhaps because it was too enjoyable. I went home. My mother, who was always ready for fun, saw the two girls below and suggested that they should help her to fetch apples from the cellar. I heard the laughter of the two young scamps in the passage, but went to my room and shut myself in. I pretended to my mother that I had got to a part of my library book that I couldn't leave. While the voices of the two girls were still ringing in my ear I could only see the letters. My retreat from my lady-love might have seemed amusing the first time, but it was a bad sign for a later period." As a matter of fact, Julius was too timid in the following years to show his feelings for the girl. His highest achievement was once to include Bertha in his prayers when she had toothache, a sign that his instinct of torture came to the fore only in anarchical actions, and at the same time as a confirmation of the correctness of his self-imposed obedience.

He avoided intercourse with Bertha, who was by no means backwards in her professions of love, seeing that when he was fourteen she once sent him a *billet-doux* through a girl friend. But yet he felt happy. He was particularly interested in history, especially that of strong-willed natures, in which he celebrated that which he himself did not possess. But he did not make the slightest effort to turn his ideals into reality.

At the beginning of puberty his sexuality was repressed into that wrong direction which gradually drew his whole being into the depths, not because he had too little moral strength, but rather, on the contrary, because he took up the fight very earnestly ; but he was not able to come to blows with the enemy entrenched in the subconscious. Those who can reconcile it with their pedagogic conscience to allow their pupils to perish in their sexual distress had better leave the following confessions of our young friend unread. But those who are ready to

save young people when it is their duty as educators to do so, may no more avoid their sexual defects than the surgeon may avoid disgusting tumours and fetid secretions. Is it not sad that this should need to be said? Must not we educators deeply regret that so many young people suffer grievous injury because professional helpers pretend that such things must on no account be discussed, and because pedagogues often do not possess the necessary knowledge for curing these critical troubles?

"But now came a terrible punishment. I had learnt to find in my thoughts that which I could not attain to in reality. But thoughts can carry one very far. First of all I was pleased with my lady-love as she was, although she blushed if I kissed her; then I caught her (in thought) with her hair unbound and without her apron; I helped her to put on her shoes and stockings; I saw her with bare arms or in her petticoat; or in her chemise, which I pulled off with blushes. I caught her in her bath, and she floundered about in fear. These were evidently forbidden thoughts, and in my conscience my beloved stood shivering and accusatory. In the rare cases when I again stood before her, and neither kissed nor embraced her, nor saw her in her petticoat, no doubt the trembling thing in my conscience was to blame for my want of feeling when I looked into her eyes, and felt the warm clasp of her hand only after she had left me."

Undressing now became a special pleasure to Julius. He says: "I now began to take longer over dressing and undressing, and even went so far as to undress without any reason, simply because I took pleasure in it. Once I lay naked on the sofa after my bath and hesitated to dress again. I felt more and more comfortable and then suddenly anxious, and something happened which frightened me. I did not know whether I was about to fall ill, and that day I was greatly depressed." But he was not aware of having done anything wrong. For some time he used to bathe in the lake without bathing-drawers, but after a few swims the emissions were auto-

matically repeated. He now had a strong feeling of guilt.

From this time onward onanism was practised by night at intervals of three weeks and afterwards of ten days. "My terror of the supposed venereal disease was frightful, and I began a terrific struggle to prevent the emissions, which I was afraid meant a loss of strength. The consequences were soon felt. I used to get up with heavy limbs, a dull feeling in my head, over-sensitiveness to love, a slight pain in the stomach, stitches in the small of the back and an impaired circulation; and I interpreted these symptoms as those of an approaching sexual malady."

And now begins the period of the inner complications, which led, in a heroic struggle of nearly ten years, to insupportable sufferings, and consequently to their final revelation. When the young man had finally succeeded in completely repressing his sexual instincts, which never appeared in any other form than that of prying (*Schaulust*), his emotional life was likewise fully choked and his life absolutely dreary. It is remarkable that his love of prying was not directed toward females, but to boys with girlish features; but he never attempted to realise these desires except when, in bathing, he let his eyes roam with sexual intention. Ethically Julius remained completely the victor over himself, but on the field of battle he lost the heart's blood of his living feelings.

"During and after confirmation instruction I still had some enthusiastic religious feelings; the main current of my religious inclinations at that time was an implacable striving for perfection and renewal, a ruthless tendency to fight, which bordered on madness, but which rapidly diminished. I then felt only a strong inclination toward philosophy and still more toward psychology. For a long time I took up natural science and was inspired with enthusiasm for the wonders of astronomy. A certain fatality drove me into intellectualism. At bottom there was something right in this attempted flight into mental life, but I committed the cardinal fault of wishing to attain my object by one leap, whereas only one way

was possible, namely, a return to admissible sensuality. Gradually I was overwhelmed by an enormous burden of things half-begun, half-read books, incompleted work, etc. I gradually became aware of the pathological aspect of my condition. I saw myself everywhere urged forward in the direction of formalism and intellectualism. What did I grasp when reading? Terrible discovery! Word-pictures, phrases, words, sounds—but it was only with great pains that I was able to grasp the real contents. The pictures which I saw when reading must have been terrible caricatures, for everything used to fall to pieces. It was partly my old passion for forms of language, but partly a kind of obsessional mechanism. And these obsessional mechanisms not only followed close on my heels everywhere, but even when I believed that I was deeply absorbed in my studies, I was pursued by these furies. I was indeed a mental corpse. Where was my love of my neighbour, where my righteous wrath, where my compassion? I had cast them into the mire together with the love which I no longer permitted myself. But I was friendly to everyone; I never harmed anybody; but I could neither love nor hate."

It is not difficult for us to find in the main lines of this development the direct continuation of those which had been formed and established in his early years. The reclusion from reality increases. The world of reality has to be replaced by that of fancy. Julius loves, but as soon as his love ought to seek realisation it hides itself. Hindered in its further development, sexuality, according to the well-known law of regression, has to revert to the past, reviving infantile activities. We recall the representation of the nude saleswoman and the undressing by the servant. Evidently all subsequent and voluntary sexual activities are connected with those scenes. The exaggerated prudery in the swimming-bath is a distinct effect of reaction, for prudery always has, as is known, an impure background. The fatal incidents after and in the bath may be regarded as enlarged editions of those narcissian observations in the dramatic representation of the Oriental woman; the inadmissible phantasies

about his girl friend represent the affective penetration into the same image. "Light strokes fell great oaks!" In any case the whole of the psychic sexual achievement is under the dominion of those childish scenes.

One cause was that the sexual impulses (which if developed under healthy and (educationally) exemplary conditions, with ethical and æsthetic experiences, are combined into a whole, and thus clarified, so that what is sexual retires more or less behind the more elevated emotional life) were isolated by the flight from female society. Consequently, if they were to be realised they would have to be exaggerated. The conscientious boy and youth would no more have formed a phantasy in conformity with the desires of normal sensuality than he would have polluted his body with masturbation. But the growth of the infantile phantasies, as we have seen, was all the grosser.

The second principal symptom, too—for I leave out of count the bodily stigmata as being of no importance—the desolation of the emotional life and the abandonment of the intellect to empty formalism, is easily unmasked as deriving from childish achievements. The love of listing and systematising was once a deflection from reality, a substitute for the sense of reality, a conveyance of feeling from reality to his own actions, from the object to the subject; in Bleuler's excellent word, an *autism*. The intellectualising was only too successful. Every feeling flowed into this channel, and nothing was left for the temperament. Hence, was it not a valuable reaction to this ostrich-like policy that its sterile formalism should itself become a torture? By eliminating emotion from reality, the inwardly harassed thinker thrust reality from him. By doing violence to his own emotional temperament or reality the poor youth trifled away the whole of Nature and her most valuable possessions. One particular may be mentioned here: between the ages of 16 and 18 Julius became a vegetarian, very much against the wishes of his parents. This symptom is pretty frequently found in people who wish to repress their sexuality; i.e. to reject it from their thoughts as painful,

instead of mastering it and making it consciously subject to moral claims. The worthy youth was, of course, thinking of the "flesh," and desirous of avoiding the "sins of the flesh." But he had no notion of the value of that of which he deprived his life-energy by this false orientation.

Up to this point we had kept only to the indications given us before the commencement of our pedagogic curative treatment.

The subsequent direct analysis confirmed the interpretations which we had been led to make after perusal of the diary.

From a pedagogic-therapeutic point of view this was one of the most difficult of cases to treat. After the analysis of a few dreams, the pressure on the brain which, according to his own expression, he had to produce and ward off simultaneously in order to be able to think at all, and which deprived him of nine-tenths of his strength, disappeared. His sleep, which had hitherto been *actively* induced, when, instead of bringing comfort, it had caused an annoying pressure on the brain, or *passively*, when twitchings of the leg and other automatic movements ensued, although pleasurable feelings prevailed, became easier. He was better able to concentrate his attention; his emotional life became normal, and the chasm between the desire and the capacity for love disappeared, the altruistic and religious feelings returned, and produced that rejuvenation of life which is one of the most beautiful experiences of the pedanalyst. But even months later there were still some inhibitions. It was only after some eight months that the young man recaptured the *joie de vivre* and the capacity for work. The analysis was carried through, and now Julius is a happy and efficient member of society.

It was indeed regrettable that Julius should have suffered for so many years without going to a physician or teacher. He was gravely hindered in his work, his social and ethical achievements were impaired, his rights to happiness curtailed. But we must not, of course, overlook the fact that the struggle which was so heroically

carried out was of great help in attaining moral purity, for the boy would certainly have lost his high ethical value if he had allowed himself to be mastered by his impure phantasies. Nevertheless, the same output of energy would have led to happier ethical results if there had been no subconscious inhibitions. As it was, the ascetic exercises carried on in the sense of the diaries of Franklin and F. W. Foerster, merely increased his distress and hastened the deformity, so to speak. Instead of these egocentric efforts, exercises directed toward the love of his fellow creatures would have been more effectual; in any case they would not have strengthened the concentration on the *ego*, as do these ascetic exercises. But when the repression is so advanced even these means are of no avail. Then analytical psychic orthopædics must intervene, and this leads back to the right paths much more surely, thoroughly and easily than the frequently painful suggestive impulses.

Would that all educators could see how imprudently and irresponsibly they are acting when they say to their pupils: "A young man should be able to settle his conflicts alone!" He "should be" able to get on without the family physician! For nearly a decade Julius was wrestling with his inner distress until he could hardly support the unnecessary pain any longer, and saw himself threatened with ruin. Just as we should not prevent people from going to their physician, even if weaklings often do so when there is no necessity, so we should never attempt to prevent people from seeking pastoral advice. Such people are, as a matter of fact, nearly always those who feel incapable of expressing their feelings. We should therefore encourage them instead of increasing their sufferings, and the fact should never be lost sight of that such people are very often those of high moral character.

The observations which we made in the case of Julius tempt us to draw certain inferences with regard to the psychology of science. For the psycho-analyst there can be no doubt that the new psychology is bound to find its true place, and that it will produce valuable results

when the study of the soul and the life of the soul has overcome those elements that will always be unfathomable, and has ceased to cast stones at those who venture to deal with the higher psychic functions. I should like to show you how, not only in the case of Julius, but everywhere, throughout the whole history of the world, the repression of instinct has influenced science right up to metaphysics. I would gladly show you how the elementary, instinctive life, robbed of its microcosmos, deprives the *ego*, liable to repression of its feelings, and the macrocosmos, the world, of its wealth. I should have to show you how the elimination of the elementary instincts and emotional values leads to an intellectualism which possesses but little utility as regards the knowledge and command of Nature, since it exhausts itself in formalism and abstractions inimical to reality. I might point out to you how the philosophy of Brahma, with its denial of the world, is a consequence of that repression of instinct which leads to asceticism; how the scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages, with its useless notional acrobatics, was the necessary consequence of the medieval ideal of life, which is most distinctly evident in the monkish oaths of celibacy, obedience and poverty. I should like to show you how far Julius was akin to Plato, Jacob Böhme, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and other thinkers under the influence of repression. But I should have to draw too much material from other psycho-analytical observations, and overstep the limits prescribed by this chapter.

In conclusion, I should like to point out the importance of *games* in Julius's case. Very early that fatal direction of his development was laid down which led to so much misery subsequently. Carr demonstrated that children's games anticipate the future life-task and give vent to the activities of unused forces in the child. This is excellent. But it seems to me that the educator should not only learn to pay attention to the prophetic and valuable but also to the harmful features of childish games.¹ By emphasising what is teleological there is a danger of attacking the peril with too little energy; just

¹ *The Psycho-analytic Method*, pp. 138, 172, 248.

as in all psycho-analytical treatment, which seeks the valuable and secret meaning in all neurotic and other manifestations, there is a fatal temptation to ward off what is injurious with too little energy under the impression that it is at bottom teleological. Consequently, a good pedagogue will consider with great care the origin of the games which have been selected or invented and as long as they do not cause any visible damage, will interfere only after their motives have become clear to him. He must be on his guard against looking merely for the talents revealed by games ; rather should he interpret the valuable symbolical language which gives access to the subconscious areas of the childish psyche, and one will thus arrive at a better understanding of conscious child-life.

VI

PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND MISSIONARY WORK¹

MISSIONARIES have hitherto given little consideration to the psychology of religion. The reasons for this are various. Mission work can look back on a history extending over centuries; on marvellous experiences and successes, on powerful pioneers and conquerors of faith, on noble heroes of word and deed, on peoples and continents under missionary influence. And all this has been accomplished without any contributions from the psychology of religion.

Is, then, the sword of the missionary spirit no longer sufficient? Or has it become so blunted and jagged that it must be sharpened again by religious psychology? Must mission work, in spite of its reverend age, sit at the feet of a science that is no older than yesterday? It is easily comprehensible that the missionaries might at first hold themselves aloof from these novelties.

And yet missionary work deserves all praise for having often humbly and wisely imbibed instruction from other sciences. If hitherto there has been no fruitful connection with the psychology of religion, the chief reason is that there was very little to be learned from the latter. Up to within a very short time ago the psychology of religion was submerged in the very necessary, but for the missionary, hardly fruitful discussion of *principles*. The question whether religion is more a matter of will (Kant), feeling (Schleiermacher), or reason (Hegel), was discussed throughout the world for a couple of generations until

¹ First published in the *Zeitschrift f. Missionskunde u. Religionswissenschaft*, 36th year, Berlin, 1921.

it was agreed that all three of these fundamental principles participate in religion as in every other psychic act. A halt was made at this banality until new problems arose, and the question of a method of religious psychology became acute. Theodore Flournoy and others fought for the idea that transcendence and the question of truth should no longer be considered. But missionary work was not furthered by such self-evident matters.

Then began a period of the collection and elaboration of religious material. Starbuck, Coe and others made use of the question schedule, the answers on which were treated by statistical methods. But the material itself left a great deal to be desired. It was untrustworthy and could not subsequently be tested; even when the goodwill of the writer was apparent there were deceptive judgments, and people could give no information about the most important processes of their own religious life. Yet the psychology of religion, which we owe to America, denotes a good step forward.

William James enlisted biography in the service of his religious researches, and elaborated certain types out of the ample materials of the phenomena of religion. But, with all due recognition of his classificatory work, there was still lacking that which was most indispensable for scientific and missionary interests: namely, the deeper causal comprehension. For it is certainly necessary to know according to what laws this or that pious occurrence took place, from what sources religious creation is fed, under what conditions this or that elimination of ritual or doctrine has become necessary, in what psychic constellation any particular religious phenomenon is bound to appear or disappear.

Seeing, then, that this causal knowledge of traditional religious psychology was lacking, no reproach can be levelled against missionary knowledge for not imputing any special importance to the youngest daughter of the science of religion.

But in recent times the psychology of religion has taken a turn which imposes the duty of a fresh attitude towards it. We will consider this first.

I. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AS INVESTIGATOR AND GUIDE OF THE SOUL

A. The Psychology of Religion fertilised by Psycho-Analysis

(a) *Its most important fundamental innovations*

The various features of the new phase to which the psychology of religion has recently attained may be indicated in the following manner :

1. *Religious-psychological investigation starts by the careful and penetrating research into, and even the influencing of, living religious Man.*

It has not, like its predecessors, to deal with religion in general, nor with the preliminary question of its task of acquiring knowledge, with mythology alone (Wundt's *Psychology of Nations*), nor with religious faith, but with the *religious process itself*, its *causes* and the *forces* which shape it, its manifestations as *notion* and *dogma*, *cult* and *community*, etc. This latest stage of development is the first to take the predicate of empiricism with perfect seriousness, and is not satisfied with second or third-hand experiences. Only the study of self-observed religious life can procure sufficient psychological knowledge of this sublime subject. It may be remarked in parenthesis that the latest phase has to make a conscientious use of the knowledge gathered by its predecessors.

2. *The latest psychology of religion aims at causal and biological comprehension, and frequently attains to this in cases where we were formerly confronted by an inexplicable enigma.*

In order to obtain causal knowledge we must be in possession of the laws and notions with which we can connect the individual phenomena. Scientific progress is only made possible by the double movement from the particular to the general and the general to the particular, the incessant correction of general presumptions in accordance with the commands of individual experience, and the correction of individual judgments in accordance with the facts of general ideas and judgments. The psychology of religion is subject to the standards of

general scientific theories ; it is not dismayed by the sacred character of its subject, for all scientific research is holy. It penetrates into the holy of holies of mythology and the tabernacle, into the mystery of Holy Communion, ecstasy, prayer and the visionary call, with earnestness and reverence, but with the incorruptible sense of reality which the duties of its task impose upon it. All science is a struggle with mystery, and mystery will always have the last word. Hence it must never demand the *first word* and hang out the prohibitory sign of *noli me tangere*.

(b) *The Psycho-Analytical Method*

We have already said enough of Freud's methods of procedure in the earlier chapters of this book, and in my work on *The Psycho-Analytic Method*, to which I have so often referred. We have seen, too, that psycho-analysis is not merely therapeutical in the ordinary sense ; from the study of neuroses and hysteria it has extended the domain of its researches to art, literature and religion. The psychical investigator who neglects nowadays the facts of the subconscious is likely to be left far behind in the race for knowledge ; he may be compared to the Chinese physician who merely feels his patient's pulse and prescribes accordingly. Psycho-analysis offers the missionary what auscultation, examination under X-rays, chemical analysis, etc., offer the medical man. If psychologists close their eyes to the facts of psycho-analysis, their behaviour is like that of people who do not wish to know anything about chemistry, and consequently ignore the laws and other factors of the science, together with its experiments, and do not raise a finger towards obtaining a better explanation of the phenomena discovered.

The aim of psycho-analysis as applied to religion is the research into the subliminal motives of pious consciousness and its effects, as well as its causal derivation and biological knowledge.

All the methods usually applied must be called into play : the associations of religious dreams, their interpretation, and that of the symbols, etc. The life-history

of the person analysed must likewise be known. A manifestation of the subconscious can only be explained when its causes have been found.

B. Psycho-Analysis as a Medium of Religious Influence

The origin of analysis in medical treatment and work leads us to expect that the laying bare of the subconscious will cause a great alteration in the life of the instincts, and to a very great extent this is the case. For the medical man the main thing is to guide into normal paths those instincts which have been fettered by morbid or injurious activities. The mole of the pathological subconscious wish is rendered harmless by the excavation of its subterranean passages; not only of that in which it was hidden at the beginning of its work, but also the side passages into which it may have slipped (pathological new formations).

The reason why the intellectual grasp is of practical importance is easy to see. The manifestations are disguises which have been chosen to escape the judicial eye of the conscious. But when the criminal has been discovered, it is no longer of any use for him to wear a false beard or other mummery. He may try a fresh disguise, but if he is again caught he is no longer inclined to do so. If he perceives that he is being observed at every step, he abandons his evil ways.

And the same is true of moral and religious facts.

A vast number of errors of the moral and religious consciousness cannot be corrected by the strongest suggestive pressure, nor by praise, blame, good example, general instruction, or the like, simply because these do not get to the root of the pathological state. Attempts at conversion by instruction, warnings, etc., invariably fail in the case of people who are drawn back into the mire by the invisible chains of subconscious compulsion. If a room is damp because it is over an open conduit, no amount of heating or of chemical absorbents will make it dry until the water supply has been discovered

and removed. Our pedagogic and missionary practice is wasting its energy as long as it does not perceive that treatment of the conscious can never suffice while the demons of the deeps are exercising their tyrannical domination. I have seen hundreds of mistaken people wandering in the paths of evil and religious perversity who had been treated by the traditional methods without success, but were saved (sometimes easily, and sometimes only with great difficulty) by psycho-analytical treatment. The morbid spell was broken, the Hades of the subconscious liberated its victims, the inhibited instincts ; error lost its ominous power, while truth, like everything that is genuine, experienced a springtime in the sunny light of knowledge.

But psycho-analysis alone is not sufficient for education and pastoral work. It is, as I once said, a method of *ploughing*, and under certain circumstances may be very successful. But the *sower* must follow the ploughman. Analysis helps us to grasp what is false and to destroy illusions. But the soul stands in need of positive life values in order that it may attain to health, love of work and purposeful endeavour ; that it may guide the vital impulse which was in the fetters of inferior and in some degree morbid symptoms due to inhibitions, partly towards an ideal, a highly valuable moral and religious activity, and partly towards its "natural" application. In this process of improvement the elementary instincts are not merely applied to higher aims : they give an emanation of energy, and even of sensory elements (which, indeed, often pass unnoticed), and connect themselves with these. This transformation is called sublimation. Where the inhibitions were very strong, it presupposes psycho-analysis ; it is, however, never explained by this alone, but only by the creation or acquisition of positive life values of the highest order.

2. THE APPLICATION OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS TO MISSIONARY WORK

It is only with many reservations that I take up the task of describing the application of psycho-analysis to

mission work, seeing that I have not had much experience of the latter. I have prepared only one heathen subject—a Tongo negress—for baptism, and even then I was in the agreeable position of being able to hand over a great part of my work to a missionary, Mr. Buergi of the Basle Mission. But have not we Christian pastors a great deal to do with non-Christians, so that of us too it may be said that we are doing missionary work? And does not the non-Christian religious consciousness offer our knowledge and our pastoral guidance the same conditions as are found in all analogous phenomena? Consequently I may allocate a certain amount of experience to myself, but at the same time I shall maintain the greatest reserve in my instructions for the possible and probable application of my suggestions to the conversion of non-Christian peoples.

A. General Points of View for the Application of Psycho-Analysis to Missionary Work

I. THE NECESSITY OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IN MISSION WORK

The novelty of psycho-analysis and the not inconsiderable difficulty of learning its method thoroughly, induce me to pause for a moment at the question whether mission work might not succeed with the development of the traditional methods which in so many respects have so brilliantly stood the test. Would it not suffice to offer the loving gifts of Christianity with still greater skill, to give more medical assistance, to offer a more suitable schooling of the spirit, more genuine technical and social progress? And will not the recruiting power of Christianity on this cultural basis bring about the desired religious transformation, especially if men of firm faith and loving hearts take up the work?

A brief consideration of the cure of neuroses will make the answer easier.

Freud is not of the opinion that neurotic pathological phenomena can be cured only by psycho-analysis. Suggestion, too, especially in the shape of authoritative

conviction, will sometimes obtain sufficient success, and where it is possible to manage with such simple means, it would not be opportune to employ psycho-analysis, which is diffuse, and penetrates only indirectly. Only in difficult cases, or if a person cannot, as in suggestion, or will not be helped by external pressure at one point, is analysis necessary; but the will of the medical man must not be the compelling factor: the person concerned must take the initiative. "Thou shalt" must not be the fundamental motive, but rather "I will." The old yoke must be shaken off, and there must be no imposition of a new one. Neurologists combine both proceedings, first by analysing up to a certain point, in order to find out the seat and the nature of the disorder, and then by concentrating the power of suggestion on that point. In cases of grave neuroses this combination is difficult to carry out, for if suggestion takes effect too early the subsequent analysis is rendered more difficult, and there can be no cure.

The task of the missionary is this: If the message of faith leads straight to the desired goal, then analysis is obviously unnecessary. But the history of mission work shows that this is by no means the rule. Hence other methods have long since been called into requisition. Cultural values have been offered which had inwardly nothing to do with Christianity, but are to-day bound up outwardly with the Christian national life. There were two purposes in this: (1) the cultural values constitute the bait to attract the non-Christian within the sphere of the missionary's influence, and (2) they also constitute a basis without which the mental level of understanding Christian thought would be too low.

Both of these theories rationalise, i.e. they endeavour to refer the inspirations of the subconscious to a foundation which sounds reasonable. But neither will accommodate itself to correct intuitions, and in their superficiality they cannot suitably develop the revelation of the missionary instinct in fully conscious spiritual work. Christian cultural values merely a bait! What a degradation! As an advertisement or proof of the nobility

and truth of Christianity culture plays a lamentable part, and it is no wonder if the speculation fails. Christianity should not stand in need of any such "puffing." And with regard to the raising of the mental level with the help of European culture, it should not be forgotten that the Gospels are intended for babes and sucklings as well as for the scribes.

Psycho-analysis, as we shall show later, teaches us to understand the true significance of the so-called indirect mission. For the moment we may say: Not only the direct sermon of faith, but also the indirect auxiliaries of the mission, frequently leave us in the lurch. Those who feel themselves impelled to do so may presume, with fatalistic ease, that conversion is based on an incomprehensible miracle, an intervention of God outside of all psychological laws. It is not the business of science which, as we know, is based on the principle of natural connections, to seek where the miracle begins. But why does no missionary repose a blind faith in such miracles? Why does he not study the spiritual life of those committed to his care? Why does he make use of means lying outside of religion, whose great value, in respect of his work, is well known to him? As a religious man he ought surely to say that science and civilisation also may be divine instruments and gifts, and ought therefore to be carefully cultivated.

If, therefore, psycho-analysis has released thousands of persons who were fettered and tyrannised over by their subconscious—among them numbers of perverse religious thinkers—and has enabled them to live a life in conformity with the spirit of Jesus (and this seems to be the only correct result of every deep analysis), we must come to the conclusion that psycho-analysis is to be regarded as *necessary* where ordinary means have failed. We consider psycho-analysis *desirable*, inasmuch as the mission methods hitherto employed have been for the most part exercised instinctively rather than with an insight into dynamic conditions, and our experience tells us that the most subtle *flair* will be enriched by clear knowledge.

2. THE POSSIBILITY OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IN MISSION WORK

But now a justifiable objection presents itself. The missionary works under conditions quite unlike those of the medical man and the educator who seek to liberate their patients and pupils from the grip of their subconscious deformed by repression. Is analysis at all possible in mission work? Can it lay bare the subconscious motives of religious formations?

If we have to deal with a pathological private religion, such as, for instance, the worship of the wind, the patient, who is suffering from other symptoms based on the same complications, may be induced to have recourse to analysis in order to recover his health, and then we shall doubtless succeed in penetrating to the deeply-hidden sources. But the missionary will find it difficult to induce non-Christians to be analysed, for the most important motive, i.e. the desire to get better, is lacking in the case of his clients, and the religion to be replaced is not, as in the case of a neurotic subject, a creation of his own, but an hereditary possession; hence it cannot be expected that the motives for the formation of the religion can be obtained by association.

I may remark in reply that I do not see why the missionary should be prevented from carrying out direct analysis if he understands how to do so. In every nation there are sick people who are the victims of grave distress owing to repression: paralytics, hypochondriacs, obsessional neurotics who believe themselves to be possessed, hallucinants, etc. If in the course of a long career a missionary has learnt successfully to operate upon tumours, fractures, hernias, etc., why should he not be able to learn analytical psychiatry, which lies so much closer to his vocation, seeing that it is merely an extension of his pastoral care. With this he could not only act as medical adviser to countless sick people, but he could also gain a valuable insight into the productive power of their religion.

In traditional religions this, that, or the other motive,

is as a rule more strongly emphasised in some persons than in others. If we investigate the conditions under which this inequality of emphasis occurs, we shall probably come upon the forces which helped to create or maintain this religious peculiarity. Thus I myself owe my valuable insight into the causes of the belief in the Devil to my analysis of a hypochondriacal pastor with whom I never conversed on dogmatic subjects. He himself recognised the origin of his tormenting belief in the Devil, which for a long time had actually dominated his religious life, to reside in the anxiety due to inhibited instincts, and was thereupon freed from it. If, then, especially among primitive peoples, the opportunity of exploring one or another of these traditional features is not so frequent as among Christians, I can very well imagine that direct analysis would nevertheless supply the most valuable information as to the conditions of religious processes and the most powerful impulses available for the commutation of religious experience.

An exceedingly important factor is the indirect analysis already mentioned. Those who have made a sufficient number of direct analytical observations, and have by long experience come to recognise the existence of certain psychological laws, will often be able to secure a reliable and scientifically valid comprehension of the instinctive and subliminal springs of action and their causes, even if neither association nor other direct information is available. All sciences work in the same way. The specialist in pulmonary complaints will often be able to diagnose tuberculosis, even though he has not proved its existence by the microscope; though no sputum has been placed at his disposal, or though he has not (perhaps) been able to percuss and auscultate. If with the help of direct analysis we have a hundred times over found anxiety produced by inhibitions where there was no organic cause; and if this anxiety has disappeared with the liberation of the instincts; then we shall be able in future—without justifying the reproach of temerity—to infer inhibitions in cases of anxiety not caused by physical factors. And if we have a thousand times

recognised symbolical obsessional acts as substitutes for instincts, whose normal effect is prevented by repression, then we shall, in the first place, consider a non-analysed religious obsessional act as being caused on analogous lines. The reliability of such indirect analyses is proved by the fact that similar causes of repression may be demonstrated without direct analysis. If by questioning and by reaction experiments we discover that a son has been prevented by a defective education from loving his parents normally, whereby his instincts have been driven into hysterical or obsessional neurotic paths, we can, as mere historians, show how the people of Israel under similar conditions were forced into the obsessional neurosis of their orthodox religion of law and ceremony.

Indirect analysis of this kind is of the very greatest value to the missionary. It helps him (1) to a deeper comprehension of religious psychology, (2) it gives him a knowledge of those factors which created the repression and drove the instincts into the paths of non-Christian religion, (3) it helps him to seal these sources more or less effectually, and thus directs his forces to the point where they are most effective; or it hinders him from using his strength unnecessarily. Thus an indirect mission is created on a psychological basis, which is immeasurably superior to that achieved by instinct. This indirect analysis likewise enables the missionary to choose among the rich stores of his faith, those treasures which constitute the greatest incentive to the non-Christian to acquire true religious knowledge, because they compensate the needs and distresses arising from the subconscious, and offer him over-values (*Mehrwerte*). If the missionary offers (according to a uniform recipe) only those religious contents which appeal most to himself, he leaves out of consideration the capacity of spiritual digestion, and runs the risk of being misunderstood in his work.

Analytical pastoral work can be carried out consistently only within the sphere of Christianity. For the analysis which has been carried out causes, as we shall show, the dissolution of every other form of religion, whereas

the principles of psycho-analysis are perfectly at one with those of Christianity. In His matter, if not in His manner, Jesus was the first psycho-analyst.¹ The Buddhist missionary cannot apply psycho-analysis because it would lay bare the pathological nature of his own religion. Analysis dispels false values as the sun does the mist, while it establishes true values on a firm basis. And Christianity and psycho-analysis cultivate nothing else than truth and love; hence both are faithful confederates.

3. THE AIMS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IN MISSION WORK

The immediate task of practical psycho-analysis is, as we now know, an entirely negative one: the psyche is to be delivered from the invisible bonds which have been forged by the hammer of the repressed individual instincts and contents. The mission, on the other hand, desires to fill the soul with the love and the life-force of Jesus. A crippled soul is insensible to such treasures. It will pour even the noblest doctrines into the mould of its own deformity. The laws of psychic continuity (the laws of relation) arrange for this. Only the inwardly free soul can take up the religion of Jesus undisguised and unspoiled, pure and profound. *The religion of Jesus*—which is to be carefully distinguished from that Christianity which is still steeped in gross paganism—*represents, dynamically considered, the ideal guide of instinct*. We can distinguish the following conditions of instinct:—

1. *The instincts are given free rein*: The result of this primitive eroticism is the loss of all higher values and efforts (type: the "fast" man). It is obvious that this use of the instincts must lead to individual and social ruin, and will waste the noblest talents.

2. *The instincts are repressed* to a greater or a less degree. If the repression is violent the result is neurosis, and, consequently, neurotic religion, which, as we shall see, assumes various aspects under the collaboration of different conditions. Religious neurosis corresponds with-

¹ Vide my work, *A New Path to the Old Gospel*, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann.

out exception to an influence on life of a moral (or as we might call it) of a eudemonist nature.

3. *The instincts are mastered*: i.e. they are kept within the sphere of the conscious, with the transfusion of those psychic energies which were attached at the outset to primary functions, into energies of quite a different character, viz. *ideal activities*. This is the standpoint of Jesus.

If we wish to determine this purely dynamic description somewhat more closely, we may do so by observing *love* as the decisive instinctive guiding force (although we must not overlook the fact that love represents an uncommonly complicated entity of endeavours extending over the whole of the soul-life). We shall then distinguish:—

1. Pure primary eroticism.
2. Neurotic eroticism (including neurotic or similar forms of religion).
3. The standardised life-direction by sublimation and freedom from repression (the religion of Jesus).

Although, in Tertullian's true phrase, the unspoiled soul is a Christian one, and although psycho-analysis, by rejecting the repression, makes possible either an ignoble primary eroticism or the religion of Jesus, it is self-evident for the missionary that he should complete the negative work of analysis by the *positive* promulgation of salvation by the Gospels. For we cannot live on pure negation, and unsublimated primary eroticism leads to dreariness of life. The apparently self-evident doctrine of the love of Jesus, with its division into the three parts of love—divine, human, and that of self—is in reality a most ingenious and profound discovery which leaves all the other great achievements of art, philosophy and prophecy far behind it. How could the missionary expect his pupils themselves to succeed in making this great discovery, seeing that even Christians, in spite of the wonderful revelations which have been vouchsafed them, have not yet, or only in part, perceived its healing and salutary power, leading to the loftiest pinnacles, human and divine summits? The corn sown by the God-sent

Sower remains the missionary's holiest privilege and gift, even if the plough of psycho-analysis has not been placed in his hands.

C. Missionary Psycho-Analysis in Respect of Individual Religions

The following remarks are not intended to be more than a diffident hypothesis, or rather, perhaps, a question and a problem. It is left to the professional man who, in addition to his acquaintance with psycho-analysis, has a thorough knowledge of the various religions, as regards their history and their present forms, to look for final solutions.

I. "NATURAL RELIGIONS"

(a) *As a psychological problem of analysis*

(a) *Magic acts and objects for the purpose of allaying anxiety and for securing the fulfilment of wishes*

With Andrew Lang, Vierkandt, Edward Lehmann, Preuss and others, I find the origin of religions to be not in animism, but in magic. The object of the magic act is to obtain by a symbolical action what it could not bring about by actual means. It is not a product of reflection, but is a demonstration, like the expressions of movement. The skittle-player whose ball goes too far to the right turns his body to the left without asking whether this is of any use. He merely responds to a need; he cannot act otherwise. The magic acts of primitive peoples are, as far as I am aware, characterised by the following features:—

1. They arise from anxiety. The difference between anxiety and fear is that the latter displays a normal proportion between the external cause and the emotional reaction; with anxiety this is not the case. Fear appears only when there is real danger; anxiety without it.

2. The object of which the uncivilised man is afraid is something *mysterious* and *secret*, the nature of which is unknown—an indefinable but terrible power.

3. The action employed as a protective measure against this terrible object, often bears a *symbolical character*; but it is impossible for the person performing it to indicate the precise meaning of this symbol, or any real connection between the action and the result aimed at.

4. In any case, however, the omission of the (even incomprehensible) action increases the anxiety and awakens the anxious expectation of a terrible punishment.

5. The performance of the magic act, therefore, becomes a compulsory action which is executed with the greatest care.

6. The magic powers are often regarded as being attached to certain objects, either threatening or protective (fetish or amulet).

7. In addition to that magic which is intended to allay anxiety there is another at the service of highly valuable material interests (luck in the chase and in war; rain). Here, too, the idea that the omission of the magic act might bring bad luck in its train may easily cause anxiety.

Let us confine ourselves to these traits, for they form the psychological problem which the missionary has to solve. Psycho-analysis gives him the desired information and the necessary causal comprehension.¹ For more than two decades it has been concerned with people who of themselves, and without any knowledge of foreign usages, have adopted the same ceremonials, except that they have for the most part done their best to keep them profoundly secret, and as far as possible their own private property. Owing to this isolation they recognised the obsession under which they lay as a pathological one, by which their lives were violently affected, on perceiving that their fellow-creatures were free from such apparently incomprehensible habits. But, apart from the modification of their attitude toward society, magic and obsessional neurotic rituals are one and the same.² *Obsessional*

¹ The riddle was solved in the small but epoch-making article by FREUD on "Obsessional acts and religious practices" (*Sammlung kl. Schriften z. Neurosenlehre*, 2. folge).

² In both cases the person concerned is very often not aware that he is in the grip of an obsession until he tries to shake off the supposed voluntary habit and finds that he cannot do so.

neurosis is private magic ; the magic of primitive peoples is a collective obsessional neurosis.

And now the missionary would have to investigate whether the laws on which obsessional neurosis is based may likewise be fulfilled by magic.

The presumptions in the case of all obsessional neuroses are violent inhibitions in restraint of life, and above all, love. Primitive Man is subject to them in the highest degree. He is often defenceless against the dangers of Nature, disease, floods, storms, etc. Is it to be wondered at that he tries (acting on the wish-principle) to obtain by symbolical action that which he cannot obtain when acting on the principle of reality? As we shall show in the next paragraph, love inhibitions are exceedingly strong. For the uncivilized person the conditions for obsessional neurosis are present in the highest degree. Anxiety is one of the permanent symptoms of the person suffering from obsessional neurosis. Many neurotics invest their inhibited instincts in anxiety alone, or in bodily symptoms which pathologically exaggerate the phenomena of normal fear (palpitation, perspiration, internal hysterical distress or *malaise*, etc.). Many a neurotic is seized with deadly fear when he is surprised writing his signature, or by the sight of a mouse, a frog, a cockchafer, etc. The cause of the anxiety invariably recalls the memory of painful events hidden from the conscious, or it expresses symbolically something that awakens violent impulses of the inhibited instincts deprived of their normal activity. Freud speaks of a "floating anxiety," which may be attached to all sorts of exterior causes, but is often fixed on one or more objects (cats, dogs, danger of fire, exposure to infection, etc.). When the sufferings of a person in the grip of obsessional neurosis have attained to a high degree of intensity, he, too, feels a *mysterious power* behind his symptoms. In slight and harmless obsessions (e.g. ceremonies of gait, grimaces, etc.) this is no more the case than in certain forms of primitive magic.

The obsessional neurotic creates a symbol, the meaning of which is beyond his comprehension, and he does so

with the greatest anxiety, suffering seriously under the thought that he has made some mistake of accomplishment. This obsessional ceremonial is often extremely complicated ; much more so than an obsessional religious rite. For instance, when bathing, he must dive and remain under water until he has counted 39 ; another has to put on and take off his shirt so many times every morning, and suffers great anxiety if he thinks he has done it too often or not often enough, so that he has to begin all over again. A boy passes a stone on the road and is afraid that he has passed it on the wrong side, so that he has to go back ; a man carries on a stupendous conflict against the number 13, which he tries to avoid in every possible way ; a young man, when he goes on or comes back from his holiday, is compelled to pronounce a certain word, so that he shall not be the victim of an accident, etc.

The reasons for these painful symbolical acts are unknown to the patient, or he tries to justify them by motives which are, on the face of it, invalid. Analysis clearly reveals the obvious nonsense of such obsessional procedure and shows exactly why it assumed its particular form. At any time a number of unnecessary determinants can be indicated. In the case of Lady Macbeth, Shakespeare names the strongest determinants, which sufficiently explain the apparent uselessness of washing her hands and sleep-walking. The psychoanalyst, however, is not satisfied with this explanation of the poet's, seeing that causes dating such to childhood are lacking.

Many cases of obsessional neurosis are given in my book on the *Psycho-analytic Method*.

The *fetish* is often met with in cases of obsessional neurosis. Certain objects are passionately desired and are often regarded in the light of a cult. The latter is occasionally, but not always, the case with so-called *fetishists*, those sexually perverse persons whose sexual passions are applied not to normal objects, but to abnormal ones, such as shoes, aprons, handkerchiefs, hair, etc. But there are obsessional neurotics who procure single

objects, or even a *secret museum*, because they believe these things, just like the fetish and the amulet, to possess an inexplicable power of protection or of doing harm. These private fetishes and amulets, too, however enigmatical they may appear to psychologists of the old school, have no secrets for the psycho-analyst. Why should it not be possible (in favourable circumstances) to lift the veil of religious fetishism?

What has been said of fetishes and amulets naturally applies to the *taboo* as well, which, as is known, may be enhanced by a maximum degree of anxiety, and invariably owes its power to repression. The obsessional neurotic taboo is perfectly known to every psycho-analyst.

Finally, we may point out its pathological counterpart, the comparatively less harmful magic of *cupidity*. We meet very frequently with the *private oracle*, which is consulted by both neurotic and healthy persons, whereby the transitions from the apparently voluntarily consulted oracle to the pathologically compulsive one are very rapid. Many boys and youths consult their oracles before forming serious decisions. "If I get to the end of the street before the tram, I shall pass my examination." "If I can get upstairs before the door slams to, I shall be lucky to-morrow; if not, something bad will happen." In the latter example obsession is already dominant.

I shall not say anything of the associative paths leading from magic (inner and outer related ideas) into rites and obsessional neurosis. In order to draw safe inferences the historians of religion and the missionaries would need to possess a thorough and varied psycho-analytical experience.

(β) *Totemism and Exogamy*

Wundt and others see in totemism the origin of the State. But when they seek to give an explanation of this system their words sound strained and distorted. Freud's researches likewise have thrown light on this subject. His remarkable book *Totem and Taboo*, treats of the extensive material in existence in that penetrating

and brilliant manner which led the founder of psycho-analysis to make his astonishing discoveries. But those who have not gone deeply into psycho-analytical work will run the risk of not understanding this book. Practised hands can confirm Freud's explanations on the basis of their own apperceptions in the domain of the subconscious. This work of his explains the phenomena of totemism and exogamy, which are externally so different and inwardly so closely akin, for the first time uniformly and on a strictly empirical basis. As a great deal of evidence would be necessary in support of this thesis, I shall confine myself to a mere reference to Freud's investigations.

(γ) *Other Religious Material*

According to the testimony of all the historians of religion, *dreams* and *hallucinations* possess an importance in respect of natural religion which must not be underrated. It is well known that psycho-analysis has paid the greatest attention to these problems. Among those analysts who have been long at work, there can be but few who have not investigated and interpreted, by the association method, a number of religious dreams, to which a high value was ascribed by the dreamers. In these cases an enormous number of phenomena are met with which correspond in their slightest details with those of the natural religions. We analyse demoniacal phenomena, and often unmask their expression as sexual phantoms (Häberlin), created by inhibited sexuality and expressing their wishes in a masked form, or as caricatures of a dreaded father, or of the mother who, for one reason or another, is partly hated and partly desired.

Closely related to "possession" is *illusion*, in respect of which the subconscious manifests itself under the mask of apperception; e.g. the head of an elephant or an antelope is regarded as a terrible demon, but of course only by such as are kept in a state of preliminary anxiety by their inhibitions, and whose predisposition to anxiety is on the brink of realisation. Another grateful object of psycho-analytic work is the *religious dance*

with its symbolical content and psychic accompanying phenomena (intoxication, ecstasy, delirium). A careful study might likewise be made of the religious *psychotherapy* of the uncivilised, which as a rule represents merely a form of magic. This is also true of the psychologically interesting *ordeals*, the rites of *nubility*, tattooing, juridical practice, preparation for the chase, agriculture and cattle-breeding, and many another religious ritual.

(b) The Application of Psycho-Analysis in Mission Work among Primitive Peoples

The contributions of psycho-analysis to the practical work of the missionary fall into three groups: (1) preparation, (2) elimination of the obsessional neurotic and hysterical religious manifestations, and (3) introduction of the Protestant religion, which is free from neurosis.

(a) Analysis in the Preparation for the Mission

The treatment of neurotic patients has taught us that the first step toward health is the *patient's own will*. Without this the decision is wanting to fulfil the by no means easy conditions by which alone the commutation of the instincts and ideas is possible. A strong resistance makes itself felt, and this resistance draws its strength from the same motives that brought about the repression. That which has been repressed may be compared to a mouse which has run away from the cat into its hole, and is under the impression that its enemy is permanently on the watch before it. At the time of suffering the neurotic patient knows what is the matter, but he cannot foresee what will happen after a commutation of his instincts. It is only when the situation has become insupportable, and when on the other hand a chance of benefiting from treatment is held out, that he will submit to analytical or to other treatment.

The same is true of the primitive non-Christian. The feelings connected with the notion of his desolate situation, and the benefits of conversion, are the only factors which

may turn his thoughts toward the mission and awaken his longings for Christianity. Thus the missionary will lay bare for the uncivilised person the insufficiency and distress associated with natural religion, and he will pay attention not only to what he himself finds to be evil, but above all, to the inferiority which is felt by the primitive man and makes such an impression on him. He will point out the superiority of Christian values and philosophy to these inferior ideas. An understanding of the principles of psycho-analysis will be very valuable in such cases, for analysis teaches us better to appreciate emotional values in other people than did the psychology of the old school, which, for instance, knew nothing of the subconscious "profit of pain" (*Lustgewinn*), and had no comprehension of the enormous importance of the pleasure gained by self-torture. The same is also true of the offer of positive values instead of fictive religious ones. Nowadays many a bait which arouses cupidity in an unchristian manner has been abandoned, seeing that such allurements merely do harm to the good cause: Christians thus gained are Christians of a dubious category. A refined psychology will surely find nobler and more efficacious means of attaining its object.

(β) *Analysis in the Elimination of Obsessive, Neurotic and Hysterical Phenomena in Natural Religions*

(a) A mission schooled in psycho-analysis aims, in the first instance, at the removal of the *causes of repression*. That which is called "indirect mission work," is for the most part an instinctive carrying out of this postulate. But the task now is to attack the enemy with full consciousness. The history of Europe shows distinctly enough that disease plays a great part in the vital inhibitions, which lead to repressed instincts and the neurotic formations of religion. (It is not denied that inner inhibitions must be unshackled by organic disease before neurosis can set in.) Hence, the *medical mission* must be set to work, not, indeed, as an attractive bait, but as a means of eliminating repressions which

cause religious formations. At the same time it accomplishes other tasks: it criticises the primitive natural religion by pillorying, with its natural means, the traditional religious procedure of exorcism, the arts of magic, etc., and facilitates the new direction of the love which had been neurotically inhibited. Or the primitive man feels that he is no match for the civilised European, and consequently flies to magic in order to avoid the difficult task of adapting himself to reality. The missionary shows him the uselessness of this action; he instructs him and thus preserves for reality and the conscious a store of psychic force, which would otherwise have been lost in neurotic paths. The fear and the feeling of inferiority he overcomes as does the neurologist. This purposeful elimination of the causes of repression should be carefully cultivated by missionaries on a psycho-analytical basis, for by so doing a great deal of that superfluous activity which is carried on nowadays under the name of indirect mission work would be spared, and missionary activity would undoubtedly take an upward swing.

It is more difficult to combat the causes of repression which result from tradition and law, e.g. marriage customs. Efficacious methods of doing so are the good example offered by the Christian, especially if his manner of living is as similar as possible to that of the primitive man, as well as instruction as to the nature of incest. How far it is possible to explain the psychology of incest repression to the primitive man can only be demonstrated by experiment. In my experience the uneducated man, like the child, possesses a striking facility for grasping psychic events which an educated man has some difficulty in comprehending. It seems to me in any case, that the mission should pay extreme attention to the fight against the causes of repression.

(b) To this must be added (provided the preparation has advanced far enough), under certain circumstances but not always), the attack on the *pathological religious phenomena which run counter to healthy ethics*. Thor's oaks are yet to be felled; the missionary has still to

prove that superstitious anxiety is founded on illusion. But he should not act systematically and by rote; he should grasp the psychological moment, as Pestalozzi does in his *Lienhardt und Gertrud*, where he attacks superstition by his ability to exploit an acute case. If the analytical preparation is far enough advanced, if the missionary has gained love and confidence, the neurotic religion will often fall to pieces of its own accord. But if this preparation has been insufficient, the psychological *faux pas* of the missionary may easily result in hatred and obstinacy.

I have already remarked that the *psycho-analytical cure of certain patients* suffering from psycho-neurosis, who resist the arts of the fetish priest or shaman, may form excellent recruiting material for well-prepared missionaries. But they must be cautious in their choice of material. I have made the acquaintance of many a missionary of talent and refined feeling, in whom I unhesitatingly detected the talent for analysis. Cures are sometimes brought about by quite summary analyses, a fact which usually causes us vexation, as we do not see the seat of the evil in the symptom, but in the psychic development, and would like to help thoroughly from a moral point of view as well. But we must not lose sight of the fact that the cure of primitive people who are supposedly "possessed," places them in a new religious sphere of influence, in which suggestion, too, may accomplish great things. If sick people who were violently suffering from supposed demons have been healed, this cannot but exert a great influence over their contemporaries.

(γ) *Psycho-Analysis in the Presentation of the Religion of Jesus*

(a) *Regression*

Jesus Himself says: "Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. xviii. 3). Psycho-analysis has demonstrated the psychological wisdom of this saying:

it has shown that there can be no *new* formation without a *regressive* formation. In every inhibition, whether coming from within or from without, former stages of development or psychic situations are revived, and such, indeed, as conform not only with the recent cause of inhibition, but also with the existent volitional compromise. An attempt is made with the help of former experiences, in which tense situations similar to the present difficulty were settled, to escape from the present distress, or, if the life volition is broken, the right to resignation is drawn from the past.

How far may the uncivilised man be allowed to regress? It would be desirable for the regression to go back to the period of unspoiled humanity. It is a matter of common knowledge that savages enjoy a childhood surrounded by love, and free from restraint. Unfortunately, however, the repressive power of the pathological religion sets in only too soon. Yet it should be possible to revive a state of childhood in primitive peoples, which should provide a good starting-point for a new evangelical path; i.e. an organisation free from neurosis, in the sense of the love of God, Man and oneself, which not only Jesus, but also a higher doctrine of life might make possible.

(b) *Transference*

In all analytical treatment of neurosis the emotional relations to the analyst must be properly developed. The emotions drawn from the subconscious depths attach themselves to the person of the analyst, either in the form of hatred, or in that of love. Thus the innocent analyst may become an object of grim hatred (very often the patient's father is indicated), or a hero, passionately loved. In this way the person of the analyst becomes the door through which the repressed feelings find their way into the light of the conscious and clear reality. The transference shows most clearly how far analysis is from being merely an intellectual process. The regulation of this personal relation with the subject of analysis, the explanation of the illusory character

of the hatred, the ennoblement of the love or the childish dependence, constitutes, in the experience of Freud and all his followers, by far the most difficult part of analysis—but certainly of every other kind of treatment too.

It is obvious that the missionary, like Jesus Himself, must make such transference serve his purposes, but with the greatest care, and full knowledge of the soul. It is of advantage to him to be acquainted with the laws of negative and positive transference, for without this it is in many cases impossible for him to understand and to master the situation, to mitigate the dangerous hate impulses by laying bare their origins, and the confusion of persons involved; to eliminate sentimental over-valuation which often goes as far as adoration, and thus to establish a moral and religious feeling of affection towards himself. The missionary must assist in bringing about important and decisive life experiences. He must let his light so shine that the non-Christian sees in him a fundamental principle, nay, the absolute fundamental power (Matt. v. 16). If Jesus was the Way to divine love (John xiv. 6), the missionary must become the way to the Way. This faculty of attracting love to oneself is certainly more important for the work of conversion than the application of Christian doctrine, even in the most skilful and persuasive form.

(c) *The reconciliation of the new Christian faith contents with the old*

Spiritual continuity demands that every new content which is to become the empirical possession and vital motive for a psyche, should previously be brought into harmony with the former phase. For this purpose the former ideas are not allowed to lie fallow or to be forgotten, but a harmonising of the old and the new material must take place.¹

Missionary work has already demonstrated that it

¹ *Vide my work, Analytical Investigation of the Psychology of Hatred and Reconciliation, Deuticke, Vienna.*

always understood this, but often carried it out only by betraying Christianity. The Jesus who loves His enemies and loathes war is transformed into the armoured warrior, and the Germanic gods were allowed to live again behind the mask of Satan. If missionary work is carried out by such means it is not a matter for wonder if, instead of conversion, we have merely a Christian etiquette, and that it is not Christianity which penetrates paganism, but the non-Christian spirit which penetrates Christianity.

Healthy relations must be obtained by other methods. The spirit of love is everything. Of course an amalgamation of the ideas of Jesus with non-Christian ideas cannot be avoided; just as, for instance, the Pauline religion transmitted its theories of the writ and the law to the new form of belief. But amalgamations of this kind are significant if the life-spirit is not disturbed either by new repressions or by an inferior morality, which drags down the sublimation to Jesus. We have no right to imagine that our European Christianity is pure and authentic! We have made such a hateful pact between our Christianity and Mars and Mammon, between the spirit of caste and national self-esteem, between lying politics and expansion, that a pure evangelical mission is a bitter necessity for our churches and our hearts. In return, the Christian religion has been overlaid with obsessive neurotic dogmas, metaphysical enormities and intellectual servitude, without any power of promoting love; and all these have been made the very core of belief—and even in mission work the rubbing in of this dogmatic ointment has been looked upon as the only way to salvation! And as this system of dogma is biologically under the dominion of repression—as the psycho-analyst at once perceives—and therefore contains much that is regressive and infantile, it always implies an agreement with primitive religions, e.g. the belief in demons and the anxiety features.

The more happily the bonds of repression have been loosened, the more clearly the danger of the pathological impulsion towards a morally indifferent cult, which is

a substitute for the promotion of reality, is perceived, the easier it will be to maintain and carry out the Christian promulgation of love in all its purity. Even if the simplicity of the religion of Jesus does not make a much greater impression on uncivilised man than the awe-inspiring practices of his priests, and even if a Christianity full of the pomp of dogma, which skilfully reflects many an element of primitive religion, should prove a stronger attraction at the commencement, the plain and unrepressed missionary sermon will exhibit its superiority in the fruits of the active love of one's neighbour.

The missionary will not, in the first instance, arouse joyful hopes by the Word, but by his acts, his goodness, his loyalty, his steadfastness and fearlessness. He will show how the religion of Jesus corresponds with the profoundest needs and longings of humanity, whereas natural religions are nothing but an unsuccessful attempt to attain these ends. Jesus Himself acted analytically by deriving the origin of a law from the human heart, and thus denying its validity (Matt. xix. 8). He Himself always interpreted the law by going back to the love-intention which was its guiding power.

The missionary must offer the primitive man a perfect, full and unspoiled Christianity, an evangelical shaping of life that does not with nervous obstinacy extort obsessive and neurotic substitutes for Christianity, with morally indifferent symbols, thus falling from the pure heights of Jesus into the dark abysses in which the primitive religions perform their magical and awe-inspiring rituals. *The Christian religion shines in the glory of pure Divinity only as the expression of healthy humanity*, and the radiant flame of truth is clouded as soon as pathogenic influences in the sense of orthodoxy or obsessive ceremonials begin to hold sway. In the healthy piety which fills the whole of Man with joy, moral strength, and that love of reality which demands God and finds salvation in Him, we find the form of faith to which the natural man who has been liberated from his repressions can, and will, attach his new and Christian religious development.

2. HINTS FOR THE APPLICATION OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IN MISSIONS TO HIGHER FORMS OF RELIGION

Those who intend to go in for missionary work ought to have seen from their own observations how the most important features of religions have arisen. Psycho-analytical work gives us plenty of opportunities for this. In the history of religion I never came across a single phenomenon that had not been autochthonously created in our own country. Only the thorough study of living humanity can give us that psychological security which is necessary for fully conscious missionary work. Still more important, however, is the fact that the missionary himself should be an incorporation of the true Christian spirit. Without the fulfilment of this preliminary condition even psycho-analysis is of no avail.

Those who work in China and Japan will have, in the first place, to be thoroughly acquainted with the psychology of *fixation to the father*. Where the father rules as a living god and the child is obliged to renounce his own volition, violent repressions set in, for the love-horizon is narrowed to an unhealthy degree, and outward love is built up without exception on wholly or almost wholly subconscious instincts of hate. The attitude towards the mother and to women in general cannot possibly be a normal one. The over-valuation of the paternal authority leads everywhere to *conservative modes of thought attaching to the past*, to mental stagnation, as in the Jews after the exile, and in many patrician families. With the Chinese there is the further danger that after his death the father may be elevated to the dignity of a god.

The Christian idea of the Father renders excellent service in such cases if it succeeds in transforming the slavish and morally dangerous conception of the father into the free and purely ethical one. Piety which is free from neurosis in the place of that which is in the grip of repression, may be gloriously explained in the discussion of the combat which Jesus, in His capacity of profound psychologist, was incessantly waging against

the father-idea. God as Father is the greatest help in the fight against the father as god ; that terrible and evil power which has such a far-reaching influence on life.

In Japan the smaller father-god was replaced by the greater one, the Mikado, and it was only when the latter, like Mutsuhito (partly in the struggle against the Shogun and as an early orphaned son) turned to progress, that stagnation was avoided. And yet it is necessary, by means of a liberal conception of marriage and love, to attain to the transformation of the inhibited collective being to an individual, morally autonomous and consequently (in the higher social sense), fully as national as international personality. The emancipation from the father-repression cuts off the psychic supports of the religious elements which correspond to certain features of natural religion.

Missionary treatment of the Indian religions presupposes a thorough acquaintance with the *processes of introversion*. Brahminism and Buddhism are forms of *mysticism*, that kind of piety which is likewise to be found extensively in Christianity, and which makes its appearance only when the life-impulse has been driven back from the outer world into the *ego*—driven back, but not repressed, since repression means the driving back into the subconscious. In Brahminism the connection with the father exercises a powerful influence, as may be seen in the caste system, and the repression of love on the one hand leads to strong *intellectualism* (which in the Upanishad philosophy produced imposing formal achievements of little real value), and on the other hand to *asceticism*, which prevented the normal action of the instincts, but procured them free vent in the shape of the wildest orgies of active and passive torture (masochist in the torture of penitents, rites of nubility, etc. ; sadist in the suttee and the like).

In its outer aspects (quite apart from its social organization) Brahminism is very similar to the form of disease known as *catatonia*, which is particularly distinguished by its exclusion from the surrounding world

and withdrawal into the *ego*; only that, behind the curtain which separates the patient from the world, there are no logical speculations, but only unbridled wish-phantasies rooted in repression. This is still more the case with Buddhism which, with its idea of nirvana, abolishes all thought, emotion and volition. The nearest approach to this is to be found in the sepulchral saints of Thibet, among whom there are several catatonic sufferers. Buddha himself, in contradistinction to Brahma, who made metaphysics the receptacle of the life-impulse shows more feeling by announcing the law of compassion as missionary in affect. This happy inconsistency, as well as the splendid Japanese Kwannon (Chinese Kwaynin), which renounces nirvana, so as to be able to help mankind, provides excellent starting-points for overcoming the Buddhistic quietism and its grave moral dangers. The creation of philosophical systems as a substitute for reality is not only to be found in Brahminism, but also in *paranoia*, which frequently creates marvellous worlds of its own.

These hints may perhaps suffice for the moment. I trust that I have made it clear that missionary work, too, may greatly enrich its knowledge by a study of psycho-analysis. Neither the youth of the scientific doctrine created by Freud, nor its difficulty of acquirement (which must not, however, be over-estimated) should prevent practical experiments. Missions have an enormous task to accomplish towards humanity. The gigantic work of imperialism and the cult of Mammon can only be met victoriously by a gigantic work of missionary love. It is the most urgent duty of the missionary to arm himself with the keenest weapons in his fight against psychic distress, and therefore he must sooner or later take up the study of psycho-analysis.

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